Crystal Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex County, Roger Leon, and Brenda Liss, 2/24/25 (#58-25E)

58-25E
OAL Dkt. No. 17833-24
Agency Dkt. No. 398-12/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Crystal Williams,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex
County , Roger Leon, and Brenda Liss,
Respondents.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
have been reviewed.
Petitioner, Crystal Williams, seeks an Order directing the Newark Board of Education
(Board) to resume payment of her attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with a School Ethics
complaint brought against her while she was serving as a member of the Board. Petitioner asserts
that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, the Board is required to finance her representation in the
underlying ethics matter, which is still ongoing.
On November 26, 2024, the Board rescinded a prior resolution authorizing its payment of
petitioner’s counsel fees. The Board contends that it is no longer obligated to pay petitioner’s
legal fees because petitioner, in her defense against the underlying ethics complaint, took a

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position adverse to the Board’s legal interests when she subpoenaed a third party to secure a
report that the Board had previously classified as “privileged.”
Petitioner filed a motion for emergent relief with the Commissioner, and the matter was
transmitted to the OAL. After reviewing the written submissions and oral arguments, the ALJ
granted petitioner’s request for emergent relief in part. The ALJ reinstated the original resolution
authorizing payment of petitioner’s counsel fees on a monthly basis but instructed petitioner’s
counsel to carve out of her bill the portion relating to the subpoena and the report, reasoning
that additional evidence and testimony is required to resolve this particular issue.
Upon review, the Commissioner disagrees with the ALJ that petitioner has demonstrated
entitlement to emergent relief. 	In accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), a grant of emergent
relief is considered an extraordinary remedy that can only be issued upon a finding that petitioner
has met the four-pronged standard set forth in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). To obtain
emergent relief, petitioner must establish that: (1) she will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted; (2) the legal right underlying her claim is settled; (3) she has a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and (4) she will suffer
greater harm than respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted. Id. at 132-34;
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b).
The controlling statute regarding the indemnification of a Board member is N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20, which provides in relevant part:
Whenever a civil, administrative, criminal or quasi-criminal action or other legal
proceeding has been or shall be brought against any person for any act or omission
arising out of and in the course of the performance of his duties as a member of a
board of education. . . the board of education shall defray all costs of defending
such action, including reasonable counsel fees and expenses, together with costs

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of appeal, if any, and shall save harmless and protect such person from any
financial loss resulting therefrom.
Therefore, indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 is required only for conduct that arises out
of and in the course of the performance of the board member’s duties.
Here, petitioner is not entitled to emergent relief because the legal right underlying her
claim is not settled. While the ALJ indicated that “petitioner was acting under the purview of her
sworn duties,” Order at 8, that fact has not yet been established. 	Further proceedings are
required to determine whether petitioner’s conduct in the underlying ethics matter arose out of
and in the course of her duties as a board member. As of the oral argument on January 2, 2025,
the parties were in the midst of discovery exchange and motion practice relative to discovery.
The facts have yet to be developed, and additional facts will likely emerge as discovery proceeds.
Moreover, well-settled case law makes it clear that petitioner’s indemnification claim is
not ripe for review at this time. In Robert Curcio v. Bd. of Educ. of the South Orange-Maplewood
School District, Essex Cty., a former school employee sought an order requiring the board of
education to indemnify him under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.1 	OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04142-24 (Initial
Decision May 22, 2024), adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 239-24 (June 24, 2024). In Curcio,
at the time the petition was filed with the Commissioner, no court proceedings or discovery had
taken place regarding the underlying complaint. 	The ALJ concluded, and the Commissioner
affirmed, that petitioner’s claim was not fit for judicial review because additional factual
1 Both N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 (“Indemnity of officers and employees”) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 (“Indemnity of
members of boards of education) require indemnification for an “act or omission arising out of and in the
course of performance of” the duties of the individual’s position. 	While there are some differences
between the two statues that are not relevant to this matter, the Commissioner concludes that the use
of the same language in this portion of each statute warrants applying the reasoning of the Curcio decision
here.

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development was required regarding whether petitioner was acting within the scope of his
employment when he committed the conduct alleged in the complaint. 	Further, the ALJ
concluded, and the Commissioner affirmed, that indemnification should be determined later
when 	more 	facts 	were 	available. 	Ibid. 	Similarly, 	in 	the 	instant 	matter, 	petitioner’s
indemnification claim may be revisited once the facts in the underlying ethics matter are further
developed.
Petitioner also sought relief against individual respondents Roger Leon and Brenda Liss.
The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has not demonstrated entitled to
emergent relief as to respondents Leon and Liss.
Accordingly, petitioner’s request for emergent relief is denied. 2 This case shall continue
at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	February 24, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	February 24, 2025
2 Because all Crowe factors must be satisfied to obtain emergent relief, the Commissioner need not analyze the
remaining three factors.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17833-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 399/12-24
CRYSTAL WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
CITY OF NEWARK, ROGER LEON
AND BRENDA LISS (as amended),
Respondents.
______________________________________
Janelle Edwards-Stewart, Esq., for petitioner, Crystal Williams (Porzio,
Bromberg and Newman, attorneys)
Lester Taylor, Esq., and Jeremy Washington, Esq. for respondents
(Taylor Law Group, LLC, attorneys)
BEFORE ANDREW M. BARON, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Crystal Williams brings this action for emergent relief seeking, among
other things in Count II of the Amended Petition, an Order directing the Newark Board of
Education to reinstate a prior resolution for the payment of counsel fees for representation

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
2
in a School Ethics matter which was brought against her while serving as a member of
the Newark Board of Education.
In Count I of the Amended Petition, under the header “Board member Exclusion
and Disenfranchisement, adds the Newark Board of Education as a respondent and still
includes individuals Superintendent Roger Leon and Board Counsel Brenda Liss as
individual respondents, petitioner Crystal Williams also seeks additional relief in the form
of restraints against individual respondents Leon and Liss. Among other things, petitioner
seeks the additional relief against those individuals for allegedly violating her right to fully
participate in Board meetings, as well as to deter her from carrying out her duties as a
duly elected member of the Board of Education.
On November 24, 2024, the District rescinded the original resolution unilaterally
and ceased payment for her counsel fees without notice to petitioner. The District did not
inform either petitioner Williams or petitioner Thomas about its decision to rescind the
legal fee agreement.
It was not until after the first oral argument started in the Thomas case that the
district represented that it is no longer obligated to pay for either petitioners’ legal services
in the manner originally agreed upon since both petitioners authorized unilateral legal
action by way of a third party contested subpoena against the district’s vendor which
submitted a confidential report to the district allegedly regarding working conditions in one
of the district schools.
That school where both petitioner Williams and Thomas initiated their own
investigation, is led by the school principal Nelson Ruiz, who filed an ethics complaint
against both petitioners which gave rise to the need for legal fee indemnification.
Thus, the District contends that this petitioner joined in the effort to obtain a
confidential document which is outside the scope of the legal representation that was
agreed upon, and which is adverse to the interests of the District and therefore the district
is no longer obligated to pay petitioners’ counsel fees.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
3
Not fully before me yet but still pending is a Cross-Motion to Dismiss the petition
as it relates to the two individual respondents Leon and Liss. 	Count I of petitioner
Williams’ amended complaint seeks restraints be imposed against both individual
respondents regarding past and future actions which allegedly prevent petitioner Williams
from carrying out her duties as a member of the Board of Education. Without this issue
being thoroughly briefed by both sides, I CONCLUDE I must decline at this time to enter
such emergent relief as contained in Count I of the amended petition at this time, since it
has not been demonstrated to me that I have the power to do so.
However, just as I CONCLUDED in the first related emergent application brought
by petitioner A’Dorian Murray-Thomas, I ALSO CONCLUDE that petitioner Williams has
met the four prongs of Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) which is the standard for
deciding whether a litigant is entitled to emergent relief.1
Subsequent to its initial filing which only named individual respondents Leon and
Liss, petitioner Williams amended her pleadings to include the Newark Board of
Education as a respondent. Respondents Leon and Liss are still named parties.
The Department of Education transmitted the case to the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the Act
establishing the office, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23, for a hearing under the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6, and the rules of procedure
established by the Department of Education to hear and decide controversies and
disputes arising under school laws, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1 to -1.17. Jurisdiction is conferred
under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9. The case was filed at the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on
or about May 24, 2024.
1 A request to Consolidate this emergent application, with an existing matter brought by another member of
the Board of Education under docket EDU 17815-24 was resolved by consent and a verbal order was
entered on the record pending a memorialization in writing after Judge Bongiovanni files a related form.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
4
My jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings is to determine whether or not
petitioner has met her burden under the four prongs of Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982), that would justify granting emergent relief.
Following an informal conference on December 23rd, oral argument in this case
was postponed until January 23, 2025 to allow petitioner time to evaluate whether to file
opposition to the application to consolidate, or to give consent, which she ultimately did.
Both sides filed supplemental submissions on January 22, 2025, including but not limited
to petitioner’s amended pleading which includes the Newark Board of Education as a
party.
Due to the timing of the amended pleading, and the continued inclusion of the two
individual parties Leon and Liss, counsel for respondent objected to the amended
pleading. 	With this case still in the early stages, I FIND it is appropriate to grant the
request of petitioner’s counsel to amend the original pleadings, without prejudice to any
motion which may subsequently be filed by respondent’s counsel to dismiss some or all
of the relief requested.
I Reserve Decision on the request for counsel fees for bringing this emergent
application pending a full hearing on all outstanding issues.
Finally, this Order applies to respondent Newark Board of Education only and not
individual respondents Roger Leon and Deborah Liss. 	As set forth herein, their liability
and exposure, (if any) will be addressed at a later time.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
This matter arises from a request for legal representation and indemnification for
counsel fees in connection with an ethics complaint brought against the first petitioner
Thomas by a Newark Board of Education employee, Nelson Ruiz who serves as principal
of the Newark School of Global Studies.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
5
The complaint, which is the subject of a separate proceeding before another
Administrative Law Judge was allegedly brought by principal Ruiz in connection with
efforts made by this petitioner and petitioner Thomas to investigate allegations of bias
and harassment at the School of Global Studies.
Petitioner Williams has a long history and record of being active in the Newark
school community which ultimately led her to seek a seat on the Newark Board of
Education.
Just as I did in the Thomas matter, although the same criteria for seeking counsel
fees from the district would apply if a member of the public brought the complaint, I FIND
it even more compelling here, since the complaint was brought by a District employee.
Seeking to exercise her legal right to reimbursement/indemnification for counsel
fees incurred in connection with the ethics complaint, petitioner through her present
counsel approached the District and the Board. After some negotiation, the Board agreed
to pay the reduced rate of $285.00 an hour for the services of the Porzio Bromberg law
firm which had been retained by petitioner to defend her interests in the School Ethics
proceeding.
Shortly thereafter, the Board introduced and approved a resolution approving the
retention of the Porzio Bromberg firm at the agreed upon hourly rate of $285.00 an hour.
It is undisputed and I FIND that the resolution did not include any conditions or
limitations connected to the representation, nor did it contain the traditional “not to exceed
a certain amount language” which most similar resolutions approved by public entities
have in order to make sure that taxpayers are not being over-billed for legal services.
During this time, and continuously, from February 2023 through November 26,
2024 petitioner was and is being represented by Janelle Edwards-Stewart of the Porzio
Bromberg law firm.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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Somewhere along the line following the August 2024 payment, the district learned
that in connection with petitioner’s defense against the complaint, she joined in a request
to subpoena a controversial document which apparently addressed the conduct at
principal Ruiz’s school. 	Though it was briefly shared with all Board members, the
document that the district had been classified as “confidential” and all board members
were required to return their copies.
The district only learned about the document subpoenaed in a roundabout way
since it was not notified or copied by petitioner’s counsel on the subpoena that went out.
As a result, additional litigation has ensued, with the attorney for the consultant filing a
‘Motion to Quash” the subpoena, which necessitated as an interested party, the district
filing a Motion to Intervene in the ethics matter since it previously classified the document
as “privileged” and did not want it released or disclosed. It is unclear why other alternate
means of securing the document were not explored by petitioner’s counsel.
Nonetheless, finding itself in an adverse legal position to the interests of the
petitioner, and with a growing legal bill not contemplated when the original resolution was
approved, on November 24, 2024, the District rescinded the original resolution and
terminated its agreement with petitioner and her counsel.
On more than one occasion, petitioner Williams says she was physically barred by
Board staff members, at the direction of respondents Leon and Liss from participating
and being physically present for parts of at least two meetings, and on at least one
occasion was barred from re-entering the building, on a very cold evening, even if just to
retrieve her coat.
At the time the resolution authorizing the payment of counsel fees was rescinded,
petitioner had accrued several thousand dollars in outstanding legal fees, which as of the
filing of the emergency application, remain unpaid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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LEGAL STANDARD
Where authorized by law and where irreparable harm will result without an
expedited decision granting or prohibiting some action or relief connected with a
contested case, emergency relief pending a final decision on the whole contested case
may be ordered upon the application of a party. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.6(a). 	With respect to
school laws in particular, the Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear and determine all
controversies and disputes arising under school laws, except higher education, or under
the rules of the State board or of the Commissioner. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9. Where the subject
matter of the controversy is a particular course of action by a district board of education
or any other party subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, the petitioner may
include with the petition of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that
action pending the Commissioner's final decision in the contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 6A:3-
1.6(a). 	A motion for a stay or emergent relief must be accompanied by a letter
memorandum or brief which must address the following standards to be met for granting
such relief pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
1. 	The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is
not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner's claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the
underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the
petitioner will suffer greater harm than the respondent will suffer
if the requested relief is not granted.
