October 24, 2012 – M.R., V.D., P.R., and C.R. v. Serenicare Funeral Home, L.L.C. and Cantrup/DeVargas Corp, d/b/a DeVargas Funeral Home, Vincent R. Salazar, Inman Shipping Worldwide, and John Does 1-5, No. 30,879

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:

Filing Date: OCTOBER 24, 2012

NO. 30,879

MLR., V.D., P.R., and C.R.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

V.

SERENICARE FUNERAL HOME, L.L.C.,
Defendant- Appellee,

and

CANTRUP/De VARGAS CORP, d/b/a

De VARGAS FUNERAL HOME,

VINCENT R. SALAZAR, INVAN

SHIPPING WORLDWIDE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge

Carter & Valle Law Fim, P.C.
Richard J. Valle

Cnostoir O’ Cleireachain
Kathryn Lueker Eaton
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellants
Allen, Shepherd, Lewis, Syra & Chapman, P.A.

E. W. Shepherd
Ryan T. Sanders

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

1In their reply brief Plaintiffs dispute that SereniCare’s agreement was with
Inman. However, Plaintiffs offered no evidence to refute the evidence presented by
SereniCare establishing that SereniCare and Inman were in fact the contracting parties.
OPINION
FRY, Judge.
{1} 	In this case, we must decide whether a Utah funeral home established sufficient
minimum contacts with New Mexico to justify a New Mexico court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the funeral home. 	The funeral home contracted with an
Ohio shipping company to prepare Plaintiffs’ relative’s (Decedent’s) body for
shipping from Utah, where Decedent died, to New Mexico, her residence. The district
court concluded that the funeral home did not have sufficient contacts with New
Mexico to satisfy the requirements of due process and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims
against the funeral home. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Decedent died in a car accident in Utah in September 2009. Plaintiff M.R., a
New Mexico resident, contacted Defendant De Vargas Funeral Home (De Vargas) in
New Mexico regarding funeral arrangements. De Vargas contacted Defendant Inman
Shipping Worldwide (Inman), an Ohio corporation, and Inman contacted Defendant
SereniCare Funeral Home, L.L.C. (SereniCare), to prepare Decedent’s body for
shipping to New Mexico. 1

See Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc., 1996-NMCA-057, 121 N.M. 738,
742, 918 P.2d 17, 21 (explaining that “the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden
of establishing such fact” and that if the party resisting jurisdiction presents affidavits
or depositions, the party asserting jurisdiction must present affidavits or other
evidence demonstrating jurisdiction over the defendant).
2Inman filed the affidavit of its general manager in support of its own motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The general manager attested that Inman
“never had physical possession, custody or control of” Decedent’s body. We do not
consider this affidavit in our analysis because Plaintiffs did not rely on the affidavit
in attempting to refute SereniCare’s evidence. See id. In addition, whether Inman did
or did not have custody of the body is immaterial to our analysis.
2
{3} 	SereniCare is a Utah limited liability company with offices in two Utah towns,
and it is licensed to perform funeral services only in Utah. SereniCare prepared the
body according to its agreement with Inman and, according to SereniCare’s funeral
director, it turned custody of the body over to Inman.2 SereniCare then billed Inman
for the services performed by sending an invoice to Inman in Ohio.
{4} 	Before Decedent’s body was sent to New Mexico, Plaintiff M.R. learned from
De Vargas that SereniCare was preparing the body in Utah. M.R., who was in Utah
at the time, telephoned SereniCare to inquire about viewing the body. The SereniCare
employee with whom M.R. spoke suggested that the family not view the
body because of severe head trauma and that, in any event, it would be another day
before the family could view the body. 	The family then decided to return to New
Mexico and informed SereniCare of this fact. Later, during the viewing of Decedent
in New Mexico before the funeral, an employee of De Vargas gave Plaintiffs a bag

3
containing Decedent’s personal effects. The next day, Plaintiffs smelled a “foul odor”
coming from the bag and discovered Decedent’s brain in a Ziploc bag labeled with her
name and the word “brain.”
{5} 	Plaintiffs sued SereniCare, Inman, De Vargas, De Vargas’s owner, and five
unnamed John Does for several torts, unfair trade practices, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty. The present appeal involves only Plaintiffs’ claims against
SereniCare.
{6} 	SereniCare filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. 	After considering the pleadings and
affidavits filed by the parties and following a non-evidentiary hearing, the district
court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish that SereniCare had sufficient
minimum contacts with New Mexico to comport with due process and dismissed the
claims against SereniCare.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
{7} 	We undertake de novo review when considering whether the district court had
personal jurisdiction over SereniCare in this case. 	Santa Fe Techs., Inc. v. Argus
Networks, Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221. Because the
district court based its ruling on the pleadings and affidavits rather than on evidence

4
presented at an evidentiary hearing, “the standard of review resembles that of
summary judgment; the appellate court reviews the pleadings and affidavits or sworn
testimony in the light most favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	The
party asserting jurisdiction—in this case, Plaintiffs—“need only make a prima facie
showing that personal jurisdiction exists.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Elements of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
{8} 	Plaintiffs argue that SereniCare’s tortious acts and/or business transactions in
New 	Mexico 	establish 	minimum 	contacts 	sufficient 	to 	satisfy 	due 	process
considerations. In analyzing arguments like those advanced by Plaintiffs, our earlier
cases utilized a three-part test that considered whether (1) the defendant’s acts fell
within New Mexico’s long-arm statutes, (2) the plaintiff’s claims arise out of those
acts, and (3) the defendant’s acts establish sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due
process concerns. 	See Doe, 121 N.M. at 742, 918 P.2d at 21. However, our more
recent cases have observed that it is no longer necessary to determine whether a
defendant has committed one of the acts enumerated by our long-arm statute. Zavala
v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2007-NMCA-149, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 36, 172 P.3d 173.
Instead, we consider the long-arm statute “as being coextensive with the requirements
of due process” and undertake “a single search for the outer limits of what due process

5
permits.” F.D.I.C. v. Hiatt, 117 N.M. 461, 463, 872 P.2d 879, 881 (1994) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
{9} 	“Due process is satisfied when a defendant has engaged in acts within the state
that indicate that the defendant reasonably anticipated being brought into a New
Mexico court.” Zavala, 2007-NMCA-149, ¶ 11. “[T]he minimum contacts required
for the state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant depend[] on whether the
jurisdiction asserted is general (all-purpose) or specific (case-linked).” Sproul v. Rob
& Charlies, Inc., 2012-NMCA- ___, ¶ 9, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 31, 167, Aug. 15, 2012).
{10} 	Plaintiffs argue that the theory of specific jurisdiction is applicable to
SereniCare because it purposefully established contact with New Mexico. See Zavala,
2007-NMCA-149, ¶¶ 17-29 (setting out the distinctions between the theories of
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction). 	We consider whether SereniCare
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New
Mexico], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” 	Id. ¶ 11 (first
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	“[S]pecific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” 	Sproul, 2012-NMCA____, ¶ 17
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6
{11} 	Although our case law establishes that the long-arm statute’s requirements are
coextensive with the requirements of due process, Plaintiffs have organized their
arguments to coincide with two of the acts specified in our long-arm statute. Plaintiffs
maintain that SereniCare (1) committed torts in New Mexico because the injury to
them occurred in New Mexico and (2) transacted business in New Mexico by agreeing
to participate in the process of returning the body to New Mexico. 	We follow
Plaintiffs’ organization and address each argument in turn.
Tortious Acts
{12} 	Assuming that Plaintiffs are ultimately able to prove that SereniCare was guilty
of some form of tortious conduct in its handling of Decedent’s body, we agree that the
tort occurred in New Mexico. 	We have stated that for purposes of personal
jurisdiction analysis, a tort “can occur in New Mexico when the actual harmful act
originates outside the state, but the injury itself occurs inside New Mexico.” Santa Fe
Techs., Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 15. “The place of the wrong is the location of the
last act necessary to complete the injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, as we have noted, the central question is whether Plaintiffs have
established that SereniCare had the minimum contacts with New Mexico to satisfy due
process.

7
{13} 	Plaintiffs contend that SereniCare had sufficient contacts with New Mexico
because it knew its preparation of Decedent’s body was for purposes of a viewing and
funeral service in New Mexico and that the effects of its improper handling of
Decedent’s brain would be experienced in New Mexico. Plaintiffs primarily rely for
support on the so-called “effects” test articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
787 (1984).
{14} 	In Calder, the respondent, an entertainer, sued a national newspaper reporter
and editor for libel in California. 465 U.S. at 784-85. The petitioners were Florida
residents and challenged the California court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them. 	Id. at 783. The United States Supreme Court held that the newspaper story
published by the petitioners “concerned the California activities of a California
resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career
was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the
brunt of the harm . . . was suffered in California.” Id. at 788-89 (footnote omitted).
The Court concluded that “[j]urisdiction over [the reporter and editor] is therefore
proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id.
at 789.
{15} 	We are not persuaded that under Calder SereniCare’s knowledge of the body’s
destination in New Mexico and its knowledge that the body was being prepared for

8
a funeral service in New Mexico constitute minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due
process. 	SereniCare did not engage in any purposeful activities directed at New
Mexico. It is a Utah limited liability company, licensed only in Utah, and it has not
advertised its services in New Mexico. It did nothing to solicit business from New
Mexico. Instead, it entered into an agreement initiated by Inman to prepare a body
that was located in Utah for shipping by Inman. Although a SereniCare employee had
a telephone conversation with Decedent’s relative, it was the relative who initiated the
phone call in Utah. SereniCare billed Inman for its services.
{16} 	These circumstances are in sharp contrast to the situation described in Calder
which involved an article printed in a nationally circulated newspaper whose largest
market was the state of California. 	Id. at 785. 	Thus, the petitioners in Calder
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of selling about 600,000 newspapers
in California per week, id., and the Supreme Court reasonably concluded that they
knew and intended that the effects of their article would be felt in California. Unlike
the petitioners in Calder, SereniCare’s contact with New Mexico was “random,
fortuitous, [and] attenuated,” and such contacts are insufficient. 	Zavala, 2007-
NMCA-149, ¶ 11 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). It was
sheer happenstance that the body Inman asked SereniCare to prepare had New Mexico
as its destination.

9
{17} 	Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs are able to prove that SereniCare’s preparation
of Decedent’s body constituted an intentional tort, “[a]n intentional tort without
minimum contacts does not comport with due process.” Santa Fe Techs., Inc., 2002-
NMCA-030, ¶ 19. “The constitutional inquiry . . . is not dependent upon the type of
tort or the underlying transaction in dispute. The inquiry is whether [the d]efendants
have such minimum contacts with New Mexico so that the suit does not offend due
process.” Id. ¶ 21.
{18} 	In addition, New Mexico case law emphasizes that in cases like the present one
involving a nonresident defendant’s personal services, “focus must be on the place
where the services are rendered, since this is the place of the receiver’s . . . need.”
Tarango v. Pastrana, 94 N.M. 727, 729, 616 P.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1980) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). 	Here, Decedent’s family needed the
embalming services provided by SereniCare in Utah as part of the process of returning
Decedent’s body to New Mexico. 	Assuming that 	Plaintiffs can prove that
SereniCare’s performance of those services was deficient, “the idea that tortious
rendition of such services is a portable tort which can be deemed to have been
committed wherever the consequences foreseeably were felt is wholly inconsistent
with the public interest in having services of this sort generally available.” 	Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Cronin v. Sierra Med. Ctr., 2000-

10
NMCA-082, ¶ 25, 129 N.M. 521, 10 P.3d 845 (explaining that “the residence of a
recipient of personal services rendered elsewhere is irrelevant and totally incidental
to the benefits provided by the defendant at his own location” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). The rendering of personal services, like those provided
by SereniCare here, without evidence that the defendant “reached into the forum state
in order to attract the [service recipient’s] business, simply does not constitute the
purposeful availment that is both contemplated in and required by our due process
analysis.” Id. ¶ 26.
Transaction of Business
{19} 	Plaintiffs also argue that SereniCare transacted business in New Mexico by
agreeing to return the body to New Mexico and that specific personal jurisdiction may
be exercised due to a clear nexus between the transaction and the cause of action.
They maintain that the nexus arose because SereniCare engaged in for-profit activities
with the goal of serving New Mexico consumers through direct contact with Plaintiffs
and in conjunction with the other Defendants to perform part of the funeral services
initiated in Utah and concluded in New Mexico.
{20} 	In support of their argument, Plaintiffs rely on Monks Own, Ltd. v. Monastery
of Christ in the Desert (Monks Own I), 2006-NMCA-116, 140 N.M. 367, 142 P.3d
955, aff’d, Monks Own, Ltd. v. Monastery of Christ in the Desert (Monks Own II),

11
2007-NMSC-054, 142 N.M. 549, 168 P.3d 121, which Plaintiffs claim adopted the
“clear nexus” test. The problem with Plaintiffs’ argument is that the New Mexico
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Monks Own I and utilized reasoning different
from that relied on by this Court. See Monks Own II, 2007-NMSC-054, ¶ 1 (stating
that the Supreme Court used “a somewhat different analysis from the Court of
Appeals”). The Supreme Court in Monks Own II did not mention a “ ‘clear nexus’
test” or use the term “nexus” at all.
{21} 	Monks Own II does not help Plaintiffs establish personal jurisdiction over
SereniCare. That case involved a Canadian company, Monks Own, that wanted to
domesticate in New Mexico a Canadian judgment against a New Mexico monastery.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The judgment was for the monastery’s breach of a contract to purchase
Monks Own’s trade name. Id. ¶ 2. Our Supreme Court concluded that the Canadian
court had personal jurisdiction over the New Mexico monastery in part because the
monastery had sufficient minimum contacts with Canada since the subject of the
contract was a Canadian trade name, the monastery’s agent traveled to Canada for
meetings in connection with the contract in question, the monastery filed a trademark
agreement with a Canadian governmental office, and the contract stated that Ontario
law governed the agreement. Id. ¶ 25. Together, these contacts established purposeful
availment of the protections of the Canadian government. Id. ¶ 28.

12
{22} 	In contrast to the monastery in Monks Own II, SereniCare demonstrated no
purposeful availment of the protections of New Mexico law. There is no evidence in
the record that any SereniCare agents initiated contact with Plaintiffs or ever visited
or advertised in New Mexico on SereniCare’s behalf. 	The business transaction at
issue was between SereniCare and Inman. The only contact with New Mexico was
fortuitous and indirect. SereniCare knew the body was being shipped by Inman to
New Mexico, and a SereniCare employee spoke to Plaintiff M.R., a New Mexico
resident, on the telephone. However, it was M.R. who initiated the call while he was
in Utah. These indirect contacts are not the kind of contacts demonstrating a focus on
New Mexico that would warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over SereniCare.
{23} 	The circumstances in the present case are closer to those in Zavala, where this
Court determined that New Mexico courts did not have personal jurisdiction over a
Texas hospital. 2007-NMCA-149, ¶ 1. In Zavala, even though the hospital treated
many New Mexicans, had a generally accessible website, and had a patient transfer
agreement with a New Mexico hospital, we nonetheless concluded that these contacts
were insufficient to satisfy due process. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 20, 23. We noted that the only
contact related to the cause of action was the agreement with the New Mexico
hospital, and that agreement was intended “to promote the continuity of care and the
timely transfer of patients and records between the facilities[,] . . . not to get more

13
business for either hospital.” Id. ¶ 23. Similarly, in the present case, the only direct
contact with New Mexico related to the cause of action was the telephone call between
M.R. and a SereniCare employee that took place in Utah, and there is no evidence that
SereniCare had anything to do with initiating that call or that it intended to solicit
Plaintiffs or other New Mexico consumers in any way. See id. ¶¶ 17-18 (noting that
even though seven percent of the hospital’s income came from New Mexico residents,
there was “no evidence that [the h]ospital intentionally solicited New Mexico
patients”).
{24} 	We are equally unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments. They contend
that New Mexico has an interest in providing redress to its residents when a suit is
based on a contract having a substantial connection with the state. Alternatively, they
maintain that SereniCare established minimum contacts when it “placed Decedent’s
body in the stream of commerce by shipping her remains to New Mexico for viewing
and burial.”
{25} 	With respect to its argument regarding the contract’s substantial connection
with New Mexico, Plaintiffs rely on McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), where the United States Supreme Court stated that “a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents” and held that a California court properly

14
exercised personal jurisdiction over a Texas life insurance company that had issued
a policy to a California resident. 355 U.S. at 221-22, 224. The Court stated that “[i]t
is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with [California].” Id. at 223.
{26} 	As the Court later explained in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the
holding of McGee is not as broad as Plaintiffs argue it to be. 	The Hanson Court
acknowledged that economic developments have caused the requirements for personal
jurisdiction to evolve but stated that “it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds
the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . .
. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not
be called upon to do so unless he has had the minimal contacts with that [s]tate that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.” 	Id. at 251 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
{27} 	The McGee facts are distinguishable from those in the present case. In McGee,
the insurance company initiated contact with the ultimate insured in California, the
insurance policy was delivered in California, and the premiums were mailed from
there. 355 U.S. at 221-22, 223. Here, SereniCare did nothing directed at New Mexico
other than to comply with Inman’s request to prepare Decedent’s body for shipping
to New Mexico. Under these circumstances, “the Due Process Clause as a ‘territorial

15
shield’ is correctly invoked to protect a non-resident who is brought into a forum with
which [it] has no contact.” Santa Fe Techs., Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 35.
{28} 	Plaintiffs’ “stream of commerce” argument is equally misplaced. The stream-
of-commerce analysis originated in the United States Supreme Court’s case, World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), where the Court explained
that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that
“delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum [s]tate.” Id. at 297-98. As an initial matter,
we are not prepared under the circumstances of this case to characterize Decedent’s
body as a “product,” much less a product being placed into commerce. In addition,
stream-of-commerce minimum contacts require something more than “an isolated
occurrence,” id. at 297, and must “arise[] from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other [s]tates.”
Id.; see Sproul, 2012-NMCA- ___, ¶ 26 (reaffirming a preference for the approach to
stream of commerce in World-Wide Volkswagen). While we agree with the dissent
that it is possible for services as well as products to be placed into the stream of
commerce, Dissent ¶ 33, the evidence in this case fails to show that SereniCare’s
unsolicited contact with this single Utah-to-New Mexico shipment equates to efforts
to serve an interstate market, as contemplated by Worldwide Volkswagen.

16
{29} 	In summary, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing
that SereniCare had minimum contacts with New Mexico sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process. The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims
against SereniCare.
CONCLUSION
{30} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs’ claims against SereniCare.
{31} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
I CONCUR:
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge (dissenting).

17
GARCIA, Judge (dissenting).
{32} 	I respectfully dissent in this case. The tortious injury asserted in this case was
suffered as a result of SereniCare’s business services that it provided as part of a
specific multi-party transaction in interstate commerce. 	As a result, minimum
contacts and personal jurisdiction must be addressed in the context of an interstate
commercial transaction, similar to the recent analysis by this Court in Sproul, 2012-
NMCA-__, ¶¶ 16-26 (recognizing the interstate commerce analysis for personal
jurisdiction, also known as the stream of commerce rule established under World-
Wide Volkswagen). Although the present case did not involve the sale of a good or
product transported into the stream of commerce, the funeral services provided by
SereniCare were part of a direct and continuous stream of commerce that began in
Utah and concluded in New Mexico.
{33} 	The majority did focus on the distinction between a service placed into the
stream of commerce and a product placed into the stream of commerce. 	Majority
Opinion ¶ 28. Although this distinction appears misplaced, the majority did proceed
to address the merits of Plaintiffs’ argument. See Hollinger v. Sifers, 122 S.W.3d 112,
117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that the stream of commerce theory can justify
long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant engaged in providing a service,
but holding that the contact requirements are more stringent when the basis for

18
jurisdiction is a service rather than a product); Bergherr v. Sommer, 523 N.W.2d 17,
22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying stream of commerce theory to assert jurisdiction
over non-resident service provider who used an intermediary to provide its services,
rather than goods, to forum state residents). At this early stage of the proceedings
involving a motion to dismiss, I would conclude that SereniCare’s voluntary
participation in this commercial event, being conducted through the stream of
interstate commerce, was sufficient to establish minimum contacts and personal
jurisdiction in New Mexico.
{34} 	It is undisputed that the funeral services provided by SereniCare for the
preparation the Decedent’s body were part of a commercial interstate transaction.
Majority Opinion ¶¶ 1-4. Despite the fact that a portion of these funeral services were
performed in Utah, SereniCare was fully aware of the overall interstate transaction and
the fact that these services would conclude with the burial of Decedent’s body in New
Mexico. 	Id. 	It is within this specific factual context that SereniCare’s minimum
contacts with the Plaintiffs and New Mexico must be analyzed. Does this interstate
activity by SereniCare invoke the benefits and protections of New Mexico’s laws?
Tarango, 94 N.M. at 729, 616 P.2d at 442 (recognizing that “it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conduction activities within the forum [s]tate”).

19
{35} 	“A single transaction of business within the state can be sufficient to subject a
nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction in this state, provided that the cause
of action involved in the suit arises from the transaction of that particular business.”
Visarraga v. Gates Rubber Co., 104 N.M. 143, 146, 717 P.2d 596, 599 (Ct. App.
1986). It is also important to consider whether minimum contacts are asserted under
a “general (all-purpose) or specific (case linked)” basis for personal jurisdiction.
Sproul, 2012-NMCA-__, ¶ 9. It is undisputed that this case only involved a specific
burial transaction that originated in Utah and was consummated in New Mexico.
Majority Opinion ¶ 9. 	SereniCare has attempted to isolate the portion of the
transaction that occurred in Utah as a means of separating its portion of the funeral
services from the full interstate burial transaction that was being arranged by
Decedent’s family.
{36} 	Our courts recognize the liberalization and expansion of jurisdiction in state
courts over foreign corporations and nonresidents under the stream of commerce rule
identified in World-Wide Volkswagen. Visarraga, 104 N.M. at 148-49, 717 P.2d at
596, 601-02. 	As we noted in Sproul, the delivery of “products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
[s]tate” may be sufficient to satisfy the foreseeability aspects of due process. 2012-
NMCA-__, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

20
{37} 	Where a business like SereniCare knowingly undertakes to participate in the
interstate commercial activity of burying a body in another state, their burial services
provided for the nonresident family are sufficiently foreseeable to purposefully avail
their business to the benefits and privileges of the state where the burial will
ultimately occur. The knowing and voluntary act of participating this type of specific
interstate business activity is neither random, fortuitous, or attenuated as asserted by
the majority. See Majority Opinion ¶ 16. If a single business transaction in interstate
commerce can be sufficient to establish minimum contacts with the forum of a
nonresident, then the present case meets the “nexus” test when applied to a specific
personal jurisdiction scenario. Burial services are a once in a lifetime event for every
person. When SereniCare knowingly participates in the burial services for an out-of-
state family located in a nonresident forum, then New Mexico should recognize that
SereniCare is accepting the benefits and protections of our laws when the ultimate
burial occurs in this state. SereniCare’s voluntary decision to participate in this type
of individualized and case-specific interstate commerce should be sufficient to meet
minimum due process requirements and we should recognize that SereniCare has
purposefully availed itself to personal jurisdiction in New Mexico.

21
{38} 	In conclusion, I do not concur with the result reached by the majority in this
case and would reverse the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
against SereniCare.
__________________________________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge