Sharonda Wadley v. Board of Education of the City of Newark, and Yakima Jackson, Essex County, 11/21/2024, (#432-24)

432-24Njcommned

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432-24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Sharonda Wadley, Helen Clement, Planties
Simon, Crystal Williams, Melissa Wilson, and
Omar Ballard,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Newark,
Essex County, and Yakima Jackson,
Respondents.
Synopsis
Petitioners – who are teachers, parents, and noninstructional staff – alleged that respondent
Yakima Jackson, a school principal, has failed to adequately perform her duties and therefore should be
removed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4, Professional Standards for School Leaders; and that the Newark
Board of Education (Board) has failed to take corrective action regarding Jackson’s job performance. The
respondents maintain that petitioners may not bypass the Board of Education and are not entitled to
seek relief directly from the Commissioner of Education. The parties filed opposing motions for summary
decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this matter, and the case is ripe for
summary decision; because the dispute herein arises under N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4, a rule of the State Board,
the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction since the plain text of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 denies the Commissioner
jurisdiction over matters concerning the rules of the State Board; rather, jurisdiction here lies with the
local board of education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5, N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4 and N.J.S.A.18A:27-4.1; 	the
removal of a school principal, regardless of tenure status, can occur only when a school’s chief
administrator has recommended such an action and it is subsequently approved by the local board of
education. 	Accordingly, the ALJ granted respondents’ motion for summary decision and denied
petitioners’ opposing motion.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that the petition must be dismissed because
there is no statute or regulation authorizing petitioners’ requested relief. In so deciding, however, the
Commissioner clarified that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the Commissioner does have jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes arising under the rules of the State Board, with the exception of those disputes
arising under the laws governing higher education – which does not apply in this case. Accordingly, the
Initial Decision was adopted as the final decision in this matter, with clarification regarding the issue of
jurisdiction.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
432-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01944-23
Agency Dkt. No. 9-1/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Sharonda 	Wadley, 	Helen 	Clement, 	Planties
Simon, Crystal Williams, Melissa Wilson, and
Omar Ballard,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Newark,
Essex County, and Yakima Jackson,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
In this matter, petitioners – who are teachers, parents, and noninstructional staff – allege
that respondent Yakima Jackson failed to perform her duties as a school principal, and therefore
should be removed. 	Petitioners rely on N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4, Professional Standards for School
Leaders, as the basis for jurisdiction in this matter.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected petitioners’ claim, reasoning that the plain
text of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 denies the Commissioner jurisdiction over matters concerning the rules
of the State Board. The ALJ concluded that since the dispute herein arises under N.J.A.C. 6A:9-
3.4, a rule of the State Board, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction. Instead, the ALJ determined
that 	jurisdiction 	lies 	with the 	local board of education 	pursuant to 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:28-5,
2
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4, and N.J.S.A.18A:27-4.1 . The ALJ further concluded that the removal of a school
principal, regardless of tenure status, can occur only when a school’s chief administrator has
recommended such an action and it is subsequently approved by the local board of education.
Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed petitioners’ motion for summary decision for failing to state a legal
basis on which petitioners would be entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
Upon review, the Commissioner wishes to clarify the issue of jurisdiction. 	The Initial
Decision states that “controversies and disputes arising under the rules of the State Board are
outside the jurisdiction of the Commissioner.” Initial Decision at 11. Under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the
Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear “all controversies and disputes arising under the school
laws, excepting those governing higher education, or under the rules of the State board or of the
commissioner.” The exception to the Commissioner’s jurisdiction applies only to disputes arising
under the laws governing higher education and does not extend to disputes concerning the rules
of the State Board.1 As such, the Commissioner has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising
under the rules of the State Board.
Nonetheless, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the petition should be
dismissed because there is no statute or regulation authorizing petitioners’ requested relief – the
Commissioner’s removal of respondent Jackson from her position as school principal for allegedly
violating N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4. Furthermore, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that removal of
a school principal, tenured or untenured, can only occur following specific action by the local
1 This reading is one of grammatical construction. If the phrase offset by commas were removed from the
statute, it would state that the Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear all controversies and disputes arising
under the school laws or under the rules of the State Board or of the Commissioner.
