The Bridge Academy vs. New Jersey Department of Education, Division of Finance and Business Services, Office of Fiscal Policy and Planning, 11/7/25 (#519-25R)

519-25R
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13120-24
Agency Dkt. No. 277-8/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
The Bridge Academy,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education, Division
of Finance and Business Services, Office of Fiscal
Policy and Planning,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by the New Jersey Department of Education, Division of Finance and Business
Services, Office of Fiscal Policy and Planning (Department) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the
Bridge Academy’s reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
The Bridge Academy is an approved private school for students with disabilities (APSSD).
On June 10, 2024, following a review of Bridge Academy’s audited financial statements for the
2022-2023 school year, the Department notified Bridge Academy that it was disallowing $39,224,
a portion of the monies paid to Bart Zantzinger—information technology (IT) consultant—during
the 2022-2023 school year. The Department determined that the total amount Bridge Academy
paid to Zantzinger exceeded the maximum consultant fees allowed under N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-

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18.6(a)(8) and/or (9).1 On August 15, 2024, the Department denied Bridge Academy’s appeal of
the decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8). This appeal to the Commissioner followed,
and the matter was transmitted to the OAL for further proceedings.
The parties cross-moved for summary decision. The ALJ concluded that the material facts
were not disputed and ruled in favor of Bridge Academy. Specifically, the ALJ held that Bridge
Academy 	“proved 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of the 	credible 	undisputed 	evidence” 	that 	the
Department’s decision to disallow a portion of the fees paid to Zantzinger during the 2022-2023
school year was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law. Initial Decision, at 11. The
ALJ agreed with Bridge Academy that the regulations cited by the Department were not
applicable to Zantzinger because he was a consultant and not a salaried employee of the APSSD.
In its exceptions, the Department argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to acknowledge
the Department’s opposition to Bridge Academy’s motion for summary decision; (2) treating the
verified petition of appeal, signed by Bridge Academy’s director and business administrator, as a
certification; (3) determining that summary decision was appropriate even though the
Department disputed portions of Bridge Academy’s statement of material facts; and (4) failing to
conclude that N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8) is applicable to the consulting arrangement with
Zantzinger. The Department asks the Commissioner to reverse and remand for entry of summary
decision in its favor, or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing.
In response, Bridge Academy asserts that it was appropriate for the ALJ to treat the
verified petition as an “affidavit” contemplated by the OAL’s summary judgment regulation,
1 While the Department cited both regulations in its initial written determination letter, it did not cite
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(9) in its denial of Bridge Academy’s appeal.

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N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. It contends that none of the material facts are disputed, and that the various
regulations relied upon by the Department are not applicable to the APSSD’s payment of
independent contractors who do not receive a salary. 	Thus, Bridge Academy asks the
Commissioner to adopt the Initial Decision overturning the Department’s disallowance of
payments to Zantzinger for the 2022-2023 school year.
Upon review, the Commissioner is constrained to remand this matter to the OAL for
further proceedings. Initially, when there is a challenge to a finding by the Office of Fiscal Policy
and Planning, the Commissioner is not legally mandated to give deference to his staff but instead
must determine if the finding was legally appropriate. Bd. of Trs. of Passaic Cnty. Elks Cerebral
Palsy Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., Commissioner Decision No. 334-14 at 4 (Aug. 14, 2014). The ALJ
utilized the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review in the Initial Decision. On
remand, the ALJ shall apply the proper standard of review.
Furthermore, the Commissioner disagrees with the ALJ that this matter is ripe for
summary decision. Summary decision may be rendered “if the papers and discovery which have
been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. “Under this standard, the . . . agency must determine ‘whether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.’” Contini v. Bd.
of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106, 122 (1985) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142
N.J. 520, 523 (1995)).

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The Commissioner finds that the limited and disputed factual record lacks sufficient
competent evidential materials to support a summary determination in this matter. In Bergen
Center for Child Development v. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Fiscal
Accountability and Compliance, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12485-18, Initial Decision (Dec. 5, 2019),
adopted, Comm’r (Mar. 2, 2020), which involved a dispute over disallowed monies paid by an
APSSD to an accountant consultant, the ALJ denied the Department’s motion for summary
decision. Thereafter, the ALJ heard testimony from the accountant regarding the nature, scope,
and performance of her job duties, as well as from the Department’s supervising auditor, and
reviewed invoices, payment records, and other documentary evidence prior to rendering a
decision in favor of the APSSD.
In contrast, here, no such testimony or evidence was provided to the ALJ by either party.
Instead, in support of its motion for summary decision, Bridge Academy relied upon its amended
verified petition of appeal, a certification from its business administrator asserting that the
allegations in the pleadings were true, the Department’s determination letters, the employment
agreement between Bridge Academy and Zantzinger, and the Department’s answer. In a written
response, the Department opposed the motion and disputed certain facts as alleged by Bridge
Academy pertaining to the nature, scope, and performance of Zantzinger’s job duties. As Bergen
Center illustrates, these matters are fact-sensitive and must be decided on a case-by-case basis
upon thorough consideration of the relevant competent evidence. In sum, the Commissioner
finds that the limited disputed factual record is insufficient to support a summary determination
as to whether the Department’s disallowance of monies paid to Zantzinger was legally
appropriate.

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Accordingly, the Initial Decision is rejected and the matter is remanded to the OAL for
further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	November 7, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	November 10, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
AGENCY REF. NO. 277-8/24
THE BRIDGE ACADEMY,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
DIVISION OF FINANCE AND BUSINESS SERVICES,
OFFICE OF FISCAL POLICY AND PLANNING,
Respondent.
David B. Rubin, Esq., for petitioner (David B. Rubin, P.C., attorney)
Sadia Ahsanuddin, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: June 2, 2025 Decided: July 8, 2025
BEFORE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, The Bridge Academy (Bridge), appeals the decision of respondent, the
New Jersey Department of Education, Division of Finance and Business Services, Office
of Fiscal Policy and Planning (OFPP), to disallow $39,224 in compensation paid to

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
2
information technology (IT) consultant Bart Zantzinger for services he provided Bridge
during the 2022–2023 school year.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By notice dated June 10, 2024, the OFPP disallowed $39,224 paid to Zantzinger
because it was above the lowest maximum salary and/or fee permitted under N.J.A.C.
6A:23A-18.6(a)(9). On August 26, 2024, Bridge filed an appeal of this ruling with the
Commissioner of Education. On September 13, 2024, the OFPP answered the petition,
denying the legal conclusions. The Commissioner transmitted the petition to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on September 16, 2024, for hearing as a
contested matter, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
A prehearing conference was held on November 6, 2024, during which the parties
stated their intention to file cross-motions for summary decision following the conclusion
of discovery. A briefing schedule was issued and on April 14, 2025, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary decision. Bridge filed responses on April 28 and May 28, 2025; with
an extension, the OFPP filed its response on May 30, 2025, which was received on June
2, 2025. The cross-motions are now ripe for review.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
In its response brief, the OFPP challenges Bridge’s version of undisputed facts on
the grounds that Bridge “provided no exhibits and no certification [and merely] repeats
the assertions it made in its petition of appeal with absolutely no evidence.” Ltr. Br. of
Resp’t in Response to Pet’r’s Motion for Summary Decision (May 30, 2025), at 2. The
OFPP goes on to note that Bridge raised no dispute as to the material facts presented by
the OFPP and therefore urges me to accept those facts. Id. at 3.
Bridge did, however, provide a certification in support of its proposed statement of
undisputed facts in the form of an affidavit from Jayne Pellegrino, Bridge’s Director and
Business Administrator. Petition of Appeal (August 26, 2024) (Petition), at 6. Since this
affidavit was already part of the record, Bridge chose to rely on it rather than “to unduly

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
3
burden the record” with additional documents. Ltr. Br. of Pet’r in Support of Cross-Motion
for Summary Decision (April 14, 2025), at 1.
On review of the competing versions of undisputed material facts, I FIND that while
Bridge offered a much more comprehensive description of the terms of its contract with
Zantzinger and of the work he and his associates performed for Bridge, both parties agree
that Bridge hired Zantzinger as an IT consultant, not as an employee. There is no dispute
regarding the following additional statements and therefore, I FIND as FACTS:
Bridge is an approved private school for students with disabilities (APSSD), having
been approved by the Department of Education pursuant to the procedures described in
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-7.2, and -7.3.
During the 2022–2023 school year, Bridge retained Zantzinger to provide IT
consultant services at the rate of $100/hour, for 1,059.37 hours.
Zantzinger was not an employee of Bridge but an independent contractor. See
Petition, Ex. B. His business is located in South Carolina. Ltr. Br. of Resp’t in Support of
Cross-Motion for Summary Decision (April 14, 2025) (Resp’t’s Br.), at 4.
By the terms of his contract with Bridge, Zantzinger worked for Bridge on an as-
needed basis, subject to the schedule dictated by Bridge to prevent the disruption of
school activities.
On June 10, 2024, Elise Sadler-Williams, OFPP Planning Associate, New Jersey
Department of Education, Division of Finance and Business Services, sent a letter to
Bridge, disallowing $39,224 in compensation paid to Zantzinger during the 2022–2023
school year because it was above the lowest maximum salary/fee permitted by N.J.A.C.
6A:23A-18.6(a)(9). Petition, Ex. A. In this letter, Sadler-Williams states that the moneys
paid to Zantzinger by Bridge were “consultant fees” which exceeded the “maximum
consultant fee guidance in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8), and N.J.A.C.
6A:23A-18.3(o), (p).” Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
4
On August 7, 2024, Bridge, through counsel, sent a letter to Thomas McMahon,
Director of the OFPP, appealing Sadler-Williams’ disallowance. Petition, Ex. C. That
appeal was denied by letter of August 15, 2024. Petition, Ex. D.
On August 26, 2024, Bridge filed a petition of appeal with the Commissioner of
Education, challenging the disallowance.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary decision is the well-recognized administrative counterpart to summary
judgment, a procedure for resolving cases in which the facts that are crucial to the
determination of the matters at issue are not actually in dispute. By applying the
applicable law and standard of proof to the undisputed facts, a decision may be reached
in a case without the necessity of a hearing at which evidence is presented and testimony
is taken. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. Here, Bridge bears the burden of demonstrating that the
Department’s disallowance of a portion of the fees paid to Zantzinger in its calculation of
actual cost per pupil in the 2022–2023 school year was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. Titusville Acad. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., EDU 00651-06, Initial Decision
(May 21, 2007), adopted, Comm’r (July 6, 2007),
<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>; Cath. Fam. & Cmty. Servs. v. N.J. Dep’t of
Educ., EDU 01051-01, Initial Decision (Jan. 14, 2003), adopted, Comm’r (Mar. 3, 2003),
adopted, State Bd. of Educ. (July 2, 2003), <http://www.nj.gov/education/legal/>.
The regulations provide that the decision sought by the movant “may be rendered
if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The rule further provides
that an adverse party must respond by affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue that can only be determined at an evidentiary hearing. Ibid. The
OAL rule is modeled on New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-2. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has explained that when deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
5
a determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party.
[Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995).]
The parties agree as to the basic facts. The issue in dispute is whether the amount
Bridge paid to Zantzinger—who both parties agree is a consultant—was excessive under
the applicable statute and regulations. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that there is no dispute
as to the material facts and the issue raised by the cross-motions for summary decision
can be decided as a matter of law.
New Jersey law requires every school district to provide a free and appropriate
education to students who are classified as disabled and in need of special services.
N.J.S.A. 18A:46-13. A district that lacks the ability to provide special education and
related services (in whole or in part) may satisfy its obligation by sending special needs
students to a State-approved facility or program, like Bridge. N.J.S.A. 18A:46-14. As an
APSSD, Bridge receives public school special education students and charges tuition for
each student, which is paid by the sending boards of education, “but in no case shall the
tuition rate exceed the actual cost per pupil as determined under rules prescribed by the
commissioner and approved by the State Board of Education.” N.J.S.A. 18A:46-21.
The statute recognizes that tuition is paid to schools like Bridge with public funds,
to educate public school students with needs that cannot be met within their home school
districts. Council of Priv. Schs. for Child. with Special Needs v. Cooperman, 205 N.J.
Super. 544 (App. Div. 1985). Accordingly, the clear intent of the statute is that the tuition
charged be fair and reasonably related to the educational services actually provided by
the private school. Regulations promulgated by the Department are designed to
implement this statutory intent. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.1 to -18.16. The Department of
Education, through the OFPP, is responsible for monitoring APSSDs to ensure that the
tuition rates charged to sending districts comply with these regulatory mandates:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
6
The board of directors of an APSSD located in New Jersey
shall determine the final tuition rate charged to be an amount
less than or equal to the certified actual cost per student as
determined by an independent school auditor. The board of
directors shall identify the certified actual cost per student and
final tuition rate charged in the audited financial statements
submitted to the Department pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
18.10.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.3(a).]
When reviewing the annual financial statements of an APSSD, the Department is
authorized to disallow certain costs “in the calculation of the certified actual cost per
student” charged to sending districts. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a). Specifically, the OFPP
disallowed $39,224 of the total compensation paid to Zantzinger during the 2022–2023
school year because it was above the lowest maximum salary/fee permitted by N.J.A.C.
6A:23A-18.6(a)(9), which states:
(a) Costs that are not allowable in the calculation of the
certified actual cost per student shall include the following:
9. A salary of an employee not covered by (a)6 above in
excess of the lowest maximum allowable salary in the same
county according to the list of maximum allowable salaries
determined in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.3(o), (p), and (q) whose
position does not require certification, license, or bachelor's
degree, including an individual with the director, assistant
director, executive director, or business manager job title
whose job function(s) are not consistent with those functions
described in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(9).]
In its brief, however, the OFPP states that through discovery, it determined that
Zantzinger “did not serve as a certified staff member,” but as a consultant. Even so, the
disallowance was still proper as the amount of fees Bridge paid Zantzinger “exceeded
[the] maximum consultant fee in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8) and

