T.B., on behalf of minor child v. Board of Trustees of the Village Charter School, Mercer County, 4/21/26 (#140-26E)

140-26ENjcommned

Texte intégral

140-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05038-26
Agency Dkt. No. 103-03-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
T.B., on behalf of minor child, T.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Village Charter School, Inc.,
Mercer County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem
necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 21, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	April 22, 2026
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 103-03-26
T.B. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, T.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
VILLAGE CHARTER SCHOOL, INC.
MERCER COUNTY,
Respondent.
T.B., appearing pro se
Jaryda A. Gonzalez, Esq., appearing for respondent (Johnston Law Firm LLC,
attorneys)
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By request for emergent relief, petitioner T.B. (petitioner or T.B.) challenges the
decision of the respondent, Board of Trustees of the Village Charter School, Inc. (VCS or
respondent), to impose discipline upon her minor child, T.B., for violating the student code
of conduct. The query is whether petitioner is entitled to emergent relief and to therefore
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
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have the discipline removed from T.B.’s pupil records. No, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) requires
proof of irreparable harm, which is not present in this case.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2026, the petitioner received notice that her daughter, T.B., was
suspended from school for a total of three days. 	On March 20, 2026, petitioner filed a
petition of appeal seeking emergent relief from respondent’s decision to impose this
discipline upon her daughter, T.B. 	The director of the Office of Controversies and
Disputes within the Department of Education transmitted the petition and motion for
emergent relief to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on March 30,
2026. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23; N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2. 	Oral
argument was held on April 1, 2026, and the record on the motion for emergent relief
closed on that date.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following FACTS are undisputed, and I therefore FIND:
T.B. is an eighth-grade student at Village Charter School. On February 26, 2026,
school staff were alerted at the end of the school day that the vape sensors were activated
in the eighth-grade girls’ bathroom during the last instructional period. (¶ 2, Dr. Bedden’s
Certification.) 	On February 27, 2026, staff viewed the video footage and identified T.B.
as one of the students in the bathroom at the time of the alert. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
On February 27, 2026, all the students identified in the video were interviewed by
staff. 	(Ibid.) 	T.B. was evaluated by the school nurse, who found no indication of
intoxication. T.B. was not taken to a hospital or medical doctor for evaluation.
On February 27, 2026, petitioner was notified that T.B. was suspended from school
for three school days, consisting of a one-day in-school suspension and a two-day out-
of-school suspension. (Id. at Exh. D.) In addition, T.B. was prohibited from participating
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
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in any school activities, such as cheerleading practice. 	On March 20, 2026, petitioner
filed for emergent relief.
Respondent’s Vaping FAQ states that if a student is caught vaping and/or is
believed to be under the influence:
• 	The student is immediately taken to the School Nurse
for a preliminary screening.
• 	The parent/guardian is notified to pick up the student.
• 	The student must be taken for an immediate medical
examination 	and 	chemical/drug 	screening 	by 	a
physician or at a designated facility.
• 	The student Code of Conduct is implemented.
[Exh. C, Dr. Bedden’s Certification.]
The FAQ also provides:
If a student is found with a vape device but does not appear
to 	be 	“under 	the 	influence” 	(no 	impaired 	health, mental
confusion, or physical signs), the policy for Possession of
Paraphernalia applies:
• 	The student is immediately taken to the School Nurse
for a preliminary screening.
• 	The parent/guardian is notified to pick up the student.
• 	The student Code of Conduct is implemented.
[Ibid.]
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Emergent Relief
The regulations governing controversies and disputes before the Commissioner of
Education provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course
of action by a district board of education . . . , the petitioner may include with the petition
of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the
Commissioner’s final decision in the contested case.” 	N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). 	The
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
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regulations further provide that the Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL
for immediate hearing on the motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
At such a hearing, a petitioner must show that the following four standards are met:
1. 	The 	petitioner 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than
the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not
granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) (citing Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982)).]
Thus, the purpose of emergent relief is “to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable
mischief, which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate
investigation of the case.’” 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132 (quoting Thompson ex rel. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Paterson, 9 N.J. Eq. 624, 625 (E. & A. 1854)). The petitioner has
the burden of establishing all the above requirements in order to warrant relief in their
favor and must prove each of these Crowe elements “clearly and convincingly.” 	Waste
Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008); D.I.
& S.I. ex rel. T.I. v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., 2017 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 814 at *7 (Oct. 25,
2017).
It is well settled that injunctive relief should not be granted except “when necessary
to prevent irreparable harm.” 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132. 	In this regard, harm is generally
considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately redressed by monetary damages. Id. at
132–33. 	Moreover, the harm must be substantial and immediate. 	Judice’s Sunshine
Pontiac, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976). More than a
risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp.,
614 	F.2d 	351, 	359 	(3d 	Cir. 	1980). 	“In 	certain 	circumstances, 	severe 	personal
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
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inconvenience can constitute irreparable injury justifying issuance of injunctive relief.
Hodge v. Giese, 43 N.J. Eq. 342, 350 (Ch. 1887) (one tenant temporarily granted right to
enter other tenant’s premises to service heater).” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133.
Here, petitioner T.B. asserts that her daughter, T.B., will suffer irreparable harm if
her records are not expunged of these suspensions because these suspensions will
prejudice her future educational opportunities. Daughter T.B. is actively applying to high
schools and petitioner does not want these infractions to impair T.B.’s opportunities to be
accepted into any high school to which she applies.
However, respondent’s counsel shared during oral argument that T.B. had been
accepted 	to 	the 	high 	school 	of 	her 	choice 	yesterday. 	Petitioner 	affirmed 	this
congratulatory information. In addition, respondent’s counsel stated that the desired high
school did not request any disciplinary records and Dr. Beddens offered his support if the
high school questioned T.B.’s disciplinary record as T.B. was a good student overall.
Moreover, the suspensions have been served, and there are no other restrictions placed
on T.B. for the remainder of the current school year. 	Thus, T.B. may continue to
participate in all school activities, provided there are no other infractions.
While this tribunal recognizes petitioner’s concern and urgency for her daughter to
have every educational opportunity possible, there is insufficient evidence that there is
“threatening, irreparable mischief” afoot or substantial or immediate harm. 	To the
contrary, T.B. has been accepted into the high school of her choice. 	Accordingly, I
CONCLUDE that petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of the Crowe test.
Because petitioner has not satisfied the first prong, discussion of the other prongs
is unwarranted.
Conclusion
To justify the granting of emergent relief, all four of the Crowe standards as codified
in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 must be met and, for the reasons detailed above, the first prong has
not been met in this matter. 	I CONCLUDE, therefore, that petitioner has not met these
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
6
required standards, and the petition for emergent relief therefore must be denied. 	This
Order, however, takes no position on the ultimate resolution of the factual dispute, which
must await a plenary hearing. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 135.
ORDER
I ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for emergent relief is DENIED, and the case
will proceed with the underlying due process petition.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be issued
without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or
reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final
decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
April 2, 2026
DATE 	KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	April 2, 2026
Date Mailed to Parties: 	April 2, 2026
KCB/gd
cc: OAL clerk
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05038-26
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APPENDIX
Exhibits
For petitioner:
Petition of appeal dated March 20, 2026, with certification.
For respondent:
Letter Brief dated March 31, 2026, with exhibits and Certification of Dr. Dana
Bedden in opposition to petitioner’s application for emergent relief

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