December 22, 2025- City of Santa Fe v. Albert Catanach, No. A-1-CA-42000

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: December 22, 2025	3
No. A-1-CA-42000	4
CITY OF SANTA FE,	5
Petitioner-Appellee,	6
v.	7
ALBERT CATANACH; INFINITE	8
INTERESTS ENT., LLC; and	9
CNSP, INC. d/b/a NMSURF,	10
Respondents-Appellants.	11
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY	12
Bryan Biedscheid, District Court Judge	13
Erin K. McSherry, City Attorney	14
Marcos D. Martinez, Senior Assistant City Attorney	15
Santa Fe, NM	16
for Appellee	17
Catron, Catron & Glassman, P.A.	18
Richard S. Glassman	19
Santa Fe, NM	20
for Appellants	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 12/22/2025 7:26 AM

OPINION	1
WRAY, Judge.	2
{1} 	In this second appeal, we consider whether the City of Santa Fe (the City)	3
complied with 47 U.S.C. § 332, 1 a federal law that imposes substantive and	4
procedural limitations on the authority of state and local governments (localities) to	5
regulate telecommunications facilities. See Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty., 296	6
F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 2002). In the first appeal, this Court determined that	7
the City adequately informed Albert Catanach, Infinite Interests ENT., LLC, and	8
CNSP, 	Inc., 	d/b/a 	NMSURF 	(collectively, 	Applicant) 	that 	the 	submitted	9
telecommunications facility request would not be considered on an expedited basis	10
under a different federal provision, 47 U.S.C. § 1455 (referred to as Section 6409).	11
See City of Santa Fe v. Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 26, 525 P.3d 419. Because	12
the 	district 	court 	had 	not 	determined 	whether 	the 	City 	complied 	with 	the	13
requirements of Section 332, we remanded for that question to be decided in the first	14
instance. See Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 32. The district court determined that	15
the City complied with Section 332, and Applicant appeals. We affirm.	16
1We refer to 47 U.S.C. § 332 in text as Section 332 and by its full citation
when referencing specific provisions.

2
BACKGROUND	1
{2} 	Because the facts were summarized in detail in Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017,	2
¶¶ 2-18, we provide only those facts necessary to understand the issues presented in	3
this second appeal. City ordinances contemplate different types of review for	4
proposed telecommunications towers, depending on the circumstances: building	5
permits, administrative approval, and/or review by, at minimum, the planning	6
commission. See Santa Fe, N.M., Code of Ordinances (SF Code) ch. 14, art. 14-6,	7
§ 14-6.2(E)(2)(b)(viii), (c) (2025)2 (excluding from the planning commission review	8
of the types of activities governed by Section 6409 but nevertheless subjecting those	9
requests to the requirements of the building code), SF Code ch. 14, art. 14-6, § 14-	10
6.2(E)(3) (2025) (describing administrative approval), SF Code ch. 14, art. 14-6,	11
§ 14-6.2(E)(4) (2025) (describing the process in the planning commission and before	12
other boards, if necessary). On April 9, 2015, Applicant sought “administrative	13
approval” 	from 	the 	City 	“to 	collocate 	and 	consolidate” 	two 	existing	14
telecommunications towers, while also acknowledging that “a new tower would	15
need to be built.” In the request, Applicant cited the City administrative approval	16
process as well as Section 6409, which requires an “expedited review process” for	17
certain types of telecommunications requests, including collocations. See Catanach,	18
2The parties do not alert this Court to any relevant substantive changes to the
SF Code in the years that have elapsed since Applicant made the initial request, and
so we cite to the current SF Code.

3
2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 4 (describing the Section 6409 process). As we explained in	1
Catanach, if Section 6409 applied, the City was required to act on a request within	2
a particular time period or the request would be “deemed granted.” Catanach, 2023-	3
NMCA-017, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	4
{3} 	The land use department responded (the Esquibel Letter) on April 28, 2015	5
and informed Applicant that because the request required construction of a new	6
tower and a setback waiver was required, the authority to review the request	7
“shift[ed] . . . to the [p]lanning [c]ommission.” The Esquibel Letter provided a	8
contact phone number and information to allow Applicant to arrange for the required	9
planning commission procedures. In Applicant’s first appeal, this Court affirmed the	10
district court’s conclusion that the Esquibel Letter notified Applicant that the	11
expedited Section 6409 process would not apply because the request was for a new	12
construction, 	not 	a 	modification. 	Catanach, 	2023-NMCA-017, 	¶¶ 	24-26.	13
Nevertheless, this Court did not agree “that the City’s compliance with Section 6409	14
and its time frames also satisfied the requirements of Section 332.” Catanach, 2023-	15
NMCA-017, ¶ 30.	16
{4} 	As a result, the matter was remanded for the district court to “consider and	17
resolve the Section 332 arguments that the parties have raised on appeal.” Catanach,	18
2023-NMCA-017, 	¶ 	32. 	Section 	332 	contains 	substantive 	and 	procedural	19
requirements for handling telecommunications facilities requests that are imposed	20

4
on localities by federal law. The dispute in the present case is centered on the	1
procedural requirements. Under Section 332, decisions on such applications must be	2
“in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” 47	3
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), and actions must be taken “within a reasonable period of	4
time after the request is duly filed,” accounting for “the nature and scope of such	5
request,” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). In the present case, the relevant “shot clock,”	6
or the presumptively reasonable time for the City to “act” to satisfy 47 U.S.C.	7
§ (c)(7)(B)(ii), is 150 days. See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify	8
Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure Timely Siting Review & to Preempt	9
Under Section 253 State & Local Ordinances that Classify All Wireless Siting	10
Proposals as Requiring a Variance (Reasonable Period of Time Ruling), 24 FCC	11
Rcd. 13994, ¶¶ 32, 42, 44-45 (2009). Even though the shot clock is “presumptively	12
reasonable,” localities may establish that any delay “was reasonable despite its	13
failure to comply” with the shot clock. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229,	14
236, 257 (5th Cir. 2012).	15
{5} 	On remand, the district court concluded that the Esquibel Letter was a	16
sufficient denial under Section 332 and in the alternative, “that the course of conduct	17
of the [p]arties reflected in the pleadings and exhibits submitted to the [c]ourt	18
demonstrates that the City acted in a reasonable manner.” For these reasons, the	19
district court denied Applicant’s request for a ruling to order the City to issue a	20

5
permit and accepted the City’s invitation to remand the matter to the City “to process	1
the 	Applicant’s 	application 	according 	to 	the 	City’s 	[o]rdinances 	governing	2
telecommunication facilities applications and any required [p]lanning [c]omission	3
approval.” Applicant appeals.	4
DISCUSSION	5
{6} 	The parties dispute whether (1) the Esquibel Letter satisfied the City’s	6
obligations under Section 332; (2) any delay by the City was reasonable under the	7
circumstances; (3) Applicant waived the right to enforce Section 332; and (4) the	8
district court properly adopted the City’s proposal to remand the matter to the City	9
to process the application. The City’s waiver argument implicates jurisdictional	10
questions, which we are bound to address. See Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-	11
NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (“The question of jurisdiction	12
compels an answer.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).	13
Our analysis of the first two issues, however, provides necessary context for our	14
conclusion that Applicant satisfied any jurisdictional requirements. We therefore	15
begin with the parties’ arguments related to the City’s compliance with Section 332.	16
I. 	The Esquibel Letter	17
{7} 	The City maintains that the Esquibel Letter was a Section 332 denial because	18
the Esquibel Letter “reasonably notified [Applicant] that there were missing	19
elements to its application” and the reasons for denial were identifiable. The	20

6
difficulty with the City’s argument is that the Esquibel Letter does not explicitly	1
deny anything, other than an expedited review process. The Esquibel Letter explains	2
that Applicant’s plans to construct a new tower did not comply with the City’s	3
requirements for distance between the property lines in relation to the height of the	4
proposed tower—the setback requirement. For that reason, administrative review	5
was not appropriate and “the authority of review” under SF Code ch. 14, art. 14-6,	6
§ 14-6.2(E)(3) shifted to the planning commission. The Esquibel Letter denied	7
administrative—or 	expedited—review, 	but 	otherwise 	only 	provided 	contact	8
information to set up meetings for the planning commission process.	9
{8} 	The denial of a particular process is not necessarily a denial of a request. The	10
City permissibly required Applicant to proceed through the planning commission.	11
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (“[N]othing in this chapter shall limit or affect the	12
authority of a [s]tate or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions	13
regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service	14
facilities.”). But localities must “act on any request for authorization to place,	15
construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period	16
of time.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). It is the request for authorization—not the	17
request for the process—that must be resolved within a reasonable time. See New	18
Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Town of Stoddard (Town of Stoddard), 853 F. Supp.	19
2d 198, 203 (D.N.H. 2012) (explaining that the Section 332 shot clock “contemplates	20

7
not just that a local government will take some action on an application within the	1
deadline, but that it will resolve the application before the deadline” (alteration,	2
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified	3
Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that	4
Congress furthered its goals with Section 332 by “reducing the impediments that	5
local governments could impose to defeat or delay the installation of wireless	6
communications facilities”). Thus, to be a denial under Section 332, the requested	7
authorization “to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities”	8
must be denied. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). The City denied Applicant’s request	9
for expedited review. But the City, through the Esquibel Letter, did not deny the	10
substantive request contemplated by Section 332, which was the request for	11
permission to collocate or consolidate the telecommunications towers.	12
{9} 	For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by the City’s argument that the	13
Esquibel Letter satisfied the requirements for a Section 332 denial because the	14
reasons for denial were identifiable. For support, the City cites T-Mobile S., LLC v.	15
City of Roswell (City of Roswell), 574 U.S. 293 (2015). The question for the City of	16
Roswell Court was “whether, and in what form, localities must provide reasons when	17
they deny telecommunication companies’ applications to construct cell phone	18
towers.” Id. at 295. The Court determined that localities must give reasons for a	19
denial in writing and those reasons must be “clear enough to enable [the] judicial	20

8
review” that Section 332 contemplates. See City of Roswell, 574 U.S. at 302-03; see	1
also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (permitting “an action in any court of competent	2
jurisdiction” by “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act	3
by a [s]tate or local government . . . that is inconsistent with this subparagraph”).	4
The underlying premise of the City of Roswell holding, however, is that the locality	5
denied the request. 574 U.S. at 307-08. Based on that premise, the City of Roswell	6
Court evaluated what was necessary to include in such a denial. Id. That premise	7
does not exist in the present case, because the Esquibel Letter did not deny the	8
request to approve the telecommunications tower.	9
{10} 	Instead, as we explained in Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 31, the Esquibel	10
Letter denied Section 6409 review, which shifted the request from the Section 6409	11
timelines to the Section 332 shot clock. As a result, to meet the “presumptively	12
reasonable” time frame, the City was required to resolve Applicant’s request within	13
150 days of the Esquibel Letter. See Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 2, 31 (noting	14
that “if the reviewing state or municipality finds that Section 6409(a) does not apply	15
. . . the presumptively reasonable time frame under Section 332(c)(7) will start to	16
run from the issuance of the state’s or municipality’s decision that Section 6409(a)	17
does not apply” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). The	18
City points to a November 2015 letter, but that letter was also limited, as the City	19
acknowledges, to denying expedited review. The record reveals no other timely	20

9
written denial of Applicant’s request for approval (as opposed to expedited review),	1
and 	the 	presumption 	therefore 	arises 	that 	the 	City 	violated 	the 	procedural	2
requirements of Section 332. Our next question is therefore whether the City	3
established “that its delay was reasonable despite its failure to comply” with Section	4
332’s presumptively reasonable shot clock. See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 257	5
(explaining that localities may rebut the shot clock’s presumption of reasonableness	6
with evidence that the delay was reasonable).	7
II. 	The Evidence That the Delay Was Reasonable	8
{11} 	Applicant contends that because the Esquibel Letter is not a sufficient Section	9
332 	denial 	and 	the 	City 	can 	point 	to 	no 	other 	written 	denial 	of 	the	10
telecommunications request, the Section 332 shot clock expired and the remedy is	11
an order for the City to issue a permit. The district court, however, found that under	12
the circumstances, “the City acted in a reasonable manner” in its handling of	13
Applicant’s request and therefore denied the relief sought by Applicant. To evaluate	14
Applicant’s argument that this finding by the district court was not supported by the	15
evidence, we turn to the record.	16
{12} 	After this Court’s remand to the district court, the parties set forth the timeline	17
of events, and our review of the record confirms the parties’ assertions. On receiving	18
the April 2015 Esquibel Letter, Applicant’s counsel wrote to the City in May 2015	19
and challenged the City’s determination that the planning commission process was	20

10
required. In September 2015, Applicant contacted the City again, this time to arrange	1
for meetings to discuss Applicant’s questions. The City and Applicant met in	2
October 2015 “to start the process of obtaining a waiver.” In November 2015, the	3
City sent a second letter to Applicant, clarifying the basis for denying Section 6409	4
review. Applicant submitted an application to the planning commission in January	5
20163 and until April 2016, Applicant engaged in the planning commission process.	6
But in April 2016, Applicant sent a letter that disagreed with the City’s November	7
2015 analysis regarding Section 6409 and noted that the City had also not complied	8
with the timelines in Section 332. For these reasons, Applicant informed the City	9
that the application was considered to be “deemed granted” under Section 6409. See	10
47 C.F.R. § 1.6100(c)(4) (2021) (“In the event the reviewing [s]tate or local	11
government fails to approve or deny a request seeking approval under this section	12
within the time frame for review . . . the request shall be deemed granted.”). By letter	13
in May 2016, the City again rejected Applicant’s reliance on Section 6409 but stated	14
that “this does not mean your client cannot pursue this plan, it just means he has to	15
go through a certain process.” Applicant proceeded to build the proposed tower. In	16
response, the City red-tagged the tower and sought an injunction.	17
3 To the extent the City argues that the January application was a second
request for Section 332 purposes, which restarted the shot clock, we disagree. The
January 2016 application initiated a new City process but did not restart the Section
332 timelines, because Applicant’s initial request for approval had not been
resolved. See Town of Stoddard, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 203.

11
{13} 	Applicant does not contest the facts set forth in the record. Instead, Applicant	1
argues that the district court did not explain “why the presumptively reasonable 150	2
days was not enough for the City.” We disagree with Applicant’s position that the	3
City was required to produce evidence that “the City needed extra time to make a	4
decision under Section 332.” Instead, the City was only required “to introduce	5
evidence demonstrating that its delay was reasonable,” which the district court could	6
then “weigh . . . against the length of the government’s delay—as well as any other	7
evidence of unreasonable delay that the wireless provider might submit—and	8
determine whether the state or local government’s actions were unreasonable under	9
the circumstances.” See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 257. As we explain, we	10
conclude that the City’s actions and the resulting delay were reasonable based on the	11
chronological evidence of the delay, beginning with the Esquibel Letter. 	See	12
Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 31 (observing that the Section 332 shot clock began	13
to run with the Esquibel Letter).	14
{14} 	In the Esquibel Letter, the City informed Applicant that the planning	15
commission proceedings were necessary and provided a phone number to get that	16
process moving. Applicant initially challenged the City’s determination about the	17
applicability of Section 6409 but eventually reached out with “questions” regarding	18
City ordinances. The Section 332 shot clock expired during this time frame, but	19
Applicant had not made the phone call to arrange for review by the planning	20

12
commission. Neither party suggested an extension of time to the shot clock. See Up	1
State Tower Co., LLC v. Town of Southport, 412 F. Supp. 3d 270, 291 (W.D.N.Y.	2
2019) (explaining that “a reasonable period of time may be extended beyond” the	3
shot clock based on “mutual consent of the” applicant and the locality (internal	4
quotation marks and citation omitted)). When the shot clock expired, the City could	5
have denied the request or continued to work with Applicant to move the request	6
along. See id. (noting that when the deadline approaches, a locality may (1) deny the	7
request and risk a substantive Section 332 claim that substantial evidence does not	8
support the denial or (2) allow the shot clock to run and risk a Section 332 claim that	9
the procedural requirements were ignored).	10
{15} 	The City chose to work with Applicant. Applicant started the process of	11
working to obtain a waiver at the end of October 2015 but did not submit the	12
necessary application until January 2016. The necessary meetings were arranged for	13
March 2016 but in late April 2016, Applicant reverted to its earlier position that	14
Section 6409 controlled. Thus, while we agree with Applicant that on our record, the	15
City did not resolve the request in the presumptively reasonable timeline, we also	16
agree with the City that Applicant abandoned the request. Applicant informed the	17
City that the ongoing Section 332 request was deemed granted under Section 6409	18
and built the tower, despite the City’s attempts to bring Applicant back to the Section	19

13
332 process.4 Those attempts continued from the May 2016 letter until the City red-	1
tagged the tower and requested an injunction. We hold that the City’s responses to	2
Applicant’s actions were not “unreasonable under the circumstances.” See City of	3
Arlington, 668 F.3d at 257.	4
III. 	Section 332 and Jurisdiction	5
{16} 	Having concluded that the Esquibel Letter was not a Section 332 denial and	6
affirmed the district court’s findings that the City acted reasonably, we consider the	7
question of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Overton v. N.M. State Tax Comm’n, 1969-	8
NMSC-140, ¶ 8, 81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613 (cautioning that appellate courts “cannot	9
ignore jurisdictional questions”). The City argues that Applicant waived any	10
challenge to the City’s compliance with Section 332, because Applicant did not file	11
suit to enforce the shot clock under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) within thirty days	12
of either the Esquibel Letter or the November 2015 Letter. The City couches this	13
argument as “jurisdictional,” based on the premise that the timeline in Section 332	14
4 While Section 332 permits the shot clock to be extended if the locality
requires more information to resolve a request, we do not consider whether the City’s
communications satisfied the requirements of Section 332 and tolled the shot clock.
See Catanach, 2023-NMCA-017, ¶ 3 (describing the process and requirements for
extending the Section 332 shot clock). Our record does not show that the City
specifically asked for more information. The City instead requested the information
that had already been provided in the form of a different application. Because we
conclude that the City acted reasonably, we decline to parse the time frames to
determine whether the time tolled sufficiently such that the period between the
Esquibel 	Letter 	and 	Applicant’s 	2016 	letter 	was 	equal 	to 	or 	less 	than 	the
presumptively reasonable 150 days.

14
is a “condition precedent to enforce” the Section 332 protections. See Wilson v.	1
Denver, 1998-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 9-10, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 153 (explaining that	2
time limitations in statutes are jurisdictional when they “establish a condition	3
precedent to the right to maintain the action” (internal quotation marks omitted)).	4
Applicant responds that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 47	5
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) is not jurisdictional and argues that we should follow suit.	6
See T-Mobile Ne., LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311, 326 (3rd Cir. 2019)	7
(“Because the text and context of this statute, and historical treatment of timing	8
requirements in similar statutes, do not reveal a clear intent from Congress to make	9
the review provision’s timing requirement jurisdictional, we conclude that it is	10
not.”). Neither party explains whether state or federal principles of statutory	11
construction apply to construe this federal statute or why we should follow their	12
preferred precedent. In any event, we conclude that if 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)	13
is jurisdictional, its conditions were met.5
14
{17} 	Under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), “[a]ny person adversely affected by any	15
final action or failure to act by a [s]tate or local government or any instrumentality	16
5 We note that we have not decided the merits in lieu of determining first
whether jurisdiction existed. Our Supreme Court has prohibited this approach, even
when the resolution of “a difficult jurisdictional question . . . would not alter the
ultimate outcome of the case.” Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 9-10. Instead, we have
evaluated the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) and concluded that if the
time-to-file provision is jurisdictional, the facts of this case establish that Applicant
satisfied any such requirement.

15
thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within [thirty] days after	1
such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent	2
jurisdiction.” 	(Emphasis 	added.) 	Regardless 	of 	whether 	this 	provision 	is	3
jurisdictional, the last event that could have triggered a thirty-day window to file suit	4
under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) for the City’s failure to act did not occur until the	5
City red-tagged Applicant’s constructed tower. See Reasonable Period of Time	6
Ruling, 24 FCC Rcd. 13994, ¶¶ 49-50 (explaining that 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)	7
creates a window for filing suit, because before the shot clock expires, the claim is	8
not ripe, but after the thirty-day period, the claim has expired); City of Arlington,	9
668 F.3d at 236 (noting that the presumptively reasonable time period reflected by	10
the shot clock may be rebutted by evidence of reasonable delay).	11
{18} 	We have already determined that the Esquibel Letter was not a Section 332	12
denial and that the City reasonably responded to Applicant’s actions. Even after	13
Applicant’s April 2016 “deemed granted” letter, the City still did not deny	14
Applicant’s request but instead encouraged Applicant to “go through a certain	15
process.” It was not until the City red-tagged the constructed tower and sought an	16
injunction that the City communicated to Applicant that the tower could not be built	17
as requested. Applicant’s answer and counterclaim, relying in part on Section 332,	18
was filed within thirty days of the red-tag. We therefore conclude that if 47 U.S.C.	19
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v) is jurisdictional, Applicant satisfied the time requirement.	20

16
IV. 	Remand to the Planning Commission	1
{19} 	The district court denied Applicant’s request for a Section 332 hearing and	2
accepted the City’s invitation to remand the matter to the City to process the 2015	3
application according to City ordinances. This case, however, arose from the City’s	4
request for an injunction and not as an appeal from an action by the City on	5
Applicant’s application. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(D) (1999) (affording the	6
district court authority to “set aside, reverse or remand the final decision” of an	7
agency under certain circumstances); Maso v. N.M. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-	8
NMCA-025, ¶¶ 13-14, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 (discussing the district court’s	9
original and appellate jurisdiction). Because this case did not arise from a planning	10
commission decision, jurisdiction could not be returned to the planning commission	11
by remand. See Los Alamos Cnty. v. Beery, 1984-NMSC-050, ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 157,	12
679 P.2d 825 (“The order of remand simply returns the jurisdiction of the cause to	13
the lower court in which it originated.”); City of Albuquerque v. Am. Fed’n of State,	14
Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 2015-NMCA-023, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 1069 (“Complaints cannot	15
be remanded to a tribunal if they did not originate there.” (internal quotation marks	16
and citation omitted).	17

17
CONCLUSION	1
{20} 	We affirm the district court’s ruling on Applicant’s motion, reverse the	2
portion of the April 25, 2024, order that remands the matter to the planning	3
commission, and remand for entry of final judgment.	4
{21} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
______________________________	6
KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge	7
WE CONCUR:	8
____________________________	9
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	10
____________________________	11
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	12