3
board of education, which did not occur here. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5; N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1;
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, as clarified
herein. Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Decision is denied, and the petition of appeal is hereby
dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	November 21, 2024
Date of Mailing: 	November 22, 2024
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
Agency Ref. No. 9-1/23
SHARONDA WADLEY, HELEN CLEMENT,
PLANTIES SIMON, CRYSTAL WILLIAMS,
MELISSA WILSON AND OMAR BALLARD,1
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF NEWARK BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ESSEX COUNTY AND YAKIMA JACKSON,
Respondents.
_____________________________________
Sharonda Wadley, for petitioners, pursuant to UAPR 1:1-5.4 and 5.5
John Burke, Esq., for respondents
Record Closed: August 23, 2024 	Decided: October 16, 2024
BEFORE JOHN P. SCOLLO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1 Pursuant to UAPR1:1-5.4 and 5.5, the Tribunal has recognized (set forth all six names) as pro se
litigants, with Sharonda Wadley as their chief spokesperson. Throughout the pendency of his matter the
Tribunal has been in contact with all six pro se litigants and chiefly with Sharonda Wadley as the chief
spokesperson for the six pro se litigants .
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
2
The Petitioners allege that Respondent Yakima Jackson, a school principal, has
failed to adequately perform her duties and therefore should be removed; and that the
Newark Board of Education has failed to take corrective action regarding Jackson’s job
performance. 	The BOE and Jackson maintain that the Petitioners are not entitled to
bypass the Board of Education and are not entitled to seek relief directly from the
Commissioner of the Department of Education.
THE ISSUE AT BAR
The issue before this Tribunal is whether or not the Petitioner’s Complaint
against Yakima Jackson and the Newark Board of Education seeking a decision from
the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Education can be based on
N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 (Professional Standards for School Leaders). 	Put another way, the
issue is whether the Petitioners can ignore the process set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5
and N.J.SA.18A:27-4.1 and thereby bypass the Newark Board of Education in the
pursuit of their goal of removing Yakima Jackson from the position of Principal of the
Grover Cleveland Elementary School.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 9, 2023, the pro se Petitioners filed their action by means of a “Pro
Se Petition of Appeal”. 	They allege that Yakima Jackson, the principal of the Grover
Cleveland 	Elementary 	School 	in 	the 	Newark 	School 	District, 	has 	failed 	to 	show
competency in performing her duties as a school principal (e.g., failing to hold meetings
and failing to address crime issues in the school) and that she has created a hostile
workplace (e.g., by yelling at parents and non-instructional staff).
On February 28, 2023, the BOE ‘s staff attorney, Sabrina Styza, Esq., filed an
Answer to the Petition on behalf of the BOE and on behalf of Yakima Jackson.
The 	N.J. 	Department 	of 	Education, 	Office 	of 	Controversies 	and 	Disputes
transmitted the matter docketed as 9-1/23 to the Office of Administrative, where it was
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
3
filed on March 2, 2023 as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52: 14B-1 to -15 and
N.J.S.A. 14F-1-13.
The matter was given OAL Docket Number EDU-01944-23 and was assigned to
John P. Scollo, ALJ on March 23, 2023. 	On March 23, 2023, Judge Scollo held a Pre-
Trial telephone Conference and issued his Pre-Hearing Order dated March 24, 2023,
which contained a schedule for the discovery process, for the filing of motions, etcetera.
Judge Scollo discussed the fact that the six Petitioners were proceeding pro se. 	Judge
Scollo made it clear to the Petitioners that they had the right to hire an attorney of their
choosing and also made it clear to the Petitioners that they were bound to follow the
Uniform 	Administrative 	Procedure 	Rules 	just 	as 	if 	they 	had 	legal 	counsel. 	The
Petitioners decided to proceed without legal counsel. 	The Pre-Hearing Order required
the parties to submit an Outline of their respective positions. 	In their May 5, 2023
Outline, the Petitioners claimed that the OAL had original jurisdiction to decide this
matter under N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.3 (Professional Standards for Teachers) and 6A:9-3.4
(Professional Standards for School Leaders). 	In her July 12, 2023 correspondence,
Sharonda Wadley, the unofficial chief spokesperson for the Petitioners, clarified the
Petitioners’ position on jurisdiction by stating that jurisdiction was based solely on
N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4, not on N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.3.
The 	parties 	exchanged 	discovery 	requests 	(Interrogatories 	and 	Document
Requests) and responded to each other’s discovery requests by June 5, 2023 (after the
Tribunal granted the parties a one-month extension of time). 	The Tribunal monitored
the discovery process and received copies of each side’s discovery requests and their
respective responses to same. 	There were no complaints from either side regarding
inadequate responses to their respective discovery requests. 	Neither side sought relief
from 	the 	Tribunal 	during 	the discovery 	period 	by means 	of a motion 	to 	compel
discovery. 	The two sides responded to each other’s discovery requests and completed
the discovery process.
On June 19, 2023, the Tribunal granted both sides leave to file dispositive
motions. 	Due to Respondent counsel’s illness, the due date for motions was extended
to August, 2023. 	The Tribunal later re-visited the matter, having not received any
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
4
motion papers, and learned that the Respondents (BOE and Jackson) had substituted-
in new counsel, John Burke, Esq, of Antonelli, Kantor, Rivera. 	It appeared that both
sides 	wanted to file dispositive motions. 	Nonetheless, 	at that 	time 	the 	Tribunal
scheduled hearing dates for November, 2023. (Subsequently, the Hearing dates were
re-scheduled due to schedule conflicts and other reasons, to February, 2024. 	For the
same reasons, the Hearing dates were re-scheduled to April, 2024; and later re-
scheduled to October 15 and 16, 2024.)
On March 4, 2024, the Petitioners filed a Motion to Re-Open Discovery because
the Respondents obtained new counsel and because the petitioners realized that they
needed documents in addition to the documents requested in their earlier discovery
requests. The Tribunal denied the motion on March 20, 2024.
On March 12, 2024, Wadley, on behalf of the Petitioners, filed a Motion for
Summary Decision (which the Tribunal deems to be a Motion for Summary Decision).
On March 15, 2024, Attorney Burke responded by filing the Respondents’ Motion for
Summary Decision. 	A few days later, these Motions were placed in abeyance due to
the laptop issue (see next paragraph). However, in July, 2024, the Tribunal allowed the
parties to proceed with these Motions.
On March 27, 2024, Petitioner Wadley wrote to the Tribunal about a seemingly
unrelated controversy regarding her April 30, 2024 planned departure from employment
with the BOE, the fact that the BOE told her that her last day at the school would be on
March 25, 2024, and the fact that Wadley wanted to obtain documents pertaining to the
within litigation from her school-issued laptop computer.
In an attempt to help the parties solve the laptop issue (which is not the issue
that this Tribunal has been asked to decide), on March 27, 2024 the Tribunal issued an
order instructing both sides to formulate and agree to a plan for safeguarding the
documents and to arrange for the BOE to transmit them to Wadley.
The BOE’s counsel wrote to the Tribunal on March 29, 2024 responding that
Wadley had no right to place her personal documents pertaining to this litigation onto
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
5
her school-issued laptop, but the BOE agreed not to open said documents, and agreed
to send the documents to Wadley if she would identify the file names associated with
the desired documents. 	Wadley replied on March 30, 2024 that she would cooperate
with the BOE when the Tribunal ordered her to do so. 	Also, on April 8, 2024, Wadley
wrote to the Tribunal complaining that Attorney Burke was making false statements.
On April 17, 2024, Wadley filed a Motion seeking to compel the BOE to transfer
her documents from the school-issued laptop to her and seeking to have the Tribunal
hold Attorney Burke in contempt. 	Since the relief sought in Wadley’s April 17, 2024
Motion was not related to the issue at bar in this matter, and since the Tribunal had
already issued an Order that was not being followed, the Tribunal deferred that Motion
indefinitely. 	The parties did not subsequently inform the Tribunal about whether or not
they resolved the laptop issue. 	Wadley never pursued her motion. 	This Tribunal does
not know if the two sides ever agreed to formulate a plan for the transfer of Wadley’s
documents, which the Tribunal had instructed them to do in its Order dated March 27,
2024. 	Having already issued an order which provided the parties with the means to
resolve the laptop issue, the Tribunal decided to take no further action regarding the
motion since the laptop issue is not the issue that this Tribunal has been tasked to
decide.
On April 18, 2024, Wadley made a request to the Tribunal to grant her time to
seek legal counsel to represent the Petitioners. 	Hopeful that the addition of legal
counsel for the Petitioners would help move the case along, the Tribunal granted
Wadley’s request. On April 26, 2024, Wadley wrote to the Tribunal saying that she had
not yet found legal counsel. 	To date, the Tribunal has not received any notice from
Wadley about the hiring of legal counsel to represent the Petitioners.
On July 16, 2024, Attorney Burke asked the Tribunal to allow the parties to
proceed with the Motions that they had filed in March, 2024. 	On that same date, the
Tribunal granted Attorney Burke’s request to allow the parties to proceed with the
Motions or to file new dispositive Motions. 	On July 29, 2024, the Tribunal, due to the
death of Wadley’s brother, granted additional time for the Petitioners to make additional
submissions. 	On August 4, 2024, the Tribunal received a document from Wadley
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
6
captioned 	“Reply 	to 	Defendant’s 	Opposition 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment”. 	The Tribunal waited to see if the parties would further supplement their
submissions. They did not do so. The judge surmised that the parties did not intend to
make any further submissions, and therefore on August 9, 2024 the Tribunal wrote to
the parties advising them that their Exhibits, if any, would be due on August 23, 2024
and that the Tribunal would proceed to decide the Motions that had been filed in March,
2024. 	The Tribunal further advised them that, depending on the outcome of the
Motions, the hearing, if necessary, would take place on October 15 and 16, 2024. 	No
Exhibits were received by August 23, 2024 and so, the Tribunal closed the record on
that date.
On October 12, 2024, the Tribunal advised the parties by email that the hearing
dates were being cancelled to allow the judge time to decide the motions. 	This writing
is the Tribunal’s Initial Decision – Summary Decision.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
There are no material issues of fact outstanding.
APPLICABLE LAW
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Macysyn v.
Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App. Div. 2000); Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J.
Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2019); Willingboro Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ, 2023 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1893 (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2023).
N.J.S.A.18A:6-9 states:
The 	Commissioner 	shall 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear 	and
determine, without cost to the parties, all controversies and
disputes 	arising 	under 	the 	school 	laws, 	excepting 	those
governing higher education, or under the rules of the State
Board or of the Commissioner. [Italics supplied]
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
7
In the matter at bar, the Petitioners claim that jurisdiction is based on N.J.A.C.
6A:9-3.4 (Professional Standards for School Leaders). 	NJ.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 reads as
follows:
School 	leader 	preparation, 	district 	induction, 	and
professional development programs shall align their learning
opportunities 	with 	the 	Professional 	Standards 	for
Educational Leaders 2015, developed by the National Policy
Board for Educational Administration (NPBEA), incorporated
herein 	by 	reference, 	available 	at
http://www.npbea.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/
11/ProfessionalStandardsforEducationalLeaders2015forNPB
A FINAL-2.pdf.
The text of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 states that school leader preparation, district
induction, 	and 	professional 	development 	programs 	shall 	align 	their 	learning
opportunities with the Standards for Educational Leaders 2015, developed by the
National Policy Board for Educational Administration. Those standards are incorporated
by reference into this regulation. The Tribunal having reviewed the website, suffice it to
say that incorporated document sets forth ten standards for School Leaders in the same
fashion as those set forth for teachers in N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.3. There are ten standards,
which are captioned as follows: Standard One: Mission, Vision, and Core Values;
Standard Two: Ethics and Professional Norms; Standard Three: Equity and Cultural
Responsiveness; Standard Four: Curriculum, Instruction, and Assessment; Standard
Five: Community of Care and Support for Students; Standard Six: Professional Capacity
of School Personnel; Standard Seven: Professional Community for Teachers and Staff;
Standard Eight: Meaningful Engagement of Families and Community; Standard Nine:
Operations and Management; and Standard Ten: School Improvement.
