Michael Spille v. Board of Education of the South Hunterdon Regional School District, Hunterdon County, 3/27/25 (#108-25)

108-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09068-24
Agency Dkt. No. 170-5/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Michael Spille,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the South Hunterdon Regional
School District, Hunterdon County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have been
reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the petition of appeal
should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to the 90-day rule, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). Kaprow v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley
Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993). Petitioner has not offered any compelling reason that would warrant relaxation of
the 90-day limitation period, and none can be gleaned from the record. Additionally, the Commissioner concurs
with the ALJ that petitioner failed to state a claim under the school laws upon which relief could be granted by the
Commissioner.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and respondent’s motion to
dismiss the petition is granted. The petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION2
Date of Decision: March 27, 2025
Date of Mailing: March 27, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.
2 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:4-34, this matter has been delegated to Assistant Commissioner Kathleen Ehling.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 170-5/24
MICHAEL SPILLE,
Petitioner,
v.
SOUTH HUNTERDON REGIONAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
HUNTERDON COUNTY,
Respondent.
Michael Spille, petitioner, pro se
Kerri A. Wright, Esq., for respondent (Porzio, Bromberg and Newman, P.C.,
attorneys)
Record Closed: February 10, 2025 	Decided: March 6, 2025
BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Michael Spille (petitioner) alleges that in 2021, the South Hunterdon
Regional Board of Education (respondent or the board) improperly engaged in a
widespread public relations campaign to influence the voting outcome on a particular
district facilities referendum. 	Respondent argues that petitioner’s claims should be
dismissed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL DISCUSSION
In 2021, respondent put a contentious referendum question on the November
general election ballot for West Amwell, Lambertville, and Stockton, asking whether
Lambertville Public School should be renovated and whether a new middle school
should be built in West Amwell, all at a total cost of $33,400,000. 	(Petition of Appeal at
1.) Within his petition, the petitioner references a wide variety of conduct perpetrated by
Superintendent 	Anthony 	Suozzo 	(the 	superintendent) 	and 	multiple 	specific 	board
members, which petitioner feels was improper and in violation of the school laws. (Ibid.)
In essence, petitioner asserts that the superintendent and the board violated both
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2(e) and N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4 when they used public funds to promote
a “yes” vote on the referendum, despite a requirement that they remain neutral and
refrain from promoting particular positions. 	(Ibid.) 	More specifically, petitioner accused
them of (a) promoting a “yes” vote via social media posts in a manner that appeared to
be an official board member endorsement, (b) putting up lawn signs around town
promoting a “yes” vote, (c) setting up a community group to advocate for a “yes” vote,
(d) canvassing voters, (e) creating videos promoting a “yes” vote, and much more. 	(Id.
at 1, 5–6, 8–10.)
On election day, the referendum passed by just two votes. 	(Id. at 17.) 	Now,
roughly three years later, petitioner seeks relief from the Commissioner of Education
(Commissioner) 	for 	the 	board’s 	alleged 	violations 	of 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:23A-5.2(e) 	and
N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4. 	While petitioner no longer seeks to invalidate the referendum (as
construction 	pursuant 	to 	the 	referendum 	vote 	has 	since 	begun), 	he 	asks 	the

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3
Commissioner for the following remedies: 	(1) removal of Superintendent Anthony
Suozzo for his “egregious behavior” during the referendum, (2) censure and/or removal
of individual board members at the time of the referendum for their approval and
participation in the superintendent’s “scheme,” and (3) public admonishment of the
district for “acting in unison to influence the voting public.” 	(See Petition of Appeal,
Relief Requested Section Addendum.)
He also initially stated that “money damages may be appropriate,” but has
partially retreated from this argument in his opposition brief. 	(Ibid.) 	Now, he instead
argues that “districts must face concrete penalties for illegal action, up to and including
financial penalties to the district.” 	(Petitioner’s Brief at 8.) 	He specifies that he is not
seeking money damages for himself but rather is asking that the Commissioner “levy
such fines and penalties as they find appropriate” for the board’s attempt to defraud the
public out of $33.4 million. (Ibid.)
Importantly, the present petition filed with the Commissioner of Education is not
Spille’s first attempt at litigating the issue of whether the board acted improperly
surrounding its alleged efforts to promote a particular voting outcome. 	Nor is it his
second attempt, but rather his third attempt at litigation surrounding the referendum.
(Respondent’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at i.)
The petitioner first attempted to invalidate the results of the referendum in
Superior Court as one of seventeen plaintiffs. (Respondent’s Brief, Ex. B at 3.) In their
complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the board had misused public funds in “a concerted
campaign to influence public opinion in support of the referendum.” 	(Respondent’s
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, quoting In re South Hunterdon Reg’l Sch.
Dist. Pub. Question, No. A-3178-21 (Feb 23, 2023).) 	The trial court dismissed the
complaint, explaining that the plaintiffs had failed to state particular facts about board
expenditures and their causal impact on the outcome of the referendum. (Respondent’s
Brief, Ex. B at 18–19.) This decision was appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed,
holding that the trial court’s findings were supported by the record. (Ibid.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
4
The petitioner’s second attempt came via a complaint filed with the New Jersey
School Ethics Commission (SEC), in which nine individual board members and the
board itself were named as respondents. (Respondent’s Brief, Ex. C.) In his complaint,
petitioner alleged that the board members, in varying combinations, had violated
provisions of the School Ethics Act, namely N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), (f), and (g),
because of their actions surrounding the referendum. (Ibid.) All but one of the eighteen
total counts had to do with the “numerous ethics violations committed . . . in connection
with the referendum.” (Id. at 2.)
There, as here, respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing primarily that
petitioner failed to allege facts, which, if true, suggested violations of the School Ethics
Act by the respondents. 	(Id. at 8–10.) 	The SEC, viewing the facts alleged in a light
most favorable to petitioner, granted the motion to dismiss, finding petitioner had “failed
to plead sufficient credible facts to support a finding” that respondents had violated the
School Ethics Act. 	(Id. at 17.) 	According to petitioner, this decision is still pending
appeal. (Petition of Appeal at 17.)
On May 29, 2024, petitioner filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education,
alleging the same facts as were alleged before the SEC. 	The key difference, however,
is the statutory scheme that petitioner says the superintendent and South Hunterdon
board members violated. 	On June 18, 2024, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss
and a supporting brief, arguing that the complaint was untimely and barred by various
preclusion doctrines, among other things. 	(See Respondent’s Brief.) 	The matter was
transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed on June 27, 2024, as a
contested case under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. 	On
October 2, 2024, the petitioner filed a brief opposing the motion to dismiss. 	(See
Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition.) 	The respondent then filed a reply brief on October 21,
2024. (See Respondent’s Reply Brief.)
In 	sum, 	respondent 	contends 	that 	the 	present 	petition 	must 	be 	dismissed
because it is barred by the related doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the
entire controversy doctrine, it is untimely under the ninety-day rule, and because the
Commissioner cannot provide the relief sought. (Respondent’s Brief at 1.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
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First, 	respondent argues 	that the present petition is 	barred by 	the related
doctrines of 	res judicata, 	collateral estoppel, 	and the entire 	controversy doctrine.
(Respondent’s Brief at 6.) 	Specifically, petitioner has already challenged the results of
the referendum both in Superior Court and before the School Ethics Commission, and
both times, he was unsuccessful. (Ibid.) These matters involved the same respondent,
same board members, and same superintendent as are involved in the present matter.
The SEC complaint alleged facts that are “nearly identical” to the present petition,
and it was nonetheless dismissed for its failure to plead sufficient credible facts to
support a finding that respondent had violated the School Ethics Act. 	(Id. at 9.) 	Thus,
petitioner is collaterally estopped from relitigating these same issues because they have
been “actually determined in a prior action” between the two parties. 	(Ibid., citing
Sacharow v. Sacharow, 177 N.J. 62, 75–76 (2003).)
Similarly, res judicata applies to bar the petition because a previously litigated
controversy is “no longer open to relitigation.” 	(Ibid., citing Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic
Beverage Control of Paterson, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960).) 	Lastly, pursuant to the entire
controversy doctrine, petitioner was required to bring all his claims in a single action
before the SEC. 	(Id. at 10.) 	Thus, to the extent petitioner seeks to bring new claims
that were not brought in the SEC matter, they are now also barred. (Ibid.)
Second, pursuant to the ninety-day rule under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), petitioner was
required to file with the Commissioner of Education within ninety days of the election
results being certified, and thus the deadline would have been in February 2022. (Id. at
3–4.) 	Petitioner missed this deadline by more than two years, making his petition
untimely. 	(Id. at 4.) 	Moreover, while New Jersey regulations permit the rule to be
relaxed in exceptional circumstances or where there is a compelling reason to do so,
that just does not exist here. 	(Id. at 5.) 	Petitioner has had two opportunities to litigate
this issue, and it is not as though he only recently became aware of the alleged
misconduct he is now referencing in the present petition. 	(Id. at 5–6.) 	Rather, “he
clearly believed he had a cause of action as early as October 2021.” (Id. at 6.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
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Third, and finally, the petition should be dismissed because it seeks relief that the
Commissioner does not have the power to give. 	(Id. at 12.) 	Removal of board
members by the Commissioner can only occur in special circumstances,1 none of which
are present here. 	(Ibid.) 	Similarly, removal of the superintendent is unsupported by
case law, as it has been repeatedly held that actions to remove administrators do not
“allege a cause of action under [the] School Law[s].” (Ibid., citing Chiodi v. Eitner, 2017
N.J. AGEN LEXIS 92 at **5–6 (Feb. 13, 2017).) In Chiodi, the Commissioner held that it
did not have jurisdiction over actions to remove superintendents brought under the
school laws. (Respondent’s Brief at 13–14.)
Moreover, public censure of the board for its actions can only be recommended
by the Commissioner upon a separate recommendation by the SEC, pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.3(a)(10). (Id. at 13.) Lastly, the Commissioner can only award money
damages to cover lost earnings or restore an improperly withheld increment, situations
which clearly do not apply here. 	(Id. at 14, citing F.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of
Montville, EDU 47-2/05, Final Decision, (July 21, 2005).) 	Thus, because petitioner’s
“requested remedies fall outside of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction,” they fail as a
matter of law and must be dismissed. (Id. at 14.)
Petitioner, meanwhile, contends that he has outlined a clear cause of action
seeking relief that is well within the purview of the Commissioner to grant. 	(Petitioner’s
Brief in Opposition at 1.) 	Regarding the preclusion doctrines, petitioner asserts they do
not apply, mainly because of the differences in the parties2 to each case as well as the
differences in the procedures used by each forum to settle complaints. 	(Id. at 4–5.)
Moreover, petitioner states that the Superior Court never considered his allegations of
misconduct, which “left the door open for future charges to be brought under Title 18A.”
(Id. at 5.) 	Concerning the preclusive effect of the SEC matter, he contends that “by
1 	These include a board member (a) having a contract with or claim against the board, (b) being
convicted of certain crimes, (c) violating the School Ethics Act (as determined by the SEC), or (d) ceasing
to be a resident of the district. (Respondent’s Brief at 12.)
2 Petitioner first argues that the ethics complaint involved different parties, as it only listed eight individual
board members as respondents. 	(Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition at 3.) 	Regarding the Superior Court
matter, petitioner states that he was only one of seventeen individuals that challenged the referendum
results, and further that the named respondents there were the district and the Board of Elections for
Hunterdon County. (Id. at 4.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
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law[,] the NJ School Ethics Commission is not equipped to hear general complaints
regarding title 18A.” (Ibid.)
