Lorenzo v. Gendebien

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MARY LORENZO, No. 90082-COA
Appellant,
vs.
PIERRE GENDEBIEN,
Respondent.

Mary Lorenzo appeals from a district court order dismissing a
complaint regarding maternity and child custody. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Family Division, Clark County; Mari D. Parlade, Judge. 1
Reversed and remanded.

Candelaria Law Group and Amber L. Candelaria, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Kelleher & Kelleher, LLC, and R. Nathan Gibbs, Henderson,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, BULLA, C.J., and GIBBONS and
WESTBROOK, JJ.

1The Honorable Kathy Hardcastle, Senior Judge, presided over the

hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss and orally granted the motion.
Judge Parlade signed the written order of dismissal and presided over all
subsequent district court proceedings.
OPINION

By the Court, GIBBONS, J.:
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was promulgated by the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) in 1973 to encourage states to adopt
statutory frameworks that reflect evolving societal norms in family life and
provide a more unified and equitable model of parental recognition,
regardless of marital status. Modeled on the 1973 UPA, the Nevada
Parentage Act (NPA), enacted in 1979 and codified in NRS Chapter 126,
remains the framework by which a person may establish legal parentage of
a child in Nevada. 2
Since that time, most jurisdictions have moved away from laws
that tie parental recognition exclusively to biological connection, instead
recognizing alternative pathways to parenthood. We now join this trending
majority on parental recognition , holding that Nevada’s presumptive
parentage statutes, as adopted by the NPA and enumerated under NRS
Chapter 126, are equitable in nature and shall not be restricted on the basis
of sex, marital status, or biological connection except in limited
circumstances. Under NRS 126.231, “any interested party may bring an
action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship, ” and

2“To determine parentage in Nevada, courts must look to the Nevada

Parentage Act, which is modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).
The Nevada Parentage Act is ‘applied to determine legal parentage.’” St.
Mary v. Damon , 129 Nev. 647, 652, 309 P.3d 1027, 1031 (2013) (quoting
Russo v. Gardner , 114 Nev. 283, 288, 956 P.2d 98, 101 (1998)).

The NPA, however, does not reflect amendments to the UPA adopted
by the ULC in 2002 and 2017. Our opinion does not rely on any of these
amendments, and most of the caselaw on which we rely predates the ULC’s
2017 revisions and amendments and is not affected by them.

2
the statutes under which paternity may be determined apply here “[i]nsofar
as practicable” to maternity actions. (Emphasis added.)
Yet gestational agreements involving a surrogate parent
present procedural complexities that are difficult to reconcile with Nevada’s
equitable notion of standing in paternity, maternity, and custody actions.
Under NRS Chapter 126, if two persons are the intended parents of a child,
both of those persons “must be parties to the gestational agreement” for
parental status and rights to properly vest. See NRS 126.710(2). However,
a related question remains as to when such parental rights may vest upon
execution of a gestational agreement, as several subsections of NRS
Chapter 126 provide the temporal phrasing “immediately upon the birth of
the child,” see NRS 126.720(1)(a)-(d), but separate parentage provisions
contemplate claims made by interested persons not party to the gestational
agreement, see NRS 126.051(1); NRS 126.071(1).
One reading of the “immediately upon birth ” language is that
intended parents become the child’s legal parents at birth , their parental
and custodial rights attach at that moment, and they thereafter hold those
rights indefinitely. However, even with that interpretation, the question
remains whether another person may later acquire parental status by
judicial pronouncement without the consent of the intended parent to a
gestational agreement.
As we explain in this opinion, the phrase “immediately upon
birth” protects the rights of the intended parent but does not categorically
bar an interested party from seeking parentage or custody merely because
they were not included as an intended parent within the gestational
agreement. Indeed, other provisions within NRS Chapter 126 expressly
contemplate alternative pathways to establishing presumptive parentage

3
status. Therefore, because of the statutory framework and persuasive
caselaw, we now hold that a putative parent has standing to bring an action
to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship and, once standing
is established, may pursue legal recognition of that relationship by invoking
and attempting to prove presumptive parentage status, even when that
individual is not included in a gestational agreement as an intended parent,
unless they consented to be omitted as an intended parent.
Further, even if the putative parent satisfies the applicable
requirements under NRS 126.051(1) for maternity and establishes
presumptive parentage status, the district court must allow the parent
named in the gestational agreement the opportunity to rebut the
presumptive parent’s claim. See NRS 126.051(3) (providing that
presumptive parentage may be rebutted in “an appropriate action ”). If the
district court determines the presumption is not appropriately rebutted,
then the court shall consider the presumptive parent as holding full
parentage status and move forward to determine the custody arrangement
that is in the best interest of the child. But if the district court finds that
the parentage presumption is appropriately rebutted, then judgment must
be entered against the putative parent.
In this case, which involves a gestational agreement with a
surrogate parent, appellant invoked NRS 126.051(1) to establish standing
to bring a maternity and custody action against respondent. In her
complaint, appellant alleged sufficient facts to support her claim that she
was the presumptive mother of the minor child, giving her standing as an
interested party to bring a parentage claim. Yet, the district court granted
respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint for lack of standing
because she had no genetic link to the minor child, was not married to the

4
child’s biological father, and was not included as an intended parent in the
gestational agreement. This was error.
On a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), the putative
parent’s allegations are presumed true, and if sufficient to establish
standing, a parentage claim must survive dismissal until such time that an
evidentiary hearing is held to determine whether a rebuttable presumption
of parental status under NRS 126.051(1) is established. If the presumption
is established by the putative parent, then the district court must determine
if that presumption is appropriately rebutted pursuant to NRS 126.051(3).
Because the allegations in appellant’s complaint , if proven, set forth
sufficient facts to establish a rebuttable presumption of maternity under
our clarified reading of NRS 126.051(1), we reverse the district court’s order
and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Mary Lorenzo and respondent Pierre Gendebien
began a romantic and cohabiting relationship in 2016. In May 2017,
Gendebien entered into a gestational agreement to have a child via
surrogate. The surrogate was implanted with Gendebien’s sperm and an
egg from an anonymous donor. The agreement listed Gendebien as the sole
intended parent, and the space for the mother’s name and signature was
left blank. Per the agreement, Gendebien assumed full legal custody and
“sole responsibility for” the child upon his birth.
In February 2018, while Gendebien and Lorenzo were in a
relationship and living together, Gendebien obtained a court order
establishing sole parentage, apparently without Lorenzo’s participation.
The order directed the Office of Vital Records to leave the mother’s name
blank on the child’s birth certificate.

5
The child, A.G., was born in June 2018 and took the father’s last
name. Gendebien and Lorenzo received A.G. into their home and raised him
until their relationship ended in November 2021 when they separated. At
first, Gendebien and Lorenzo had an informal timeshare agreement for
equal time with respect to A.G., but Gendebien gradually reduced Lorenzo’s
access to the child and eventually cut off access altogether.
In September 2022, Lorenzo filed a complaint to establish
maternity and sought joint legal and physical custody over A.G. Lorenzo’s
complaint alleged that she and Gendebien held her out as a parent before
the birth and regarded her as A.G.’s parent from the time of his birth until
Gendebien cut off her access to A.G. She also alleged that she had been in
a cohabiting relationship with Gendebien from 2016 to November 2021 and
that Gendebien had promised to add her name to A.G.’s birth certificate.
Gendebien moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing
that Lorenzo had no legal basis to establish maternity or obtain custody as
she did not give birth to A.G., did not adopt A.G., did not consent to or
participate in engaging a surrogate for the reproductive process, was not
married to him, and was not a party to the gestational agreement.
Lorenzo opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that her
complaint set forth sufficient facts establishing a rebuttable presumption of
maternity pursuant to NRS 126.051(1), as some of the presumptions of
paternity enumerated in that statute applied to her situation. Specifically,
she emphasized that pursuant to NRS 126.051(1)(b), she had lived with
Gendebien (A.G.’s natural father) for more than six months before the
period of conception and continued to cohabit with him through the period
of pregnancy. She further argued that she established a rebuttable

6
presumption of maternity because she received A.G. into their home and
they openly held him out as her child pursuant to NRS 126.051(1)(d).
Lorenzo also raised the doctrine of equitable adoption, arguing that she
could establish maternity under this theory because she reasonably and
foreseeably relied to her detriment on Gendebien’s promise that she would
eventually be added to A.G.’s birth certificate.
Gendebien replied, not by disputing Lorenzo’s factual
allegations, but by arguing that the paternity presumptions in NRS
126.051(1) were inapplicable to a maternity action. Thus, he asserted
Lorenzo could not establish maternity by living with Gendebien for six
months before conception and continuing to cohabit with him through the
period of pregnancy or by receiving A.G. into her home and openly holding
him out as her child. Further, Gendebien contended that Lorenzo did not
dispute the validity of the gestational agreement and that the existence of
a valid gestational agreement controls the issue of parentage. As the sole
intended parent listed on the gestational agreement, Gendebien argued
that he was the only person with parental rights over A.G., and no one else
could move to establish parentage.
Gendebien additionally argued in his reply that Lorenzo was
barred from raising the issue of equitable adoption because she did not
plead it in her complaint. He asserted that the equitable adoption doctrine
was inapplicable, at any rate, because a promise to be added to a child’s
birth certificate is different from a promise to adopt.
After a hearing on the motion in October 2022, the district court
dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint to establish maternity and custody but

7
allowed a claim for nonparent visitation to proceed. 3 The written order
stated that the presumptions of parentage were “overcome and negated”
because Lorenzo was not A.G.’s biological mother, did not carry A.G., and
did not donate the egg. The district court also found that Lorenzo, as
Gendebien’s former girlfriend (i.e., not a domestic partner or spouse) lacked
standing to bring a maternity action because they were not married nor did
she sign the gestational agreement. As it found these reasons sufficient to
dismiss Lorenzo’s custody action, the court noted that there was no need to
specifically rule on the applicability of Nevada’s paternity presumption
statutes as to the presumptions of maternity as asserted by Lorenzo. 4
Lorenzo moved for reconsideration, arguing that the district
court misapplied the law in finding that she lacked standing. She also
contended that the court erred by assuming that a genetic link is required
to establish maternity. In response, Gendebien argued that the
reconsideration standard had not been met because Lorenzo did not proffer
any authority in her reconsideration motion that was not already
considered by the district court.

3The district court ruled on Gendebien’s motion to dismiss at the close

of the October 2022 hearing. A written order was issued in January
2023—entitled “Order From 10/18/2022 Hearing”—and notice of entry was
filed in February 2023.
4Lorenzo appealed from the district court ’s October 2022 ruling and

January 2023 order, but the supreme court dismissed her appeal as
premature because th e district court’s ruling and order did not constitute a
final appealable judgment or order pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1) or NRAP
3A(b)(7), as the district court had not yet reached a decision with respect to
her request for nonparent visitation. See Lorenzo v. Gendebien , No. 87318,
2024 WL 223710 (Nev. Jan. 19, 2024) (Order Dismissing Appeals).

8
Before the district court ruled on her motion for
reconsideration, Lorenzo also moved for relief pursuant to NRCP 52 and 59.
Lorenzo moved for the court to alter or amend its judgment to find that she
set forth facts that established rebuttable presumptions of maternity under
NRS 126.051(1)(b) and (1)(d) and argued in the alternative that custody
could be awarded to her as a nonparent. She attached numerous affidavits
from friends, family, and acquaintances to this motion, all detailing the
closeness of the relationship between Lorenzo and A.G. and supporting
Lorenzo’s claim that she was held out as A.G.’s mother. She also asserted
that she was unaware of the written gestational agreement until after the
filing of her complaint in the present case. Gendebien opposed both motions
and reiterated his argument that Lorenzo had no basis to establish
maternity or seek custody because she was not listed as an intended parent
on the gestational agreement that the district court had already found valid
and enforceable.
Following a hearing, the district court denied both motions in
August 2023, finding that Lorenzo had failed to plead a cause of action
because the gestational agreement controlled the issue of maternity. It
further found that Lorenzo did not plead “in such a way to meet the

9
elements of a claim for equitable adoption of [A.G.].” 5 The district court,
however, provided Lorenzo with another opportunity to seek nonparent
visitation in light of its orders denying Lorenzo maternity and custody.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Lorenzo’s
request for nonparent visitation in September 2024 and subsequently
denied it in an “Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law & Final
Orders,” issued in December 2024. The court determined that Lorenzo had
not rebutted the presumption against nonparent visitation under NRS
125C.050(4) by providing clear and convincing evidence that nonparent
visitation would be in A.G.’s best interests. Lorenzo now appeals from that
order, solely challenging the district court’s grant of Gendebien’s motion to
dismiss her complaint for maternity and custody pursuant to NRCP
12(b)(5).
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Lorenzo argues that the district court erred in
finding that she lacked standing to maintain her custody action because she
was merely a “girlfriend” of A.G.’s father and shared no biological link with
A.G. Lorenzo further contends that, under NRS 126.051, Nevada’s
paternity statutes must apply equally to maternity actions —providing her

5Specifically, the district court ruled that Lorenzo did not plead a

claim for equitable adoption and Lorenzo only argues that Gendebien
agreed to add her name to the child’s birth certificate, not that he agreed
she could adopt the child. Lorenzo, however, failed to cite any relevant
authority below or on appeal demonstrating that an agreement to add a
name to a birth certificate has the same legal effect as a promise to allow an
adoption. Therefore, we discern no error in the district court’s ruling on this
issue and do not address it further. See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest. ,
122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (explaining that
this court need not consider an argument that is not cogently argued or
lacks the support of relevant authority).

10
with the requisite standing for her maternity and custody action to survive
NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal even if she was not a party to a gestational
agreement. Gendebien responds that the district court correctly dismissed
Lorenzo’s complaint for want of standing, noting that Lorenzo had no
biological link to A.G. and was not a party to the gestational agreement.
Gendebien further submits that NRS Chapter 126 provides no basis for her
to invoke paternity presumption statutes equally to maternity actions.
Standard of review
Motions to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) are subjected to
a “rigorous standard of review on appeal.” Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North
Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28 , 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). This court
presumes the truth of a plaintiff’s factual allegations and draws all
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672. “[A plaintiff’s
complaint] should be dismissed only if it appears beyond a doubt that it
could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief.” Id.
While plaintiffs must set forth facts supporting a legal theory, they need not
correctly identify the legal theory upon which they rely. Droge v. AAAA Two
Star Towing, Inc ., 136 Nev. 291, 308, 468 P.3d 862, 878 (Ct. App. 2020). A
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Zohar v.
Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 736, 334 P.3d 402, 404 (2014). An appellate court
reviews the dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing under the same de
novo standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim. Citizens for Cold
Springs v. City of Reno , 125 Nev. 625, 629, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009); Shoen
v. SAC Holding Corp. , 122 Nev. 621, 634, 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006)
(observing that when a plaintiff lacks standing, it is appropriate to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted),
abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. Johnson , 137 Nev. 126, 483 P.3d
531 (2021).

11
Lorenzo has standing to pursue her claim for parentage
The district court ruled that Lorenzo did not have standing to
bring a complaint for parental rights for several reasons , including
Lorenzo’s lack of marital status with Gendebien, her lack of biological
connection to A.G., and the omission of her name as an intended parent from
the gestational agreement. We address all of these issues in turn.

12
Impact of marital status and genetics
NRS 126.231 permits “[a]ny interested party” to “bring an
action to determine the existence of a mother and child relationship.” The
Nevada Supreme Court has held that an interested party for purposes of
the Nevada Parentage Act is “someone with a direct personal stake, either
financial or social, in establishing or disestablishing the [parental]
relationship.” In re Est. of Murray , 131 Nev. 64, 71, 344 P.3d 419, 424 (2015)
(addressing standing in the context of an action to determine paternity
under NRS 126.071). “[A] determination of parentage rests upon a wide
array of considerations rather than genetics alone.” St. Mary v. Damon , 129
Nev. 647, 653, 309 P.3d 1027, 1032 (2013).
Lorenzo alleged in her complaint that (1) she and Gendebien
had an agreement that she would be added to A.G.’s birth certificate;
(2) she, Gendebien, and A.G. lived together for years as a family from before
A.G.’s birth until November 2021, and she had a close and bonded
relationship with A.G. ; (3) she and Gendebien continuously held her out as
A.G.’s mother; and (4) she and Gendebien had an equal time share with A.G.
for several months following their separation. While Gendebien accurately
points out that Lorenzo lacks a genetic link to A.G., NRS 126.051 and NRS
126.231 do not restrict maternity actions to only those with a genetic link
to the child. Cf. Rosie M. , 138 Nev. 539, 542-43, 512 P.3d 758, 762-63 (2022)
(holding NRS 126.051(2) creates a conclusive presumption of fatherhood
when a blood or genetic test shows a 99-percent match and that a putative
father with a genetic link to the child prevails over a putative father without
a genetic link); see also NRS 128.016 (stating a putative father “means a
person who is or is alleged or reputed to be the father ” of a child born out of
wedlock).

13
Assuming, as we must, that Lorenzo’s factual allegations are
true, they establish that she had a clear personal stake in her relationship
with A.G. as his putative mother, as the person that appeared to be, was
reputed to be, and fulfilled the role of A.G.’s mother, even without a genetic
link to him. She, therefore, by definition, has standing to request a
determination of maternity under NRS 126.231. And unlike in Rosie M., no
person is claiming a genetic link to A.G. other than Gendebien.
Impact of Nevada’s presumptive parentage statutes
We next address whether Nevada’s presumptive parentage
statutes, notably NRS 126.051(1)(b) and (1)(d), may be equally applied to a
maternity action as practicable. Lorenzo argues that Nevada’s parentage
presumptions under NRS 126.051 should apply to all putative parents,
regardless of sex or gender. Gendebien counters that those presumptions
are primarily used to determine paternity and are inapplicable to Lorenzo’s
maternity action.
Because of the fundamental rights to which biological parents
are entitled, any encroachment on the rights of such parents and, especially,
any test to expand who is a parent should be appropriately narrow, as we
address below. See Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 66- 67 (2000) (“[I]t
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children . . . . T he
Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to give [the nonparental
visitation statute] a narrower reading, but it declined to do so.”). NRS
126.051(1) enumerates a list of disjunctive factors by which paternity may
be rebuttably presumed. T hese factors also apply to actions to determine
maternity, “[i]nsofar as practicable.” NRS 126.231. Lorenzo identifies two
provisions of NRS 126.051(1) that she argues apply to her maternity action.

14
First, NRS 126.051(1)(b) states that “[a] man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if . . . [h]e and the child’s natural mother were cohabiting
for at least 6 months before the period of conception and continued to
cohabit through the period of conception.” Second, NRS 126.051(1)(d) states
that “[a] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if . . . [w]hile
the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”
Lorenzo argues that NRS 126.051(1)(b) applies to her case
because she alleged in her complaint that she lived with Gendebien from
2016 to 2021, and A.G. was born in June 2018. She also suggests that NRS
126.051(1)(d) applies because her complaint alleged that A.G. was received
into their home and she and Gendebien both continuously held A.G. out as
their child. Although her complaint did not cite NRS 126.051, Lorenzo was
not required to do so to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP
12(b)(5). See Droge, 136 Nev. at 308, 468 P.3d at 878 (holding that a
complaint need not identify a precise legal theory in order to state a claim
for relief). As we consider all factual assertions contained in her complaint
as true for the limited purpose of surviving NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal, we
therefore conclude that Lorenzo sufficiently pleaded that the applicable
paternity presumptions in NRS 126.051(1) apply to her case subject to the
“practicab[ility]” of applying the paternity statutes to her maternity action.
NRS 126.231.
To reiterate, NRS 126.231 provides that “the provisions of [NRS
Chapter 126] applicable to the father and child relationship apply to” an
action to determine maternity “[i]nsofar as practicable.” The district court
found that these factors were inapplicable to Lorenzo, due to her lack of a
biological link to A.G. or marital or domestic partner relationship to

15
Gendebien, and that she was not a party to the gestational agreement.
Therefore, the court determined that the applicability of parentage
presumptions Lorenzo sought to invoke under NRS 126.051 need not be
ruled on. 6 Lorenzo argues that application of the presumptions in NRS
126.051(1)(b) and (1)(d) is practicable because they are based in social and
familial conduct rather than genetic factors, so they can be performed by
either parent, regardless of sex or gender. But Gendebien counters that
applying these presumptions to this specific case would open the door to
results not contemplated by the legislature, namely women not genetically
linked to a child being adjudicated the mother under NRS 126.051(1).
Nevada appellate courts have not expressly addressed the
question of whether the paternity presumptions found in NRS 126.051(1)
can apply equally to women under NRS 126.231 when they are not
biologically related to the child, have not equitably adopted the child, and
have not been identified as the mother in the gestational agreement. But
in resolving a maternity dispute between two female former same-sex
partners under the NPA , our supreme court held that the paternity statutes
apply to maternity actions “insofar as practicable” under NRS 126.231 and

6During the October 2022 hearing, although the district court
expressed that it w as sympathetic to Lorenzo’s position, it ruled that “under
the current state of the law,” Nevada’s parentage statutes did not “accord
her status as a parent of a child .” As to the presumptions, the court also
noted that “this is a case where the legislature or the court—the Supreme
Court needs to be making these determinations rather than the trial court
making new law.” In its January 2023 written order, it found that Lorenzo
“acknowledged she is not the biological mother of the child, did not carry the
child, or donate the egg, and accordingly any presumptions under NRS
126.051 have been overcome and negated, and the Court does not need to
rule on the applicability of the paternity presumption statutes to
presumptions of maternity.”

16
then cited some of the ways paternity can be established under NRS
126.051, including the provision regarding holding oneself out as a parent.
St. Mary, 129 Nev. at 653, 309 P.3d at 1032. While the supreme court did
not address whether these presumptions would be applicable under the
circumstances at bar, it did favorably cite cases from California that
analyzed that state’s nearly identical paternity presumption statute and
applied those presumptions to putative mothers. Id. at 656, 309 P.3d at
1033-34. Specifically, the supreme court cited Elisa B. v. Superior Court ,
where a district attorney filed an action to compel a same-sex former
partner of a woman who had biological twins to pay child support under
California’s Uniform Parentage Act. 117 P.3d 660, 662-63 (Cal. 2005).
In Elisa B., the California Supreme Court analyzed California
Family Code section 7611(d), which stated that “[a] man is presumed to be
the natural parent of a child if . . . [h]e receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child.” 7 Id. at 667. The court noted
that California Family Code section 7650 provided that, in determining a
mother and child relationship, “[i]nsofar as practicable , the provisions of
this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply [to the
mother].” Id. at 665 (emphasis added). The court agreed with the California
Court of Appeal that the statute and legal principles concerning the
presumed father apply equally to a woman seeking a maternity
determination. Id. at 667. It further held that the former partner was the
twins’ parent and was thus obligated to pay child support because she

7This statute was amended in 2013 to include gender-neutral
language. It now provides that “[a] person is presumed to be the natural
parent of a child if . . . [t]he presumed parent receives the child into their
home and openly holds out the child as their natural child. ” Cal. Fam. Code
§ 7611(d) (2013).

17
received the twins into her home and held herself out as their mother. Id.
at 670. The court was not dissuaded by the fact that there was no adoption
agreement between the biological mother, who was impregnated by
artificial insemination, and the former partner. Id. at 663. Nor did it place
weight on the fact that the former couple never registered as domestic
partners. Id. The court instead emphasized that the children were
conceived with the expectation that both partners would raise the children
and that the former partner voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations
of parenthood once the children were born. Id. at 670. Similarly, here,
Lorenzo alleges that there was an expectation that both Lorenzo and
Gendebien would raise A.G. as their child in the household they shared.
Elisa B. also relied on In re Karen C. , where the California
Court of Appeal held that applying the presumption regarding holding
oneself out as a parent in California Family Code section 7611(d) was
“practicable” in a maternity action. 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 682 (Ct. App.
2002). There, a 12-year-old child had requested that the juvenile court
decree the existence of a mother-daughter relationship between her and a
nonbiologically related woman who, the child alleged in her complaint, had
raised her for the first ten years of her life. Id. at 677-78. Assuming the
truth of the factual allegations in the child’s complaint, the court of appeal
concluded that the putative mother would be rebuttably presumed to be the
child’s natural parent. Id. at 682.
In St. Mary, our supreme court concluded that California’s
precedent addressing its parentage statutes, including Elisa B., was “highly
persuasive” for two critical reasons. First, because it analyzed a statutory
scheme with many similarities to Nevada’s. St. Mary, 129 Nev. at 656, 309
P.3d at 1034. Second, the California Supreme Court recognized the

18
important policy consideration that having two parents is typically in a
child’s best interest. Id. Indeed, the pertinent language in California
Family Code section 7611(d) is almost identical to NRS 126.051(1)(d), and
both statutes are substantively identical to the UPA as promulgated in
1973. See St. Mary , 129 Nev . at 652, 309 P.3d at 1031 (noting that the NPA
is modeled after the UPA); Cal. Fam. Code § 7600 (“This part may be cited
as the Uniform Parentage Act.”). 8 Moreover, California Family Code section
7650 and NRS 126.231 are substantively identical and share a nexus to the
UPA, further suggesting a gender-neutral approach should apply to
Nevada’s parentage statutes. Compare Cal. Fam. Code § 7650 (“Any
interested person may bring an action to determine the existence or
nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable , the
provisions of this division applicable to the father and child relationship
apply.” (emphases added)), with NRS 126.231 (“Any interested party may
bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child
relationship. Insofar as practicable , the provisions of this chapter
applicable to the father and child relationship apply to that action. ”
(emphases added)).
Given the similarity of Nevada’s statute to California’s and the
important policy considerations implicated therein for gender neutrality, we
conclude that applying the paternity presumptions in NRS 126.051(1)(b)
and (1)(d) is practicable here. See Karen C. , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682 (“It is

8See, e.g., 2017 UPA § 609 Comment (explaining that the recognition

of presumptive parentage for unmarried, nonbiological parents was
“modeled” on trending state norms derived from equity, statutes, and
caselaw); see also Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood , 126 Yale
L.J. 2260, 2370-72 (2017) (compiling references to “jurisdictions in which
unmarried, nonbiological parents may attain some form of parental
recognition without having adopted the child”).

19
[not] impracticable to apply the presumption equally to women; rather, it
merely means that the presumption, when applied, is usually easier to
rebut by clear and convincing evidence in the case of a woman.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). It follows that maternity, like paternity, can be
rebuttably presumed when a putative mother receives a child into her home
and holds herself out as the child’s parent or when she resides with the
child’s natural father for six months prior to conception and through the
period of pregnancy. 9 See NRS 126.051(1)(b), (d); see also Elisa B. , 117 P.3d
at 668-69.
In light of our clarification that Nevada’s presumptive
parentage statutes may be equally asserted in maternity actions to survive

9In addition to California, several states have similarly concluded

that nonbiological parents may pursue presumptive parentage status based
on the conduct of an interested party in living with a child and treating the
child as their own. See, e.g., In re Parental Resps. of A.R.L. , 318 P.3d 581,
584-85 (Colo. App. 2013) (noting that presumptive parentage status “may
be demonstrated by, among other things . . . receiving the child into one’s
home and holding the child out as a natural child” and “[d]epending upon
the evidence presented, a person may be a presumed parent without being
a biological or adoptive parent ”); In re Parental Resps. of A.D. , 240 P.3d 488,
491 (Colo. App. 2010) (affirming a finding of presumptive parentage of a
nonbiological father and rejecting an argument that, under the UPA, a
biological or adoptive relationship is required to establish a parent-child
relationship); Partanen v. Gallagher , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1138-40 (Mass. 2016)
(concluding a presumptive parentage statute may be invoked “even where
biological ties to the children are absent ” because it was “consistent with
our construction of other provisions in the statute”); In re Guardianship of
Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H. 2014) (holding a former same-sex
partner, not biologically related to a child, may pursue a parentage claim
because she “adequately pleaded that she received [the child] into her home
and openly held [the child] out as her child” ); Chatterjee v. King , 280 P.3d
283, 296 (N.M. 2012) (holding a same-sex partner of a child’s adoptive
mother asserted sufficient facts to give her standing to establish parentage
“because her allegations satisfy the [statutory] hold out provision”).

20
dismissal, we must also conclude under the NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal
standard that Lorenzo ’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim with
regard to both subparts of NRS 126.051, (1)(b) and (1)(d) of Nevada’s
presumptive parentage statute. She alleged in her complaint that (1) “the
parties were never married but lived together in a familial relationship from
2016–November 2021,” (2) A.G. “was conceived and born while the parties
lived together in a family relationship,” (3) “both parties have continuously
held [Lorenzo] out as the child’s mother,” (4) the parties had an agreement
that Lorenzo would be added to the child’s birth certificate , (5) after
separation, the parties shared joint physical custody (equal time share) for
several months until Gendebien began to dictate and control Lorenzo’s
parental time, and (6) Lorenzo was not aware of anyone, other than the
parties, who claimed parentage, custody, or visitation rights as to the child.
Because the truth of Lorenzo’s factual allegations must be
presumed on an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss , we conclude that she has
alleged sufficient facts in satisfaction of NRS 126.051(1)(b) and (1)(d) such
that she may assert her status as a presumptive parent, and her action to
determine the existence of a mother and child relationship under NRS
126.231 must withstand dismissal. See Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 228, 181
P.3d at 672. As a result, the district court’s NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal of
Lorenzo’s parentage action must be reversed.
Application of NRS 126.051 ’s rebuttable parentage presumption
Once a putative parent, like Lorenzo, survives dismissal, the
putative parent must establish her claims of entitlement to recognition as a
presumptive parent under any applicable subpart of NRS 126.051(1)(a)-(d).
See, e.g., In re Est. of Murray , 131 Nev. at 71, 344 P.3d at 424 (concluding
that the respondent was entitled to a presumption of paternity under NRS
126.051(1)(d) after she demonstrated that she was received into the home

21
during her minority and held out as a natural child of the father). Our
statutes, however, do not expressly designate the applicable burden a
putative parent carries in demonstration of this presumptive status. But
as we have held, a preponderance of the evidence remains the “default
evidentiary standard in family law absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary.’’ Monahan v. Hogan , 138 Nev. 58, 69, 507 P.3d 588, 597 (Ct. App.
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, an evidentiary
hearing must be held—providing each party with an opportunity to submit
testimony and other evidence and arguments as to Lorenzo’s satisfaction of
NRS 126.051(1) and the applicable subparts she advances in support of her
invocation of presumptive parentage status by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The district court must ultimately make specific findings under
NRS 126.051(1) and each relevant subpart therein. Cf. Davis v. Ewalefo ,
131 Nev. 445, 452, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015) (holding that specific findings
and adequate explanation of the reasons behind the district court’s
determination in a child custody matter are necessary for benefit of
appellate review). If the court finds that Lorenzo has failed to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence her presumptive status under any of the
subparts advanced, her parentage claim fails. But alternatively, if the
district court finds that Lorenzo has met her burden under NRS 126.051(1)
to establish presumptive status by a preponderance of the evidence as to
any subpart, the court must proceed to the rebuttal inquiry.
The statute controlling the rebuttal inquiry, NRS 126.051(3),
enumerates that “[a] presumption under subsection 1 may be rebutted in
an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.” (Emphasis
added.) Gendebien must therefore be provided with the opportunity to

22
rebut Lorenzo’s presumptive parentage status. We recognize, however, that
until now the district court did not have the benefit of an established test to
determine how a parentage case concerning the invocation of the
presumptive parentage statutes may be rebutted in “an appropriate action. ”
In enumeration of NRS 126.051(3), the Nevada Legislature did
not expressly define what constitutes an “appropriate action” for rebutting
a parentage presumption. Nor have courts across the United States been
uniform in how they construe this phrase in UPA-modeled presumptive
parentage provisions. Some courts, such as the Minnesota Supreme Court,
treat “appropriate action” as a threshold, procedural limitation: an action is
“appropriate” only if it is timely and brought by a party with standing under
the parentage statutes, and if those predicate requirements are not met, the
trial court never reaches the merits of the rebuttal inquiry. In re Est. of
Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 454-55 (Minn. 2006).
In re Estate of Jotham involved an intestacy dispute in which
one presumed child sought, more than 50 years after her sister’s birth, to
rebut the statutory presumption that the sister was also the decedent’s
child. 722 N.W.2d at 449. The Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA) permitted
a paternity presumption to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
only in “an appropriate action,” but did not define that phrase. Id. at 454.
The court rejected the argument that “an appropriate action” meant any
properly filed legal proceeding. Id. Instead, it reasoned that such a broad
construction would render the limiting phrase meaningless and would allow
parties to evade the scheme’s standing and timeliness requirements. Id. at

23
454-55.10 And it was on this basis that the court determined that rebuttal
cannot be attempted in a paternity action under the MPA where a party
lacks standing or the action is untimely. The Jotham court therefore
construed “an appropriate action” as one in which the party seeking
rebuttal would be permitted, under the MPA, to bring an action declaring
the nonexistence of the presumed parent-child relationship. Id. at 455-56.
Subsequently, in Murray, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted
Jotham’s reasoning as instructive in the probate context, concluding that
this approach furthered the NPA’s underlying principles of early
establishment of parent-child relationships and stability for legally
recognized families. See In re Est. of Murray , 131 Nev. at 69-71, 344 P.3d
at 422-24 (adopting Jotham’s reading in the probate context and using
“appropriate action” to incorporate NRS Chapter 126’s rules concerning
limitations and standing). In doing so, the supreme court also recognized
that legal parentage may turn on more than biology alone. Id. at 68-69, 344
P.3d at 422 ( recognizing that parentage may rest on “a wide array of
considerations rather than genetics alone”).
The Murray court began from the premise that the NPA’s
language, modeled after the UPA, supplies the rules for determining legal
parentage in Nevada for custody and child support proceedings. Id. at 68,
344 P.3d at 421-22. The court recognized that, despite the central purpose
of the NPA’s adoption to address child-support obligations, a legal

10The Jotham court went on to note that “[o] ther courts analyzing the

meaning of ‘an appropriate action ’ in the context of the Uniform Parentage
Act have similarly concluded that the phrase signifies an action instituted
pursuant to the Act . . . . While we are not bound by these courts ’
interpretations, we endeavor to construe uniform laws to effectuate their
purpose of making the laws of the states in which they are enacted
consistent with each other.” 722 N.W.2d. at 455.

24
determination of parentage carries consequences beyond custody or
support, including inheritance rights. Id. at 68, 344 P.3d at 422. And
because the legislature had not created a separate framework for
determining parentage in probate proceedings, the court concluded that
parentage disputes in that context must be resolved under the NPA. Id. at
69, 344 P.3d at 422-23. The Murray court therefore decided that contrary
evidence was insufficient to rebut a parentage presumption except in
certain actions. Id. Relying on Jotham, it recognized that a parentage
presumption may be rebutted only in an action properly brought and
maintained under controlling parentage statutes. See id. at 70-72, 344 P.3d
at 423-24 ( explaining that “an appropriate action” restricts the
circumstances in which a paternity presumption may be rebutted and
holding that the appellants lacked standing and were time-barred from
challenging paternity status). Thus, although Murray arose in a probate
proceeding, its reasoning is instructive here because it confirms that
rebuttal under NRS 126.051 depends not merely on the existence of
contrary evidence, but on whether the party seeking rebuttal may properly
maintain a parentage action under the NPA.
Here, once Lorenzo’s action is determined to be authorized
under the NPA, which we have done, it qualifies as an “appropriate action”
for purposes of rebuttal under NRS 126.051(3). This understanding accords
with Murray’s recognition that parentage presumptions serve important
policies beyond genetics, including finality, family stability, and the
protection of established parent-child relationships.
And while Murray is instructive on the timing and distinct
nature of the appropriate action analysis in the presumptive parentage
context, Nevada caselaw does not establish the specific considerations a

25
district court should evaluate for purposes of the rebuttal inquiry. We
therefore may look to California authority interpreting substantially
similar parentage statutes . See St. Mary , 129 Nev. at 656, 309 P.3d at 1034
(“California’s precedent is highly persuasive because it pertains to a
statutory scheme that is substantially similar to Nevada ’s and advances the
policies that underlie the Nevada Parentage Act . . . .”); see, e.g., Shapiro v.
Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017) (observing that because
“California’s and Nevada ’s anti-SLAPP statutes are similar in purpose and
language, we look to California law for guidance” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
With nearly identical language to Nevada’s statutes,
California’s corollary statutes on the nature and requirements of rebuttal
have been evaluated under similar facts and circumstances as those
implicated in the present case. Compare NRS 126.051(3) (“A presumption
under subsection 1 may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear
and convincing evidence. ” (emphasis added)), with Cal. Fam. Code § 7612(a)
(“[A] presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by
clear and convincing evidence. ” (emphasis added)).
In addressing its equivalent parentage statutes, the California
Supreme Court has effectively conjoined the “appropriate action” inquiry
with the substantive rebuttal analysis itself, asking whether, on the
particular facts and policy considerations presented, it is appropriate to
displace the presumption at all. See, e.g., Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 941 (Cal.
2002) (holding the section 7611(d) presumption “may be rebutted in an
appropriate action” but concluding rebuttal was not “appropriate” where
doing so would leave the child fatherless); see also In re Jesusa V. , 85 P.3d

26
2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (weighing competing presumptions by reference to “policy
and logic” under its equivalent statute in light of the child’s established
family unit); In re Karen C. , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682 (extending the section
7611(d) presumption to a nonbiological mother and remanding for a
determination of whether rebuttal was “appropriate” under Nicholas H.); In
re Salvador M. , 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 709 (Ct. App. 2003) (declining to find
rebuttal “appropriate” where that would sever a deeply rooted mother -child
bond and there were no competing maternal claims).
In Elisa B., the California Supreme Court synthesized this line
of authority and articulated, in substance, a merits- focused “appropriate
rebuttal” inquiry—holding that, where circumstances exist factually that
favor the nonbiological parent, rebuttal was not “appropriate” despite clear
evidence of no genetic relation. 117 P.3d at 667-70. The court identified
three reasons why the presumption could not be appropriately rebutted in
that case. First, the petitioner seeking presumptive parentage status
“actively participated in causing the children to be conceived with the
understanding that she would raise the children as her own together with
the birth mother.” Id. at 670. Second , the petitioner voluntarily expressed
an intention to accept the responsibilities and enjoy the benefits of
parenthood together with her partner from before the children were
conceived through the first years of the children’s lives. Id. Third, akin to
Nicholas H., there was no competition from any other person claiming to be
the children’s second parent, and allowing rebuttal of the presumption in
that case would have left the children without the support of a second
parent—a responsibility that would ultimately fall to the state to assume.
Id. (clarifying that rebuttal of presumptive parentage is generally
inappropriate where “there are no competing claims to [ a petitioner] being

27
the children’s second parent”); see also In re Salvador M. , 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
709 (“[W]e conclude this is clearly not an appropriate action to find
respondent rebutted the presumption because there was no competing
maternal interest and to sever this deeply rooted mother/child bond would
contravene the state’s interest in maintaining the family relationship.”) .
We now hold the California approach, as augmented by several
jurisdictions,11 to be persuasive in the adoption of a new framework to
determine the outcome of a putative parent’s claim to presumptive
parentage status—concluding that Nevada courts must apply its statutory
scheme as likewise considered and employed by the California Supreme
Court in Elisa B for purposes of rebuttal. We crystalize those reasons as
conjunctive factors instructive to the rebuttal inquiry, including (1) family-
formation, intent, and conduct; (2) voluntary assumption of parental
responsibilities; and (3) existence and nature of competing parentage claims

11Several jurisdictions have expressly designated the California
approach articulated in Elisa B. as instructive to the rebuttal inquiry. Most
notably, the New Mexico Supreme Court, applying materially identical UPA
language, has followed a similar integrated approach, treating “appropriate
action” as part of the substantive rebuttal inquiry rather than a separate
procedural bar. Chatterjee v. King , 280 P.3d 283, 294-95 (N.M. 2012)
(looking to Nicholas H., Elisa B., and related UPA cases and grounding the
rebuttal analysis in family- formation intent, the child’s established
attachments, and the absence of a superior competing claim) ; see also In re
A.D., 240 P.3d 488, 490 (Colo. App. 2010) (declining to consider rebuttal
arguments where a child had bonded with a presumptive father and
severance risked trauma); Partanen v. Gallagher , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1140
(Mass. 2016) ( emphasizing that rebuttal may be achieved by disproving the
putative parent’s assertions about her involvement in pre-birth planning).

28
brought by putative parents with no genetic connection to the child. 12
The district court must consider and make specific findings
under each of the three factors and weigh them to determine if a putative
parent’s assertion of presumptive parentage status is rebutted despite
evidence that a putative parent seeking maternity was not, in fact, the
biological parent of the subject minor. See NRS 126.051(3) (articulating the
rebuttal burden in the presumptive parentage context as clear and
convincing evidence); cf. Pryor v. Pryor , 103 Nev. 148, 150, 734 P.2d 718,
719 (1987) (explaining that Nevada begins with the presumption that
property acquired during marriage is community property and that the
party asserting a separate property claim bears the burden to rebut that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence); Lopez v. Lopez , 139 Nev.
533, 540-41, 541 P.3d 117, 124-25 (Ct. App. 2023) (emphasizing that the
presumption of community property can be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence).
As to the family-formation factor, the inquiry turns on whether
the putative parent actively participated in the decision to conceive or form
the family with the shared understanding that the person would raise the
child as a parent. Next, under the voluntary-assumption factor , courts must
determine whether the putative parent voluntarily expressed an intent to
accept—and in fact accepted—the responsibilities and benefits of
parenthood from before the child’s conception or at birth through the early

12We note, as to the competing parentage factor, our supreme court

has already determined that genetic parentage under NRS 126.051(2) is
superior to putative parentage without genetic connection. See Rosie M. ,
138 Nev. at 542-43, 512 P.3d at 762-63.

29
part of the child’s life. 13 Finally, under the competing-parentage factor ,
courts determine whether there is competition from another person
claiming to be the child’s second parent or whether rebuttal would instead
leave the child without the support of a second parent .14
In sum, o nce a party has properly invoked Nevada’s parentage
statutes—i.e., the action is “appropriate” in the Jotham-Murray sense
because it satisfies NRS Chapter 126’s standing and limitations
requirements—the “appropriate action” language in NRS 126.051(3) does
not create a second, free-standing procedural hurdle. Instead, it is
answered within the substantive rebuttal analysis itself: the district court
must determine, under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,
whether the presumption of parentage is appropriately rebutted on these
facts in light of the family-formation, voluntary-assumption, and competing-
claims considerations.

13We note that the existence of a gestational surrogacy contract and

terms therein may be considered as one of many facts and circumstances of
the case that may inform either the family-formation or voluntary-
assumption factors. The mere existence of a contract is not, however,
determinative of any factor.
14Nevada law now explicitly permits a child to have a legal parent-

child relationship with more than two persons, though the practical
application of three or more parent custodial arrangements remains subject
to judicial determination and the best-interest-of-the-child standard. See
NRS 126.021(3) (stating the definition of “parent and child rel ationship”
“does not preclude a determination by a court that a child has such a legal
relationship with more than two persons ”); see also St. Mary, 129 Nev. at
654-57, 309 P.3d at 1032-35 (holding the NPA does not preclude a child from
having two legal mothers). Although that issue does not appear to be
present in this case, we nevertheless acknowledge that additional clarity as
to what constitutes a “competing claim” may be necessary in future
litigation involving gestational surrogacy and parentage.

30
Here, the district court is therefore instructed on remand to
make its findings under our newly announced three-factor test in evaluation
of Gendebien’s rebuttal arguments, assuming the case reaches that stage.
Just as it must make specific findings under NRS 126.051(1), the district
court holds the same obligation to make specific findings under NRS
126.051(3). Cf. Davis, 131 Nev. at 452, 352 P.3d at 1143. But the court need
not bifurcate its evidentiary proceedings or decisions where the same
evidence bears on both the existence of a parentage presumption and the
rebuttal inquiry. Cf. Monahan, 138 Nev. at 65-69, 507 P.3d at 594-96
(concluding that not every best-interest factor had to be applied anew where
the relevant findings had already been considered and that any failure to
make a new analysis of overlapping best-interest factors was harmless).
If Lorenzo satisfies the presumptive burdens, then Gendebien
must meet his burden for the rebuttal factors. If he does not, then the case
is not an appropriate action for rebuttal. But if the district court weighs the
factors and determines Gendebien has satisfied his burden, then Lorenzo’s
presumptive parentage status is overcome and her claims fail. As we clarify
above and discuss further next, Lorenzo’s parentage claim is not based on a
genetic relationship, so Gendebien’s assertion that she lacks a biological
link is not controlling to prospective rebuttal arguments—especially if there
is no competing claim or conclusive presumption like in Rosie M. See 138
Nev. at 543-44, 512 P.3d at 762-63.
Thus, in sum, if Lorenzo meets her burden in showing her
presumptive parentage status, the burden shifts to Gendebien to
demonstrate such status is appropriately rebutted with clear and
convincing evidence. If her burden is met and his burden is not met,
Lorenzo would be granted parental rights, and the case would then turn to

31
what custody arrangement and parenting time Lorenzo should be granted
that is in the best interest of the child. See NRS 125C.0035(1) (“In any
action for determining physical custody of a minor child, the sole
consideration of the court is the best interest of the child.” ); Davis, 131 Nev.
at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143 (same). But if he does meet his burden, then
judgment would be entered in favor of Gendebien.
Impact of the gestational agreement
Gendebien argues that even if the presumptions of maternity
under NRS 126.051(1)(b) and (1) (d) apply here, the existence of a valid
gestational agreement controls the issues of maternity and custody.
Lorenzo responds that while the gestational agreement may establish
Gendebien’s parentage at the time of A.G.’s birth, it does not forever
preclude her from establishing parentage when in A.G.’s best interest.
The construction and interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law that is reviewed de novo. Irving v. Irving , 122 Nev. 494, 496,
134 P.3d 718, 720 (2006). Appellate courts follow the plain meaning of a
statute absent an ambiguity. Id. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible
to two or more reasonable interpretations. Id. When a statute is
ambiguous, appellate courts look to legislative intent to ascertain its
meaning. Id.
Where a legal question invokes multiple statutes, courts are to
construe the statutes as a whole so as to reconcile and harmonize them to
the extent practicable. Diamond Nat. Res. Prot. & Conservation Ass’n v.
Diamond Valley Ranch, LLC , 138 Nev. 436, 441, 511 P.3d 1003, 1007 (2022).
When two statutory provisions conflict, appellate courts apply rules of
statutory construction to resolve the conflict. Williams v. State, Dep’t of
Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 600, 402 P.3d 1260, 1265 (2017). Appellate courts
should avoid interpretations that render statutory language meaningless or

32
superfluous. Id. at 596, 402 P.3d at 1262. Ambiguous statutes should also
be read in a fashion that conforms to reason and public policy. Nuleaf CLV
Dispensary, LLC v. State, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. , 134 Nev. 129, 133,
414 P.3d 305, 309 (2018).
NRS 126.500 to NRS 126.810, inclusive, govern gestational
agreements. Pursuant to NRS 126.710(2), “[i]f two persons are the intended
parents, both of the intended parents must be parties to the gestational
agreement.” “The intended parent or parents shall be considered the parent
or parents of the resulting child immediately upon the birth of the child.”
NRS 126.720(1)(a). “The resulting child shall be considered the child of the
intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.” NRS
126.720(1)(b). “Parental rights vest in the intended parent or parents
immediately upon the birth of the resulting child.” NRS 126.720(1)(c). “Sole
legal and physical custody of the resulting child vest with the intended
parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.” NRS
126.720(1)(d).
The language of NRS 126.710(2), standing alone, is clear and
unambiguous. NRS 126.710(2) plainly states that if there are two parents
of a child born pursuant to a gestational carrier, then both intended parents
must be named as such on the gestational agreement. Because Lorenzo is
not listed as an intended parent on the gestational agreement, it follows
that she is not an intended parent of A.G. pursuant to the gestational
agreement.
NRS 126.720(1) can, and should, be interpreted according to its
plain language as well. Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of that statute all
include the phrase “immediately upon the birth of the child” and subsection
(c) includes the phrase “immediately upon the birth of the resulting child.”

33
Per the statute, this is when parental and custody rights vest in the
intended parents. The phrase “immediately upon the birth of the child” (or
the “resulting child”) is clear and unambiguous. This phrase is inclusive of
the intended parents and guarantees that their parental status and
parental rights vest as the intended parents immediately upon the birth of
the child. But this phrase does not, as Gendebien suggests, operate as a bar
to establishing post-birth parentage status by persons who are not excluded
by the gestational agreement. Indeed, nothing in NRS 126.710 rules out
the possibility that another person may thereafter enter the child’s life and
become a parent if such rights accrue before or shortly after birth as alleged
in this case.
As previously discussed, NRS Chapter 126 provides alternative
pathways to parental recognition. These pathways allow an interested
party to establish post-birth presumptive parentage status, including by
showing that the putative parent cohabitated with the biological parent for
at least six months before the period of conception or received the child into
their home and held themselves out as the child’s parent immediately after
birth. See NRS 126.051(1)(b), (d). Permitting a party to invoke those
provisions to assert presumptive parentage is consistent with Nevada’s
parentage scheme as a whole, which recognizes that “the relationship
between a parent and child is of fundamental societal and constitutional
dimension.” St. Mary, 129 Nev. at 654-55, 309 P.3d at 1032-33. The policies
underlying that scheme likewise include identifying parental support
obligations, preventing children from becoming wards of the state, and
advancing the child’s best interest. Id. at 656, 309 P.3d at 1034; see also
Willerton v. Bassham , State, Dep’t of Hum. Res. , 111 Nev. 10, 20, 889 P.2d
823, 829 (1995) (holding that the “overarching purpose” of the UPA “and

34
most state acts modelled thereon” is to identify parental support obligations
and to prevent the child from becoming a ward of the state ).
Foreclosing an interested party from seeking presumptive
parentage status merely because they were not identified as an intended
parent when the gestational agreement was signed cannot, therefore, be
squared with NRS Chapter 126’s broader statutory purpose and would risk
absurd results, which courts must avoid. See City of Henderson v.
Wolfgram, 137 Nev. 755, 757, 501 P.3d 422, 424 (2021) (“[Appellate courts]
will avoid constructions that would lead to an absurd result.”). For example,
reading NRS 126.720(1) as having an exclusive effect—as Gendebien
suggests—as opposed to an inclusive effect, might forever foreclose
interested parties from bringing actions to determine parentage. That
approach risks, in some circumstances, adversely impacting children
because they were born subject to a gestational agreement and could never
benefit from the recognition of more than one parent under our presumptive
parentage statutes. 15 Therefore, Gendebien’s argument that Lorenzo’s

15We stress, however, that these principles do not require a district

court to recognize a putative parentage claim merely because doing so could
reduce the possibility of wardship or provide an additional source of
financial support. T he child’s best interest remains the “polestar of judicial
decision making in family law matters.” Monahan, 138 Nev. at 62, 507 P.3d
at 592. Although Nevada law generally presumes that a child’s best interest
is served by the support of two or more parents, see St. Mary, 129 Nev. at
656, 309 P.3d at 1034 , that understanding does not independently compel
recognition of another legal parent where doing so would not serve the
child’s best interest. Cf . NRS 125C.001(1) (stating Nevada’s policy that
children maintain a relationship with both parents after the parents have
ended their relationship with each other); see also In re Guardianship of
N.M., 131 Nev. 751, 757, 358 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2015) ( “[W]hen determining
whether a parent is qualified and suitable, the district court must give ‘the
child’s basic needs [and] welfare ’ priority over the parent ’s interest in
custody.”).

35
omission as a named, intended parent to the gestational agreement
categorically bars her from invoking Nevada’s presumptive parentage
statutes is unpersuasive on the record we have and inconsistent with the
scheme’s broader purpose.16
The legislative history of NRS 126.720 reinforces our
interpretation here. NRS 126.720 was enacted in 2013 as part of what was
originally Assembly Bill 421, 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213, §§ 26-27, at 810,
which sought to modernize Nevada’s laws concerning assisted reproduction
and gestational agreements. 17 While parts of NRS 126.720 were amended
in 2015 and 2017, subsection (1) has remained unchanged. Much of the
committee discussion of the original bill addressed lawmakers’ concerns
about a surrogate attempting to establish parentage over the child:
Assemblyman Wheeler: Will this law protect
parents from a donor or a surrogate coming back

16Moreover, Lorenzo alleged in her reply brief on the motion for
reconsideration that she was unaware of the existence of a written
gestational agreement until it was disclosed by Gendebien after she filed
her complaint. Lorenzo further submits that “ the type of Gestational
Agreement which [Gendebien] refers to does nothing more than establish
that the paid surrogate, or their spouse, do not have parental rights over
the birthed child. ” Indeed, we note that the ultimate Order Establishing
Parentage that was issued on the basis of the joint petition filed by
Gendebien, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s spouse in February 2018
ordered that the surrogate “is not genetically related to the child, and has
neither parental rights nor parental obligations to raise the child” but did
not address Lorenzo’s status.
17See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 421 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Judiciary, 77th Leg. (Nev., Apr. 8, 2013) (testimony of Kimberly Surratt,
Esq.) (“The year 1995 does not sound like a significant amount of time for
most people when you are talking about law, but when you talk about the
advancements in medical technology for the reproductive industry, it is a
significant amount of time. ”).

36
when a child is two or three years old and saying
that that is their kid?
Kimberly Surratt: In my opinion, absolutely yes; it
will protect them. Can a surrogate or donor still
show up and throw their hands up and jump up and
down? Yes, but the parentage will already be an
absolute nonappealable decision based on these
statutes and the timeline.
Hearing on A.B. 421 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg.
(Nev., Apr. 8, 2013). Importantly, the comments about parentage being an
“absolute nonappealable decision” were made in the context of a
hypothetical surrogate trying to assert parental rights after the child was
born, a key issue this bill was intended to remedy. See id. This intent was
codified in NRS 126.720(1)(e), which provides that “[n]either the gestational
carrier nor her legal spouse or domestic partner, if any, shall be considered
the parent of the resulting child.” Read in context and considered as a
whole, see In re Pub. Recs. Requests to LVMPD , 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 26, 569
P.3d 624, 629 (2025), the foregoing provisions were intended to reinforce the
rights of the intended parents over the gestational carrier, not permanently

37
prevent all other interested persons from asserting parental rights. 18
Although the question at bar involves multiple statutes, we construe the
plain meaning of each to be in harmony, see Diamond Nat. Res. Prot. &
Conservation Ass’n, 138 Nev. at 441, 511 P.3d at 1007 , and it is not the case
that these statutes otherwise compel our engagement in Nevada’s canon s of
statutory construction, cf. Williams, 133 Nev. at 600, 402 P.3d at 1265.

CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court erred in dismissing Lorenzo’s
complaint on the grounds that she had no genetic link to the minor child,
was not married to the child’s biological father, and was not included as an
intended parent in the gestational agreement. We now clarify that when a
gestational agreement names only one intended parent, another interested
party who has not been excluded from seeking parentage under the terms

18This point is particularly salient here, as we previously noted that

there is a factual contention by Lorenzo—who was omitted as an intended
parent from the gestational agreement—that she was not even aware of the
existence of the written contract between Gendebien and the surrogate.
Specifically, her reply brief on reconsideration asserts that the “ Gestational
Agreement referred to by [Gendebien], is not an agreement that [Lorenzo]
was a party to or that was she aware of and is irrelevant ” to her claims for
parentage and custody. As she characterizes, this “s ecret Gestational
Agreement was not made known to [Lorenzo] until it was disclosed in the
discovery phase after she filed her Complaint. ” Lorenzo also suggested in
her reply brief on reconsideration that if, “as [Gendebien] seems to imply,
[Lorenzo] was a Necessary Party to the Gestational Agreement, his failure
to join her likely renders any such judgment invalid.” See generally Gladys
Baker Olsen Fam. Tr. ex rel. Olsen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 110 Nev. 548,
553-54, 874 P.2d 778, 781-82 (1994) (holding that to render a complete
decree in any civil action, “all persons materially interested in the subject
matter of the suit [must] be made parties so that there is a complete decree
to bind them all” and that the failure to join a necessary party to a case was
“fatal to the district court’s judgment” ); see also NRS 126.101(1)-(2)
(describing necessary parties in a paternity action).

38
of the gestational agreement by consent has standing to bring a maternity
or custody action and may survive NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal of those claims
if the complaint alleges facts that establish presumptive parentage status
under NRS 126.051(1).
Further, once a putative parent’s complaint survives dismissal
under the NRCP 12(b)(5) standard, the district court must determine, after
an evidentiary hearing, if the putative parent has demonstrated their
presumptive parentage status pursuant to NRS 126.051(1) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the putative parent does not adequately
demonstrate their presumptive parentage status, they may not maintain
their parentage claim. But if the court determines that the putative parent
has demonstrated their presumptive parentage status, upon specific
findings under NRS 126.051(1), the court will then shift to the rebuttal
inquiry under NRS 126.051(3). If the presumption is not appropriately
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, then the district court shall
declare that parentage exists and move forward to determine the

39
appropriate custody arrangement in the best interest of the child. 19 If the
presumption is rebutted, then judgment is to be entered for the biological
parent or intended parent named in the gestational agreement.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing
Lorenzo’s complaint, and we remand this matter to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 20

Gibbons, J.

We concur:

19Because Lorenzo does not challenge the district court order denying

her request for nonparent visitation, that portion of the court’s order
remains in place until the court can conduct a hearing and enter a new order
or temporary order. Nevertheless, we note that the nonparent visitation
order was premised upon the finding that Lorenzo had not overcome the
presumption against nonparent visitation. See NRS 125C.050(4).
Therefore, if Lorenzo establishes her presumptive parent status, and the
court determines her parentage status is not appropriately rebutted, she
may proceed with her request for joint custody as a parent, as would be
allowed in any other custody action, based upon the best interest of the
child. See generally NRS 125C.0035(1). However, if she does not establish
her presumptive parentage status, or it is appropriately rebutted, the
nonparent visitation order remains in effect, and any new order denying her
complaint for maternity or custody in its entirety would be the final
judgment. It will be within the district court’s discretion whether and how
to use the testimony and other evidence received at the evidentiary hearing
on nonparent visitation in combining and resolving the issues discussed in
this opinion.
20Insofar as the parties have raised other arguments that are not

specifically addressed in this opinion, we have considered the same and
conclude that they either do not present a basis for further relief or need not
be reached given the disposition of this appeal.

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Bulla, C.J.

Westbrook, J.

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