N.J.A.C .6A:9-3.4 with the incorporated document sets forth a set of aspirational
standards and it contains no enforcement provisions which allow for the removal of
school leaders who do not meet said standards.
The term “School Leader” is defined in N.J.S.A. 18A:26-8.2 (13)(a) as:
a school district staff member who holds a position that
requires 	the 	possession 	of 	a 	chief 	school 	administrator,
principal, or supervisor endorsement.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
8
The Tenured Employees Hearing Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10, et seq., states:
No person shall be dismissed or reduced in compensation If
he is or shall be under tenure … except for inefficiency,
incapability, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause, and
then only after a hearing held pursuant to this subarticle, by
the commissioner, or a person appointed by him to act in his
behalf, after a written charge or charges, of the cause or
causes of the complaint, shall have been preferred against
such person, signed by the person or persons making the
same, who may or not be a member or members of a board
of 	education, 	and 	filed 	and 	proceeded 	upon 	as 	in 	this
subarticle provided.
N.J.S.A.18A:28-5 states:
The services of all teaching staff members … in the positions
of teacher, principal, … shall not be dismissed … except for
Inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct such teaching
staff 	member 	or 	other 	just 	cause 	and 	then 	only 	in 	the
manner prescribed by subarticle B of article 2 of chapter 6 of
this title ….
N.J.S.A.18A:27-4.1 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, rule, or regulation
to the contrary,
(a) A board of education shall appoint, transfer, or remove a
certificated or non-certificated officer or employee only
upon 	the 	recommendation 	of 	the 	chief 	school
administrator and by a recorded roll call majority vote of
the full membership of the board.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The plain text of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, while stating that the Commissioner of
Education has jurisdiction over all controversies and disputes arising under the school
laws, specifically denies jurisdiction to the Commissioner over matters concerning the
Rules of the State Board. 	The Petitioners claim that their sole basis for jurisdiction in
this matter are the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4. 	N.J.A.C. 6A:0-3.4 is a rule of the
State Board. 	It therefore follows that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction over
the controversy or dispute in this matter since, by the Petitioners’ own admission, their
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
9
action is based on something outside the Commissioner’s jurisdiction 	- 	a rule of the
State Board.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10, tenure prevents a teacher or other school staff
member from being fired or disciplined unless the school gives him/her notice and can
prove specific misconduct. A tenured employee is entitled to a hearing before the local
Board of Education. At such a hearing the school district must prove that a teacher has
shown evidence of inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct or other just cause. If a
tenured employee loses before the BOE, he has the right to appeal to the State
Commissioner of Education.
When non-tenured teachers or staff members have been terminated or non-
renewed, the BOE must give them notice of said termination or non-renewal and the
reason for doing so. 	Non-tenured teachers or staff members may ask for an informal
hearing before the BOE to find out the reasons for their termination or non-renewal, but
it is not a formal adversarial hearing. 	At most, the employee may use the hearing to
persuade the BOE to consider keeping him/her on staff.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5, a tenured staff member can only be dismissed
(i.e., removed) after he/she has been in due course charged with misconduct such as
inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming, or other just cause. 	If, by a recorded
majority vote of the full BOE, the employee is found guilty of misconduct, then the
employee may file an appeal with the Commissioner of the Department of Education.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-1, a teaching staff member can only be appointed
by a majority vote of the full BOE, which shall be a recorded vote. Likewise, in regard to
removal of a certified or non-certified employee, pursuant to N.J.S.A.18A:27-4 and 4.1,
the BOE must follow its own rules. 	After receiving the recommendation of the chief
school administrator (usually the school superintendent) to remove the employee, the
BOE shall vote on whether or not to remove him/her. 	In taking such a vote, it is
required that any action adverse to the employee’s interest must pass by a majority vote
of the full BOE and the vote must be recorded.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
10
Thus, by a reading of the above-referenced statutes, it is clear that the removal
of an officer, such as a school principal, whether that principal be tenured or untenured,
can occur only when the school’s chief administrator has recommended that such an
adverse action be taken and it is approved by the local BOE. 	Then and only then may
the adversely-affected employee file an appeal with the Commissioner of Education.
The above-referenced statutes provide that disciplinary actions against a school
officer, such as a principal, must be initiated by school management and voted on by
the BOE. 	The above-referenced statutes contain no provisions allowing disciplinary
action against a school principal to be initiated directly with the Commissioner of the
Department of Education.
In reviewing the Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Decision (which Ms. Wadley
labelled as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure), I see no basis in the law on which the Petitioners would be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The Motion was inarticulately drafted. The motion seems
to claim that Jackson’s status as a tenured or untenured school principal determines the
outcome of this matter. 	As noted in the analysis of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 and N.J.S.A.
18A:27-4.1, Jackson’s status as a tenured or untenured school principal is irrelevant.
The issue in this matter is whether the Petitioners can rely on N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 as the
basis of the disciplinary charges which the Petitioners seek to bring against Jackson.
As already noted, N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 is a set of merely aspirational standards and
cannot 	serve 	as 	the 	basis 	for 	disciplinary 	charges. 	N.J.S.A.18A:28-5 	and
N.J.S.A.18A:27-4.1 	are 	the 	applicable 	statutes 	governing 	the 	bringing 	of 	charges
against both tenured and untenured employees. 	Petitioners’ Motion for Summary
Decision also seems to claim that certain documents should have been produced by the
Respondents. 	If that is the Petitioner’s argument, then the motion is actually a
discovery motion and it is out-of-time.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
11
CONCLUSIONS
The Petitioners have conceded that their action is based on N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4, a
rule of the State Board; and since N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 clearly states that controversies and
disputes arising under the rules of the State Board are outside the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, I CONCLUDE that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction over the
action brought by the Petitioners.
Having read the text of N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 with its incorporated document and
having determined that it is aspirational in nature and having determined that it does not
contain an enforcement provision, I CONCLUDE that N.J.A.C. 6A:9-3.4 cannot serve as
the basis for disciplinary charges against a school principal. At most, the standards set
forth in N.J.A.C. can be used to measure whether or how well school personnel,
including principals, are striving to achieve the aspirational goals set forth therein, but
that is not a matter of discipline.
The above-referenced statutes (N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 and N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4 and
4.1) show that the local BOE cannot be bypassed. 	Therefore, I CONCLUDE that
jurisdiction for the action at bar lies with the local BOE.
I also CONCLUDE that the filing of the present Petition with the Commissioner of
Education was not in accordance with the governing statutes cited above.
I also CONCLUDE that the Commissioner’s referral of same to the Office of
Administrative Law was merely incidental and I CONCLUDE that the Commissioner did
not overtly or impliedly assert that he had jurisdiction over this matter when he referred
it to the OAL.
The Respondents, having proven that jurisdiction for the present controversy
does not belong with the Commissioner and belongs with the local school authorities, I
therefore CONCLUDE that they are entitled to a grant of Summary Decision in their
favor.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
12
However, all is not lost for the Petitioners. 	Having reached the above-stated
conclusions, the Tribunal notes that there is nothing that prevents the Petitioners from
bringing their grievances against Yakima Jackson to the superintendent of the Newark
School District. 	It would then be in the superintendent’s discretion to bring the matter
before the local BOE.
I CONCLUDE that the Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Decision does not state a
legal basis on which the Petitioners would be entitled to a judgment in their favor as a
matter of law. 	Therefore, I CONCLUDE that Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Decision
must be, and hereby is, DENIED.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is on this Sixteenth (16th) day of October, 2024
ORDERED that the Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Decision is hereby DENIED; and it
is further
ORDERED 	that 	the Respondent’s 	Motion for 	Summary 	Decision 	is 	hereby
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that all Hearing dates are hereby cancelled; and it is further
ORDERED that this ORDER shall be served upon all parties today by email.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Acting Commissioner of the
Department of Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five
days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall
become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01944-23
13
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the 	ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 	Exceptions may be
filed by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to
the other parties.
October 16, 2024
DATE 	JOHN P. SCOLLO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
db

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