Regarding the application of the ninety-day rule, petitioner argues that the rule
should be relaxed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.16, as it is necessary here to avoid
injustice. 	(Id. at 1–2.) 	Namely, “the behavior in question deserves a closer look by the
judiciary,” as the conduct is “nothing less than an attempt by a school district [to]
defraud taxpayers of $33.4 million via false statements, presentations, and illegal
actions.” (Id. at 3.) For this reason, the ninety-day rule should be considered under this
more relaxed standard. 	Petitioner also argues that because there are present issues
with the district’s handling of universal pre-K facilities related to the referendum, this
conduct ties into the 2021 events, thus making it an “ongoing, connected series of
actions” that prevents a definitive ninety-day clock from being established. (Id. at 2.)
Concerning whether the Commissioner can grant the relief sought, petitioner
asserts that “some punishment must exist” to discourage this board as well as other
boards from taking similar actions in the future. 	(Ibid.) 	For petitioner, “districts must
face concrete penalties for illegal action,” in this case “attempting to defraud the public
out of $33.4 million via referendum.” (Id. at 6.)
In its reply to petitioner’s opposition brief, respondent essentially reasserts the
same defenses that it raised in its first brief while also replying to petitioner’s new
arguments. Regarding the ninety-day rule, whether this is an “ongoing series of events”
is irrelevant, as petitioner himself admits to being aware of the alleged misconduct in
2021. (Respondent’s Reply Brief at 2.) Even so, he failed to file a petition for more than
two years after the deadline, pursuing two other avenues of relief in the meantime.
(Ibid.)
Concerning the preclusion doctrines and the present relief sought, respondent
reiterates that petitioner is seeking relief that only the SEC has the power to provide
him, and he has already sought such relief in the separate SEC matter, which he lost.
(Id. at 2–3.) 	Thus, there is nothing left to be adjudicated that has not already been
addressed by the prior Superior Court and SEC matters.

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Additionally, respondent asserts it is irrelevant that the two prior matters involved
slightly different parties than the present one, as this is legally insignificant for the
purposes of these doctrines. 	(Respondent’s Reply Brief at 7.) 	The entire controversy
doctrine requires a party to bring all its claims from one event in a single action against
all of the known defendants. (Ibid.) Likewise, res judicata prohibits duplicative litigation
against the same or substantially similar parties. 	(Id. at 8.) 	Lastly, collateral estoppel
prevents a party from relitigating an issue against the same general (but not necessarily
identical) parties as were involved in the prior action. (Ibid.)
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION
In his petition of appeal, the petitioner claims that respondent South Hunterdon
Board of Education violated state laws and regulations via its actions surrounding a
district-wide referendum on school renovations.
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2, in relevant part, provides as follows:
(e) Public relations activities . . . that are not part of the
instructional program or do not provide, in a cost-effective
way, information about school district or district board of
education operations to the public, that are excessive in
nature are prohibited. 	All activities involving promotional
efforts 	to 	advance 	a 	particular 	position 	on 	school
elections or any referenda shall be prohibited.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2(e).]
N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4, meanwhile, states in relevant part that
[n]o literature which in any manner and in any part thereof
promotes, favors or opposes . . . the adoption of any bond
issue, proposal, or any public question submitted at any . . .
election shall be given to any public school pupil in any
public school building . . . for the purpose of having such
pupil take the same to his home or distribute it to any person
outside of said building or grounds . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4.]

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Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes contains what are collectively known as the
“school laws.” 	Jurisdiction over disputes arising under the school laws is addressed in
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, which provides as follows:
The 	commissioner 	shall 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear 	and
determine . . . all controversies and disputes arising under
the 	school 	laws, 	excepting 	those 	governing 	higher
education, or under the rules of the State board or of the
commissioner. 	For the purposes of this Title, controversies
and disputes concerning the conduct of school elections
shall not be deemed to arise under the school laws.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.]
Meanwhile, 	the 	School 	Ethics 	Act’s 	implementing 	regulations 	cover 	the
jurisdiction of the SEC, providing that
(a) The [School Ethics] Commission shall have jurisdiction
over matters arising under the Act. 	The [School Ethics]
Commission 	shall 	not receive, 	hear, 	or 	consider 	any
pleadings, 	motion 	papers, 	or 	documents 	of 	any 	kind
relating to any matter that does not arise pursuant to the
Act.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4.]
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, refers broadly to the common-law
doctrine barring relitigating claims that have already been adjudicated. 	In essence, the
doctrine 	“provides 	that 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	between 	parties 	that 	has 	been 	finally
determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those
parties or their privies in a new proceeding.” 	Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505
(1991).
Both New Jersey and federal law require three basic elements for application of
the res judicata doctrine: (1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final and on
the merits, (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in
the prior action, and (3) the claims in the second action must arise from the same

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
10
transaction or occurrence as the claims in the first one. 	Federated Dep’t Stores v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 814 F.2d 1226, 1230 (7th
Cir. 1987); Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991).
Next, collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies when (1) the
identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication, (2) there was a final judgment on the
merits, (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of
N.J. Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 1992).
Lastly, 	the 	entire 	controversy 	doctrine 	embodies 	the 	concept 	that 	“the
adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court” and
that “accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in
that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying
controversy.” Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989). The doctrine itself is codified
in New Jersey Court Rule 4:30A, which provides:
Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire
controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the
omitted 	claims 	to 	the 	extent 	required 	by 	the 	entire
controversy doctrine, except as otherwise provided by R.
4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 4:67-4(a) (leave required
for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions).
[R. 4:30A.]
“The purposes of the doctrine are threefold: 	(1) the need for complete and final
disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the
action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the
avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.” 	DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267
(1995) (citing Cogdell, 116 N.J. at 15). 	Where appropriate, the entire controversy
doctrine also applies to administrative hearings. 	City of Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J.
1, 31–32 (1980); State v. Gonzalez, 273 N.J. Super. 239, 252 (App. Div. 1994).

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New Jersey Administrative Code section 6A:3-1.3(i) provides as follows:
(i) The petitioner shall file a petition no later than the 90th
day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order,
ruling, or other action by the district board of education,
individual party, or agency, that is the subject of the
requested contested case hearing . . . .
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).]
While the ninety-day rule is generally applied in a strict fashion, it may be relaxed
“under exceptional circumstances or if there is a compelling reason to do so.” 	Snow v.
Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Moorestown, Burlington Cnty., 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 312,
*9 (Apr. 20, 2007). However, such relaxation is rare and should not occur “unless strict
adherence to the rule would be inappropriate, unnecessary or where injustice would
occur,” or if there is “a substantial constitutional issue or other issue of fundamental
public interest beyond that of concern only to the parties themselves.” Id. at **9–10.
It is questionable whether the equitable doctrines of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine apply to the instant petition. Petitioner has
twice previously challenged the conduct surrounding the referendum, once before the
Superior Court, and simultaneously before the School Ethics Commission. 	However,
the specific allegations in those proceedings surrounded elections irregularities and
ethical violations. 	Arguably, the Superior Court could not have ruled on the claims in
the current petition, since it alleges violation of the school laws, and the Commissioner
has primary jurisdiction over all claims arising under the school laws. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.
Additionally, the SEC’s jurisdiction is specifically limited to claims arising under the
School 	Ethics 	Act. 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:28-1.4. 	Thus, 	it 	too 	would 	have 	been 	without
jurisdiction to consider the school law violations alleged in the current petition.
Since petitioner did not, and likely could not, have alleged violations of the school
laws in the prior proceedings, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and/or entire controversy
doctrine may not be appropriate grounds for dismissal. 	However, as explained below,
the petition should still be dismissed.

