March 7, 2022- Charles Benns v. New Mexico Department of Public Safety, No. A-1-CA-38507

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
_ Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Opinion Number: Filed 3/7/2022 1:18 PM
Filing Date: March 7, 2022 A. 2 |
al
No. A-1-CA-38507 Mark Reynolds
CHARLES BENNS,
Petitioner-Respondent
v.
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

Respondent-Petitioner.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Denise Barela Shepherd, District Judge

Christin K. Kennedy
Albuquerque, NM

Justine Fox-Young, P.C.
Justine Fox-Young
Albuquerque, NM

for Respondent

Joan M. Waters, Assistant General Counsel
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

OPINION	1
DUFFY, Judge.	2
{1} 	In this appeal we consider whether the New Mexico Department of Public	3
Safety (DPS) erred in denying Petitioner Charles Benns’s application for a concealed	4
handgun license under the Concealed Handgun Carry Act (CHCA), NMSA 1978,	5
§§ 29-19-1 to -15 (2003, as amended through 2015). DPS concluded that Benns is	6
disqualified by statute from obtaining a concealed handgun license based on two	7
prior convictions for which he received deferred sentences. On Benns’s petition for	8
writ of certiorari to the district court, the court reversed DPS’s denial, reasoning that	9
because Benns had successfully completed his deferred sentences, he was not	10
considered to have been “convicted” for purposes of the CHCA. We conclude that	11
the term “convicted” as used in the CHCA refers to an adjudication of guilt and does	12
not depend on the imposition of a sentence. Therefore, Benns’s prior convictions	13
disqualify him from obtaining a concealed handgun license, notwithstanding his	14
successful completion of his deferred sentences. We reverse the district court and	15
affirm DPS.	16
BACKGROUND	17
{2} 	New Mexico’s CHCA authorizes DPS to issue concealed handgun licenses to	18
“qualified applicants.” Section 29-19-3. Applicant qualifications are set out in	19
Section 29-19-4, which first lists ten criteria that applicants must satisfy, followed	20
by four types of past criminal conduct that disqualify an applicant. Two of these	21

2
criteria are at issue here. First, Section 29-19-4(A)(5) requires that an applicant must	1
not have been “convicted of a felony in New Mexico or any other state or pursuant	2
to the laws of the United States or any other jurisdiction.” Second, Section 29-19-	3
4(B)(4) states that DPS shall deny a concealed handgun license to an applicant who	4
has “been convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving assault, battery or battery	5
against a household member.” The CHCA does not define the word “convicted.”	6
{3} 	In 2017, Benns applied for a concealed handgun carry license. DPS denied	7
Benns’s application based on his prior misdemeanor and felony history: in 1989,	8
Benns was convicted of misdemeanor battery against a household member and	9
received a deferred sentence, and in 1991, Benns was charged with aggravated	10
assault with a deadly weapon, a fourth-degree felony, to which he pleaded no contest	11
and received a deferred sentence. See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-2(A) (1963). Benns	12
successfully completed the terms of the second deferred sentence in 1994.	13
{4} 	Benns requested an administrative hearing for reconsideration of the denial.	14
DPS granted this request and, after the hearing, issued a final order denying Benns’s	15
application. Benns appealed the decision to the district court. The district court	16
reversed DPS’s denial, concluding that upon successful completion of his deferred	17
sentences, Benns was no longer “convicted” for purposes of Sections 29-19-4(A)(5)	18
and (B)(4). DPS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.	19

