State v. Yazzie

I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
New Mexico Compilation
Commission, Santa Fe, NM
'00'04- 12:12:00 2019.03.26

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2019-NMSC-008

Filing Date: January 24, 2019

Docket No. S-1-SC-36508

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

NATHANIEL YAZZIE,

Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Karen L. Townsend, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Marko David Hananel, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

{1} With this opinion we revisit the circumstances under which an officer may make a

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warrantless entry into a home under the emergency assistance doctrine.1 Relying on cases
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court held in Ryon
that a warrantless entry is reasonable under the emergency assistance doctrine when (1) law
enforcement officers “have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand
and an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property;” (2) the officers’
primary motivation for the search is a “strong sense of emergency” and not “to arrest a
suspect or to seize evidence[;]” and (3) the officers have some reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to connect the emergency to the area to be searched. See
2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 39.

{2} Since Ryon was decided, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the
emergency assistance doctrine under the Fourth Amendment focuses on the objective
reasonableness of the officer’s actions and does not include a subjective component. See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“The officer’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant.”). Applying the interstitial approach, we hold that an officer’s subjective
motivation remains relevant to the reasonableness of a warrantless entry under Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. We further hold that the officer’s warrantless
entry in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10.
The Court of Appeals having concluded otherwise, we reverse. In doing so, we reiterate our
recent holding in State v. Martinez that the presence of video evidence in an appellate record
does not affect the deference due to a district court’s factual findings at a suppression
hearing if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See 2018-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 18-
19, 410 P.3d 186.

II. BACKGROUND

{3} Defendant Nathaniel Yazzie entered a conditional plea of no contest to the offense
of attempt to commit negligent child abuse following the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. Defendant had moved to suppress all of the evidence gathered after Officer
William Temples of the Farmington Police Department entered his unlocked apartment
without a warrant in response to a welfare check. Defendant argued in his suppression
motion that Officer Temples’ entry violated his right to privacy in his home under the Fourth
Amendment and Article II, Section 10. The State responded that Officer Temples’ entry was
reasonable to ensure the safety of those inside the apartment, thereby making his actions
constitutionally permissible under the emergency assistance doctrine.

{4} The district court held a hearing where it considered the officer’s testimony as well

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The United States Supreme Court has referred to this doctrine as the “emergency aid
exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47-48 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Historically, we have used the term “emergency assistance doctrine” to
refer to the same constitutional principle. See State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 1, 137 N.M.
174, 108 P.3d 1032. We continue use of our prior terminology in this opinion.

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as the lapel video from the night of the incident. The video was not played during the
hearing, but the district court reviewed it prior to issuing its letter decision denying the
motion to suppress. The letter decision did not include formal, enumerated findings of fact.
On review, we will “draw from the record to derive findings based on reasonable facts and
inferences.” State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 33, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103. The
record provides the following facts.

{5} Officer Temples was dispatched to Defendant’s residence to conduct a welfare check
at 9:43 p.m. on December 5, 2013 after Defendant’s downstairs neighbor had reported a loud
“thumping” sound coming from the apartment above. Officer Temples testified that no one
answered Defendant’s door after he loudly knocked and announced himself as a police
officer over the course of eight to ten minutes. He told the district court that during that time,
the only response to his knocking was an infant crying continuously and a young child
“hollering, ‘Mommy! Mommy, wake up!’ ” Officer Temples described the infant’s cry as
“a constant cry as if there was nobody caring for the child.” He further testified that the
doorknob rattled as though someone was trying, but unable, to open the door from the inside.

{6} Officer Temples explained at the hearing that these observations led him to believe
that someone in the apartment was hurt or otherwise incapacitated, leaving the children
unattended. He said he thought the children’s mother may have required aid because
“usually when a child . . . asks their mommy to wake up several times, usually Mommy
wakes up when she’s sober or uninjured.” Officer Temples testified that he opened the
unlocked apartment door to peer inside once he concluded that his assistance was required
within. When he did, he observed Defendant and an adult woman lying on the floor of the
apartment with two children under six and an infant in the same room.