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Despite the above findings, the respondent’s motion to dismiss should still be
granted because the petition is untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) and because
petitioner has presented no compelling reason to relax the rule’s application. 	The
ninety-day clock began running the moment the referendum results were confirmed
such that petitioner would have been generally aware of them. 	This means the clock
began to run in what was likely late November and would have reached the ninety-day
deadline in February 2022.
Nonetheless, the petitioner instead opted to pursue relief via other avenues,
namely the Superior Court (to challenge the referendum outcome itself) and the SEC
(seeking to punish board members for their conduct). 	It was only when he had lost in
those matters that he decided to initiate a contested case before the Commissioner,
roughly twenty-seven months after the ninety-day clock had expired.
Only a compelling reason could justify relaxing the ninety-day rule so expansively
now to permit the present petition. 	Snow, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 312 at *9. 	Here,
however, petitioner has failed to present any such reason or highlight how relaxing of
the rule would serve to prevent injustice, particularly since he already availed himself of
two 	other 	forums 	to challenge 	the 	conduct 	surrounding the referendum 	and 	has
provided no reason for his failure to timely file the instant claim at that time. 	Since the
petitioner has offered no compelling reason for relaxation and the petition is untimely
under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), it should be dismissed.
In addition to being untimely, there is another defect with the petition: 	the
Commissioner 	of 	Education 	is 	not 	empowered 	to 	remove 	or 	reprimand 	the
superintendent or board members pursuant to the statutory or regulatory schemes of
which petitioner now asserts there have been violations. 	In other words, the relief
petitioner 	is 	seeking 	is 	untethered 	to 	the 	statutory 	and 	regulatory 	schemes 	he
references.
First, N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4 itself does not outline any specific remedies for violations
thereof, let alone the remedies sought by petitioner. 	Instead, the statute only provides
that no one shall distribute literature that favors or opposes the adoption of any bond

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issue to a public-school pupil on school grounds so that they then take the literature
home and show it to others, and that the board of education for that district shall
prescribe rules to carry out this prohibition. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4. 	Here, petitioner does
not reference any rules promulgated by the South Hunterdon Regional Board of
Education that provide for the relief he is seeking.
Second, and more importantly, the petitioner’s reliance on N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
5.2(e) 	is 	misplaced, 	as 	it 	does 	not 	relate 	to 	punishment 	of 	board 	members 	or
superintendents for ethical misconduct. 	Rather, this subsection is part of a broader
regulatory scheme aimed at ensuring the financial efficiency of district boards of
education. It is true that subsection 5.2(e) prohibits all activities by a board that promote
a particular position on a referendum. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-5.2(e). However, in the broader
context of the regulation, it is apparent that this prohibition is tied to the budget a school
board receives each year, essentially serving as one of many guidelines for a board on
how to properly use budgetary resources. 	Much like N.J.S.A. 18A:42-4, subsection
5.2(e) does not list any remedies that can be pursued when the board commits a
violation, 	let 	alone 	removal 	or 	reprimand 	of 	individual 	board 	members 	or 	the
superintendent. There is just no ethics dimension to the regulation.
Instead, the proper statute to rely on for the specific relief sought would be the
School Ethics Act, of which petitioner already claimed violations before the SEC. 	He
lost, 	which 	may 	be 	why 	he 	then 	opted 	to 	initiate 	a 	contested 	case 	with 	the
Commissioner, citing violations of the New Jersey School Laws and their implementing
regulations. 	Since petitioner states the SEC dismissal is pending appeal, that is his
best remaining avenue for obtaining the relief he seeks. The present petition should be
dismissed.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to the
within motion, I CONCLUDE that the motion papers in this case support the conclusion
that the motion to dismiss must be granted and that Spille’s petition must be dismissed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
14
ORDER
It is therefore hereby ORDERED that the South Hunterdon Regional School
District Board of Education’s motion must be granted and that Spille’s petition must be
dismissed. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal be DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Acting Commissioner of the
Department of Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five
days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall
become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09068-24
15
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the 	ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 	Exceptions may be
filed by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to
the other parties.
March 6, 2025
DATE 	DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
DJB/onl