May 28, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Ryan Fast, No. A-1-CA-37655

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 5/28/2019 11:27 AM

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STA... OF NEW M_...C'

Sadan Ge NoW MeXICu,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
V. NO. A-1-CA-37655
RYAN FAST,

Defendant-Appellant.
Al. wAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

Christina P. Argyres, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
John Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

3 Defendant has appealed following his conviction for DWI. We previously
issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to affirm.

Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain

unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.

1 {2} 	In his docketing statement Defendant raised two issues, contending that the
2 officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop that led to his arrest and
3 conviction, and challenging the metropolitan court's imposition of certain fees. [DS
4 4] He renews both arguments in his memorandum in opposition. [MIO 2-7] We
5 address each in turn.
6 	{3} 	Relative to the validity of the traffic stop, Defendant contends that the officer's
7 belief that he observed a traffic violation when Defendant crossed a "painted center
8 median" containing a solid yellow line should be regarded as an unreasonable mistake
9 of law. [MIO 2-6] However, nearly identical situation was presented in State v.
10 Dopslaf, 2015-NMCA-098, ~ 1,356 P.3d 559, wherein this Court concluded that the
11 	officer's beliefthatthe defendant had violated NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-319 (1978)
12 	was reasonable. Defendant suggests no fact or circumstance that would distinguish
13 	this case. We therefore conclude that Dopslafis controlling.
14 	{4} 	Defendant suggests that the ambiguity inherent in Section 66-7-319 and
15 	recognized four years ago in Dopslaf should undermine the reasonableness of the
16 	officer's belief that Defendant committed a violation. However, as the analysis in
17 Dopslaf reflects, 	the 	ambiguity 	in 	Section 	66-7-319 	only 	contributes 	to 	the
18 	reasonableness of the officer's belief that the observed conduct constituted a traffic
19 violation. SeeDopslaf, 2015-NMCA-098, ~~ 14, 16-17 (explaining that the ambiguity
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1 inherent in Section 66-7-319 contributed to the reasonableness of the officer's belief
2 that the defendant 	had committed a violation). 	Insofar as the 	statute remains
3 	unaltered, our analysis and conclusion remain the same.
4 	{5} 	More fundamentally, we understand Defendant to contend that ambiguous
5 statutes such as Section 66-7-319 should be deemed invalid, thereby precluding any
6 presumption of good-faith mistake oflaw. [MIO 4-6] In so arguing, Defendant relies
7 on 	Fifth 	and 	Eleventh 	Circuit authorities. However, nothing 	within 	our 	own
8 jurisprudence appears to be consistent with this suggested approach, and we decline
9 the invitation to conflate statutory ambiguity with categorical-invalidity.
10 	{6} 	Finally, Defendant renews his challenge to the metropolitan court's imposition
11 	of several fees . [MIO 7] For the reasons previously stated, [CN 2-3] we adhere to our
12 	initial assessment of this matter, and reject Defendant's assertion of error.
13 	{7} 	Accordingly, 	for the reasons stated in 	our notice of proposed summary
14 disposition and above, we affirm.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WE CONCUR:

ra ° =e Ch

BRIANA H. Z

Judge