{7} The lapel video shows Officer Temples knocking six times in the span of roughly six
minutes before opening the unlocked apartment door. After his first knock, movement can
be heard within, the doorknob rattles, and a child can be heard calling to his or her mother.
Moments later, an infant begins to fuss. Officer Temples knocks a second time and someone
again rattles the doorknob but gives no additional response. After his fifth unanswered
knock, Officer Temples announces that he is an officer of the Farmington Police Department
and requests that someone come to the door. The fussing baby is heard again, but no one
responds to his request. Officer Temples then says to himself, “Mom and Dad are obviously
passed out.” At this point in the video, the baby’s crying increases in volume and tempo. A
minute later Officer Temples knocks a sixth time and announces himself again. When he
does not receive a response, Officer Temples opens the unlocked door of the apartment. He
knocks a seventh time while standing in the doorway. About one minute later, Officer
Temples calls for a backup officer and a portable breath test unit (PBT). He then fully enters
the apartment, approximately eight minutes after his first knock.

{8} Officer Temples testified that once inside the apartment he performed a sweep of the
adjoining rooms of the apartment to ensure officer safety, as well as to see if any other
individuals in the apartment required assistance. During the sweep, Officer Temples

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observed empty alcohol bottles in the kitchen at the top of an open trash can.

{9} In the lapel video, Officer Temples performs a thirty-second sweep of the apartment,
shining his flashlight into each of the rooms, including the kitchen. The lapel video shows
that after the requested backup officer arrives, the pair of officers physically rouse the adults,
question them, and administer the breath tests. They do not call for a medical response unit.
Based on the results of the breath tests, they arrest both adults. This sequence of events is
reflected in Officer Temples’ arrest report. Defendant was later charged with negligent child
abuse contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D) (2009).

{10} In denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, the district court concluded that the entry
was justified under either the community caretaking or emergency assistance doctrines,
citing Ryon. The district court explained that the entry was permissible because Officer
Temples based his decision to enter on “what he was told and what he heard and observed
at the apartment,” which gave him “a reasonable concern that a medical emergency existed
warranting immediate entry.” The district court also concluded that the safety sweep was
appropriate because “[i]t was a very brief inspection and was supported by what the officer
observed upon entering the residence.” Finally, the district court found that Officer Temples’
“primary motivation was not criminal investigation but to render aid or protection from
harm.”

{11} Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant pleaded no contest to the
lesser offense of attempt to commit negligent child abuse, a fourth-degree felony in violation
of Section 30-6-1(D). He entered a conditional plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial
of the suppression motion.

{12} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
State v. Yazzie, No. 34,537, mem. op. ¶ 2 (N.M. Ct. App. May 11, 2017) (non-precedential).
The State petitioned for certiorari to review the issue of whether Officer Temples’ entry and
subsequent inspection were lawful under the emergency assistance doctrine. See N.M. Const.
art. VI, § 2; NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(B) (1972); Rule 12-502 NMRA. We granted certiorari
and reverse.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{13} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.
First, we look for substantial evidence to support the [district] court’s factual finding, with
deference to the district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.”
Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Anhayla H., 2018-NMSC-033, ¶ 36, 421
P.3d 814 (quoting State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Patricia H., 2002-
NMCA-061, ¶ 22, 132 N.M. 299, 47 P.3d 859). Contested facts are reviewed “in a manner
most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 144 N.M.

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371, 188 P.3d 95. “We then review the application of the law to those facts, making a de
novo determination of the constitutional reasonableness of the search or seizure.” Martinez,
2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although our inquiry
is necessarily fact-based it compels a careful balancing of constitutional values, which
extends beyond fact-finding, to shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the
constitutional requirement of reasonableness in factual context.” Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005,
¶ 11 (omission omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{14} After the Court of Appeals decided Yazzie, we reaffirmed in Martinez that appellate
courts must afford a high degree of deference to the district court’s factual findings if
supported by substantial evidence. 2018-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 3, 15. In particular, an appellate
court must presume that the district court credited an officer’s testimony, even if that
testimony is not perfectly aligned with video evidence. See id. When video evidence
conflicts with other evidence, an appellate court must defer to the district court’s factual
findings if supported by evidence in the record. See id. ¶ 17. We accord such deference here.

