August 27, 2020- State of New Mexico v. Juan Montelongo Esparza, No. A-1-CA-37917

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: _______________	2
Filing Date: AUGUST 27, 2020	3
No. A-1-CA-37917	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
JUAN MONTELONGO ESPARZA,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY	10
William G.W. Shoobridge, District Judge	11
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	12
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
for Appellee	15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	16
Charles D. Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender	17
Santa Fe, NM	18
for Appellant	19
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/27/2020 11:05 AM

OPINION	1
MEDINA, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendant Juan Montelongo Esparza appeals his conviction for leaving the	3
scene of an accident (no great bodily harm or death), in violation of NMSA 1978,	4
Section 66-7-201(D) (1989). We hold that the district court committed fundamental	5
error in failing to properly instruct the jury on Defendant’s duty to remain at the	6
scene of an accident and remand for retrial.	7
BACKGROUND	8
{2} 	On June 12, 2015, at approximately 3:40 p.m., a vehicle driven by Defendant	9
collided with a vehicle driven by Freddy Marquez. Marquez was ejected from his	10
vehicle and was severely injured. Marquez’s girlfriend was also in the vehicle at the	11
time of the accident, however, she sustained only minor injuries. Shortly after the	12
collision several drivers stopped and unsuccessfully attempted to render aid to	13
Marquez, who died shortly thereafter from his injuries. Based on witness testimony,	14
emergency personnel arrived on the scene between fifteen and forty-five minutes	15
after the collision.	16
{3} 	After the collision, a witness saw Defendant sitting in his vehicle talking on a	17
cellphone but could not understand what Defendant was saying because Defendant	18
was not speaking English. Defendant did not approach Marquez or his girlfriend at	19
any time after the accident. At some point, Defendant got out of his car, began pacing	20

2
back and forth, and then left the scene on foot. One witness estimated that Defendant	1
left the scene between fifteen and twenty minutes after the accident, while another	2
believed that Defendant left the scene forty-six minutes after the accident. In either	3
case, Defendant left the scene before the first emergency responder arrived. When	4
he left the accident scene, Defendant left behind his resident card which included his	5
name, 	along 	with 	his 	vehicle 	registration 	and 	insurance 	card, 	in 	the 	glove	6
compartment of his vehicle.	7
{4} 	Police located Defendant approximately two hours after the accident, four	8
miles from the accident scene. Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled	9
strongly of alcohol. Defendant’s blood alcohol content measured 0.04 grams per 100	10
milliliters of blood, approximately four hours after the accident. A forensic expert	11
estimated that at the time of the collision Defendant had consumed the equivalent of	12
four-and-a-half beers.	13
{5} 	The State charged Defendant with multiple crimes as a result of the accident,	14
including homicide by vehicle (DWI), in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-	15
101 (2004, amended 2016); leaving the scene of an accident involving personal	16
injuries but not great bodily harm or death, in violation of Section 66-7-201(D);	17
leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle, in violation of	18
NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-202 (1978); and failure to give information and render	19
aid, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-203 (1978). Following trial, a jury	20

3
acquitted Defendant of homicide by vehicle (DWI) and failure to give information	1
and render aid, but convicted Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident involving	2
damage to a vehicle, in violation of Section 66-7-202, and leaving the scene of an	3
accident involving personal injuries but not great bodily harm or death, in violation	4
of Section 66-7-201(D). The district court sentenced Defendant to 364 days for	5
violating Section 66-7-202(D) and vacated the lesser conviction for leaving the	6
scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle to avoid a double jeopardy	7
violation. This appeal followed.	8
DISCUSSION	9
{6} 	Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues the district	10
court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury. Second, Defendant	11
contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We address each	12
argument in turn.	13
Jury Instructions	14
{7} 	Defendant argues the district court fundamentally erred in failing to instruct	15
the jury on the scope of his legal obligation to remain at the scene of the crime. “The	16
propriety of the jury instructions given by the district court is a mixed question of	17
law and fact requiring de novo review.” State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMSC-004, ¶ 31,	18
434 P.3d 297. Defendant concedes he failed to preserve any error with respect to	19
instructing the jury, thus we review only for fundamental error. See Rule 12-	20

4
321(B)(2)(c) NMRA; Candelaria, 2019-NMSC-004, ¶ 31 (reviewing purported	1
error in jury instructions for fundamental error because it was not raised at trial).	2
“The doctrine of fundamental error applies only under exceptional circumstances	3
and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8,	4
135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. “[T]he general rule is that fundamental error occurs	5
when the trial court fails to instruct the jury on an essential element.” State v. Lucero,	6
2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 27, 389 P.3d 1039 (internal quotation marks and citation	7
omitted). “We will only affirm a case in which the trial court failed to instruct the	8
jury on an essential element when, under the facts adduced at trial, that omitted	9
element was undisputed and indisputable, and no rational jury could have concluded	10
otherwise.” State v. Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 63, 920 P.2d 1017	11
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	12
{8} 	The hit-and-run statute applicable to leaving the scene of an accident	13
involving death or personal injuries—such as the tragic accident in this case—	14
provides, “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or	15
death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident	16
or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event	17
shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of	18
Section 66-7-203[.]” Section 66-7-201(A). Section 66-7-203, in turn, provides,	19
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to	20
or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or	21

5
attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration	1
number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request exhibit his	2
driver’s license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or	3
person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any	4
person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the	5
carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person	6
to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if	7
it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is	8
requested by the injured person.	9
Depending on whether the accident resulted in “great bodily harm or death” and	10
whether the driver “knowingly fail[ed] to stop or to comply with the requirements	11
of Section 66-7-203[,]” the driver may be found guilty of a misdemeanor, a fourth	12
degree felony, or a third degree felony. See § 66-7-201(B)-(D). Here, Defendant was	13
convicted of a misdemeanor under Subsection (D) for “failing to stop or comply with	14
the requirements of Section 66-7-203 . . . where the accident does not result in great	15
bodily harm or death[.]”	16
{9} 	There is no Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI) for the crime of leaving the scene	17
of an accident. 1 See State v. Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 9, 464 P.3d 1090	18
(“[T]here are no uniform jury instructions for the crimes that Section 66-7-201	19
defines[.]”). Accordingly, the district court “was required to give an instruction that	20
substantially follows the language of the statute in order to be deemed sufficient.”	21
1 In order to avoid confusion over how to properly instruct the jury in future
cases, we encourage the UJI Criminal Committee to consider drafting instructions
for the crimes proscribed by Section 66-7-201, as well as Section 66-7-202 (for
accidents involving damage to vehicles).

6
State v. Luna, 2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 21, 458 P.3d 457 (alteration, internal quotation	1
marks, and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2018-NMCERT-__ (No. S-1-SC-36896,	2
Mar. 16, 2018). The court instructed the jury to find Defendant guilty if the State	3
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “[D]efendant operated a vehicle involved	4
in an accident”; (2) “[t]he accident resulted in injury to Freddy Marquez”; and (3)	5
“[D]efendant failed to immediately stop, return[,] and remain at the scene[.]”2
6
{10} 	Defendant argues the given jury instructions were fundamentally flawed	7
because they did not instruct the jury that Defendant only had a duty to remain at the	8
scene of the accident “until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203.”	9
Section 66-7-201(A). This temporal limitation on a driver’s criminal liability for	10
leaving the scene of an accident, Defendant argues, constituted an essential element	11
that the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him. We	12
agree.	13
{11} 	While 	our 	appellate 	courts 	have 	previously 	dealt 	with 	appeals 	from	14
convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury	15
under Section 66-7-201, it appears we have yet to definitively address whether the	16
State must prove that a driver failed to comply with the requirements of Section 66-	17
2 This instruction was identical to the instruction for Defendant’s vacated
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle—
except for the second element, which provided, “The accident resulted in damage to
a 2007 Cadillac Escalade[.]”

7
7-203 before leaving the scene of the accident. See, e.g., Hertzog, 2020-NMCA-031,	1
¶ 10 (analyzing whether the failure to instruct jury on definition of “accident”	2
constituted 	reversible 	error 	and 	whether 	sufficient 	evidence 	supported 	the	3
defendant’s conviction under Section 66-7-201); State v. Montoya Guzman, 2004-	4
NMCA-097, ¶ 20 136 N.M. 253, 96 P.3d 1173 (analyzing whether sufficient	5
evidence 	supported 	the 	defendant’s 	conviction 	under 	Section 	66-7-201). “In	6
determining what is or is not an essential element of an offense, we begin with the	7
language of the statute itself, seeking of course to give effect to the intent of the	8
[L]egislature.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 56, 279 P.3d 747 (internal	9
quotation marks and citation omitted). We follow “the ordinary and plain meaning	10
of the words of statute, unless this leads to an absurd or unreasonable result and	11
unless the Legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary.” Hertzog,	12
2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 12 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	13
“[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give	14
effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v.	15
Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks	16
and citation omitted).	17
{12} 	Defendant argues, and we agree, that the plain language of the last clause of	18
Section 66-7-201 requiring a driver to “immediately return to and in every event . . .	19
remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section	20

8
66-7-203” indicates that whether or not a driver complied with the requirements of	1
Section 66-7-203 is an essential element when it is alleged that the driver unlawfully	2
failed to remain at the scene of the accident. (Emphasis added.) By using the	3
conjunction “until,” the Legislature imposed a temporal limitation on a driver’s	4
obligations to remain at the scene of an accident and expressly conditioned criminal	5
liability for leaving the scene on a driver’s failure to first comply with the	6
requirements 	of 	Section 	66-7-203. 	See 	Until, 	Merriam-Webster 	Dictionary,	7
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/until 	(last 	visited 	July 	20, 	2020)	8
(defining “until” when used as a conjunction, as “up to the time that” and “up to such	9
time as”). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, if the driver satisfies the	10
requirements of Section 66-7-203 before leaving the scene of the accident, no	11
criminal liability under Section 66-7-201 may be imposed. Conversely, the driver	12
may be convicted of violating Section 66-7-201 if he fails to satisfy the requirements	13
of Section 66-7-203 before leaving the scene.	14
{13} 	Given that a defendant is not required to remain at the scene of an accident	15
under 	all 	circumstances—a 	requirement 	the 	instruction 	in 	this 	case 	directly	16
suggests—it follows that the jury must be instructed on this element. Otherwise, a	17
driver could be convicted of leaving the scene of an accident despite complying with	18
Section 66-7-203 by giving his information, exhibiting his driver’s license, and	19
providing any reasonable aid to those injured in the accident. Such a result would	20

9
undercut the Legislature’s intent and run contrary to the purposes of our hit-and-run	1
statutes, which are “to prohibit drivers from evading criminal or civil liability, to	2
ensure people receive necessary aid or medical attention, and to deter drivers from	3
thwarting or impeding investigations and avoiding liability for the harm they cause	4
by failing to stop or failing to comply with Section 66-7-203.” Hertzog, 2020-	5
NMCA-031, ¶ 16.	6
{14} 	Given the plain language of Section 66-7-201(A), we hold that a driver’s	7
failure to satisfy the requirements of Section 66-7-203 prior to leaving the scene is	8
an essential element for a conviction of the crime of leaving the scene of an accident	9
involving death or personal injuries. See State v. Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 38,	10
150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705 (“The language of a statute determines the essential	11
elements of an offense.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The district	12
court must instruct the jury to determine, among the other elements, whether the	13
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, prior to leaving the scene of the	14
accident, the driver failed to: (1) “give his name, address, and the [vehicle]	15
registration number”; (2) exhibit his driver’s license upon request to the “person	16
struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with”;	17
and (3) render “reasonable assistance” to any person injured in the accident. Section	18
66-7-203; see Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 39 (“It is the fundamental right of a	19
criminal defendant to have the jury determine whether each element of the charged	20

10
offense has been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation	1
marks and citation omitted)).	2
{15} 	The State argues that it was only required to prove that Defendant “simply	3
failed to remain” at the scene and contends any other conclusion is contrary to	4
Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, because—according to the State—this Court “stated [in	5
that case] that the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant ‘failed to stop	6
and/or failed to remain at the scene of the accident[.]’ ” Id. ¶ 20. We reject this	7
argument. In Guzman, we reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a	8
conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. In setting forth the elements for our	9
sufficiency review, we stated,	10
In order to convict [the d]efendant of [leaving the scene of an]	11
accident[] involving death or personal injuries, the [s]tate was required	12
to prove that [the d]efendant (1) operated a motor vehicle; (2) was	13
involved in an accident which caused great bodily harm or death of the	14
victim; (3) failed to stop and/or failed to remain at the scene of the	15
accident; and (4) failed to render reasonable aid to the victim.	16
Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Given the fourth element—which incorporates one of a	17
driver’s duties under Section 66-7-203—it is clear the state was required to prove	18
more than simply that the defendant “failed to stop and/or failed to remain at the	19
scene of the accident.” Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, ¶ 20. Additionally, the defendant	20
in that case did not raise the argument that Defendant now raises (i.e., that the State	21
is 	required to demonstrate that 	Defendant 	failed to comply with 	all 	of the	22
requirements of Section 66-7-203 before leaving the scene of the accident)—most	23

11
likely because the defendant did not stop at all. See Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097,	1
¶¶ 14, 20 (noting that the defendant only made a U-turn to investigate after hitting a	2
pedestrian and left when she did not see anything). “The general rule is that cases	3
are not authority for propositions not considered.” State v. Sanchez, 2015-NMSC-	4
018, ¶ 26, 350 P.3d 1169 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g.,	5
Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 15-16, 348 P.3d 183 (declining to rely on	6
a case for a proposition because the parties in that case did not appear to raise the	7
argument now being considered). Accordingly, the State’s reliance on Guzman is	8
unavailing.	9
{16} 	The State also cites Section 66-7-201(D), the specific subsection Defendant	10
was convicted of violating, for the proposition that “a person may be found guilty of	11
leaving the scene of an accident if he simply failed to remain, even without failing	12
to comply with the requirements of [Section] 66-7-203.” Section 66-7-201(D)	13
provides, in 	relevant 	part, “Any person failing to stop 	or comply with 	the	14
requirements of Section 66-7-203 . . . where the accident does not result in great	15
bodily harm or death is guilty of a misdemeanor[.]” The State does not explain	16
exactly how Section 66-7-201(D) supports its position, but it appears that the State	17
is arguing that the statute’s use of the disjunctive “or”—which indicates that a	18
defendant may be found guilty by simply failing to stop—made it unnecessary to	19
instruct the jury on whether Defendant complied with Section 66-7-203. See State v.	20

12
Dunsmore, 1995-NMCA-012, ¶ 5, 119 N.M. 431, 891 P.2d 572 (“The use of the	1
disjunctive ‘or’ indicates that the statute may be violated by any of the enumerated	2
methods.”).	3
{17} 	We are unpersuaded by the State’s logic. Reading Section 66-7-201(A) and	4
(D) together makes clear that drivers have two distinct duties following an accident:	5
(1) to “immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto	6
as possible” and (2) to “immediately return to” and “remain at the scene of the	7
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203[.]” Section 66-	8
7-201(A); see State v. Gurule, 2011-NMCA-042, ¶ 12, 149 N.M. 599, 252 P.3d 823	9
(“[W]e read all provisions of a statute and all statutes in pari materia together in	10
order to ascertain the legislative intent.”). The failure to perform either of these	11
duties is grounds for a violation; a driver may be convicted under Section 66-7-	12
201(D) by failing to “immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as	13
close thereto as possible” or failing to “immediately return to” and “remain at the	14
scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203.”	15
Section 66-7-201(A).	16
{18} 	It is undisputed that Defendant stopped his vehicle at the scene of the accident	17
in this case. Consequently, in order to convict Defendant of violating Section 66-7-	18
201(D), the State was required to prove that Defendant failed to “remain at the scene	19
of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203[.]” Section	20

13
66-7-201(A). We, therefore, reject the State’s argument that Defendant “could be	1
found guilty of leaving the scene of an accident if he simply failed to remain.” For	2
the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in failing to instruct the	3
jury to determine whether Defendant fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203	4
before leaving the scene of the accident.	5
Fundamental Error	6
{19} 	Having found error in the jury instructions, we must now determine whether	7
it was fundamental. As stated earlier, failure to instruct the jury on an essential	8
element is generally fundamental error; we will only affirm in such cases “when,	9
under 	the 	facts 	adduced 	at 	trial, 	that 	omitted 	element 	was 	undisputed 	and	10
indisputable, and no rational jury could have concluded otherwise.” Lopez, 1996-	11
NMSC-036, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. (stating that	12
“the question to be answered when an essential element has been omitted is whether	13
there was any evidence or suggestion in the facts, however slight, that could have	14
put the omitted element in issue” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	15
omitted)). Thus, “[i]f the evidence does not indisputably establish the missing	16
element or elements, there exists fundamental error, and we must reverse.” Luna,	17
2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 23; see State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 46, 279 P.3d 747	18
(“[F]undamental error occurs when, because an erroneous instruction was given, a	19

14
court has no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was not based on the	1
lack of the essential element.”).	2
{20} 	For the following reasons, we conclude the omitted element of whether	3
Defendant complied with Section 66-7-203’s requirements was not “undisputed and	4
indisputable,” and therefore the error was fundamental. Luna, 2018-NMCA-025,	5
¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). First, Defendant testified that	6
he left his resident card, vehicle registration, and insurance information in the glove	7
compartment of his vehicle when he walked away on foot from the scene of the	8
accident.3 Second, there was no evidence that Defendant failed to comply with any	9
request to exhibit his driver’s license to anyone at the scene. Third, although	10
Defendant did not render any aid to Marquez, he testified that, as soon as he came	11
to after the accident, others were already performing CPR on Marquez and he	12
realized someone had already called 911.	13
{21} 	It is also noteworthy that the jury failed to convict Defendant of his stand-	14
alone violation of Section 66-7-203 for failure to give information and render aid. In	15
addressing this charge during closing argument, Defendant argued that although he	16
did not give aid to Marquez, he was informed as soon as he came to that an	17
3 As the State does not argue this was insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy
Defendant’s duty to “give his name, address and the registration number of the
vehicle he [was] driving” Section 66-7-203, we assume, without deciding, a rational
jury could have concluded Defendant’s act of leaving these items at the scene
fulfilled this duty.

15
ambulance was already on the way and people were performing CPR on Marquez.	1
Given his lack of medical training, Defendant argued that it was unreasonable for	2
him to have to inject himself into the attempts to save Marquez’s life in order to	3
avoid liability. He further argued that he did not fail his duty to give his information	4
because he left his resident card and registration information in his car before he left	5
on foot.	6
{22} 	For this count, the jury was instructed to find Defendant guilty if the State	7
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “[D]efendant operated a vehicle involved	8
in an accident”; (2) “[t]he accident resulted in damage to a vehicle”; (3) “[D]efendant	9
did not give his name, address and registration number of [his] vehicle”; and (4)	10
“[D]efendant did not render assistance to any person injured or make arrangements	11
for treatment[.]” As the first two elements were undisputed, it follows that the jury	12
found the State’s evidence lacking regarding Defendant’s purported failure to “give	13
his name, address and registration number of [his] vehicle” and/or “render assistance	14
to any person injured or make arrangements for treatment.” While not necessarily	15
dispositive of our fundamental error analysis, this fact counsels in favor of finding	16
fundamental error.4
17
4 By the same token, we cannot say that the jury’s decision not to convict
Defendant of violating Section 66-7-203 necessarily means that it found that
Defendant did satisfy its requirements—which Defendant asserts would bar retrial
of Defendant’s conviction under Section 66-7-201(D). The jury instructions did not
require the jury to find that Defendant affirmatively satisfied all of Section 66-7-

16
{23} 	In light of the foregoing evidence and arguments, it does not appear that the	1
missing essential element of whether Defendant complied with the requirements of	2
Section 66-7-203 prior to leaving the scene was indisputably established. See Lopez,	3
1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 13. We must therefore reverse.	4
Sufficiency of the Evidence	5
{24} 	Despite concluding the failure to instruct the jury on Defendant’s obligation	6
to remain at the scene until he satisfied Section 66-7-203’s requirements, we must	7
nonetheless address Defendant’s sufficiency argument to determine whether double	8
jeopardy bars retrial. See State v. Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, ¶ 41, 332 P.3d 850	9
(“To avoid any double jeopardy concerns, we review the evidence presented at the	10
first trial to determine whether it was sufficient to warrant a second trial.”). In	11
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a defendant’s convictions, we	12
must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to	13
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of	14
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶ 54, 453	15
P.3d 416 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	16
203’s requirements in order to acquit him. Rather, the instructions required the State
to prove that Defendant failed to satisfy each specified requirement under Section
66-7-203. Thus, it is possible the jury still found that Defendant failed to satisfy one
or more of Section 66-7-203’s requirements before leaving the scene, which would
subject him to criminal liability under Section 66-7-201.

17
{25} 	Defendant concedes that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict	1
him of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries under	2
the erroneous jury instructions. Defendant also acknowledges that our appellate	3
courts generally review sufficiency claims against the erroneous jury instructions	4
used at trial. See State v. Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18, 150 N.M. 110, 257 P.3d	5
930 (“We review [the d]efendant’s [sufficiency of the evidence] claim under the	6
erroneous instruction provided to the jury at trial.”); State v. Akers, 2010-NMCA-	7
103, ¶ 32, 149 N.M. 53, 243 P.3d 757 (“In a case such as this one in which an	8
erroneous instruction was apparently given, we nonetheless review the sufficiency	9
of the evidence under the instructions as given.”). Nonetheless, Defendant asks this	10
Court to depart from established case law and measure the sufficiency of the	11
evidence against the statutory elements of leaving the scene of an accident involving	12
death or personal injuries.	13
{26} 	Even were we to agree with Defendant, our Supreme Court has determined	14
that appellate courts review sufficiency claims “under the erroneous instruction	15
provided to the jury at trial.” Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18. We must, therefore,	16
reject Defendant’s request to depart from precedent. See State ex rel. Martinez v.	17
City of Las Vegas, 2004-NMSC-009, ¶ 22, 135 N.M. 375, 89 P.3d 47 (reiterating	18
principle that “the Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court precedent”). Given	19
Defendant’s concession, and given the evidence presented above, we conclude	20

18
sufficient 	evidence 	supported 	Defendant’s 	conviction 	and 	retrial 	is 	therefore	1
permitted.	2
CONCLUSION	3
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.	4
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
____________________________________	6
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	7
WE CONCUR:	8
_______________________________	9
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	10
_______________________________	11
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	12