June 29, 2020- State of New Mexico v. William Ramey, No. A-1-CA-37640

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: _______________	2
Filing Date: JUNE 29, 2020	3
No. A-1-CA-37640	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
WILLIAM RAMEY,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY	10
Jarod K. Hofacket, District Judge	11
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	12
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
for Appellee	15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	16
Santa Fe, NM	17
Victor E. Sanchez, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defender	18
Albuquerque, NM	19
for Appellant	20
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 6/29/2020 10:59 AM

OPINION	1
VARGAS, Judge	2
{1} 	Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, in	3
violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011, amended 2019), following	4
entry of a conditional plea. Defendant contends that the district court erred in	5
denying 	his 	motion 	to 	suppress 	all 	evidence, 	including 	physical 	evidence,	6
testimonial evidence, and statements made by Defendant. In support of his claim,	7
Defendant argues that his right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth	8
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New	9
Mexico State Constitution was violated. That violation, he contends, requires the	10
suppression of the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule because the discovery	11
of a prior warrant did not purge the taint of the unconstitutional seizure. We agree	12
with Defendant and therefore reverse.	13
BACKGROUND	14
{2} 	The Silver City Police Department has a practice whereby officers routinely	15
pull up to unknown individuals walking at night and ask for their names and dates	16
of birth. Officer Javier Hernandez testified during the suppression hearing that the	17
purpose of this practice is to create a “database [of] people” who are walking around	18
Silver City on any particular night so he could review the names in the event a crime	19
was committed later in the night.	20

2
{3} 	At approximately 12:18 a.m., Defendant, on his way home from work, was	1
walking alone on the sidewalk, traveling east along New Mexico Highway 180.	2
While driving his patrol car east on New Mexico Highway 180, Officer Hernandez	3
spotted Defendant walking along the highway. The officer drove past Defendant,	4
made a U-turn, drove westbound, traveled past Defendant again, and then made a	5
second U-turn to pull up behind him.	6
{4} 	Officer Hernandez testified that, at the time he spotted Defendant, he had not	7
had previous contact with Defendant, he did not recognize him as someone with	8
active warrants, he was not looking for anyone fitting Defendant’s description, he	9
did not recall reports of crimes committed in the vicinity of his encounter with	10
Defendant, and Defendant was not acting suspiciously or in a way that made him	11
think Defendant had committed a crime. Instead, Officer Hernandez testified, the	12
reason he made contact with Defendant was simply because he was walking.	13
{5} 	Officer Hernandez parked his car less than fifty feet away from Defendant,	14
shining his headlights on him. After stepping out of his car, Officer Hernandez began	15
walking toward Defendant, who had stopped walking. The officer then initiated the	16
following exchange:	17
Officer Hernandez: What’s up, brother?	18
Defendant: [inaudible]	19
Officer Hernandez: Good, and you?	20

3
Defendant: Walking home.	1
Officer Hernandez: Yeah, where you live at?	2
Defendant: Up there on Rosedale.	3
Officer Hernandez: Ok. I’m just doing a citizen contact, man. Just	4
seeing who’s out and about, okay? What’s your name?	5
Defendant: Will.	6
Officer Hernandez: Will. What’s your last name, Will?	7
Defendant: Ramey.	8
Officer Hernandez: How do you spell your last name?	9
Defendant: R-A-M-E-Y.	10
At this point, Officer Hernandez, who was standing a few feet away from Defendant,	11
began writing down Defendant’s information. He then continued with the exchange:	12
Officer Hernandez: You live over there on Rosedale? That what you	13
said?	14
Defendant: Yeah.	15
Officer Hernandez: What was your first name again?	16
Defendant: Will.	17
Officer Hernandez: Will. Okay what’s your date of birth, Will?	18
Defendant provided his date of birth, and the officer continued:	19
Officer Hernandez: Alright, man, you have a good one. Just be careful	20
on your way home, okay?	21
Defendant: Okay.	22

4
Defendant began walking away from Officer Hernandez when the officer said	1
something about Rosedale, to which Defendant responded, “Hell yeah! [inaudible].”	2
Officer Hernandez replied, “I got you, man.” Still standing in the same spot where	3
he stopped to speak with Defendant, Officer Hernandez immediately called into	4
dispatch to tell them he had a name and date of birth for dispatch to check. After	5
dispatch responded, Officer Hernandez provided Defendant’s information.	6
{6} 	When Officer Hernandez returned to his car dispatch informed him that	7
Defendant had an outstanding warrant for driving with a revoked license. Upon	8
learning this information, Officer Hernandez pulled up to Defendant again and	9
arrested him on the warrant. While conducting a search incident to arrest, Officer	10
Hernandez discovered methamphetamine on Defendant’s person.	11
{7} 	Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search	12
incident to arrest. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress,	13
concluding the circumstances demonstrated the encounter was consensual and,	14
therefore, not a seizure. Defendant appealed to this Court pursuant to a conditional	15
guilty plea to the possession of a controlled substance charge, which reserved his	16
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.	17
DISCUSSION	18
{8} 	Defendant’s 	appeal 	raises 	the 	following 	issues: 	(1) 	whether 	Officer	19
Hernandez’s actions of stopping Defendant to ask for his name and date of birth	20

5
constituted a seizure; and (2) whether the evidence derived from any seizure must	1
be suppressed.	2
I. 	Standard of Review	3
{9} 	“Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law	4
and fact.” State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008, ¶ 13, 437 P. 3d 182 (internal quotation	5
marks and citation omitted). We begin by reviewing the district court’s factual	6
determinations 	for substantial 	evidence. 	Id. 	“Substantial 	evidence is 	relevant	7
evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”	8
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We give “deference to the district	9
court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented,” and review contested	10
facts “in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (internal quotation	11
marks and citations omitted). We then review the district court’s application of the	12
law to those facts de novo. Id.	13
II. 	Requesting Defendant’s Identity Constituted a Seizure Under the Fourth	14
Amendment	15
{10} 	Before 	examining 	whether 	Officer 	Hernandez’s 	conduct 	in 	requesting	16
Defendant’s name and date of birth violated the Fourth Amendment, we must first	17
consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Hernandez’s	18
actions of stopping Defendant as he walked home constituted a seizure under the	19
Fourth Amendment.	20

6
{11} 	“Law enforcement officers generally need no justification to approach private	1
individuals on the street to ask questions.” State v. Gutierrez, 2008-NMCA-015, ¶ 9,	2
143 N.M. 522, 177 P.3d 1096; State v. Williams, 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 11, 139 N.M.	3
578, 136 P.3d 579 (“An officer may approach a person to ask questions or request	4
identification, without any basis for suspecting that particular individual, as long as	5
the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”	6
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Indeed, “[p]olice contact is	7
consensual so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and	8
go about his business or to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the	9
encounter.” State v. Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 13, 318 P.3d 180 (alteration,	10
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	11
{12} 	However, “a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment	12
when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person	13
would have believed he was not free to leave.” Id. ¶ 12 (alterations, internal	14
quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[I]f an officer conveys a message that an	15
individual is not free to walk away, by either physical force or a showing of	16
authority, the encounter becomes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 13	17
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instances of seizure by a show of	18
authority, however, also “requires submission to the assertion of authority.” Id.	19
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	20

7
{13} 	To 	determine 	“whether 	a 	person 	was 	seized, 	we 	evaluate: 	(1) 	the	1
circumstances surrounding the contact, including whether police used a show of	2
authority; and (2) whether the circumstances of the contact reached such a level of	3
accosting and restraint that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was	4
not free to leave.” Id. ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In	5
evaluating whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, [this Court] look[s]	6
to three factors: (1) the police conduct, (2) the person of the individual citizen, and	7
(3) the physical surroundings existing at the time of the encounter.” Williams, 2006-	8
NMCA-062, ¶ 13. At issue in the present case is whether the circumstances	9
surrounding 	the 	initial 	encounter 	between 	Officer 	Hernandez 	and 	Defendant	10
conveyed a message to Defendant that he was not free to leave.	11
{14} 	We considered facts similar to these in State v. Soto, 2008-NMCA-032, 143	12
N.M. 631, 179 P.3d 1239. In Soto, the testimony established that it was the practice	13
of the Ruidoso Downs Police Department to routinely pull people over to obtain	14
information about their identities to assist officers in potentially solving crimes that	15
occurred later in the night. Id. ¶ 2. At about 2:30 a.m., two Ruidoso Downs Police	16
Officers observed the defendant riding his bicycle on a public service road. Id.	17
Without activating their lights, the officers pulled alongside the defendant, at which	18
point the defendant stopped his bicycle. Id. ¶ 3. The officers asked where the	19
defendant was going. Id. The defendant explained he was going home and when he	20

8
was unable to give an address, one of the officers asked for his identification. Id. The	1
defendant provided the officers with his driver’s license, and the officers ran a	2
warrant check on him. Id. The officers discovered that the defendant had an	3
outstanding felony warrant and arrested him. Id. During the search incident to arrest,	4
officers discovered that the defendant had methamphetamine in his possession. Id.	5
{15} 	Rejecting the state’s argument that the encounter was consensual, this Court	6
held that the defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.	7
See id. ¶ 13. We explained that the officers’ actions of pulling up next to and	8
stopping the defendant’s bicycle, their questioning of the defendant’s activities, their	9
request for his identification, their conduct in retaining the defendant’s driver’s	10
license to run a warrant check, the lateness of the hour, and the defendant’s	11
“isolation” on the service road “conveyed to [the d]efendant that the officers	12
expected [the d]efendant to comply with their requests.” Id. Accordingly, we held	13
that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person “would not feel free	14
to disregard the officers or terminate the encounter.” 	Id. (alteration, internal	15
quotation marks, and citation omitted).	16
{16} 	Here, Defendant was walking alone at 12:30 a.m., going from work to his	17
home with no other people walking in the area. Officer Hernandez was driving in a	18
patrol vehicle when he passed by Defendant, made a U-turn, passed by him again,	19
and made another U-turn before pulling up behind Defendant and parking his	20

9
vehicle, with his headlights shining on Defendant. Defendant had stopped walking	1
when Officer Hernandez stepped out of his patrol car, and stood in the same spot as	2
Officer Hernandez walked toward him. Officer Hernandez approached Defendant,	3
coming within a few feet of him, asked where Defendant lived, and asked for his	4
name and date of birth.	5
{17} 	The State argues that because the conversational tone was “cordial, friendly	6
and not remotely confrontational” no seizure occurred. Additionally, the State argues	7
that this case is distinguishable from Soto because Officer Hernandez’s contact with	8
Defendant was “far more brief and informal,” he did not ask for details about where	9
Defendant was going,1 and he did not request or retain Defendant’s identification.	10
Notwithstanding these points of distinction, we are still faced with circumstances in	11
which a reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard Officer Hernandez’s	12
questions and walk away. Based on Defendant’s isolation in the area, the lateness of	13
the hour, Officer Hernandez’s conduct in passing Defendant and performing two U-	14
turns before parking behind Defendant with his headlights shining on Defendant,	15
Defendant’s conduct in stopping when the officer parked behind him, Officer	16
Hernandez’s question about where Defendant lived, and Officer Hernandez’s	17
1 We note that upon Defendant informing Officer Hernandez that Defendant
was walking home, Officer Hernandez asked where he lived. He did not, however,
ask for more information after Defendant told him the street on which his home was
located.

10
request for Defendant’s name and date of birth, a reasonable person would not have	1
felt free to leave. See id.; Williams, 2006-NMCA-062, ¶ 11. Therefore, we conclude	2
that Defendant was seized under the Fourth Amendment when Officer Hernandez	3
stopped him and asked him questions. Having concluded Defendant was seized	4
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we now consider whether the	5
evidence derived from this seizure is admissible or must be suppressed under the	6
Fourth Amendment.	7
III. 	The Evidence Must Be Excluded	8
{18} 	“As a general rule, the federal constitution requires suppression of evidence	9
obtained in a manner that runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Tapia,	10
2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 13, 414 P.3d 332 (omission, internal quotation marks, and	11
citation omitted). This “exclusionary rule encompasses both the primary evidence	12
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure and evidence later	13
discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the	14
poisonous tree.” Id. (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	15
Notwithstanding the general rule that evidence obtained as a result of an improper	16
seizure should be excluded, the United States Supreme Court has identified three	17
exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine, the inevitable	18
discovery doctrine, and the attenuation doctrine. Id. ¶ 14.	19

11
{19} 	Rather than argue that the seizure of Defendant in this case was justified by	1
reasonable suspicion or another exception to the warrant requirement, see State v.	2
Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (“Warrantless seizures	3
are presumed to be unreasonable and the [s]tate bears the burden of proving	4
reasonableness.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), the State contends	5
that even if Defendant was seized, any evidence obtained following the seizure is	6
nevertheless admissible under the attenuation doctrine. The attenuation doctrine	7
provides 	that 	“[e]vidence 	is 	admissible 	when 	the 	connection 	between 	[the]	8
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted	9
by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional	10
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence	11
obtained.” Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation	12
omitted).	13
{20} 	To evaluate whether the relationship between the unlawful seizure and the	14
challenged evidence has become “sufficiently weak [so as] to dissipate any taint”	15
that results from the original illegality, the United States Supreme Court identified	16
three factors relevant to the inquiry: “(1) the lapsed time between the illegality and	17
the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and	18
(3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Brown v.	19
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).	20

12
{21} 	First, we note that only six minutes elapsed between the initial seizure and the	1
discovery 	of 	the 	methamphetamine. 	Because 	the 	temporal 	proximity 	factor	2
“[g]enerally . . . 	weighs in favor of suppression unless substantial time elapses	3
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained[,]” State v. Edwards,	4
2019-NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 452 P.3d 413 (internal quotation marks and citation	5
omitted), we weigh this factor in favor of suppression. See Utah v. Strieff, ___ U.S.	6
___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (explaining that when evidence is discovered	7
“only minutes after the illegal stop[,] . . . such a short time interval counsels in favor	8
of suppression”).	9
{22} 	The 	second 	factor, 	whether 	there 	existed 	intervening 	circumstances	10
attenuating the initial seizure from the discovery of the evidence, however, strongly	11
favors attenuation. After obtaining Defendant’s name and date of birth, Officer	12
Hernandez transmitted the information to dispatch who notified the officer that	13
Defendant had a valid, preexisting arrest warrant that was entirely unconnected with	14
the initial seizure. When a defendant has “a preexisting, untainted, valid arrest	15
warrant, which obligate[s an officer] to arrest [the d]efendant when [the officer]	16
discover[s] 	it,” 	this 	intervening 	circumstance 	“strongly 	favors 	attenuation.”	17
Edwards, 2019-NMCA-070, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Strieff, 136	18
S. Ct. at 2062 (“In this case, the warrant was valid, it predated [the] Officer[‘s]	19
investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the stop.”).	20

13
{23} 	Finally, we consider the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct,	1
described as a “particularly significant,” factor by the United States Supreme Court.	2
Id.. “[T]o be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the mere	3
absence of proper cause for the seizure.” Edwards, 2019-NMCA-070, ¶ 12 (internal	4
quotation marks and citation omitted).	5
{24} 	We have previously explained that when “police stop[ a d]efendant on the	6
basis of nothing other than the vague notion that they would obtain [the d]efendant’s	7
personal information from him, and without any further suspicion, they [run] a	8
warrant check on him[, t]he purpose of the stop—to obtain information from [the	9
d]efendant—[is] directly related to [the d]efendant’s ultimate arrest.” Soto, 2008-	10
NMCA-032, ¶ 27; see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (rejecting the defendant’s argument	11
that the officer’s detention of a defendant to ask what he was doing at a residence	12
the officer was surveilling for drug activity was purposeful and flagrant, stating that	13
the officer’s actions were “not a suspicionless fishing expedition in the hope that	14
something would turn up.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Tapia,	15
2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 38 (concluding police misconduct was neither purposeful nor	16
flagrant because “[n]othing in the record indicates that [the officer] initiated the	17
traffic stop for the specific purpose of investigating [the d]efendant or for some other	18
merely pretextual reason.”). Therefore, to weigh in favor of suppression, a defendant	19
must demonstrate “purposeful and flagrant official misconduct where: (1) the	20

14
impropriety 	was 	obvious, 	or 	the 	official 	knew 	his 	conduct 	was 	likely	1
unconstitutional but continued nonetheless; or (2) the misconduct was investigatory	2
in design and purpose.” State v. Monafo, 2016-NMCA-092, ¶ 15, 384 P.3d 134.	3
{25} 	Here, Officer Hernandez testified that it was his practice when working the	4
night shift, regardless of whether a crime had been reported or not, to stop anyone	5
he did not know and ask for their name and date of birth. He explained that his reason	6
for doing this was to establish a database of people walking around Silver City at	7
night, so that if a crime was committed later in the night, he could review the names	8
of the people with whom he had had contact. This was a standard practice of the	9
Silver City Police Department.	10
{26} 	Notwithstanding his testimony that the purpose behind his stop of Defendant	11
was part of his practice to establish a database, we note that Officer Hernandez did	12
not simply add Defendant to his list and continue with his shift. Instead, before he	13
even left the spot where he stood speaking with Defendant, he contacted dispatch,	14
and provided Defendant’s information to perform a warrant check on Defendant—	15
all without any suspicion that Defendant had engaged in or was engaging in criminal	16
activity. Compare Soto, 2008-NMCA-032, ¶ 27 (observing that the “police stopped	17
[the d]efendant on the basis of nothing other than the vague notion that they would	18
obtain [the d]efendant’s personal information from him, and without any further	19
suspicion, they ran a warrant check on him”), with Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063	20

15
(concluding that the officer “was at most negligent” in suspecting the defendant of	1
criminal activity), Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 38 (concluding that the record was	2
devoid of evidence “that [the officer] initiated the traffic stop for the specific purpose	3
of investigating [the d]efendant or for some other merely pretextual reason[;] . . .	4
rather, she addressed [the d]efendant based on her observation that he was not	5
wearing a seat belt”), and Edwards, 2019-NMCA-070, ¶ 12 (concluding that the	6
police “investigation was clearly not a suspicionless fishing expedition in the hope	7
that something would turn up[; r]ather, [the officer]’s aim was to investigate the	8
report of a possible serious crime, a shooting, and so he sought to interview potential	9
departing witnesses” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As the	10
Supreme Court of Kansas concluded:	11
In applying the third [attenuation] factor, we also note that when	12
law 	enforcement 	officers 	approach 	random 	citizens, 	request	13
identification, and run warrant checks for no apparent reason, the	14
officers clearly are performing investigatory detentions designed and	15
executed in the hope that something might turn up. . . . Regardless of	16
whether a suspicionless detention to identify a citizen and check that	17
citizen for outstanding arrest warrants is characterized as a standard	18
practice, a field interview, a pedestrian check, or a “fishing expedition,”	19
such a detention can, and often will, demonstrate at least some level of	20
flagrant police conduct.	21
State v. Moralez, 300 P.3d 1090, 1103 (Kan. 2013), abrogated on other grounds as	22
recognized by State v. Tatro, 445 P.3d 173, 180 (Kan. 2019).	23
{27} 	Although Officer Hernandez characterized the basis for stopping Defendant	24
and requesting his name and date of birth as falling within a standard practice of	25

16
collecting names in case criminal activity occurred later on that night, his conduct	1
demonstrated that his true purpose in gathering Defendant’s information was to run	2
a warrant check. Accordingly, “the misconduct was investigatory in design and	3
purpose,” 	Monafo, 2016-NMCA-092, ¶ 15, and therefore weighs in favor of	4
suppression. Under these circumstances, we conclude admission of the evidence in	5
Defendant’s possession would embolden police to engage in unreasonable seizures	6
and, therefore, this factor weighs in favor of suppression. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at	7
2063 (explaining that the third factor contemplates “exclusion only when the police	8
misconduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant”);	9
see also id. at 2063-64 (concluding that the officer’s decision to stop the defendant	10
was an isolated incident and “was at most negligent,” but observing that “[w]ere	11
evidence of a dragnet search presented here, the application of the Brown factors	12
could be different”); cf. Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 38 ( concluding that “[t]his third	13
consideration tips the balance away from suppression because nothing suggests that	14
admission of the evidence will embolden police to engage in unconstitutional traffic	15
stops”); Edwards, 2019-NMCA-070, ¶ 12 (holding that “[t]here is no evidence that	16
[the officer] approached and addressed [the d]efendant for arbitrary reasons, and	17
similarly nothing suggests that admission of the evidence will embolden police to	18
engage in unconstitutional investigatory detentions.” (alteration, internal quotation	19
marks, and citation omitted)).	20

17
{28} 	Applying the three attenuation factors, we hold that the evidence discovered	1
on Defendant’s person was inadmissible because the seizure was not sufficiently	2
attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant. Compare Soto, 2008-NMCA-032,	3
¶¶ 26-27 (excluding evidence obtained after an officer discovers and executes a	4
preexisting arrest warrant, because the first and third factors weighed in favor of	5
suppression), with Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (“Although the illegal stop was close in	6
time to [the defendant’s] arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors	7
supporting 	the 	[s]tate.”), 	Tapia, 	2018-NMSC-017, 	¶¶ 35, 	37-38 	(concluding	8
exclusion of the evidence is unnecessary when the first factor weighs in favor of	9
suppression but the second and third factors weigh in favor of attenuation), and	10
Edwards, 2019-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 11-12 (same). Having concluded Defendant’s right	11
is protected under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, we need	12
not reach his argument under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.	13
See State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957 (“If the	14
right is protected by the federal constitution, then the state constitutional claim is not	15
reached.”).	16
CONCLUSION	17
{29} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying	18
Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of Defendant’s	19
unlawful seizure, and we remand to the district court to permit Defendant to	20

18
withdraw his conditional plea. See State v. Jean-Paul, 2013-NMCA-032, ¶ 34, 295	1
P.3d 1072 (permitting the defendant to withdraw her conditional plea after prevailing	2
on her appeal of the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress).	3
{30} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	4
______________________________	5
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	6
WE CONCUR:	7
____________________________________	8
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	9
____________________________________	10
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	11