November 26, 2014 – State of New Mexico v. Kevin Sheehan, No. 33,192

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: 	November 26, 2014
NO. 33,192
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KEVIN SHEEHAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN COUNTY
James Waylon Counts, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
John R. Hakanson, P.C.
Miguel Garcia
Alamogordo, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
FRY, Judge.
{1} 	The State appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence gathered during Defendant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated.
Officer Cory Crayton detained Defendant after observing what he believed to be an
unconscious female passenger in Defendant’s vehicle, which was parked on the side
of the road. The district court concluded that Officer Crayton did not have reasonable
suspicion to perform an investigatory detention and that the community caretaker
exception to the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Officer Crayton’s actions.
Because we conclude that the district court applied the wrong standard in analyzing
Officer Crayton’s actions, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	The following facts are taken from Officer Crayton’s testimony at the
suppression hearing. 	Officer Crayton was patrolling state highway 48 in Lincoln
County when he noticed a Jeep parked on the shoulder of the road. It was just after
midnight. The driver’s side door was open and the interior light was on. Inside the
Jeep were two people; Defendant was in the driver’s seat, and a woman was in the
passenger seat. Officer Crayton testified that the woman was crouched to the side
with her head tilted completely back, such that he could “see her esophagus.” 	He

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stated that it did not look like a position one would choose to sleep in. 	Officer
Crayton testified that Defendant was “leaning” over her.
{3} 	Believing that something might be wrong, Officer Crayton stopped beside the
Jeep and asked whether they were okay. 	Defendant responded that they were and
then, according to Officer Crayton, he anxiously began attempting to leave. At this
point, Officer Crayton backed up, activated his lights, and pulled in behind the
vehicle. 	He testified that he did not see any indication that something violent or
criminal had taken place between Defendant and the female passenger. Instead, he
was concerned for the woman because, although she may have been sleeping, she did
not look like she was in a sleeping position, and he believed that she may have been
unconscious. 	Officer Crayton testified that at that point, he intended to detain the
vehicle in order to ensure the female passenger’s safety.
{4} 	Officer Crayton approached the vehicle on the passenger side. At that point,
the woman “came to” and said something to Officer Crayton. 	Officer Crayton
testified that his concern for the female passenger was alleviated by her speaking. He
testified, however, that he smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the Jeep. 	He
therefore asked Defendant to exit the Jeep. As Officer Crayton spoke to Defendant,
he smelled alcohol on Defendant’s breath. 	Officer Crayton asked Defendant to

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perform a field sobriety test. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with
driving while intoxicated.
{5} 	Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was unconstitutionally
seized the moment Officer Crayton turned on his emergency lights and pulled behind
Defendant’s car. The district court agreed with Defendant and concluded that there
was no evidence that there was an emergency requiring the assistance of Officer
Crayton nor was there reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was underway.
Accordingly, the district court suppressed any evidence obtained by Officer Crayton
after the stop. The State now appeals.
DISCUSSION
{6} 	The State argues that the district court relied on the wrong standard in granting
Defendant’s motion to suppress because it relied on the higher standard of the
community caretaker exception that applies to warrantless entries into residences. We
agree with the State that the district court applied the wrong test in determining that
the stop violated Defendant’s constitutional rights.
Standard of Review
{7} 	On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review
findings of fact to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence and we
review legal conclusions de novo. State v. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123 N.M.

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159, 935 P.2d 1171. 	In determining whether the law was correctly applied to the
facts, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 	State v.
Cline, 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785. However, because the facts
are largely undisputed in this case, we review only the legal conclusions of the district
court in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress. 	State v. Morales, 2005-NMCA-
027, ¶ 8, 137 N.M. 73, 107 P.3d 513.
Officer Crayton Validly Stopped Defendant Pursuant to the Community
Caretaker Exception
{8} 	There is no dispute that the initial encounter between Defendant and Officer
Crayton was appropriate. As stated above, however, the district court concluded that
a seizure occurred once Officer Crayton activated his lights and pulled behind
Defendant. The district court concluded that Officer Crayton did not have reasonable
suspicion for such a stop. In turning to the community caretaker exception, the district
court stated that the standard for analyzing this encounter was whether there were
“reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate
need for [police officer] assistance for the protection of life or property.” The district
court noted that despite repeated opportunities to do so, Officer Crayton never
testified that he thought there was an emergency. 	The district court therefore
concluded that the community caretaker exception did not apply.

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{9} 	We agree with the district court that Officer Crayton did not have the requisite
reasonable suspicion to undertake an investigative detention of Defendant when he
first activated his lights and pulled in behind him. State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013,
¶ 10, 123 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282 (stating that investigatory stops, which constitute a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, require reasonable suspicion). The issue
then is whether Officer Crayton was acting pursuant to his role as a community
caretaker when he detained Defendant. Id. (recognizing that “in some circumstances,
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, police may intrude upon an
individual’s privacy to carry out community caretaker functions that further public
safety”). 	“An officer who is acting as a community caretaker does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.” Schuster v. State Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-
025, ¶ 26, 283 P.3d 288. Therefore, “[w]hen police act as community caretakers, . .
. the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not
appropriate inquiries.” State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d
1032. “When determining whether a warrantless search or seizure is reasonable on
the basis of the community caretaker exception, we must measure the public need and
interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree of and nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen.” 	Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

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{10} 	Due to differing expectations of privacy, however, not all actions by police that
invoke the community caretaking exception are analyzed under the same standard.
Id. ¶ 25. In this case, the district court stated that the standard was whether there were
“reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand.” This language
comes from the first element of the “emergency aid doctrine.” Id. ¶¶ 25, 29 (“First,
the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand
and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.”
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 	The emergency aid
doctrine is only one of three distinct doctrines within the broadly-termed “community
caretaker exception,” the other two being the automobile impoundment and inventory
doctrine, and the redundantly-titled community caretaking doctrine, also known as the
public servant doctrine. 	Id. ¶ 25. 	To avoid confusion, we will refer to the third
doctrine as the public servant doctrine. 	While these doctrines share the “common
characteristic” of applying to situations in which the police officer’s actions “are
motivated by a desire to aid victims rather than investigate criminals,” because each
doctrine involves separate types of intrusions involving distinct expectations of
privacy, the doctrines are analyzed by different standards. 	Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

1We recognize that our Supreme Court made an earlier statement in Ryon that
appears somewhat contradictory to this later statement. Our Supreme Court stated that
“[t]he emergency doctrine applies to, but is not limited to, warrantless intrusions into
personal residences.” Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do
not construe this statement as limiting our conclusion in this case because the Court
immediately thereafter stated that the emergency assistance doctrine may justify
more 	intrusive 	searches 	of 	the 	home 	or 	person 	than 	the 	lower 	standard 	of
reasonableness that applies to an involuntary search or seizure of a “vehicle on a
public highway.” Id.; Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tx. Crim. App. 2003) (en
banc) (“[T]he [public servant] doctrine deals primarily with warrantless searches and
seizures of automobiles . . ., while the emergency doctrine deals with warrantless
entries of, but is not limited to, private residences.”).
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{11} 	The emergency aid doctrine “applies specifically to warrantless intrusions into
the home.”1 Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 31. Our Supreme Court has stated that the
inquiry under the emergency aid doctrine is “unique” because “a search within a home
raises unique concerns.” 	Id. ¶ 22. “[I]ntrusion into the privacy and sanctity of the
home must be guarded with careful vigilance and permitted only in carefully thought-
through and clearly justifiable circumstances.” Id. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). 	Therefore, the burden for justifying a warrantless entry into a
private residence under the emergency aid doctrine is significantly higher than the
standards under the other community caretaker doctrines. Id. ¶ 26 (“Since the privacy
expectation is strongest in the home only a genuine emergency will justify entering
and searching a home without a warrant and without consent or knowledge.”); see
State v. Baca, 2007-NMCA-016, ¶ 31, 141 N.M. 65, 150 P.3d 1015 (“This standard
is high because it reflects the bedrock constitutional principle that a warrantless entry

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into a home presents unique concerns.”). The encounter in this case did not involve
a warrantless entry into a home. 	Thus, because the district court applied the
emergency aid doctrine to the encounter, it relied on the wrong standard in granting
the motion to suppress.
{12} 	The proper standard to apply to the encounter in this case is the public servant
doctrine. The “public servant doctrine deals primarily with warrantless searches and
seizures of automobiles.” Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). 	Because “there is a lesser privacy expectation in a vehicle on a
public highway, an involuntary search or seizure there is judged by a lower standard
of reasonableness[ than the emergency assistance doctrine].” 	Id. 	Under the public
servant doctrine, “a police officer may stop a vehicle for a specific, articulable safety
concern, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a violation of law has
occurred or is occurring.” 	Apodaca v. State, Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1994-
NMCA-120, ¶ 5, 118 N.M. 624, 884 P.2d 515; see State v. Reynolds, 1993-NMCA-
162, ¶ 8, 117 N.M. 23, 868 P.2d 668 (“Part of the function of police officers is to carry
out community caretaking functions to enhance public safety. It is appropriate, then,
for police officers to stop vehicles for a specific, articulable safety concern.”), rev’d
on other grounds, 1995-NMSC-008, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315. 	This is an
“objective test to determine whether a vehicle stop is based on a reasonable concern

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for public safety.” 	Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 30. 	“The scope of any intrusion
following the stop must be limited to those actions necessary to carry out the purposes
of the stop, unless . . . reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises.” Apodaca, 1994-
NMCA-120, ¶ 5.
{13} 	We conclude that Officer Crayton sufficiently articulated a specific concern for
the safety of the female passenger to permit him to detain the vehicle to alleviate that
concern. Officer Crayton repeatedly emphasized during his testimony that he detained
the vehicle due to his concern for her safety. These safety concerns were rooted in his
observation of the female passenger’s position in the vehicle, specifically his
observation that she appeared unconscious and in an unnatural position, did not
respond to his inquiry or even give any indication that she registered the question, and
that Defendant was “leaning over her.” Because Officer Crayton’s concern was for
the passenger, it follows that his concerns for her would be alleviated by a response
from her, 	not 	just 	from Defendant. 	The 	district 	court 	made 	no 	credibility
determination regarding Officer Crayton’s testimony indicating that the court found
that Officer Crayton’s motivation was something other than concern for the female
passenger. 	Instead, the court concluded that Officer Crayton’s concerns were not
sufficient to meet the higher standard of the emergency assistance doctrine. Under the
correct standard, however, Officer Crayton permissibly detained Defendant’s vehicle

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until he could ascertain whether assistance was needed. See Schuster, 2012-NMSC-
025, ¶ 27 (stating that “a continued investigation by an officer in his or her role as a
community caretaker is reasonable as long as the officer is motivated by a desire to
offer assistance and not investigate”).
{14} 	Finally, we note our agreement with the Montana Supreme Court that once “the
officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or
that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure
implicating . . . the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.” 	State v.
Lovegren, 2002 MT 153, ¶ 25, 310 Mont. 358, 51 P.3d 471. Here, Officer Crayton
stated that once the female passenger roused herself, his concerns for her safety were
alleviated but that he smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle. At this point, Officer
Crayton was no longer acting in a community caretaker role, and the situation
transitioned into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. No argument was presented
below or on appeal that this seizure violated the Fourth Amendment and accordingly
we do not address it.
CONCLUSION
{15} 	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of Defendant’s
motion to suppress.

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{16} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge