December 7, 2016- State of New Mexico v. Manuel Gallegos-Delgado, No. 34,321, VzWHn

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: _______________
Filing Date: December 7, 2016
NO. 34,321
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MANUEL GALLEGOS-DELGADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Stan Whitaker, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
L. Helen Bennett, P.C.
L. Helen Bennett
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant

OPINION
VANZI, Judge.
{1} 	Defendant Manuel Gallegos-Delgado is an undocumented immigrant who pled
guilty to drug possession and driving while under the influence of alcohol in exchange
for the State agreeing not to oppose a conditional discharge of the drug charge.
Federal removal proceedings were then initiated against Defendant, pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012), and he was
permanently deported. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, arguing that his attorney had only advised him that a possible consequence of
pleading guilty would be deportation, not that he would be barred re-entry into the
United States forever. The district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw
his plea is the subject of this appeal. The question presented to this Court is whether
Defendant’s attorney rendered deficient representation by failing to advise him of the
specific immigration consequences that would follow as a result of his guilty plea, and
if so, whether Defendant was prejudiced by her deficient performance. We answer
these questions in the affirmative and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

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BACKGROUND
{2} 	On May 30, 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and
driving while under the influence of alcohol in exchange for dismissal of other
charges against him and a probated sentence. Part of the plea agreement was that the
State would not oppose a conditional discharge of the possession charge. After
pleading guilty, Defendant received a conditional discharge of the possession charge,
was placed on supervised probation, and received a deferred sentence. At the plea and
sentencing hearing, during the plea colloquy, the district court judge inquired as to
whether there were any immigration issues, and Defendant’s attorney said she
“explained [the] immigration consequences for [Defendant and the] possibility of
deportation” and that he had consulted with an immigration attorney. The judge then
specifically 	asked 	Defendant 	if 	his 	attorney 	had 	explained 	the 	immigration
consequences of entering the guilty plea and that he may be deported. Defendant said
that she had and that he nevertheless wanted to go forward with the plea. Defendant
additionally stated that he had an opportunity to discuss the terms and conditions of
the plea agreement with a separate immigration attorney. The judge explained to
Defendant that if he successfully completed the terms of his probation, the possession
charge would be discharged and he would no longer have it on his record. Of note, a
conditional discharge operates like a conviction under federal immigration law, see

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8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A), unlike in New Mexico, where a conditional discharge is not
an adjudication of guilt. NMSA 1978, § 31-20-13(A) (1994).
{3} 	Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his probation, and the State
moved to revoke Defendant’s probation. The district court appears to have retracted
the conditional discharge for the possession charge, and an amended judgment and
sentence was entered on November 20, 2013.
{4} 	Because Defendant violated New Mexico law, he was subject to deportation
under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A), 1226(a)(1), 1227(a)(1)(B). On
November 25, 2013, Defendant was taken into custody by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and removal proceedings were initiated against him. An
Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Defendant was ineligible for cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status under the INA because of his possession conviction.
The IJ also denied Defendant’s request for voluntary removal because Defendant’s
controlled substance conviction prohibited Defendant from ever lawfully returning to
the United States.
{5} 	Defendant then filed a motion for relief from judgment and to withdraw his
guilty plea. In the motion, Defendant alleged that he was not advised that he would
be deported as a result of his guilty plea and stated that he would not have entered into
the plea agreement if he had known the specific immigration consequences of his plea.

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The district court held a hearing on the motion on October 20, 2014. At the hearing,
Defendant testified that he had already been deported and he was currently in the
custody of the United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Defendant further testified that he would not have entered the guilty plea had he
known all the immigration consequences. On cross-examination, Defendant admitted
that his attorney told him he “would” be deported, despite asserting in an affidavit she
said he “might” be deported. On re-direct, Defendant confirmed that he knew he was
going to be deported but said he did not know about the other immigration
consequences that would result from the plea, such as being forbidden from ever
returning to the United States. During his testimony, Defendant clarified that he never
had actually hired an immigration attorney; he had only spoken to one briefly on the
phone, and she had not discussed the specific consequences that might emerge from
pleading guilty because she had not reviewed his case.
{6} 	Defendant’s trial attorney, who had since withdrawn as Defendant’s counsel,
also testified at the hearing, and she said that the evidence against Defendant was
“strong” and he was “adamant” in taking the plea. Furthermore, she testified that she
specifically told Defendant that the conditional discharge “would not have the same
effect with immigration” as it would with other clients. However, she could not
remember the exact language she used and whether she told Defendant “he would

5
most definitely, to a certainty, be deported” or whether he “can be deported.” The
following is additional relevant testimony from Defendant’s trial attorney, Courtney
Aronowsky, at the hearing:
[Prosecutor:] 	Ms. Aronowsky, you’re aware that since 2004, you
are 	required 	to 	advise 	your 	clients 	of 	the 	specific 	immigration
consequences of each charge to which they’re pleading; isn’t that
correct?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] Yes.
[Prosecutor:] 	But you did not do that in this case?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] Yes, right.
. . . .
[Mr. Shattuck:] 	Were you aware that he would be denied . . . bond
while he was going through a removal proceeding?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.
[Mr. Shattuck:] 	As result of this plea?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.
[Mr. Shattuck:] 	Were you aware that he would be denied the right for
voluntary removal and to return to the country as result of this plea?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.
[Mr. Shattuck:] 	Were you aware that he would be denied any attempts
to adjust his status as a result of entering this plea?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.

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[Mr. Shattuck:] 	And were you aware that he would never be able to
reapply for reentry into this country?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.
[Mr. Shattuck:] 	And since you were not aware of those issues, were
you able to discuss them with him?
[Ms. Aronowsky:] No.
{7} 	Ultimately, the district court denied Defendant’s motion, finding that Defendant
had been advised of the consequences of entering the guilty plea and that there was
no evidence Defendant had wanted to go to trial. The district court also found that
“[D]efendant’s trial counsel was not deficient in her representation[,]” and that the
“record fails to provide any proof that [D]efendant was either leaning toward trial by
any pre-conviction statements or actions, or that it was a viable option he was
considering.” This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction
{8} 	We begin by addressing whether this Court has jurisdiction in the present
matter. We conduct our review of the jurisdictional issue de novo. State v. Gutierrez,
2016-NMCA-077, ¶ 17, 380 P.3d 872. Defendant requested appellate relief under
Rule 1-060(B)(4) NMRA, which is the proper procedural mechanism for a person no
longer in state custody to appeal an allegedly void judgment. See State v. Tran, 2009-

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NMCA-010, ¶ 16, 145 N.M. 487, 200 P.3d 537. We have previously held that this
Court has jurisdiction when a defendant wishes to “challenge his underlying criminal
conviction when in the custody of ICE” if the Defendant has filed a Rule 1-060(B)(4)
motion. State v. Favela, 2013-NMCA-102, ¶ 11, 311 P.3d 1213, aff’d, 2015-NMSC-
005, 343 P.3d 178 (Favela II). Although a conditional discharge is not a conviction
under New Mexico law, see § 31-20-13(A); State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 6,
297 P.3d 374, it has that effect under federal immigration law when an alien has pled
guilty and a judge has ordered some type of punishment, even if a formal adjudication
of guilt has been withheld. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A).
{9} 	Defendant was in ICE custody at the time he filed this appeal and alleges that
the judgment entered against him is void. Because Defendant’s guilty plea to the
possession charge operated as a conviction under federal law and was thus the basis
for the IJ finding that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, adjustment of
status, voluntary removal, and that Defendant could never lawfully return to the
United States, we conclude that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 1-060(B).
The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
{10} 	Defendant claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion 	to 	withdraw 	his 	guilty 	plea 	because 	his 	attorney 	rendered 	deficient
representation by not advising him of the specific immigration consequences and, as

8
a result, he was prejudiced. A district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Tejeiro, 2015-
NMCA-029, ¶ 4, 345 P.3d 1074, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-005, 367 P.3d 440. An
abuse of discretion happens “when a district court’s ruling is clearly erroneous or
based on a misunderstanding of the law[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The district court also abuses its discretion“when the undisputed facts
establish that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given.” State v. Paredez,
2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 5, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
{11} 	Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, defendants in
criminal cases have the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-88 (1984). This right extends to plea negotiations.
Patterson v. LeMaster, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032; see Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be
voluntary and intelligent. State v. Garcia, 1996-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 544, 915
P.2d 300. If a defendant pleads guilty based on the advice of his or her attorney,
whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent depends on whether the attorney’s
assistance in counseling the guilty plea was ineffective. Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029,
¶ 5. Because a motion to withdraw a guilty plea connected to an allegation of

9
ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact, we review
Defendant’s claim de novo. See id.; see also Gutierrez, 2016-NMCA-077, ¶ 33.
{12} 	In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court adopted a two-part test
applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Under the test, a defendant
seeking to make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of
demonstrating: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient[,]” and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-
020, ¶ 9, 127 N.M. 218, 979 P.2d 729. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, both prongs of the Strickland test must be met. Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-
029, ¶ 6.
1. 	Deficient Performance
{13} 	With respect to guilty pleas that have deportation and other immigration
consequences, our Supreme Court held in Paredez that “an attorney’s non-advice to
an alien defendant on the immigration consequences of a guilty plea would . . . be
deficient performance.” 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 16. The Paredez Court further held:
If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise that client of the
specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether
deportation would be virtually certain. Proper advice will allow the
defendant to make a knowing and voluntary decision to plead guilty. . . .
An 	attorney’s 	failure 	to 	provide 	the 	required 	advice 	regarding
immigration consequences will be ineffective assistance of counsel if the
defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney’s omission.

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Id. ¶ 19 (emphases added).
{14} 	Since Paredez, this Court has interpreted the law as “requir[ing] criminal
defense counsel . . . to read and interpret federal immigration law and specifically
advise the defendant whether a guilty plea will result in almost certain deportation.”
State v. Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 688, 147 P.3d 897. It is not
sufficient to advise a client that he or she will be deported, but rather, the criminal
defense attorney must inform the client with specificity what the immigration
consequences might be. See Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 7 (“An attorney who failed
to meet his affirmative burden in providing his client with information about
deportation risks would thus necessarily satisfy the first prong of the Strickland
analysis.”).
{15} 	In the instant case, the record is not illuminating on the question of whether
Defendant’s trial attorney informed him that it was a virtual certainty he would be
deported. Defendant alleges that his attorney only told him he “could” be deported.
But during the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant testified
both that his attorney told him he “would” be deported and that he “possibly” would
be deported. To complicate matters, Defendant’s trial attorney testified that she could
not recall the precise language used, i.e., whether she said he would definitely be
deported or whether he could be deported. Because of the ambiguous evidence, we are

11
unable to conclude whether Defendant’s attorney properly advised him it was a virtual
certainty he would be deported. However, that is not the end of our inquiry.
{16} 	Paredez not only requires defense attorneys to advise their clients if they will
be deported but also demands that attorneys “conduct an individualized analysis of the
apparent immigration consequences for [a d]efendant.” See Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141,
¶ 15. Here, the specific immigration consequences confronting Defendant, in addition
to the risk of deportation, are substantial. For example, as a general rule, the Attorney
General “may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable
from the United States if the alien . . . has not been convicted of any aggravated
felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). However, Defendant’s controlled substance
conviction limits the application of this section. See United States v. Valenzuela-
Escalante, 130 F.3d 944, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that possession of a
controlled substance is an “aggravated felony” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)
and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(B)). Similarly, the Attorney General’s ability to adjust
Defendant’s residency status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(C)(ii) is negated by a
felony conviction. See id. (“The Attorney General shall adjust the status of any alien
provided lawful temporary resident status under subsection (a) of this section to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien . . . establish[es] that
he . . . has not been convicted of any felony . . . in the United States.”).

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{17} 	Furthermore, Defendant would generally be allowed to voluntarily depart the
United States at his own expense rather than being subject to removal proceedings. 8
U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1). However, Defendant’s controlled substance conviction renders
him “deportable” under Section 1229c(a)(1), thus limiting this option. See id. (limiting
the option to self-deport to aliens “not deportable under [8 U.S.C. S]ection
1227(a)(4)(B)”).
{18} 	Most significantly, Defendant’s controlled substance conviction results in a
permanent bar to reentry to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that “aliens who are inadmissible . . . are ineligible to receive visas and
ineligible to be admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) provides
that an alien “convicted of . . . a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . .
relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.” See Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort,
390 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that “aliens [that] are deemed
‘inadmissible’ [are] ineligible even to apply for a visa that would permit them to
legally enter the United States”); People v. Am. Sur. Ins. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216,
219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (applying 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and noting that “review of
present federal immigration law indicates that the statutory bars to legal reentry are
nearly, if not flatly, impregnable for a convicted drug trafficker”). As discussed above,
the conditional discharge of Defendant’s drug possession charge operates as a

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conviction under federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A)(i) (“The term ‘conviction’
means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a
court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where . . . the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilt[.]”). Defendant’s attorney acknowledged that she did not advise Defendant of
these additional immigration consequences. Indeed, Defendant testified that at the
time of his guilty plea he was not aware that deportation would be permanent or that
he would suffer other severe immigration consequences. Therefore, Defendant’s guilty
plea was not voluntary and intelligent as required by the Sixth Amendment. See
Garcia, 1996-NMSC-013, ¶ 9; see also Favela II, 2015-NMSC-005, ¶ 14 (“It is
imperative that every defendant entering into a plea agreement which could result in
immigration consequences possesses a clear understanding of those immigration
consequences.”).
{19} 	In addition, in its order denying Defendant’s motion, the district court found
that “[D]efendant testified that his trial attorney advised him of the specific
consequence of deportation.” As previously discussed, however, Defendant’s attorney
was required to advise him, not only of the consequence of deportation, but also of
other immigration ramifications. See Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 15 (“We read
Paredez to require at a minimum that the attorney advise the defendant of the specific

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federal statutes which apply to the specific charges contained in the proposed plea
agreement and of consequences, as shown in the statutes, that will flow from a plea
of guilty.”). But Defendant’s attorney testified that she was not aware of the full
breadth of immigration consequences Defendant faced. As such, she was unable to
give Defendant advice regarding the relevant federal statutes and such non-advice
constituted deficient performance. See Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 16; see also
Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 16 (explaining that a resident alien’s defense attorney
“should have analyzed and discussed with [the d]efendant the federal statute relating
to cancellation of removal” and other immigration consequences beyond the issue of
deportation). Defendant has thus met the first prong of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test.
2. 	Prejudice
{20} 	The second prong of the Strickland test requires Defendant to demonstrate that
his “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the
plea process.” Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In order to establish such prejudice, the defendant must show that there is
a “reasonable probability” he would not have taken the plea had the attorney’s
representation regarding the specific immigration consequences been constitutionally
adequate. 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	“Our 	recent

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jurisprudence adopts ‘a broad approach to how a defendant can demonstrate
prejudice.’ ” Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 14 (quoting Favela, 2013-NMCA-102,
¶ 20). The approach used by this Court is not mechanical, but rather, is determined by
the facts of each case. Favela, 2013-NMCA-102, ¶ 19.
{21} 	To show that a defendant would have rejected a plea deal had his attorney
advised him of the specific immigration consequences beyond deportation, a
defendant must show that his decision to decline the plea bargain “would have been
rational under the circumstances.” Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 14 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Generally, however, prejudice may not be shown by the
defendant’s self-serving statements alone and requires some corroborating evidence.
Id. ¶ 15. Corroborating evidence may include: (1) the defendant’s pre-conviction
statements or actions that indicate the defendant preferred to go to trial, Patterson,
2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 30; (2) the strength of the State’s case, id. ¶ 31; (3) evidence of
a defendant’s connections to the United States, see Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 21;
and (4) the defendant’s post-conviction behavior that demonstrates he probably would
not have pled guilty had he received competent advice, see Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029,
¶¶ 15, 28-30. However, these factors are not exclusive. Id. ¶ 15 (“Our courts have
placed no limit on the types of relevant evidence a defendant may provide to
demonstrate that he would have rejected the plea if given appropriate advice.”).

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{22} 	In denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court
found that there was no pre-conviction evidence that demonstrated Defendant wanted
to proceed to trial. To the contrary, however, Defendant’s pre-conviction efforts to
engage an immigration attorney demonstrated Defendant’s intent to avoid immigration
consequences. Moreover, upon the advice of the immigration attorney, Defendant got
married specifically in an attempt to avoid deportation. Had Defendant been properly
advised, therefore, there is a “reasonable probability” he would have rejected the plea
deal, see Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), as evidenced by his pre-conviction actions that show he was concerned
about the immigration consequences of his case and actively took steps aimed at
reducing the consequences. See Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 27 (stating that a
defendant’s pre-conviction efforts to make the district court aware of his immigration
situation strongly supported the proposition that the defendant would have rejected the
plea deal if his counsel’s representation had been constitutionally adequate).
{23} 	Although the strength of the State’s case appears to have been “strong,” the
district court did not consider the harshness of the consequences Defendant was
confronted with as a result of his guilty plea, see Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 22,
which likely would have informed Defendant’s decision to proceed to trial had he
known the full scope of immigration ramifications. The district court placed particular

17
emphasis on the fact that Defendant had consulted an immigration attorney who had
advised him not to plead guilty and he nevertheless decided to take the plea deal,
presumably because of the strength of the State’s case against him. Defendant,
however, testified that he had not actually hired the immigration attorney and that she
did not know the specific circumstances of his case. More importantly, Defendant
very well may have made a strategic decision to go against the non-individualized
advice of the immigration attorney in order to avoid being subjected to both
incarceration and deportation. See id. (“It is conceivable that a non-citizen might opt
to plead guilty and accept deportation to avoid serving a prison sentence, rather than
face the possibility of both incarceration and deportation.”). But had Defendant’s
attorney properly advised him of the severe and specific immigration consequences
beyond deportation, it “would have been rational under the circumstances” for
Defendant to reject the plea deal so that he could have an opportunity to be acquitted
and, therefore, an opportunity to avoid the harsh immigration consequences that
awaited him. See Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
{24} 	With respect to the evidence of Defendant’s connections to the United States,
Defendant has a wife and young child here. The record also indicates that Defendant
alleges that he came to the United States in 1998 as a child and has lived here

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continuously since then. Defendant’s connections to the United States and the fact that
he has lived here his entire adult life could have been deciding factors in his decision
to plead guilty given he was unaware of the more severe immigration consequences
he faced. See Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 21. Such evidence of attachment to this
country may further corroborate Defendant’s claims. See Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029,
¶ 24 (explaining that where a defendant had lived with his family in the United States
for over a decade, such connection to this country provided corroborating evidence
that the defendant would not have accepted a plea deal had he known the immigration
consequences).
{25} 	Finally, we note that the district court did not consider Defendant’s post-
conviction behavior, which suggests that Defendant would not have taken the plea
deal had he fully known the immigration consequences he faced. Our jurisprudence
recognizes that a defendant’s post-conviction behavior may be relevant in the
prejudice analysis. Id. ¶ 28. “In Paredez, our Supreme Court held that the speed of a
defendant’s post-conviction reaction upon discovering the adverse immigration
consequences of his guilty plea could be considered when weighing the reasonable
probability that he would have acted differently with competent advice.” Tejeiro,
2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 28. Here, Defendant’s appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals was remanded on May 27, 2014. Two days later Defendant signed an

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affidavit 	stating, 	“[H]ad 	[I] 	know[n] 	that 	I 	would 	surely 	face 	immigration
consequences and be stripped of any rights to contest deportation [or] removal, I
would not have entered into the [plea] agreement and would not have [pled] guilty.”
Less than a month later, on June 24, 2014, Defendant filed his motion for relief from
judgement and to withdraw his guilty plea with the district court. Defendant’s post-
conviction actions, although not conclusive, see id. ¶ 29, strongly indicate that
Defendant would have rejected the plea deal if his attorney had not provided deficient
representation. Indeed, Defendant’s continued effort to fight the immigration
consequences, including this very appeal, further supports the conclusion that
Defendant was prejudiced.
{26} 	In sum, we hold that Defendant’s attorney rendered deficient performance by
not 	informing 	Defendant 	of 	the 	specific 	immigration 	consequences, 	beyond
deportation, that would arise from his guilty plea. We further hold that the
constitutionally inadequate representation prejudiced Defendant because he would not
have taken the plea deal had he known the full scope of severe immigration
consequences he faced as a result of pleading guilty.

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CONCLUSION
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s
motion to set aside his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
_________________________________
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge