August 17, 2020- State of New Mexico v. Fabian Trujillo, No. A-1-CA-37618

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	2
Plaintiff-Appellee,	3
v. 	No. A-1-CA-37618	4
FABIAN TRUJILLO,	5
Defendant-Appellant.	6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY	7
Matthew J. Wilson, District Judge	8
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	9
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General	10
Santa Fe, NM	11
for Appellee	12
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	13
MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender	14
Santa Fe, NM	15
for Appellant	16
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DUFFY, Judge.	17
{1} 	Defendant Fabian Trujillo appeals his jury conviction for aggravated battery	18
against a household member resulting in great bodily harm, contrary to NMSA 1978,	19
Section 30-3-16(C) (2008, amended 2018). We affirm.	20
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/17/2020 9:51 AM

2
BACKGROUND	1
{2} 	J.M. (Victim) testified to the following. Defendant was driving Victim’s car	2
and Victim was sitting in the passenger seat when Defendant began hitting Victim	3
with a closed hand, including blows to Victim’s head, the side of her body, her arms,	4
and her ribs. Defendant hit Victim’s face and behind her ear, and he pulled her finger.	5
Defendant broke the tip of Victim’s finger and fractured her ribs. Defendant finally	6
pulled over, injected heroin, and passed out. Victim walked down the road where	7
she accepted a ride home from a passing driver. An ambulance took Victim from her	8
house to a hospital.	9
{3} 	About five minutes after Victim testified to the foregoing, the State asked her,	10
“What sort of injuries did you have?” Victim responded, “Like I said, this finger	11
right here was broken[.]” Defense counsel objected, stating:	12
Judge, I’m going to object on the basis of hearsay with regard to any	13
diagnosis that was given to this individual at the hospital and also move	14
to strike her previous statement that she had fractured ribs. I believe	15
that these statements are based on possibly expert opinion of the	16
medical individuals who are not here and are not available for cross-	17
examination as to the true nature of her injuries. I think she can say	18
what she felt, what stuff looked like, but not a medical diagnosis.	19
The district court overruled the objection, stating that the objection regarding the	20
fractured ribs was untimely and that Victim could “talk about her own body and	21
what happened to her.” However, the district court reminded the State that it needed	22
to lay a proper foundation for such testimony.	23

3
{4} 	The State asked Victim about her treatment at the hospital and Victim	1
responded, “I’m not sure what they did. They tested . . . they looked at my bumps	2
on my head; they just felt right—like right here, I had . . . a fracture right here, facial	3
fracture.” Victim stated that her finger was in a splint for “a long while.” The	4
following exchange occurred:	5
State: 	And how about your injury to your face?	6
Victim: 	My regular doctor did X-rays.	7
State: 	X-rays. Okay. And were you shown those X-rays?	8
Victim: 	He told me about them.	9
Following 	this 	questioning, 	the 	district 	court 	heard 	Defendant’s 	objection.	10
Defendant stated:	11
[We] renew the objection . . . with regard to testimony about the	12
fractured face in particular. It doesn’t sound like there would be any	13
way for her as a person to know that she had a fracture except based on	14
the X-rays that they gave . . . her doctor, and that information relayed	15
to her.	16
The district court again overruled the objection but noted that Victim could not	17
testify to anything the doctor said.	18
{5} 	Victim testified that due to the injury to her ribs, it hurt to breathe “for a long	19
time. To laugh, to do anything.” She testified her ribs were in pain for about eight	20
weeks.	21

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DISCUSSION	1
I. 	Hearsay	2
{6} 	Defendant argues that the district court admitted out-of-court statements about	3
Victim’s injuries in violation of the rule against hearsay. See Rule 11-801(C)	4
NMRA; Rule 11-802 NMRA. “We review the admission of evidence under an abuse	5
of discretion standard and will not reverse in the absence of clear abuse.” State v.	6
Hnulik, 2018-NMCA-026, ¶ 6, 458 P.3d 475 (internal quotation marks and citation	7
omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court exercises its discretion	8
based on a misunderstanding of the law[,]” id. (internal quotation marks and citation	9
omitted), or “when its ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and	10
circumstances of the case.” State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 745,	11
266 P.3d 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	12
{7} 	“Hearsay” is defined as “a statement that (1) the declarant does not make	13
while testifying at the current trial or hearing, and (2) a party offers in evidence to	14
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Rule 11-801(C). Hearsay is	15
inadmissible unless an exception applies. See Rule 11-802. As a preliminary matter,	16
we note that Defendant’s initial hearsay objection to Victim’s testimony about her	17
broken ribs and finger was made more than five minutes after Victim first testified	18
to those facts, and at that point, “the horse was already out of the barn when [the	19
d]efendant tried to shut the door.” State v. Neswood, 2002-NMCA-081, ¶ 18, 132	20
N.M. 505, 51 P.3d 1159 (stating that “[g]enerally, evidentiary objections must be	21

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made at the time the evidence is offered”). Nonetheless, assuming without deciding	1
that Defendant’s objections were sufficient to preserve his arguments for appeal, we	2
find no basis for reversal on the merits.	3
{8} 	Although Defendant alleges generally that Victim “testified at length about	4
what she was told about alleged internal injuries by other people, i.e. her medical	5
care providers[,]” Defendant did not identify any alleged hearsay statements with	6
particularity in his briefing. “We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what	7
a party’s arguments might be.” Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-	8
040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	9
{9} 	Our own review of Victim’s testimony reveals that, contrary to Defendant’s	10
characterization, Victim did not testify to any statement made by her doctors or	11
medical providers. She testified that her finger and ribs were broken, and that she	12
had a facial fracture; she never testified that anyone else asserted or uttered to her	13
that she had fractured or broken bones. Although she testified that her medical care	14
providers tested her facial injuries and told her about x-rays they had taken, she never	15
testified to any statements made by her providers. Because we are unable to	16
determine what portion of Victim’s testimony Defendant seeks to challenge on	17
appeal, and because our review failed to reveal any out-of-court statement that	18

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constitutes hearsay, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by	1
allowing Victim’s testimony. See Rule 11-801(C).1
2
II. 	Sufficiency of the Evidence	3
{10} 	Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for	4
aggravated battery of a household member. “[A]ppellate courts review sufficiency	5
of the evidence from a highly deferential standpoint.” State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-	6
088, ¶ 13, 331 P.3d 930 (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	7
“All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and we resolve all	8
conflicts and make all permissible inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Id.	9
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Jury instructions	10
become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be	11
measured.” State v. Smith, 1986-NMCA-089, ¶ 7, 104 N.M. 729, 726 P.2d 883. “We	12
examine each essential element of the crimes charged and the evidence at trial to	13
ensure that a rational jury could have found the facts required for each element of	14
1 Defendant cites to a case from Georgia for the proposition that “[a] lay
witness is not competent to give what amounts to a medical opinion relative to his
injuries or the effect thereof.” Jones v. State, 669 S.E.2d 505, 508 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008). That court ultimately concluded, however, that “[w]e can find no authority,
nor does [the defendant] present any, for the proposition that victims of crimes
cannot testify as to the injuries they suffered during an assault.” Id. The same is true
here. Defendant’s exploration of this issue is limited to the single citation, without
analysis or explanation, and so we decline further review on appeal. See Elane
Photography, LLC, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70.
Likewise, Defendant states in a subject heading that the district court “violated
Defendant’s right to confrontation,” but he did not develop this argument in the body
of his brief. See id.

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the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Slade, 2014-NMCA-088, ¶ 13 (internal	1
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]ppellate courts do not search for	2
inferences supporting a contrary verdict or re-weigh the evidence because this type	3
of analysis would substitute an appellate court’s judgment for that of the [fact-	4
finder].” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	5
{11} 	Defendant’s specific argument is that there was insufficient evidence that	6
Victim suffered “great bodily harm” as required by the jury instructions. The district	7
court instructed the jury to find great bodily harm if Victim’s injury caused	8
“prolonged impairment of the use of any member or organ of the body.” See UJI-	9
14-131 NMRA (defining “great bodily harm”). Defendant argues that because	10
Victim’s testimony as to her internal injuries was hearsay, we should either not	11
consider it or else weigh it lightly in our sufficiency analysis. We reject these	12
propositions. See State v. Gipson, 2009-NMCA-053, ¶ 4, 146 N.M. 202, 207 P.3d	13
1179 (“We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the	14
fact finder as long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.”); State v.	15
Castillo-Sanchez, 1999-NMCA-085, ¶ 30, 127 N.M. 540, 984 P.2d 787 (“In	16
assessing the sufficiency of evidence at trial, however, we consider all evidence that	17
was 	admitted, 	even 	if 	we 	reverse 	on 	the 	ground 	that 	some 	evidence 	was	18
inadmissible.”).	19
{12} 	To the extent Defendant’s sufficiency argument depends on a determination	20
that Victim should not have been allowed to testify to her internal injuries, our	21

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determination that the testimony was properly admitted also resolves the sufficiency	1
issue Defendant raises. Moreover, even without considering any disputed testimony,	2
Defendant’s sufficiency argument still fails. In addition to Victim’s testimony as to	3
her facial fracture, broken finger, and fractured ribs, Victim testified that her ribs	4
were in pain for eight weeks. Victim testified that due to the injury to her ribs, it hurt	5
to breathe “for a long time. To laugh, to do anything.” She also testified that her	6
finger was in a splint for “a long while.” Victim testified that her finger “still hurts	7
to this day, but when it’s cold” and stated, “I think it’s never going to heal.” From	8
this testimony—which is separate from and independent of the testimony Defendant	9
challenges as hearsay—a rational jury could have concluded that there was	10
“prolonged impairment of the use of any member or organ of the body” and thus	11
great bodily harm. See State v. Cordova, 2016-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 18-19, 366 P.3d 270	12
(concluding that a victim’s testimony that she suffered severe bruising, road rash,	13
and bruised ribs, leaving her in extreme and immobilizing pain for one month with	14
recurring bouts of pain was sufficient to satisfy great bodily injury). We therefore	15
conclude that sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s conviction for aggravated	16
battery of a household member.	17
CONCLUSION	18
{13} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.	19

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{14} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
__________________________________	2
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
_________________________________	5
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	6
_________________________________	7
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	8