N.J.S.A. 6A:3-1.6(b)
The seminal issue in the case before me is whether or not petitioner is entitled to
emergent relief concerning an action by the Newark Board of Education and co-
respondents, Leon and Liss regarding the unilateral rescission by resolution of an
agreement to pay for petitioner’s reasonable counsel fees in defending against an ethics
complaint brought against her by a District employee.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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The New Jersey Legislature long ago established public policy in favor of
encouraging and in fact requiring boards of education to indemnify individuals most of
whom serve voluntarily as members of local boards of education for legal fees in certain
types of legal proceedings, including but not limited to formal grievances filed in the form
of ethics complaints against sitting and/or former school board members. See N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20 et. seq.
Pursuant to this law, boards of education are required to indemnify a board
member if a complaint is filed against them in connection with the board member’s duties.
See Quick v. Old Bridge 308 N.J Super, 338. (App. Div 1998). 	The law is liberally
construed in favor of covering a board member’s counsel fees, regardless of the outcome
of the case against them. (Emphasis added). See also, Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd.
of Ed. 100 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1986).
The policy in favor of covering a board member’s counsel fees also applies to
administrative matters Matthews v. Englewood, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01228-08 (2010).
In defense of its action rescinding the prior resolution, the Newark Board of
Education argues that its actions were distinguished from the facts in Castriota v. Roxbury
427 N.J. Super 592 (App. Div. 2012), in that the rescission of the prior resolution paying
for counsel fees was not done in a legal forum. 	Nonetheless, that case also refers to a
public entity acting in a “quasi-judicial” forum similar to the circumstances here, where the
Board, without notice to petitioner, acted as judge and jury in unilaterally terminating its
agreement to pay for legal services in an action that had been brought against the
petitioner by an employee of the Board, (in this case the principal of a school which the
board member was looking into complaints by members of the public and staff associated
with the principal’s school).
In doing so, petitioner was acting under the purview of her sworn duties, thus for
purposes of this proceeding, other than the separate legal dispute over the subpoena the
appropriateness of which will be determined at a later time, the public policy of this State
not only says she is entitled to have her “reasonable” fees covered which the board had

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
9
already negotiated and agreed upon, but the statute uses the word, shall be covered.
(Emphasis added).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In petitioner’s initial emergent basis statement, petitioner contends that emergent
relief is required because:
Petitioner 	says 	she. 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted since it would jeopardize her
ability to put on a proper defense to the ethics complaint filed
against her by a District employee, and that preventing her
from doing so would damage her reputation in the public
domain as an elected member of the Newark Board of
Education.
Respondent’s opposition to the emergent application states
essentially that petitioner has not met the criteria for emergent
relief, including but not limited to the argument that at this
stage there is no irreparable harm, and the equities do not
balance in petitioner’s favor at this stage of the proceedings.
Respondent further states that even if there is some merit to
petitioner’s contentions, since there are so many facts in
dispute, the matter cannot be decided without a full plenary
hearing on the merits. Respondent further contends that the
actions of petitioner and her counsel now put them in an
adverse legal position to the District which is paying for her
counsel fees, while also being compelled to protect its interest
in keeping a document confidential.
In order to prevail on an application for emergent relief, a petitioner must meet all
four conjunctive prongs set forth in Crowe. Since, petitioner has established irreparable
harm, as well as the likelihood of success on the merits, she is entitled to partial
emergent relief, on the limited issue of indemnification of reasonable counsel fees
incurred in defending against the ethics allegations. Public policy is well established that
a public official who gets sued or as in this case is charged with an ethics violation is
entitled to a defense and to be indemnified by the governing body unless their acts were
ultra vires or outside the scope of their duties.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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I further CONCLUDE that while I have concerns about the manner in which
petitioner and her counsel sought to obtain the confidential document to support her
defense in the ethics case, the application for emergent relief should only be GRANTED
in PART, as it relates to reinstating the original resolution awarding petitioner counsel
fees, since the District unilaterally and in an arbitrary and capricious manner without
notice or due process to petitioner rescinded the prior resolution memorializing an
agreement to pay petitioner’s counsel fees to defend against the ethics complaint which
was brought against her by a District employee.
With that said, I FURTHER CONCLUDE that it is only appropriate at this time to
return petitioner to the original status quo, being reasonable counsel fees at $285.00 to
defend her interests against the original ethics charge. However, without testimony and
additional evidence and information, I AM UNABLE TO CONCLUDE that the subpoena
and corresponding litigation related to it is also covered by the umbrella of the original
resolution, especially when there may have been other less costly means to obtain the
document in dispute for use in the ethics case.
While the District may have “unclean hands’ by virtual of its unilateral action
terminating the agreement for counsel fees, to some extent the petitioner and her counsel
themselves also have “unclean hands” by virtue of their own unilateral action sending a
subpoena out to a District consultant for a document they knew had already been
classified as confidential and when there may have been other less costly means to obtain
it.
Clearly, when the District agreed to pay petitioner’s reasonable counsel fees, they
did not contemplate paying additional fees for a separate action which would permit
petitioner to obtain a confidential document it had retained an outside consultant to
prepare.
Accordingly, while I CONCLUDE that petitioner would suffer irreparable harm if the
original agreement was not reinstated, and petitioner would likely succeed on the merits,
the equities are balanced in her favor and the law on the subject is well-settled, I ONLY

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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CONCLUDE that this determination applies to the original agreement to cover petitioner’s
reasonable fees for legal representation. For the time being, petitioner’s counsel will have
to “carve out of her bill” that portion that pertains to the subpoena and the dispute over
the document, the justification for which can be decided at a later time.
I CONCLUDE that without testimony and additional evidence and information
concerning whether petitioner’s actions seeking to secure the confidential document were
appropriate, the legal dispute over the document and the corresponding fees related to it
should be dealt with at a later time.
It should be noted here that my CONCLUSION at this stage of the proceedings is
limited to the request for Emergent relief under the now amended petition against the
added respondent Newark Board of Education.
I FURTHER CONCLUDE while petitioner Williams may have suffered irreparable
harm due to the alleged conduct of Leon and Liss it is not appropriate to enter the
requested relief regarding counsel fees against the individual respondents Leon and Liss,
nor is it evident at this time petitioner will succeed on the merits of the request for
restraints against them and I ALSO CONCLUDE unless it is demonstrated to me at a
later time in the case, I HAVE NO AUTHORITY, to enter restraints against respondents
Leon and Liss as requested by this petitioner Williams regarding their alleged actions
against her at recent Board meetings.
I CONCLUDE that aspect of the requested relief shall be addressed at a later time
after both sides have had the opportunity to fully brief and put before me the law on
whether or not I have legal authority to order and grant such relief.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	AT 	THIS 	TIME 	AS 	IT 	PERTAINS 	TO 	THE 	ORIGINAL
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT OF REASONABLE COUNSEL FEES,

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
12
PAID ON A REGULAR BASIS ON THE DISTRICT’S MONTHLY BILL LIST TO DEFEND
AGAINST THE ORIGINAL ETHICS COMPLAINT.
I HEREBY ORDER THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT IS REINSTATED AND FOR
THE REASONS SET FORTH HEREIN, THE NOVEMBER 24, 2024 RESOLUTION
RESCINDING THE AGREEMENT IS DEEMED NULL AND VOID.
I RETAIN JURISDICTION AND FURTHER ORDER, that the remainder of the
case, including but not limited to further disputes over the continuing obligation to pay for
petitioner’s counsel fees shall be subject to a full plenary hearing over the entire matter,
including whether or not the fees related to the subpoena for a confidential document
which might have been secured in alternate ways are appropriate, and/or whether or not
that portion of the primary ethics case which the District says puts it and petitioner in an
adverse situation outside the scope of N.J.S.A.18A:12-20.
The same applies to the request for emergent relief requesting restraints which for
purposes of this application are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE until both sides can
fully brief and put before me the law as it relates to jurisdiction and power over individual
respondents and their actions.
Finally, since only part of the requested relief is being granted at this time, the
request for counsel fees is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to renewal
at a later time.
This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who/which
by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. 	If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDS 17833-24
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The next telephone status conference in this matter shall be held on March 6, 2025
at 3:30 PM. 	PLEASE DIAL IN FOR THE CONFERENCE 	Toll Free Number: 1-877-
951-6587 Participant Code: 96089818.
January 28, 2025 	________________________________
DATE 	ANDREW M. BARON, ALJ
Date Received at Agency 	January 28, 2025
Date E-Mailed to Parties: 	January 28, 2025
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