June 13, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Patrick Martinez, No. A-1-CA-36657

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 6/13/2019 10:24 AM

Filing Date: June 13, 2019 i
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No. A-1-CA-36657 Mark ——

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Opinion Number:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

PATRICK MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY
Cindy M. Mercer, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Margaret Crabb, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Patrick J. Martinez
Albuquerque, NM

Pro Se Appellant

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OPINION
DUFFY, Judge.
43 Defendant appeals his conviction for speeding, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 66-7-301 (2002, amended 2015) after a de novo trial in district court. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
93 Defendant was stopped and cited for speeding by an officer with the Isleta
Police Department. Following his trial and conviction in magistrate court for
speeding, Defendant filed a de novo appeal in the district court. After a half-day
bench trial, the district court found Defendant guilty of speeding for driving 55 miles
per hour in a posted 45 mile-per-hour speed zone. On appeal to this Court, Defendant
argues that the speed regulation statutes, Section 66-7-301 and NMSA 1978,
§ 66-7-303 (1996), are ambiguous and should be construed to allow motorists to
accelerate in advance of an increased speed limit sign once the sign is visible.
DISCUSSION
33 We consider an issue of first impression in New Mexico, at what point in
relation to a speed limit sign does a speed limit become effective such that a driver
can be cited for a violation of Section 66-7-301. This is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. See State v. Tarin, 2014-NMCA-080, {| 6, 331

P.3d 925.

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In construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent

of the Legislature. To accomplish this, we apply the plain meaning of

the statute unless the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence

to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or

contradiction, in which case the statute is to be construed according to

its obvious spirit or reason. . .. While the consideration of public policy

is the province of the Legislature, where a statute is ambiguous, we may

consider the policy implications of varying constructions of the statute.
State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, 4 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
4; We begin by looking at the plain meaning of the speed limit statutes, Sections
66-7-301 and -303. Section 66-7-301(A) sets forth default speed limits for certain
types of roads and conditions, but also states in Subsection (C) that these speed limits
may be altered as authorized in Section 66-7-303(B). Section 66-7-303(B) states in
relevant part “that [an altered] speed limit shall be authorized and effective when
appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at that particular part of the
highway[.]” Thus, the plain language of Section 66-7-303(B) indicates that a speed
limit is effective at the point where the sign is located.
{5} This interpretation is supported by several provisions found in the New
Mexico Department of Transportation’s 2008 Signing and Striping Manuall,! (the

NMDOT Manual), a document issued in compliance with the Legislature’s mandate

that the state transportation commission “adopt a manual and specifications for a

'http://dot.state.nm.us/content/dam/nmdot/Infrastructure/SignandStripingManual.pdf
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uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of [the
Motor Vehicle Code].” NMSA 1978, § 66-7-101 (2003). The NMDOT Manual
recognizes that “[uJniformity of the meaning and application of traffic control
devices is vital to their effectiveness.” NMDOT Manual, ch. 1, § 1.1.3. Further, in a]
section addressing signage and captioned, “Standardization of Location,” it states:
The longitudinal displacement between a sign and the corresponding
roadway element varies from zero in the case of a speed limit sign (or
most regulatory signs) that is physically placed at the point where the

speed limit (or regulation) begins or ends, to | mile or more in the case
of an advance guide sign.

NMDOT Manual, ch. 2, § 2.1.16, at 2.1-20 (2008) (emphasis added); see also
NMDOT Manual, ch. 2, § 2.2.2, at 2.2-6 (2008) (providing that a speed limit sign be
installed “[t]o show the beginning of a new speed limit . . . at the physical location
where the speed limit changes”); NMDOT Manual, ch. 2, Exhibit 2.2-C, at 2.2-7
(2008) (indicating, in a table headed “Suggested Spacing for Speed Limit Signs[,]”
that for every type of road listed, the “normal placement” for speed limit signs is “at
the beginning of the speed limit”). Moreover, our State Transportation Commission,
the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the Federal Highway
Administration, and the U.S. Secretary of Transportation all agree that the speed

limit is effective at the point where the sign is located.”

*The New Mexico Transportation Commission’s determination that speed
limit changes take effect at the point where a speed limit sign is placed is consistent
with the approach taken by the American Association of State Highway Officials in

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{6} Were we to accept Defendant’s argument that a speed limit becomes effective
at the point where the sign can be read, we would disrupt uniformity in the
application of well-established local and national practices governing the placement
of speed limit signs. We decline to depart from the sound reasoning articulated by
the Transportation Commission in the NUDOT Manual, given its particularized
knowledge and experience in promoting uniformity of traffic control devices.
Moreover, Defendant’s proposed interpretation of Sections 66-7-301 and -303
would render speed limits and their boundaries subjective, based upon the unique
point of view of each driver approaching a speed limit sign, thereby eliminating
meaningful, standardized enforcement of speed limits throughout the state.
Interpreting these statutes as Defendant suggests would produce an unworkable and
absurd result. See United States v. Block, 452 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (M.D. Fla.1978)
(“To hold that changing traffic speed zones become effective when the posted signs
become visible would result in the law being variable, uncertain, and relative to
individual motorists’ eyesight. The effect would be theoretically confusing, as well

as practically impossible.”); see generally Tarin, 2014-NMCA-080, { 8 (rejecting a

its 2009 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), available at
https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009r1r2/mutcd2009r1r2edition.pdf, which is
developed jointly with the Federal Highway Administration and approved by the
U.S. Secretary of Transportation. See MUTCD § 2B.13, JJ 3-4 (2009) (providing
that “Speed Limit... signs... shall be located at the points of change from one
speed limit to another. ... At the downstream end of the section to which a speed
limit applies, a Speed Limit sign showing the next speed limit shall be installed”).

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party’s proposed interpretation of a statute where doing so “would produce an
unworkable situation and absurd result”). For all of these reasons, we hold that “the
speed limit starts at the physical location of the sign and continues to be in effect
until it ends at the next different speed limit sign.” Shafron v. Cooke, 190 P.3d 812,
814 (Colo. App. 2008) (noting that a driver’s “sight[ing] of a forty mile per hour
sign did not allow him to increase his speed above twenty-five miles per hour until
he reached that sign’).
{ | Weare similarly unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that because drivers
often decelerate in anticipation of a slower speed limit, he should have been allowed
to speed up in anticipation of a faster one. Defendant misapprehends that posted
speed limits represent the maximum traveling speed, and as one court explained,

[A] speed limit sign for a slower speed zone requires a motorist to have

his speed reduced by the time he reaches the sign. Slower speed zones,

in short, are mandatory. On the other hand, a speed limit sign indicating

a faster speed zone simply means that a motorist may proceed at a faster

speed than he is presently permitted once he has reached that sign. The

speed limit sign for a faster speed zone does not require that a motorist

be driving at the faster speed when he reaches the sign, but simply

allows him to begin doing so once he has reached the sign. Faster speed

zones are permissive.
Block, 452 F. Supp. at 910. Just as with speed limit increases, however, slower speed
limits become applicable at the point that the sign is posted.

{83} Finally, Defendant advocates for the rule of lenity here, arguing that the

speeding statute is ambiguous because it does not clearly state where any particular

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speed limit starts and ends. “The rule of lenity counsels that criminal statutes should
be interpreted in the defendant’s favor when insurmountable ambiguity persists
regarding the intended scope of a criminal statute.” State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-
049, § 18, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Finding no ambiguity in the relevant statutes, we reject Defendant’s rule
of lenity argument.

CONCLUSION

93 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for speeding.

0} ITISSO ORDERED.

Minoo 1g by

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

ee Oe

M. MONICA ZAMORA, hief Judge

ISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge