Scott Dickerson v. Town of Dover

*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
SCOTT DICKERSON, : TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
: DOCKET NOs.: 005403-2010
: 004187-2011
Plaintiff, : 008887-2012
:
v. :
:
TOWN OF DOVER, :
:
:
Defendant. :
:
Dated: March 30, 2020
Joseph G. Buro for plaintiff (Zipp & Tannenbaum, L.L.C., attorneys).
David C. Pennella for defendant (Law Office of David C. Pennella).
BIANCO, J.T.C.
This opinion following oral argument shall serve as the court’s determination concerning
the motion by plaintiff, Scott Dickerson (“Mr. Dickerson”), to compel payment of interest from
the defendant municipality Town of Dover (“Dover”) on the tax refund owed by Dover to Mr.
Dickerson pursuant to the stipulation of settlement signed by the parties on February 21, 2019.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court finds that, in addition to his stipulated tax refund of
$108,382.11, Mr. Dickerson is entitled to statutory interest of 5% per annum pursuant to N.J.S.A.
54:3-27.2 because Dover breached the terms of the stipulation of settlement by failing to pay Mr.
Dickerson the tax refund no later than June 1, 2019.
Procedural History
Mr. Dickerson timely appealed the local property tax assessments on his commercial
properties in Dover, designated by the taxing district as Block 1215 Lot 1, Block 1215 Lot 10,
Approved for Publication
In the New Jersey
Tax Court Reports

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Block 1215 Lot 12, and Block 1215 Lot 15 (“Subject Property”), for tax years 2010, 2011, and
2012. On February 21, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement reducing the
Subject Property’s local property tax assessments for the relevant years. The reduced assessment
entitled Mr. Dickerson to a total refund of $108,382.11 as shown below:
Docket No. Tax Refund Amount
005403-2010 $35,065.36
004187-2011 $35,962.03
008887-2012 $37,354.72
The stipulation of settlement contained a provision that waived statutory interest under
N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2.1 The critical parts of this agreement are paragraphs four and six. Paragraph
four reads: “Statutory interest, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2, having been waived by taxpayer,
shall not be paid provided the tax refund is paid upon approval of the 2019 fiscal year budget of
the Town of Dover but not later than June 1, 2019.”2 Paragraph six sets forth the method of
delivery with another reference to the June 1st deadline stating that: “All refunds as a result of the
settlement set forth herein are to be made payable to the taxpayer and forwarded to Zipp &
Tannenbaum, LLC, 280 Raritan Center Parkway, Edison, New Jersey 08837 upon approval of the
2019 fiscal budget of the Town of Dover but no later than June 1, 2019.” (Emphasis added). Read
together, these paragraphs signal that Mr. Dickerson waived his statutory right to interest provided
1 “[I]n the event that a taxpayer is successful in an appeal from an assessment on real property,
the respective taxing district shall refund any excess taxes paid, together with interest thereon . . .
within 60 days of the date of final judgment.” N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2.
2 At oral argument, the parties explained that the June 1 date served to accomplish the dual aims
of allowing Dover enough time to pass the town budget while establishing a firm deadline for
timely payment with or without budget approval. Dover asserted that, at the time the date was
chosen, it was unaware that June 1 fell on a Saturday.

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that Dover issued a refund made payable to Mr. Dickerson and sent to his counsel, Zipp &
Tannenbaum, LLC, (hereinafter “Zipp & Tannenbaum”) no later than June 1, 2019.
The following day, February 22, 2019, the court entered final judgments pursuant to the
stipulation of settlement, reducing the assessments on the Subject Property for the relevant tax
years. On February 26, 2019, Zipp & Tannenbaum sent Dover’s Tax Collector a letter containing
copies of the judgments issued by the Tax Court and a copy of the stipulation of settlement. The
letter reiterated paragraph four of the stipulation by requesting that a refund check made payable
to Mr. Dickerson, be forwarded to Zipp & Tannenbaum “upon approval of the [Dover’s] 2019
fiscal year budget . . . but no later than June 1, 2019.”
By June 1, 2019, Dover had paid neither the refund nor interest to Mr. Dickerson. On June
3, 2019, Dover mailed two checks totaling $108,382.11 and copies of purchase orders to Zipp &
Tannenbaum for the same amounts as the checks. The purchase orders contained a section titled
“Certification & Declaration” requesting the payee (i.e., Mr. Dickerson) to sign and certify that
“the within bill is correct in all its particulars.” To date, Mr. Dickerson has not signed these
purchase orders. On June 10, 2019, Zipp & Tannenbaum sent a letter to Dover returning the
purchase orders and stating that, because payment was made after the June 1, 2019 deadline,
interest was owed. The letter asked Dover to recalculate the refund with interest. Since then,
Dover has not issued any payments to Mr. Dickerson. On July 9, 2019, Mr. Dickerson filed a
motion to compel payment of refund with interest. Oral argument was heard on October 2, 2019.
Facts
The facts of this case were established through oral argument, and the certifications
submitted by Mr. Dickerson, his attorney, Peter Zipp (“Mr. Zipp”) of Zipp & Tannenbaum, and
Dover’s Town Administrator. All dates take place in 2019.

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Mr. Dickerson had several telephone and in-person communications with Dover
employees between February 22 and June 1. First, in April, Mr. Dickerson called the Dover
Finance Department to see whether the refund was available. He was told that the refund would
not be available until after Dover’s budget was released in May. Towards the end of April, Mr.
Dickerson appeared at Town Hall in person to speak with the Dover Town Administrator. Mr.
Dickerson was told by the Dover Town Administrator that he “would not be receiving the refund
check any time soon.” Later, in May, Mr. Dickerson called Dover Town Hall about the refund
and was told that the budget was scheduled to be adopted in mid-June, after the June 1 deadline
set by the parties. Finally, on Friday, May 31, Mr. Dickerson appeared at Town Hall and was
again told that payment was not available at that time.3
On Monday, June 3, Mr. Dickerson went to Town Hall and asked to be paid directly; he
was told to come back later that day. Mr. Dickerson returned that afternoon and was presented
3 Dover asserts that it was ready to pay Mr. Dickerson in-person on Friday, May 31, but failed to
do so because it was subsequently told by its attorney that the checks had to be mailed to Zipp &
Tannenbaum. Dover’s Town Administrator, however, certified that, before speaking with Dover’s
attorney, “I told Mr. Dickerson that he could pick up the checks or I could mail them on Monday
and he specifically told me that would be okay. I acted on reliance of Mr. Dickerson’s verbal
statement that the checks and vouchers could be sent out on Monday.” Thus, on one hand Dover
was committed to paying Mr. Dickerson in-person on Friday, May 31, until speaking with Dover’s
counsel, while on the other hand Dover had already committed to mailing payment to Mr.
Dickerson on Monday, June 3, before speaking with counsel. It is unclear why, after learning from
counsel that payment could not be made directly, Dover’s Town Administrator did not ask Mr.
Dickerson to sign the purchase orders and then mail payment to Zipp & Tannenbaum. In the
second instance, Dover’s Town Administrator did not give Mr. Dickerson an option to be paid on
May 31. He simply told Mr. Dickerson that he could be paid on June 3, and Mr. Dickerson agreed.
Notably, Dover never asserted in its papers nor at oral argument that the conversation with counsel
occurred before Monday, June 3, when payment was finally made. Dover’s Town Administrator’s
certification further alleges that he was misled by Mr. Zipp’s authorization that the checks could
be mailed on Monday, June 3. However, Dover does not specify when this conversation took
place. Based on these inconsistencies and the totality of the evidence, including a copy of Mr.
Dickerson’s phone records, the court is satisfied that Mr. Dickerson was not given the option to be
paid on Friday, May 31, and Dover’s attorney was not contacted until Monday, June 3.

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with two purchase orders for the total refund amount but without interest. Dover’s Town
Administrator informed Mr. Dickerson that payment had to be forwarded to Mr. Zipp, at which
time Mr. Dickerson called Mr. Zipp, requesting that he authorize for the payment to be made
directly to Mr. Dickerson. During this call, Mr. Zipp advised Mr. Dickerson that the payment was
late and should include interest. Mr. Zipp also advised Mr. Dickerson not to sign the purchase
orders, and instructed Dover’s Town Administrator to forward the purchase orders and checks to
his firm.
At 1:24 pm on June 3, Dover’s Town Administrator sent an email to Zipp & Tannenbaum
with attached copies of the refund checks, asking whether Mr. Zipp wanted the checks mailed to
his office or given directly to Mr. Dickerson. While it is unclear whether the actual checks were
handed to Mr. Dickerson or eventually mailed to Zipp & Tannenbaum, in either case, they were
not deposited. The next correspondence between the parties occurred in a letter dated June 10.
Zipp & Tannenbaum returned the purchase orders to Dover requesting that they be recalculated to
include interest pursuant to the stipulation of settlement. Dover did not re-issue payment.
Applicable Law
I. N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2
When a taxpayer is successful in his local property tax appeal, the municipality is obligated
to issue a refund plus interest.4 N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2. Refunds must be paid “within 60 days of the
4 This provision applies whether the taxpayer obtains a favorable judgment through trial or
settlement. Waterview Vill.-Cmty. Realty Mgmt. v. City of Ventnor, 4 N.J. Tax 262, 267-68 (Tax
1982).

6
final judgment.” Ibid.5 “In computing any period of time fixed by rule or court order, the day of
the act or event from which the designated period begins to run is not to be included. The last day
of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor
legal holiday.” R. 1:3-1.6
II. Settlement Agreements
It is a long-settled principle that “[a] settlement agreement between parties to a lawsuit is
a contract.” Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super.
118, 124 (App. Div. 1983); see also, Petrie Retail, Inc. v. Town of Secaucus, 19 N.J. Tax 356, 363
(Tax 2001) (finding that “settlements before the Tax Court are typically considered binding
contracts.”), aff’d, 363 N.J. Super. 74 (App. Div. 2003). As such, a court should uphold the terms
of a settlement agreement between parties “absent a demonstration of ‘fraud or other compelling
circumstances[.]’" Pascarella, 190 N.J. Super. at 125 (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super.
130, 136 (App. Div. 1974).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has emphasized that municipalities would be bound by
the contracts they made:
It has long been the rule in New Jersey that "court[s] cannot relieve
municipalities from hard bargains[.]" It has been emphasized that
5 In 2019, the statute was amended to provide that interest was payable at the lower of 5% or 1%
above the prime rate. N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2. Such refunds plus interest must be paid within sixty
days of the date of a final judgment if the property is residential. Ibid. If the property is
commercial, it could be paid within three years of the date of the final judgment unless the refund
amount was below $100,000, in which case it must be repaid within sixty days of the final
judgment. This amendment applies to appeals filed after the effective date of August 9, 2019. L.
2019, c. 230, § 3. Therefore, it does not apply to the instant appeals, which are simply bound by
the original sixty-day deadline.
6 Made applicable to the Tax Court by R. 1:1-1.

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"[m]unicipal contracts stand on the same footing as contracts
between natural persons and courts will not inquire into the
reasonableness of the terms of such contracts in the absence of bad
faith, fraud or capricious action."
Also, this Court repeatedly has hewed to the maxim that "[c]ourts
cannot make contracts for parties. They can only enforce the
contracts which the parties themselves have made.” In other words,
"[w]hen the terms of [a] contract are clear, it is the function of a
court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for
either of the parties [because t]he parties are entitled to make their
own contracts." Thus, "[a]s a general rule, courts should enforce
contracts as the parties intended." In doing so, the judicial task is
clear: the "court must discern and implement the common intention
of the parties [and its] role is to consider what is written in the
context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to apply a
rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose."
[McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 545-46 (2008)
(citations omitted).]
III. Equitable Remedies
The Tax Court has both legal and equitable jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 2B:13-3(a). The doctrine
of substantial compliance is typically invoked when a party fails to strictly adhere to a statutory
obligation and is used “to avoid ‘harsh consequences that flow from technically inadequate actions
that nonetheless meet a statute’s underlying purpose.’” In re Earle Asphalt Co., 401 N.J. Super.
310, 328 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Galik v. Clara Mass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 352 (2001)).
The asserting party must establish the following elements: “(1) the lack of prejudice to the
defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general
compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner’s claim, and (5) a
reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute.” Id. at 328-29 (citing
Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)).
“The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a party from repudiating prior conduct if such
repudiation ‘would not be responsive to the demands of justice and good conscience.’” Davin,

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LLC v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 67 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Carlsen v. Masters, Mates &
Pilots Pension Plan Tr., 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979)).
To establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the claiming party must
show that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made,
intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural
and probable that it would induce action. Further, the conduct must
be relied on, and the relying party must act so as to change his or her
position to his or her detriment.
[Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984).]
The party invoking the doctrine has the burden of proof. Ibid.
Finally, the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex stands for the proposition that “the law
does not care about inconsequential matters . . . the law will not remedy trivial injuries.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 431 (7th ed. 1999); see also, Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 837, 843-44
(7th Cir. 2014) (“the usual legal translation of ‘de minimis non curat lex’ is that the law doesn’t
concern itself with ‘trifles,’” and this “is common law doctrine, both state and federal”). The Tax
Court in Petrie Retail, Inc. held that a breach was not de minimis where a municipality, owing a
refund to a taxpayer, missed a stipulation of settlement payment deadline by six days. 19 N.J. Tax
at 363. Referencing the deadline set in the parties’ stipulation of settlement, the court held that
“[t]he fact that this provision may be deemed boilerplate and was not subject to much negotiation
does not diminish the fact that taxpayer, by way of that provision, is giving up a significant right
of interest it would otherwise be entitled to receive under the statue, in the hope that payment will
be made in a prompt fashion.” Ibid. The court went on to conclude that “[w]hile the Tax Court
may have some right to apply equitable principles, this right does not apply to changing an
agreement executed by two parties.” Id. at 364.

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Analysis
The court finds that Dover failed to comply with the terms of the stipulation of settlement
and therefore owes Mr. Dickerson the full refund amount of $108,382.11 plus statutory interest.
The stipulation of settlement clearly identifies June 1 as the final opportunity for Dover to remit
an interest-free refund to Mr. Dickerson, and it is an uncontested fact that no payment was issued
until June 3. Absent compelling circumstances, New Jersey public policy and case law instructs
courts to enforce settlement agreements by their terms to give both parties the benefit of their
bargain. Here, Dover argues that the stipulation of settlement is subject to R. 1:3-1 which, along
with the equitable doctrines of substantial compliance, equitable estoppel, and de minimis non
curat lex, serves to relieve Dover from having to pay statutory interest. The court is not persuaded
by these arguments, as analyzed below.
I. R. 1:3-1 and Stipulations of Settlement in Tax Court
Settlements in Tax Court are subject to a different procedure than those in Superior Court.
A settlement agreement entered into by parties in Superior Court does not require judicial approval.
Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124 (App. Div. 1983). By contrast, in Tax Court,
“[j]udgment in a local property tax matter may be entered upon stipulation of the parties supported
by such proof as the Court may require.” R. 8:9-5(a) (emphasis added). “Proof” in this context
refers to the adequacy of the agreed-to assessment and assurance that the municipal tax assessor
participated in the negotiations and approved the settlement. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 8:9-5 (2020). A final judgment is then entered by the court to establish
the assessment.7
7 One explanation for the final judgment requirement is to ensure compliance with N.J.S.A. 54:3-
26; 54:51A-8 (the Freeze Act). Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 5 on R. 8:9-5.

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Despite these procedural differences, the court rejects Dover’s argument that because June
1 fell on a Saturday, R. 1:3-1 serves to extend the deadline to the following non-holiday weekday,
in this case to Monday, June 3. According to Dover, because a stipulation of settlement in the Tax
Court is subject to court approval and followed by a final judgment, it is adopted by the court and
becomes a court document akin to a court order or rule. This is a matter of first impression here;
Dover has not provided, nor has the court found any case law that addresses this argument.
The court is satisfied, however, that stipulations of settlement filed in the Tax Court are
not court orders. Dover has provided no convincing basis for this court to deviate from, or expand
upon, the established principle that “settlements before the Tax Court are typically considered
binding contracts.” Petrie Retail, Inc., 19 N.J. Tax at 363. The stipulation of settlement, though
entered in the court and subject to judicial approval, is detached from the final judgment which the
court enters to enforce the assessment amount.
Here, the June 1 deadline was fixed by the parties in the contractual stipulation of
settlement, not the court’s final judgment. In fact, the final judgment does not even reference the
refund amounts. Therefore, the June 1 deadline was not “fixed by rule or court order.” R. 1:3-1
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the court did find that the stipulation of settlement
was a “rule or court order”, R. 1:3-1 applies to computations of time. Ibid. There is no computation
of time required here. Rather, the June 1 deadline set by the parties was a clear, final date by which
Dover could issue a refund without interest. To hold otherwise would allow the court to alter a
stipulation of settlement that was freely entered into by the parties. That would be inconsistent
with case law instructing this court to interpret such agreements as contracts, and New Jersey’s

11
public policy towards encouraging settlement in the first place. Accordingly, the court finds that
R. 1:3-1 is inapplicable here to allow the June 1 deadline to extend until June 3.
II. Substantial Compliance
Dover does not argue that it substantially complied with N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2. In fact, the
stipulation of settlement represents a negotiated agreement to avoid complying with N.J.S.A. 54:3-
27.2’s sixty-day payment with interest requirement. Dover instead argues it should not owe
interest despite missing the June 1 deadline because it substantially complied with the stipulation
of settlement. This argument is without merit given that the doctrine of substantial compliance
and the relevant case law that Dover relies upon, pertain to a party’s compliance with a statute or
court rule, see, Corcoran v. St. Peter’s Med. Ctr., 339 N.J. Super 337, 341-42 (App. Div. 2001),
and not to a negotiated settlement between the parties as is the case here.
Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of substantial compliance was applicable here,
Dover has not provided a reasonable explanation for why it missed the payment deadline.8 Despite
Mr. Dickerson’s frequent visits to Town Hall, Dover did not even confirm the proper method of
delivery with its attorney until after the deadline had passed. Accordingly, the court finds that the
doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable here.
III. Equitable Estoppel
8 See discussion infra Section III. Equitable Estoppel. Dover’s claim that it relied on Mr.
Dickerson’s waiver is not a reasonable explanation for why it missed the June 1 deadline.
Furthermore, though the stipulation of settlement contemplated budget approval, it still set a hard
deadline of June 1. While Dover asserts that it did not know that June 1 fell on a Saturday when
it agreed to the stipulation of settlement, it has not demonstrated how it was prejudiced by this
oversight. Mr. Dickerson certified that he was informed in May that the budget would not be
approved until mid-June; Dover’s budget was eventually passed sometime after June 3. Dover
cannot argue that it was in a better position financially to pay Mr. Dickerson on June 3rd than it
was on May 31. In fact, Dover maintains that it was able to pay Mr. Dickerson on May 31.

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The court further finds that Dover did not change its position to its detriment based on Mr.
Dickerson’s and Mr. Zipp’s actions. Dover argues that Mr. Dickerson should be estopped from
enforcing the June 1 deadline because he waived that deadline and Dover relied on that waiver to
its detriment. Dover also maintains that it was misled by Mr. Zipp into believing that payment
could be made on June 3.
Dover has failed to satisfy its burden to prove either of these claims. The court finds that
Dover was neither ready, nor willing to pay Mr. Dickerson on May 31. Accordingly, Mr.
Dickerson’s acquiescence to Dover’s instruction on Friday, May 31 to return on Monday, June 3,
cannot be deemed a waiver, and, moreover, did not cause Dover to change its position to its
detriment. Finally, the conversation between Mr. Zipp and the Dover Town Administrator did not
occur until Monday, June 3. Clearly, Dover cannot rely upon Mr. Zipp’s authorization to mail
payment on June 3 as support for its change in position to its detriment; by June 3, Dover had
already missed the June 1 payment deadline.
Mr. Dickerson repeatedly appeared at Town Hall for payment leading up to the June 1
deadline, giving Dover numerous opportunities to either remit payment or at the very least confirm
method of delivery. Throughout their encounters leading up to the June 1 deadline, Dover
consistently told Mr. Dickerson to return at another time because payment was not ready. A similar
encounter occurred on May 31, during Mr. Dickerson’s final attempt to secure payment before
June 1. The court is satisfied that, despite Mr. Dickerson’s insistence, Dover was not prepared to
meet the June 1 deadline and told Mr. Dickerson to return on June 3. Clearly, Dover did not call
Mr. Zipp before June 3 to elicit a waiver of the June 1 deadline. Dover cannot argue now that it
was misled into changing any position to its detriment. Accordingly, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel simply does not apply.

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IV. The Doctrine of De Minimis Non Curat Lex
Finally, Dover argues that its breach is de minimis because it only missed the stipulated
payment deadline by two days. The Tax Court in Petrie Retail, Inc. has already rejected a similar
argument where a municipality missed the payment deadline by six days. 19 N.J. Tax at 363.
Here, Mr. Dickerson gave up a statutory right to interest by waiving the same for over ninety days
in the hopes that he would be paid in a timely manner. This was a significant detriment to Mr.
Dickerson, and Dover breached its duty to issue a refund by the agreed upon deadline. The court
concludes that this breach was not de minimis.
V. N.J.S.A. 36:1-1
While the parties did not reference it, the court is mindful of N.J.S.A. 36:1-1 which concerns
transactions conducted on holidays and weekends. Under that statute, any “bills of exchange, bank
checks and promissory notes . . . otherwise presentable for acceptance or payment on any of the
days . . . enumerated” as legal holidays “shall be deemed to be payable and be presentable for
acceptance or payment on the secular business day next succeeding any such holiday.” N.J.S.A.
36:1-1(a).9
Saturday is included as one “of the days . . . enumerated” as a legal holiday. Ibid.; see
also, N.J.S.A. 36:1-1.1 (“[e]ach Saturday in each year shall . . . be considered as the first day of
9 By comparison, New York’s statutory scheme separately addresses legal holiday and weekend
deadlines depending on whether they are found in contracts or statutes. See N.Y. Gen. Constr. §§
25; 25-a. In New York, contract performance deadlines which fall on a weekend generally carry
over to the following business day “unless the contract expressly or implicitly indicates a different
intent.” N.Y. Gen. Constr. § 25(1) (emphasis added). At least one federal court has interpreted
N.Y. Gen. Constr. §§ 25; 25-a (read together) to be substantively equivalent to N.J.S.A. 36:1-1.
See Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Goduti-Moore, 229 F.3d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (where a
federal court sitting in diversity found the statutes to be “materially indistinguishable” for choice-
of-law purposes). Under the present facts, arguendo, the court is satisfied that the parties’ intent
would defeat a default extension of the weekend deadline pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Constr. § 25(1).

14
the week . . . and as public holidays.”). The Supreme Court in Poetz v. Mix held that “where, by
statute, an act is due arithmetically on a day which turns out to be a Sunday or legal holiday, it
may be lawfully performed on the following day.” 7 N.J. 436, 445 (1951) (emphasis added); See,
e.g., Potter v. Brady Transfer & Storage Co. 21 N.J. Super. 175, 178 (App. Div. 1952) (holding
that a filing deadline, established by statute, which fell on a Sunday was properly extended to the
next day); Mercer Cty. Park Comm. v. Di Tullio Plumbing & Heating Co., 139 N.J. Super. 36, 39-
40 (App. Div. 1976) (finding that a county park commission could accept a contractor bid on
Monday when the statutory deadline to accept the bid fell on a Saturday). There is no case law in
New Jersey interpreting N.J.S.A. 36:1-1 to apply to payment deadlines agreed to between
municipalities and taxpayers in settlement agreements concerning local property tax
assessments.10
Here, the parties agreed that statutory interest would be waived by Mr. Dickerson provided
Dover paid him “no later than June 1, 2019.” Based on this clear, unambiguous language used by
the parties, Dover was obligated to pay Mr. Dickerson by June 1 and cannot rely on N.J.S.A. 36:1-
1 to excuse it from missing this deadline. Dover has already stated that it was unaware that the
June 1 date fell on a Saturday when it entered into the settlement agreement, and the parties agreed
that the June 1 date served as a final deadline. To allow Dover the benefit of making payment
beyond the deadline would be inconsistent with case law instructing the courts that “[m]unicipal
contracts stand on the same footing as contracts between natural persons.” McMahon, 195 N.J. at
10 There is case law supporting the proposition that an insurance policy time period which ends on
a weekend should be extended to the following business day. Vuarnet Footwear, Inc. v. Sea-Rail
Serv. Corp., 334 N.J. Super. 442, 454 (App. Div. 2000). However, New Jersey also has a public
policy of construing insurance contracts in favor of the insured (and exclusions against the insurer)
as such policies are contracts of adhesion that are not subject to negotiation. Id. at 450. In the
present matter, the parties freely negotiated a settlement agreement, and New Jersey has a public
policy of enforcing such agreements by their own terms.

15
545. Dover has not persuaded the court that it took reasonable steps to make payment at any time
before the June 1 deadline, nor has it shown that it was prejudiced in any way because it did not
know that June 1 fell on a Saturday. The court therefore concludes that the June 1 deadline should
be enforced as written, as this result best respects the intent of the parties in choosing that date to
serve as a final deadline.
Conclusion
Dover breached the terms of the stipulation of settlement by failing to pay Mr. Dickerson
by June 1, 2019. Under the default rule of N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2, Dover would have been obligated
to issue a refund with interest within sixty days of the court’s judgments. The court finds no basis
in law or equity to extend the deadline beyond the agreed-upon date of June 1, 2019. Accordingly,
Dover owes Mr. Dickerson statutory interest of 5% per annum under N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2 on the
refunds for each of the three tax years totaling $108,382.11 as tabulated earlier, which interest is
to be calculated from the date of the payment of tax to the date the refund is paid.
Pursuant to R. 8:9-3, the parties will submit calculations of interest due to Mr. Dickerson
to the court within 30 days of the date of this opinion. If the parties agree on the calculations, a
consent order shall be submitted for the court’s endorsement. If there is no agreement, then the
court shall make a determination based on the calculations submitted by each party and issue its
own order accordingly. The court retains jurisdiction.