IV. DISCUSSION

{15} This case centers on the reasonableness of Officer Temples’ warrantless entry and
search of Defendant’s apartment under the emergency assistance doctrine. The emergency
assistance doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. It permits law enforcement officers to “enter a home without
a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant
from imminent injury.” Id. The emergency assistance doctrine arises from a police officer’s
duty as community caretaker to assist those “who are seriously injured or threatened with
such injury.” Id. This duty is “totally divorced” from law enforcement’s separate goal of
gathering evidence and investigating crime. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973).

{16} The “ultimate touchstone” of any Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis is
“reasonableness.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). In assessing reasonableness, courts must balance the public interest and an
individual’s right to be free from police interference upon personal liberty. See State v.
Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307. Such balancing requires a
close examination of the facts. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of Officer
Temples’ search under both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10. We first
determine whether the entry and search were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If
we conclude that Officer Temples’ conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
we then apply our interstitial approach to examine the reasonableness of his actions under
Article II, Section 10. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19-21, 122 N.M. 777, 932
P.2d 1 (adopting the interstitial approach for determining whether a parallel provision of the
New Mexico Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart).

A. Reasonableness of the Entry and Search Under the Fourth Amendment

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{17} The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. This protection is only conferred when individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched or the thing to be seized. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The parties do not dispute
that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. We agree. See Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
first among equals. At the Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{18} As an individual’s privacy interests are strongest in the home, warrantless searches
of a home are “presumptively unreasonable.” See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). That presumption can be overcome in certain exigent
circumstances where an officer’s warrantless entry is justified by a compelling need of law
enforcement. See id. Acting to provide emergency assistance to “protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury” is such a justification which serves the public interest and tips the
constitutional balance in favor of obviating the warrant requirement. See id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

{19} In Ryon, this Court adopted a widely-used analysis of the emergency assistance
doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. See 2005-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 26, 29 (“The emergency
assistance doctrine, which may justify more intrusive searches of the home or person, must
be assessed separately by a distinct test.”). At the time, the United States Supreme Court had
acknowledged that a warrantless entry into a home may be justified by the need to render
emergency aid, but the United States Supreme Court had not yet articulated the appropriate
reasonableness analysis under the emergency assistance doctrine. In Mincey v. Arizona, the
United States Supreme Court observed that “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police
officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid. . . . But a warrantless search must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation[.]” 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{20} The Ryon Court noted that, following Mincey, some courts had adopted a “purely
objective test” to assess an entry under the emergency assistance doctrine, but the majority
of courts had adopted the test first articulated in People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347
N.E.2d 607 (1976) (abrogated by Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398). Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶
29. In addition to assessing whether an officer reasonably believed that entry was necessary
to respond to an imminent emergency and gauging whether the search was limited in scope
to the emergency which justified the entry, the Mitchell test also inquired into an officer’s
subjective beliefs and motivations for the warrantless entry:

First, “the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the

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protection of life or property.” Second, “the search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest or seize evidence.” Third, “there must be some
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency
with the area or place to be searched.”

Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 29 (alterations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

{21} This Court recognized that a subjective inquiry is unusual in the Fourth Amendment
context but nonetheless adopted the Mitchell test in full. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 33
(“The second part of the three-part Mitchell test is more controversial. Federal and state
courts, including New Mexico, usually do not consider the subjective intent of an officer in
a search and seizure analysis.”). In doing so, this Court reasoned that questioning the
officer’s subjective intent was critical to limiting the application of the emergency assistance
doctrine, which could otherwise give law enforcement an easy way around the warrant
requirement. See id. ¶ 34 (“A subjective test addresses the chief concern raised by a
warrantless search purportedly justified by the community caretaker exception or emergency
assistance doctrine: the possibility that the police will use the doctrine as a subterfuge or
pretext when the real purpose of the search is to arrest a suspect or gather evidence without
probable cause.”). Mindful that the need to render emergency assistance may arise in the
course of a criminal investigation, we clarified that “[a]lthough the police need not be totally
unconcerned with the apprehension of suspects or the collection of evidence, the motivation
for the intrusion must be a strong sense of emergency[.]” Id. ¶ 39.

{22} The year after the Ryon decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Brigham
City that an officer’s subjective motivation was irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness
of an entry under the emergency assistance doctrine. 547 U.S. at 404 (“An action is
reasonable . . . , regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Despite that clear direction from the Supreme Court,
New Mexico courts continued to use the Ryon test in Fourth Amendment cases. Notably, the
decisions in cases decided on appeal rested solely on the first prong of the test. See, e.g.,
State v. Cordova, 2016-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 8 n.1, 13, 366 P.3d 270 (concluding that the officers
did not have “reasonable grounds to believe” that the defendant was injured, stating that the
subjective prong of the Ryon/Mitchell test was “immaterial” to the analysis, and noting that
the subjective prong was eliminated by the Supreme Court in Brigham City); State v.
Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 37, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.3d 173 (stating that the officers could
not “show reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency requiring immediate
assistance for the protection of life or property”); State v. Baca, 2007-NMCA-016, ¶ 27, 141
N.M. 65, 150 P.3d 1015 (concluding that the officer lacked “specific and articulable facts”
to reasonably conclude there was an emergency at hand and a need for assistance).

{23} We are constrained by the Supreme Court’s precedent in Brigham City and therefore
eliminate the separate inquiry under Ryon into the officer’s subjective intent for the entry and
search under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, a warrantless entry and search of a home

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is permitted under the emergency assistance doctrine if the state establishes just two
elements. First, “[p]olice must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency
at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property[.]”
Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 39. Second, “there must be some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Id. This
two-part test controls whether Officer Temples’ entry and subsequent search of Defendant’s
home was lawful under the emergency assistance doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.

1. Objective reasonableness of the entry

{24} In applying the first step of this analysis, we consider whether the district court’s
factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings support
a conclusion that Officer Temples’ entry was objectively reasonable. An objective review
requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a “prudent and
reasonable official [would] see a need to act to protect life or property[.]” Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 30-31
(explaining that “reasonableness is tested objectively under the totality of the
circumstances”).

{25} Law enforcement must have “credible and specific information” that a victim is in
need of emergency aid before a warrantless entry may be justified under the emergency
assistance doctrine. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 42-43. In Ryon, officers responded to
a “ ‘911 call welfare check’ ” about a “ ‘possible stabbing victim.’ ” Id. ¶ 2. When they
arrived at the scene, they learned from the bleeding victim that the perpetrator lived down
the street. Id. A dispatch went out to locate the suspect who was thought to be on his way
to his residence. Id. ¶ 4. As additional officers were en route to the suspect’s home, the
dispatcher told them that the suspect might be injured. Id. Upon their arrival at the house,
the officers noticed that the lights were on and the front door was slightly ajar. Id. The
officers did not receive a response when they knocked and announced their presence. Id.
Relying on information that the suspect may be injured and finding it odd that the door
would be open in the cold weather, the officers entered the home. Id. Inside they observed
a bloodied knife in the kitchen sink, the knowledge of which they used to obtain a search
warrant for the home. Id. ¶ 5.

{26} To aid in its determination of whether the officers’ entry was objectively reasonable,
this Court weighed “the purpose and nature of the dispatch, the exigency of the situation
based on the known facts, and the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives
to the type of intrusion actually accomplished.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 43-44 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The Court concluded that the known facts—the knowledge that the
suspect may be injured, the state of the house, and the lack of response at the door—did not
point to an imminent emergency and that the officers did not do enough to corroborate the
information they were given before entering without a warrant. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. The Court
noted that the officers did not even know whether the suspect was home, let alone whether
he was actually injured. Id. ¶ 43

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{27} The State argues that this case is distinguishable from Ryon and that Officer
Temples’ entry was objectively reasonable as the information available to him caused him
to reasonably believe entry was necessary to protect Defendant’s children and give aid to
their mother. The State notes that Officer Temples’ reasonable perception of the emergency
came into focus with each new fact he learned while standing outside the apartment. At first,
Officer Temples knew he was responding to a welfare check based on the neighbor’s report
of a loud thumping sound coming from Defendant’s apartment. When Officer Temples
arrived at the apartment, the thumping sound had been replaced with the sounds of a small
child hollering in an attempt to rouse his or her mother and a baby fussing and then crying
continuously. In addition, Officer Temples noticed the doorknob rattling several times as
though someone were attempting to open the door. Crucially, he did not hear the children’s
mother—or any adult—moving within the apartment, even though the child was yelling for
his or her mother to wake up. The State asserts that each of these observations compounded
upon the next to form a sufficient reasonable basis for Officer Temples to conclude that the
nonresponsive mother required medical attention and that, due to her condition, the children
were left alone in a dangerous situation.

{28} Defendant argues that the facts available to Officer Temples were not enough to
support a reasonable belief that a sufficiently compelling emergency existed within the
apartment. Defendant focuses primarily on facts that were not present when Officer Temples
knocked on the door—facts that would more clearly indicate an emergency. For example,
there were no loud noises coming from the apartment when Officer Temples arrived and no
sounds to indicate violent behavior inside. Additionally, there were no concerned neighbors
gathered outside, no damage to the windows or building to indicate an altercation, and no
signs of spilled blood. Furthermore, the children were not wandering alone outside to suggest
that they were left unattended. Contra United States v. Taylor, 624 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir.
2010) (holding that an officer was justified in following a young girl into her home after
finding her wandering alone on a busy street). Finally, Defendant argues that the sounds of
the children were unremarkable for the time of day when Officer Temples knocked. The
small child’s calls to the mother were not extraordinarily loud or severe, and the baby’s
crying was likely tied to Officer Temples’ continued knocking. Defendant thus asserts that
the known facts were insufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that a serious
emergency was underway. Instead, Defendant argues that Officer Temples was acting on
mere conjecture that his assistance was required within the apartment.

{29} We are not convinced by Defendant’s argument that Officer Temples lacked key
information to conclude that the children and their mother were in need of immediate aid.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the district court’s decision, there is substantial evidence to support
the district court’s factual findings in this case. In particular, Officer Temples’ first-hand
knowledge about the presence of small children—who apparently were unsupervised and
unable to rouse their parents—supports the objective reasonableness of his conclusion that
he needed to take action to “[protect] life or property.” See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 39.

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{30} In reaching this conclusion, we are persuaded by the reasoning in Taylor. 624 F.3d
at 632, 635. The court in Taylor concluded that an officer’s actions were objectively
reasonable when he accompanied a four-year-old girl into her house after she was found
wandering alone on a busy street. Id. at 628. Before the officer entered the home, he asked
the girl whether anyone was home to care for her. Id. at 629. She responded that no one was
home and that she had been waiting for the bus to take her to day care. Id. The officer yelled
“hello” into the home several times as he followed the young girl inside. Id. The girl’s father
responded that he was in a back room. Id. When the officer and the girl entered the room,
the officer saw a bag of bullets next to the bed. Id. The officer proceeded to investigate the
father and eventually charged him as a felon in possession of a firearm, a federal offense. Id.
at 629-30.

{31} The Taylor court held that the discovery of the young girl alone on a crowded street
constituted an emergency which reasonably justified the officer’s entry into the girl’s home.
Id. at 632. It noted that the exigency was not limited to the girl herself but also extended to
her father. Id. (“[A] child of such tender age wandering alone outside the home raised the
real possibility that her caretaker was unconscious or otherwise in need of assistance.”).
Because young children are “the most vulnerable members of our society[,]” to find the
officer’s actions unreasonable “would not be in the interests of small children, would not be
in the interests of their parents, and would not be in the interests of the community.” Id. at
635; see also Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 549, 555 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
reasonable officer could conclude that entering an unoccupied house was necessary to locate
a missing child who may have been inside).

{32} In this case, the district court found that Officer Temples knew the children were left
unattended because their mother was unresponsive for several minutes after a neighbor
reported hearing a loud thumping coming from the apartment. Indeed, Officer Temples had
several pieces of specific and credible information that, when coupled with reasonable
inferences based on his observations, warranted his entry to provide emergency assistance.

{33} Officer Temples’ compounding observations formed a reasonable basis for him to
conclude that his emergency assistance was required within the apartment. The purpose of
the dispatch was to check on the welfare of those within Defendant’s apartment. Based on
the information from the dispatcher, Officer Temples knew that a neighbor had heard a loud
thumping sound minutes before his arrival, but the apartment was silent when he got to the
door. The only response he received to his repeated knocking was an infant’s cries and a
young child’s plea to his or her mother to wake up. Unlike the officers in Ryon, Officer
Temples knew the children were located inside the apartment. Contra 2005-NMSC-005, ¶
43. Furthermore, Officer Temples could reasonably infer that the mother was also in the
apartment based on the child’s call to her. He then made the rational inference that the
mother may be injured or unconscious as he did not hear any adult movement within the
apartment in the several minutes he stood outside.

{34} Knowing that the very young children were unattended, Officer Temples had few

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reasonable alternatives but to open the door and check on the occupants. Entering the
apartment was the only feasible way for Officer Temples to corroborate his suspicion that
the mother was unconscious. Cf. id. (reasoning that officers could have contacted their
colleagues at the crime scene, walked around the home, looked in windows, or spoken with
the occupants of the other house on the property before entering suspect’s home). Officer
Temples was the first officer to arrive at the scene. The apartment was not on the ground
floor, and it does not appear from the lapel video that there were any windows accessible to
Officer Temples. It would have been reasonable for Officer Temples to speak with
Defendant’s neighbors, but Officer Temples’ failure to do so does not necessarily mean that
his entry was unreasonable. See id. ¶ 32 (“The fact that a different course of action would
have been reasonable does not necessarily mean the officer’s actions are unreasonable.”).
Moreover, the downstairs neighbor had already reported to police the critical fact of the loud
thumping coming from the apartment.

{35} We are persuaded by the reasoning in Taylor that children deserve society’s utmost
protection. The very young children apparently left to care for themselves in this case also
raised reasonable concerns about the welfare of their guardians. See Taylor, 624 F.3d at 632,
635. Our conclusion about the reasonableness of the entry in this case is based on the totality
of the circumstances; no single fact in isolation is sufficient to justify Officer Temples’ entry.
For example, a baby crying for several minutes at night should not lead a reasonable officer
to conclude that it is in emergency distress. Nor does the mere lack of response to an officer
knocking at the door create a sufficient reasonable basis for an officer to enter a home out
of concern that its occupants may be unable to come to the door. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, Officer Temples reasonably perceived that the children were unattended and
that their mother may be in need of emergency aid. We therefore conclude that Officer
Temples’ entry was objectively reasonable under the emergency assistance doctrine.

{36} Before we turn to the second prong of the modified Ryon test, we pause to correct the
Court of Appeals about the standard of review that must be applied when assessing whether
the district court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of
Appeals improperly rested its decision on an independent review of the lapel video and did
not credit Officer Temples’ testimony regarding the circumstances that led to his entry. See
Yazzie, No. 34,537, mem. op. ¶¶ 11-12. For example, the Court of Appeals stated that the
sounds of the baby and the child were “intermittent and briefly heard,” id. ¶ 12, while Officer
Temples testified that the child inside was “hollering” for the mother to wake up and that the
baby was crying constantly as though left unattended. This discrepancy in the description
of the volume and frequency of the children’s noises demonstrates that the Court of Appeals
substituted its own view of the evidence and failed to view these facts in the light most
favorable to the State as the prevailing party. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 12 (“On appeal,
we must review the totality of the circumstances and must avoid reweighing individual
factors in isolation. . . . In doing so, we . . . view the facts in the manner most favorable to
the prevailing party.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

{37} Additionally, the Court of Appeals did not appropriately defer to the district court’s

11
factual findings. The Court of Appeals’ impressions regarding the sounds of the children on
the video conflicted with Officer Temples’ testimony at the hearing. When faced with
conflicting evidence, the Court of Appeals should have deferred to the district court’s finding
that Officer Temples’ entry was justified based on “what he heard . . . at the apartment.” See
Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 17.

2. Reasonableness of the safety sweep

{38} The second step of the emergency assistance analysis under the Fourth Amendment
requires inquiry into whether Officer Temples had “some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” See Ryon,
2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 39. When police officers enter a home under the emergency assistance
doctrine, they are not permitted to do “more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain
whether someone is in need of assistance . . . and to provide that assistance[.]” Id. ¶ 38
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that the
officer must reasonably perceive “a direct relationship between the area to be searched and
the emergency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A search upon entry
must be limited to the “exigencies which justif[ied] its initiation.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Essentially, this step asks whether the manner and scope of a
search following an entry under the emergency assistance doctrine were reasonable. See
United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (2006) (explaining that this prong is primarily a
question of scope).

{39} In this case, the district court concluded that Officer Temples’ safety sweep was
appropriate as it was a “brief inspection” supported by Officer Temples’ observations upon
entering the apartment. There is substantial evidence to support these findings of the district
court. First, the record shows that Officer Temples directly connected Defendant’s apartment
with the emergency at hand. He testified that he entered the apartment to which he was
dispatched—the same apartment from which he heard a baby crying and a child attempting
to awaken his or her mother.

{40} Next, the evidence shows that the manner and scope of the search were reasonable.
The lapel video shows that Officer Temples spent approximately thirty seconds peering into
the rooms adjoining the main room. He shined his flashlight into each room, but he did not
appear to fully enter the other rooms or disturb any objects within. According to Officer
Temples’ testimony, the empty alcohol bottles he observed were in plain view in the kitchen.

{41} Finally, the record supports the conclusion that the sweep was limited to the
exigencies that justified the initial entry. Officer Temples testified that he performed the
brief safety sweep to ensure officer safety and to ascertain whether any other individuals
required assistance. Finding no one in the apartment but the three children and their parents,
the lapel video shows that Officer Temples returned to the main room where he remained
with the children as he attempted to rouse their parents.

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{42} We defer to the district court’s findings which we determine to be supported by
substantial evidence. Based on those findings, we conclude that Officer Temples’ safety
sweep was reasonable and limited in scope to the emergency at hand. Cf. Najar, 451 F.3d
at 720 (concluding that the officers’ search was confined “to only those places inside the
home where an emergency would reasonably be associated”). We hold that Officer Temples’
entry and subsequent search were objectively reasonable and thus permissible under the
emergency assistance doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.

B. Interstitial Analysis

{43} Because we conclude in this case that Defendant’s right to be free from warrantless
police intrusion into his home is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, we proceed to
examine his claim under Article II, Section 10. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19 (“Under
the interstitial approach, th[is C]ourt asks first whether the right being asserted is protected
under the federal constitution. . . . If it is not, then the state constitution is examined.”).

{44} Defendant asks this Court to depart from federal analysis of the emergency assistance
doctrine to find a violation of his right to be free from unreasonable search under Article II,
Section 10. We have not adopted a test for the emergency assistance doctrine under our state
constitution. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 6 n.3 (explaining that the discussion in that case
was limited to a Fourth Amendment analysis). For this purpose, Defendant requests that we
adopt the full, three-part Ryon test, including inquiry into the officer’s primary, subjective
motivations for the warrantless entry. To adopt this inquiry would conflict with federal
guidance, however, we may diverge from federal precedent in interpreting our own
constitution when we identify a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between the
state and federal governments, or distinctive state characteristics which warrant such
departure. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19. We consider our distinct heightened
preference for warrants and historical view that Article II, Section 10 offers greater
protection for individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to be “adequate grounds
upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence.” State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 15-
16, 329 P.3d 689.

{45} Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees that “[t]he people
shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures[.]” In several instances, New Mexico courts have recognized that this provision
provides broader protection of individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment. See
State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 53, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861; State v. Garcia, 2009-
NMSC-046, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032; see also Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 16
(holding that Article II, Section 10 offers individuals greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment of the right to privacy in their garbage left for collection); State v. Ochoa, 2009-
NMCA-002, ¶¶ 8, 38, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143, cert. quashed, 147 N.M. 463, 225 P.3d
793 (holding that pretextual traffic stops violate Article II, Section 10 though such stops are
permitted under the Fourth Amendment). Article II, Section 10 confers this broader
protection because it “is calibrated slightly differently than the Fourth Amendment.” Levya,

13
2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It not only protects
individual privacy rights and supports “the integrity of the criminal justice system,” but it
also serves as the “ultimate regulator of police conduct.” See id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 22 (requiring that police knock
and announce their presence when executing a search warrant).

{46} The regulatory role of Article II, Section 10 supports New Mexico’s preference for
warrants. See Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 16 (“The underlying principle upon which the
preference for warrants is predicated is that the judicial warrant . . . provides the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches
than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)); see also Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 30 (explaining that New Mexico favors
warrants and a reasonableness analysis over blanket federal rules). Because the emergency
assistance doctrine allows officers to enter a home without a warrant, our interpretation of
Article II, Section 10 as the supreme regulator of police conduct requires us to assess an
officer’s warrantless entry and search under a more stringent standard.

{47} Inquiry into an officer’s primary motivation for entry affords individuals broader
protection against baseless, warrantless intrusions into their homes. The subjective element
of the Ryon test provides a judicial sieve through which courts may scrutinize warrantless
police action and properly exclude evidence obtained under the guise of emergency
response. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 37 (“[W]e permit the trial court to examine
motivation because, in the absence of a warrant, a neutral magistrate has not provided a
preliminary review.”). As this analysis offers greater protection for individual privacy rights
and serves to regulate warrantless police conduct, we consider the full Ryon test integral to
the rights afforded under Article II, Section 10.

{48} Accordingly, we adopt the complete Ryon test to determine under Article II, Section
10 when the emergency assistance doctrine may apply to a warrantless entry and search of
a home. For the doctrine to apply: (1) “[p]olice must have reasonable grounds to believe that
there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection
of life or property;” (2) “the search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest a
suspect or to seize evidence[, and] . . . the motivation for the intrusion must be a strong sense
of an emergency;” and (3) “there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable
cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Ryon, 2005-NMSC-
005, ¶ 39.

{49} The first and third prongs of the Ryon test contemplate the same analysis conducted
under the Fourth Amendment; we therefore come to the same conclusions reached above.
Under Article II, Section 10, Officer Temples had objectively reasonable grounds to believe
there was an emergency that required his immediate assistance to protect Defendant’s
children and their mother. Additionally, there was a reasonable basis for Officer Temples to
associate the emergency with the apartment he ultimately entered and searched.

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{50} Under the second prong, there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s
conclusion that Officer Temples’ primary motivation for entry was to render aid and
protection from harm. Indeed, Officer Temples testified that he was worried about the
mother’s medical condition when she failed to respond to her child’s plea to wake up. He
further testified that her lack of response led him to believe that the children had been left
unattended. The Court of Appeals did not analyze Officer Temples’ primary motivation for
entry, but it agreed with the district court that he appeared “genuinely concerned about the
welfare of the children.” Yazzie, No. 34,537, mem. op. ¶ 13.

{51} Defendant asks us to infer that Officer Temples’ primary motive was not to render
aid and protection but rather to investigate a suspected crime within the apartment. To
support this inference, Defendant points to the facts that Officer Temples requested a unit
with a PBT and did not call medical responders after entering the residence. The district
court concluded that Officer Temples’ “primary motivation was not criminal investigation.”
We will defer to the district court’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence. The
facts relied upon by Defendant urging a contrary conclusion are not sufficient to overcome
the standard of review in this case. See Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 15 (“An appellate
court must indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the district court’s decision and
disregard all inferences or evidence to the contrary.” (alteration, internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). In sum, Officer Temples’ entry and search were reasonable under Article
II, Section 10.

V. CONCLUSION

{52} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Because it reversed the
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals did not reach
Defendant’s remaining arguments. We remand this case for a determination of any issues
remaining on appeal.

{53} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice

____________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice, Retired
Sitting by designation

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____________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice, Retired
Sitting by designation

____________________________________
GARY L. CLINGMAN, Justice, Retired
Sitting by designation

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