3
DISCUSSION	1
{5} 	The issue in this case is whether the word “convicted” as used in the CHCA	2
includes convictions for which a defendant has successfully completed a deferred	3
sentence. We conclude that it does and hold that Benns’s criminal history constitutes	4
a basis for disqualification under Section 29-19-4.	5
I. 	Standard of Review	6
{6} 	“Upon a grant of a petition for writ of certiorari under Rule 12-505 [NMRA],	7
this Court conducts the same review of an administrative order as the district court	8
sitting in its appellate capacity, while at the same time determining whether the	9
district court erred in the first appeal.” Commc’n Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. State,	10
2019-NMCA-031, ¶ 13, 446 P.3d 1183 (internal quotation marks and citation	11
omitted). “[W]e apply a de novo standard of review to administrative rulings	12
regarding statutory construction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	13
II. 	A Deferred Sentence Does Not Eliminate the Underlying Criminal	14
Conviction for Purposes of the CHCA	15
{7} 	In order to understand the effect of Benns’s deferred sentences in this case,	16
we begin with a brief overview of the features of a deferred sentence. We then turn	17
to New Mexico case law addressing how a deferred sentence may be taken into	18
account for other purposes. As we discuss below, the characteristics that define a	19
deferred sentence—an adjudication of guilt without the imposition of a sentence—	20

4
are what ultimately inform our conclusion that the underlying conviction remains	1
and may be taken into account for purposes of the CHCA.	2
{8} 	Deferments are one of three statutory sentencing options that provide an	3
alternative to confinement. See NMSA 1978, § 31-20-3 (1985) (providing for	4
deferred and suspended sentences); NMSA 1978, § 31-20-13 (1994) (providing for	5
conditional discharge orders). “The Legislature intended to give courts the authority	6
to defer sentencing if, in the court’s opinion, the defendant could be rehabilitated	7
without imposing punishment.” United States v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 29, 326	8
P.3d 454; see id. (stating that “[t]ypically, a deferred sentence would be considered	9
in cases where the court feels that it is more appropriate to allow the offender the	10
opportunity to prove that his lapse in judgment was a one-time mistake and not an	11
error indicative of a more serious, underlying issue requiring incarceration”). Thus,	12
for all but first degree and capital felonies, the Legislature provided that	13
[u]pon entry of a judgment of conviction of any crime not constituting	14
a capital or first degree felony, any court having jurisdiction when it is	15
satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as	16
well as the defendant will be served thereby, may . . . enter an order	17
deferring the imposition of sentence.	18
Section 31-20-3(A) (emphases added).	19
{9} 	Functionally, deferments take place after the entry of a plea or conviction but	20
before any sentence is imposed. 	See Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 24; 	State v.	21
Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 783, 82 P.3d 954 (stating that a	22

5
deferred sentencing order is entered with an adjudication of guilt). When the period	1
and conditions of deferment are complete, the defendant “has satisfied his criminal	2
liability for the crime, [and] the court shall enter a dismissal of the criminal charges.”	3
NMSA 1978, § 31-20-9 (1977). Thus, “[d]eferment, if successfully completed,	4
would result in no actual sentence being imposed and ultimately in a dismissal of the	5
charges.” Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 24. But see State v. Kenneman, 1982-NMCA-	6
145, ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 794, 653 P.2d 170 (stating that if the defendant violates the terms	7
of his probation, the district court may revoke the deferral and impose any sentence	8
that might originally have been imposed).1
9
{10} 	New Mexico courts have previously concluded that even though the criminal	10
charge is dismissed after a defendant has completed the period of deferment, the	11
1 A deferment falls between the other alternative sentencing options. A
suspended sentence also involves an adjudication of guilt, but in contrast to a
deferment, the court will “sentence the defendant and enter an order suspending in
whole or in part the execution of the sentence[.]” Section 31-20-3(B); see also
Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 10 (stating that for both suspended and deferred
sentences there has been an adjudication of guilt); Kenneman, 1982-NMCA-145, ¶ 8
(stating that “the difference . . . is that suspension involves a sentence imposed while
deferral does not”). A conditional discharge, on the other hand, is different from a
suspended 	or 	deferred 	sentence 	“because 	there 	is 	no 	adjudication 	of 	guilt.”
Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 10; see also id. ¶ 8 (“[U]pon a guilty plea or verdict,
the defendant is placed on probation and sentencing is deferred 	without an
adjudication of guilt.”); § 31-20-13(A) (stating that a court may enter a conditional
discharge and place a defendant on probation “without entering an adjudication of
guilt”). “[E]ven though there is a guilty plea, the successful completion of probation
under the terms of a conditional discharge results in the eradication of the guilty plea
or verdict and there is no conviction.” Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 10.