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
7
N.J.A.C. 6A23A-18.3(o) and (p).” Resp’t’s Br. at 4, 5.1 The regulations now relied on by
the OFPP state, in pertinent part:
(a) Costs that are not allowable in the calculation of the
certified actual cost per student shall include the following:
8. A salary in excess of the associated maximum allowable
salary determined pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.3(o), (p),
and (q) for a staff member or consultant whose position
requires certification, license, or a bachelor's or master's
degree, including a director, assistant director, executive
director, and business manager.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8).]
(o) An APSSD shall reference as guidance the
Commissioner-published list of maximum allowable salaries
by job title and county, according to the job titles contained in
N.J.A.C. 6A:9B relevant to APSSDs. Except for administrative
job titles referenced in (p) below, maximum allowable salaries
are based on the highest contracted salaries (not including
payment of unused sick and vacation days and severance
pay) of certified staff by job title in a district board of education
for any prior year, indexed by the average increase in salary
between the two preceding school years for each job title. The
salaries are based on a 12-month contract period from July 1
through June 30 and the maximum allowable salary of an
APSSD staff member shall be prorated for staff employed for
less than 12 months. Under no circumstances shall the
maximum allowable salary calculated be less than the
corresponding salary in the prior year for the same job title
and county. Unrecognized job titles shall be correlated to
similar job titles in public schools based on their functional
activities. The maximum allowable salary of a staff member
holding a part-time or split-time position shall be prorated
including the salary of staff employed in entities defined in (e)
and (f) above.
(p) An APSSD shall reference as guidance the
Commissioner-published list of maximum allowable salaries
by administrative and job titles and county according to the job
titles contained in N.J.A.C. 6A:9B and 6A:23A-18.2 relevant
to APSSDs. Maximum allowable salaries are based on the
1 To add to the confusion, Sadler-Williams cites both N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)(8) AND (9) (in separate
sentences), but when rejecting Bridge’s appeal, McMahon cites only -18.6(a)(8). See Petition, Exs. A and
D.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
8
highest contracted salary (not including payment of unused
sick and vacation days and severance pay) by administrative
job title for the entire State in a district board of education,
special services district board of education, and educational
services commission with comparable average daily
enrollments for any prior year, indexed by the average
increase in salary between the two preceding school years for
each job title. The salaries are based on a 12-month contract
period from July 1 through June 30 and the maximum
allowable salary of the APSSD staff member shall be prorated
for staff employed for less than 12 months. Each district board
of education, special services district board of education, and
educational services commission with an ADE equal to or less
than the highest APSSD ADE will be considered comparable.
Under no circumstances shall the maximum allowable salary
calculated be less than the corresponding salary in the prior
year for the same job title. The maximum allowable salary of
a staff member holding a part-time or split-time position shall
be prorated including the salary of staff employed in entities
defined in (e) and (f) above.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.3(o), (p).]
Bridge contends that the above regulations are not applicable here because
Zantzinger is a consultant, not an employee. The next section of the regulation, N.J.A.C.
6A:23A-18.3(q), does describe payment of consultants:
(q) An APSSD shall use the recognized position title list
published annually by the Commissioner, or his or her
designee, to employ staff whose position requires certification
in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:9B or a bachelor's or master's
degree, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2. An APSSD shall
hire only staff or consultants in job titles that require
certification or a bachelor's or master's degree if the titles are
included on the recognized job titles list, or if such titles are
unrecognized job titles that are approved annually by an
executive county superintendent in accordance with N.J.A.C.
6A:9B-5.5. The APSSD may use unrecognized administrative
job titles, but maximum salaries for the titles are restricted in
accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.6(a)9. The maximum
salaries of APSSD-hired staff in administrative or support job
titles, such as, but not limited to, chief executive officer or chief
financial officer, shall be limited to the maximum salary of a
director in accordance with (p) above.

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9
Bridge relies on the analysis of this last-quoted section of the regulation in Bergen
Center for Child Development v. New Jersey Department of Education, 2019 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 1059 (December 5, 2019), adopted, 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 275 (March 2, 2020).
The ALJ found, and the Commissioner agreed, that N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.3(q) did not
support the disallowance of a portion of the fees paid to an outside accountant for the
reasons discussed below.
First, the regulation states that “an APSSD shall use the recognized position title
list published annually by the Commissioner, or his or her designee, to employ staff whose
position requires certification in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:9B or a bachelor’s or
master’s degree, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2.” The ALJ concluded that this section
of the regulation does not apply to a consultant who is not employed as a member of the
school staff. Similarly, as an IT consultant, Zantzinger was not required to be certified as
an educator, nor did he serve in one of the job titles listed in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2, which
require degrees.
Second, the regulation requires that “[a]n APSSD shall hire only staff or
consultants in job titles that require certification or a bachelor’s or master’s degree if the
titles are included on the recognized job titles list, or if such titles are unrecognized job
titles that are approved annually by an executive county superintendent in accordance
with N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-5.5.” With this phrase, the regulation now expands its scope to
individuals serving as consultants, like Zantzinger. It provides that an APSSD can retain
consultants in “job titles that require certification [or a degree]” if the title is on the
approved list, or specially approved by the Executive County Superintendent. But again,
as noted above, Zantzinger was not retained in a title requiring certification or a degree,
making this part of the regulation inapplicable.
The OFPP counters that under N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.5(a)(22), Zantzinger, an IT
consultant, is required to have a bachelor’s degree. Resp’t’s Br. at 15. The regulation
states:
An APSSD shall ensure school staff; consultants;
subcontractors, including members of a management

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
10
company; and anyone working with students hold the proper
school certification, license, or bachelor’s degree required
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2 to provide the services
being rendered.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.5(a)(22).]
The regulation does not specifically require consultants to hold degrees or
certification unless such a requirement is found in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.2, the definitions
section. In that section, the definitions of “business managers” and “directors” include the
requirement of bachelor’s degrees or certification. This section of the regulations does
not include any requirements for consultants and/or IT professionals.
The OFPP attempts to link the regulations setting maximum annual salaries for
staff and consultants with those also requiring certain staff and consultants to hold
certifications or degrees. See Resp’t’s Br. at 12. But the OFPP cannot make this
connection without some evidence that Bridge, or the Department of Education, or the
County Superintendent requires IT professionals working in APSSDs to have degrees,
certification, and/or licenses. No such evidence has been made available, and there is
no reason to conclude that such would be presented in an evidentiary hearing.
Finally, the OFPP cites the requirements that employees of an APSSD must
provide “administrative and business functions on the APSSD’s premises . . . during
normal hours of operation.” Resp’t’s Br. at 15, citing N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-18.5(e). Again,
Zantzinger was not an employee, and even if this location requirement could be attached
to the work he performed, there is a strong argument that he was connected (virtually) to
the computer systems located at Bridge.
The OFPP argues that Bridge’s position, taken to its logical conclusion, means that
there is no cap on the amount that a private school for the disabled could pay its outside
consultants—as long as degrees or some form of certification are not a requirement of
their job titles. And those “excessive” payments would then be passed on to the
taxpayers—a situation that these regulations were adopted to prevent. If that is the result,
the remedy lies first with the Legislature, to revise the statute, and then with the
Department of Education, to revise its regulations accordingly.

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Based on the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that petitioner The Bridge Academy has
proved by a preponderance of the credible undisputed evidence that the decision of
respondent OFPP to disallow a portion of the fees paid to Bart Zantzinger during the
2022–2023 school year was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the law.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, I hereby ORDER that the cross-motion of THE
BRIDGE ACADEMY for summary decision in its favor is GRANTED and the cross-motion
of respondent DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF FISCAL POLICY AND
PLANNING for summary decision in its favor is DENIED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 13120-24
12
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
July 8, 2025
DATE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
TMC/kl