6
“conviction” remains. E.g., Padilla v. State, 1977-NMSC-063, ¶ 9, 90 N.M. 664,	1
568 P.2d 190; State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, ¶ 15, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268.	2
Under longstanding New Mexico precedent, a “conviction” refers to the finding of	3
guilt by plea or by verdict and does not require the imposition of a sentence. E.g.,	4
Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 44; 	Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 10 (collecting	5
cases); see also NMSA 1978, § 30-1-11 (1963) (stating that “[n]o person shall be	6
convicted of a crime unless found guilty by the verdict of the jury” a guilty or no	7
contest plea, or a finding of guilt in a bench trial). Consequently, this Court and our	8
Supreme Court have held that while a deferred sentence may remove the criminal	9
liability, the adjudication of guilt remains and may be taken into account for other	10
purposes. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 47; Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, ¶ 15.	11
{11} 	In Padilla, for example, our Supreme Court held that the defendant could be	12
charged under the state’s habitual offender statute based on a prior felony conviction	13
for which he had received a deferred sentence. 1977-NMSC-063, ¶¶ 1, 11. The	14
defendant argued that his prior conviction could not serve as the basis for a habitual	15
offender charge because it had been dismissed after he successfully completed the	16
deferred sentence. Id. ¶ 1. The Court acknowledged that “[t]here is some merit to the	17
contention that upon dismissal of criminal charges under the deferred sentence	18
provision . . . there has been no prior conviction.” Id. ¶ 9. However, the Court noted	19
that in previous cases, it had “determined that the contrary is true, holding that a	20

7
‘conviction’ refers to a finding of guilt and does not include the imposition of a	1
sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court thus concluded that the defendant’s prior	2
conviction could be used for purposes of habitual offender proceedings because	3
“[h]abitual offender proceedings are based by statute on prior felony convictions.	4
Since it is not necessary to impose a sentence in order to constitute a conviction, the	5
deferred sentence was of no consequence. It is the conviction that is crucial and not	6
the sentence.” Id. ¶ 11.	7
{12} 	Similarly, in Brothers, this Court held that the defendant was required to	8
register as a convicted sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and	9
Notification Act (SORNA), even though he had satisfactorily completed his deferred	10
sentence for the underlying charge and the charge had been dismissed. 2002-NMCA-	11
110, ¶ 15. SORNA defined a “sex offender” as “a person convicted of a sex offense	12
on or after July 1, 1995.” NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-3(A)(1) (1995, amended 2013).	13
The defendant argued that “the expiration of his deferred sentence, satisfaction of	14
criminal liability, dismissal of the . . . charges, and restoration of his civil rights	15
combined to eradicate his convictions, and he therefore was no longer required to	16
register as a sex offender.” Brothers, 2002-NMCA-010, ¶ 8. We rejected this	17
argument, reasoning that “[n]othing in Section 31-20-9 suggests that when a deferred	18
sentence expires and the charges are dismissed, the conviction no longer exists.”	19
Brothers, 2002-NMCA-010, ¶ 9. We also noted that “if the expiration of a deferred	20

8
sentence resulted in the eradication of a conviction, a deferred sentence would be no	1
different than a conditional discharge.” Id. ¶ 10.	2
{13} 	In light of these precedents, Benns’s underlying convictions remain, even if	3
he never received a sentence and the charges were ultimately dismissed. We hold	4
that those convictions can—and must—be taken into account for purposes of the	5
CHCA.	6
III. 	Reese Does Not Support Reversing DPS’s Denial of Benns’s Concealed	7
Handgun License Application	8
{14} 	Benns argues that Padilla and Brothers are outdated authority and that our	9
Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Reese is dispositive. According to Benns,	10
Reese instructs that when a felony charge is dismissed following the completion of	11
a deferred sentence, the charge can no longer be used as a predicate conviction for	12
other purposes. However, the holding in Reese is not as broad as Benns suggests. As	13
we explain, Reese expressly left Padilla and Brothers intact and did not alter the	14
longstanding precept that a “conviction” is based on an adjudication of guilt.	15
{15} 	At issue in Reese was a narrow question certified by the Tenth Circuit to our	16
Supreme Court: “If an otherwise-qualified person has completed a deferred sentence	17
for a felony offense, is that person barred from holding public office without a	18
pardon or certificate from the governor[?]” 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 1 (internal quotation	19
marks and citation omitted). The question arose after the defendant—who had	20
successfully completed a deferred sentence for a felony conviction under New	21

9
Mexico law—was federally indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which made it	1
unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable	2
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess firearms. Reese, 2014-	3
NMSC-013, ¶¶ 4, 6, 9. The defendant pleaded guilty to the federal felon-in-	4
possession charge and appealed his conviction, asserting that he was no longer a	5
felon under New Mexico state law because he successfully completed a deferred	6
sentence for the state felony conviction and the charges had been dismissed. Id.	7
¶¶ 6, 8.	8
{16} 	The federal felon-in-possession statute at issue in 	Reese 	defined what	9
constitutes a conviction and explicitly excluded any conviction for which a person	10
has had his or her civil rights restored. Id. ¶ 10; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (stating that	11
“[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has	12
been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction”	13
for purposes of § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added)). “[F]ederal law considers the civil	14
rights of convicted felons ‘restored’ when, under state law, they have regained four	15
basic civil rights: (1) the right to vote, (2) the right to hold public office, (3) the right	16
to serve on a jury, and (4) the right to possess firearms.” Reese, 2014-NMSC-013,	17
¶ 11. The parties agreed that the defendant’s rights to vote, serve on a jury, and	18
possess firearms had been restored but disputed whether New Mexico had restored	19

10
the defendant’s right to hold public office. Id. ¶ 12. The Tenth Circuit certified the	1
case to our Supreme Court to resolve the question of state law. Id. ¶ 13.	2
{17} 	Reviewing the case, our Supreme Court noted that the Legislature had enacted	3
a “restoration of citizenship” statute that provided a felon’s civil rights (including	4
the right to hold public office) would be restored upon the successful completion of	5
an individual’s sentence. Id. ¶ 26 (citing NMSA 1953, § 40A-29-14(A), (C) (1963)	6
and NMSA 1978, § 31-13-1 (2005)). The Court reasoned that because the statutory	7
mechanism for restoring civil rights was tied to the completion of a sentence, it was	8
never meant to apply to those who received a deferred sentence (and had no sentence	9
to complete) because it was not necessary. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Instead, the Court concluded	10
that a defendant’s civil rights were restored by operation of law when the defendant	11
successfully completed the conditions of deferment and the underlying charges were	12
dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 28, 43.	13
{18} 	In context, Reese did no more than determine the effect of a deferred sentence	14
within the framework of two statutes—a federal statute that specifically defined	15
what constitutes a conviction, and a state statute that tied the restoration of a	16
defendant’s civil rights to a sentence imposed. See id. ¶¶ 44-45 (explaining that the	17
scope of the Court’s analysis was limited to whether a deferred sentence stood as a	18
conviction under the federal definition, which depends on whether a defendant’s	19
civil rights had been restored under state law). Benns nevertheless argues that Reese	20

11
controls here because the Court, when discussing the history and purpose of deferred	1
sentencing in New Mexico, characterized a deferred sentence as “an act of judicial	2
clemency” that allows a court to “reinstate the defendant to civic life with the same	3
rights and privileges as if the conviction had never occurred.” Id. ¶ 29 (alteration,	4
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Benns concludes that a defendant	5
who completes a deferred sentence does not forever remain “convicted” of a felony	6
or 	misdemeanor. 	But 	as 	DPS 	correctly 	notes, 	the 	Reese 	Court 	specifically	7
“recognized that restoration of an individual’s civil rights following a felony	8
conviction was an issue distinct from whether the individual remained a convicted	9
felon.”	10
{19} 	The Reese Court discussed the distinction in response to the government’s	11
argument, relying on Padilla and Brothers, “that a felony conviction, even with a	12
deferred sentence, remains on the record after the charges are dismissed and,	13
therefore, that the felony should remain a conviction for the purposes of the federal	14
felon-in-possession statute.” Id. ¶ 44. The Court ultimately concluded that Padilla	15
and Brothers were not relevant to the question of whether a conviction “still stand[s]	16
as a conviction under the federal definition which excludes those who have had their	17
civil rights restored,” id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted),	18
because “[r]estoring a defendant’s civil rights does not require that the record of the	19
conviction be erased.” Id. ¶ 49. Importantly, the Court expressly reaffirmed the core	20

12
holdings from Padilla and Brothers, stating that “since a conviction does not impose	1
a sentence, it follows that criminal liability may be removed while leaving the	2
adjudication of guilt as a mere notation in the record, which may be taken into	3
account for other purposes.” Id. ¶ 47 (emphasis added).	4
{20} 	Unlike Reese, this case does not implicate Benns’s civil rights. Rather, Benns	5
wishes to obtain a license to carry a concealed handgun—a statutory privilege.	6
Accordingly, Reese’s analysis of how completing the terms of a deferred sentence	7
affects a defendant’s civil rights is not dispositive of the question before us: whether	8
Benns’s convictions are convictions that may be considered as disqualifying criteria	9
for purposes of the CHCA. Under Padilla and Brothers, they are because they	10
involved an adjudication of guilt. And contrary to Benns’s contentions, these cases	11
continue to control our decision here.	12
IV. 	A Conviction for Purposes of Section 29-19-4 Is an Adjudication of Guilt	13
{21} 	Benns’s final argument rests on the plain language of Section 29-19-4. He	14
notes 	that 	in 	Section 	29-19-4(B)(1), 	the 	Legislature 	specifically 	referred 	to	15
deferments as a disqualifying condition, but failed to identify them specifically in	16
the two subsections at issue here, Sections 29-19-4(A)(5) and (B)(4). In Benns’s	17
view, that omission was intentional.	18
{22} 	Section 29-19-4 states in relevant part:	19
A. 	The department shall issue a concealed handgun license to an	20
applicant who:	21

13
. . . .	1
(5) has not been convicted of a felony in New Mexico or any	2
other state or pursuant to the laws of the United States or any other	3
jurisdiction;	4
. . . .	5
B. 	The department shall deny a concealed handgun license to an	6
applicant who has:	7
(1) received a conditional discharge, a diversion or a deferment	8
or has been convicted of, pled guilty to or entered a plea of nolo	9
contendere to a misdemeanor offense involving a crime of violence	10
within ten years immediately preceding the application;	11
. . . .	12
(4) been convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving assault,	13
battery or battery against a household member.	14
Section 29-19-4 (emphasis added).	15
{23} 	As the district court correctly noted, “Section 29-19-4(A)(5) uses the term,	16
‘convicted,’ but does not include deferred sentencing. . . . The same is true of	17
Section 29-19-4(B)(4) with regard to misdemeanor assault, battery or battery against	18
a household member. This is in contrast to Section 29-19-4(B)(1), which does	19
include the term ‘convicted’ as well as reference to . . . deferment.” 2 Benns argues	20
2DPS argues that the term “deferment” in Section 29-19-4(B)(1) could refer
to a deferred adjudication rather than a deferred sentence. However, DPS has not
provided any New Mexico authority expressly discussing or applying a deferred
adjudication procedure; rather, DPS points only to a single case from the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico in which that court mentioned

14
that 	“the 	specificity 	of 	the 	Legislature 	in 	[Sub]section 	(B)(1) 	demonstrates	1
legislative awareness of and the decision to include deferred sentences . . . for these	2
types of offenses, as well as highlights the absence of these terms in the other	3
sections of the statute.” In other words, Benns infers that a “deferment” is different	4
from a “conviction” because both terms are used in 29-19-4(B)(1), and the	5
Legislature did not intend to disqualify applicants who had received a deferred	6
sentence following a felony conviction because the Legislature did not specifically	7
identify deferred sentences in Section 29-19-4(A)(5); likewise for a misdemeanor	8
conviction for aggravated battery against a household member, see § 29-19-4(B)(4).	9
{24} 	While Benns’s reading of these subsections conforms to the rule of statutory	10
construction that a statute must be read in its entirety and each part construed “in	11
connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole,” Britton	12
v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 28, 433 P.3d 320 (internal quotation	13
that 	“New 	Mexico’s 	conditional 	discharge 	statute 	is 	known 	as 	a 	deferred
adjudication statute.” United States v. Silva-Borrego, No. 00-1164 JP, 2000 WL
36739489, at *1 (D.N.M. Dec. 21, 2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing to a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case in support). Thus, if we
accepted DPS’s argument, then Section 29-19-4(B)(1) would effectively say that
DPS must deny a concealed handgun license to an applicant who has “received a
conditional 	discharge, 	a 	diversion 	or 	a 	[conditional 	discharge] . . . [for] 	a
misdemeanor offense involving a crime of violence within ten years immediately
preceding the application[.]” DPS has offered no argument to explain or justify such
redundancy.
In contrast to DPS’s suggestion, New Mexico cases use the term “deferment”
when addressing deferred sentences. See, e.g., Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 4 (stating
that the defendant “successfully satisfied the conditions of his deferment”).

15
marks and citation omitted), we cannot apply his interpretation to some of the other	1
specifically listed items in Section 29-19-4(B)(1) without reaching an absurd and	2
unreasonable result. See State v. Strauch, 2015-NMSC-009, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d 317. In	3
particular, the Legislature included guilty pleas and no contest pleas among the	4
specifically listed items in Section 29-19-4(B)(1). Under Benns’s interpretation,	5
convictions arising from guilty or no contest pleas would also not be considered	6
“convictions” under the subsections at issue here. That would lead to an absurd result	7
whereby someone convicted by a jury would be prohibited from obtaining a	8
concealed carry license, while someone who pleads guilty or no contest to the same	9
charge would not. We find no indication of a legislative intent to distinguish between	10
applicants in this way and thus decline to adopt such an interpretation here. See Nat’l	11
Council on Comp. Ins. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 1986-NMSC-005, ¶ 5, 103	12
N.M. 707, 712 P.2d 1369 (stating that “courts may substitute, disregard or eliminate,	13
or insert or add words to a statute, if it is necessary to do so to carry out the legislative	14
intent or to express the clearly manifested meaning of the statute”).	15
{25} 	We adhere to the principle that “words used in a statute are to be given their	16
ordinary and usual meaning,” Blue Canyon Well Ass’n v. Jevne, 2018-NMCA-004,	17
¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “presume the	18
[L]egislature 	is 	aware 	of 	existing 	law 	when 	it 	enacts 	legislation.” 	State 	v.	19
McClendon, 2001-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 551, 28 P.3d 1092 (internal quotation	20

16
marks and citation omitted). Applying these devices, we presume the Legislature	1
was aware of Padilla and Brothers when it enacted Section 29-19-4 in 2003 and	2
used the term “convicted” in Sections 29-19-4(A)(5) and (B)(4) to mean an	3
adjudication of guilt, regardless of the imposition of a sentence. See § 30-1-11	4
(stating that a person is convicted if found guilty by jury verdict, guilty or no contest	5
plea, or a finding by the court in a bench trial). Since the successful completion of a	6
deferred sentence leaves the underlying conviction intact, we conclude that the term	7
“convicted” in Sections 29-19-4(A)(5) and (B)(4) applies to defendants whose	8
charges are dismissed at the completion of deferred sentences.	9
{26} 	Accordingly, in light of the undisputed facts regarding Benns’s prior felony	10
charge, we hold that DPS properly denied his application for a concealed handgun	11
license.	12
CONCLUSION	13
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court and reinstate DPS’s	14
denial of Benns’s application for a concealed handgun license.	15
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	16
_____________________________	17
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	18

1
WE CONCUR:
2
Kristina Bogardus
3
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
4 5
Mane Bylohalen
JANE B. YORALEM, Judge
17