Republican National Committee v. Evnen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
Republican National Committee et al., appellants
and cross-appellees, v. Robert B. Evnen, in his
official capacity as Nebraska Secretary of
State, appellee and cross-appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed October 16, 2026. 	No. S-26-685.
1. Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual dis-
pute presents a question of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a
lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted
evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. ____: ____. An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor.
4. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The constitutionality
of a statute and constitutional interpretation are questions of law, and
an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the
decision reached by the trial court.
5. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
6. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
7. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing is a jurisdictional component
of a party’s case, because only a party who has standing may invoke the
jurisdiction of a court.
8. Standing: Words and Phrases. Standing involves a real interest in the
cause of action, meaning some legal or equitable right, title, or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/22/2026 02:19 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
9. Standing: Claims. Common-law standing generally focuses on whether
the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. That injury must
be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal sense.
10. Complaints: Justiciable Issues. A complainant must allege an injury
to itself that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract,
and the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.
11. Actions: Proof. A litigant must show that its injury can be fairly traced
to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.
12. Declaratory Judgments: Courts: Jurisdiction: Parties. The rule in a
declaratory judgment action is that all who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration sought are indispensable
parties, and when all such parties have not been joined, the district court
has no jurisdiction to determine the controversy.
13. Declaratory Judgments: Parties: Words and Phrases. In a declara-
tory judgment action, a party is “indispensable” when the party has an
interest in the controversy to an extent that such party’s absence from
the proceedings prevents the court from making a final determination
concerning the controversy without affecting such party’s interest.
14. Constitutional Law: Statutes. A facial challenge is a challenge to a
statute, asserting that no valid application of the statute exists because it
is unconstitutional on its face. Generally, a facial challenge seeks to void
the statute in all contexts for all parties.
15. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. A plaintiff can succeed in a facial
challenge only by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under
which the act would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all
of its applications.
16. Statutes. Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
17. ____. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into
a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the
province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of
a statute.
18. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions: Intent. The Legislature is pre-
sumed to know the language used in a statute, and if a subsequent act on
the same or similar subject uses different terms in the same connection,
the court must presume that a change in the law was intended.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Ryan
S. Post, Judge. Affirmed.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
J.L. Spray, Stephen D. Mossman, and Jacob C. Garbison, of
Mattson Ricketts Law Firm, L.L.P., for appellants.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Zachary B. Pohlman,
and Cody S. Barnett for appellee.
Daniel J. Gutman, of Gutman Law Group, and Daniel J.
Freeman, pro hac vice, for amicus curiae Democratic National
Committee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Per Curiam.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Nebraska statute provides that persons “residing outside
the United States,” who have “never resided in the United
States,” but who have a parent registered to vote in Nebraska,
“shall be eligible to register to vote and vote” in one county
in Nebraska where a parent is registered to vote. 1 The present
appeal and cross-appeal arise from a challenge to this statute.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that one chal-
lenger has standing, as a candidate for office, to bring the
lawsuit and that we otherwise have jurisdiction over the appeal
and the cross-appeal. However, we also conclude that the
challengers failed to prove the statute is unconstitutional on
its face. As such, we affirm the judgment of the district court
against the challengers and in favor of the Nebraska Secretary
of State (Secretary).
II. BACKGROUND
1. Legal Background
Since 1875, the Nebraska Constitution has required that
electors “shall have resided in” the state, county, and voting
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-939(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
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precinct. 2 Currently located in art. VI, § 1, the relevant provi-
sion states:
Every citizen of the United States who has attained the
age of eighteen years on or before the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November and has resided within the
state and the county and voting precinct for the terms
provided by law shall, except as provided in section 2 of
this article, be an elector for the calendar year in which
such citizen has attained the age of eighteen years and for
all succeeding calendar years.
In 1895, in Berry v. Wilcox, 3 we addressed “[w]hat constitutes
residence within the meaning of the constitution.” In keeping
with the “generally accepted definition of ‘residence,’ when
the term is used with reference to the qualification of voters,”
we concluded that the term “‘residence’” is synonymous with
“‘domicile.’” 4
In 1994, the Nebraska Legislature adopted the Election
Act 5 and, in so doing, created the statutory framework that,
as amended, is at issue here. As part of the 1994 enactment,
the Legislature defined “[r]esidence” consistently with Berry
to mean
(1) that place [in Nebraska] in which a person is actu-
ally domiciled, which is the residence of an individual or
family, with which a person has a settled connection for
the determination of his or her civil status or other legal
purposes because it is actually or legally his or her per-
manent and principal home, and to which, whenever he
or she is absent, he or she has the intention of returning,
[and] (2) the place [in Nebraska] where a person has his
2 Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1 (1875).
3 Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 85, 62 N.W. 249, 250 (1895).
4 Id.
5 1994 Neb. Laws, L.B. 76, § 1 (codified, as amended, at Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 32-101 (Cum. Supp. 2024)).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
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or her family domiciled even if he or she does business in
another place . . . . 6
Also as part of the 1994 enactment, the Legislature adopted
language that appears to implement the federal Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). 7 As
currently codified in § 32-939(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024), this lan-
guage states:
As provided in section 32-939.02, the persons listed in
this subsection who are residents of Nebraska and who
reside outside of Nebraska or the United States or are
members of the Nebraska National Guard ordered into
the active service of the state or of the United States shall
be allowed to simultaneously register to vote and make
application for ballots for all elections in a calendar year
[in the manner set forth in this section.] 8
Among the persons listed are members of the armed services
who are absent from the state, their spouses and dependents
“residing with them,” and “[o]verseas citizens.” 9 The constitu-
tionality of these provisions is not disputed in this case, but the
provisions are discussed by the parties and play a role in our
analysis. For simplicity, we refer to these provisions, which are
codified in § 32-939(1), as “subsection (1).”
Subsequently, in 2005, the Legislature adopted the language
at issue here. 10 As currently codified in § 32-939(2)(a), that
language states:
6 1994 Neb. Laws, L.B. 76, § 16 (codified, as amended, at Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 32-116 (Cum. Supp. 2024)). Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-107 (Reissue 1993)
(“[r]esidence shall mean that place at which a person has established his
home, where he is habitually present, and to which when he departs he
intends to return”).
7 Pub. L. No. 99-410, § 101, 100 Stat. 924 (codified, as amended, at 52
U.S.C. §§ 20301 to 20311 (2018 & Supp. V 2023)).
8 See 1994 Neb. Laws, L.B. 76, § 282.
9 § 32-939(1).
10 2005 Neb. Laws, L.B. 401, § 7.

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
As provided in section 32-939.02, a person who is the age
of an elector and a citizen of the United States residing
outside the United States, who has never resided in the
United States, who has not registered to vote in any other
state of the United States, and who has a parent registered
to vote within this state shall be eligible to register to vote
and vote in one county in which either one of his or her
parents is a registered voter.
Section 32-939(2)(b) further provides that persons “registering
to vote or voting” under this authority must sign a form stat-
ing that they meet the aforementioned criteria and specifying
the county where their parent is registered to vote. We refer to
§ 32-939(2)(a) and (b) collectively as “subsection (2).”
2. Procedural Background
(a) Complaint and Answer
On June 22, 2026, the Republican National Committee
(RNC), together with Jack Riggins, a registered voter, and
Pamela Dingman, a registered voter and candidate for Lancaster
County engineer, (collectively the appellants) filed suit against
the Secretary challenging subsection (2). The following allega-
tions are taken from the appellants’ amended complaint.
The appellants alleged that the RNC is a “national political
committee that manages the Republican Party’s business”; it
“nominates candidates for public office”; it “supports its nomi-
nees . . . by dedicating significant resources to educate, mobi-
lize, assist, and turn out voters”; and its members “include
Nebraska residents . . . whose votes are subject to dilution
by those who have never lived in the United States.” The
appellants further alleged that as registered voters, Riggins’
and Dingman’s votes are “subject to dilution by those who
have never lived in the United States.” In addition, the appel-
lants alleged that as a candidate for elected office, Dingman
has “‘an obvious personal stake in how the result’ of the
November election ‘is determined and regarded’ by the people
of Nebraska.”

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
The appellants also alleged that subsection (2) “extends voter
qualifications to individuals who never resided in Nebraska,”
in violation of article VI, § 1. The appellants sought a dec-
laration that subsection (2) is unconstitutional, as well as an
injunction barring the Secretary from “implement[ing] and
enforc[ing]” subsection (2) and providing ballots to persons
who “vote by virtue of [its] provisions.”
The Secretary filed an answer denying that the appellants
have standing to bring the lawsuit and alleging “[a]ffirmative
and [a]dditional [d]efenses” that are not relevant to our analy-
sis below.
(b) Secretary’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
The Secretary then moved for summary judgment in his
favor. In support of that motion, the Secretary relied on the
complaint and answer described above, the legislative his-
tory of the 2005 amendments to the Election Act, and an
affidavit from the “Deputy Secretary of State for Elections.”
The legislative history showed that the introducer of the 2005
legislation intended it to “‘provide[] the children of UOCAVA
qualified citizens the right to register in the same Nebraska
jurisdiction as their parents even if they have not lived in the
United States.’” 11 The deputy Secretary’s affidavit showed
that there were 116 people “eligible and registered to vote”
under subsection (2), 30 of whom were registered to vote in
Lancaster County. The Secretary further noted that only six of
those people voted in the 2026 primary election (one of them
in Lancaster County).
Based on this evidence, the Secretary asserted that all the
appellants lack standing. The Secretary claimed, summarized,
that the pleadings failed to show the RNC has standing as an
organization or association; Riggins’ and Dingman’s claim of
11 See, e.g., Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 408, Government, Military
and Veterans Affairs Committee, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 2005)
(statement of Senator Flood).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
vote dilution does not involve a particularized injury; the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of
Elections 12 recognizing candidate standing is not controlling
here; and Nebraska courts had never previously recognized an
“abstract interest” in “election integrity or political legitimacy,
standing alone,” as sufficient for common-law standing.
The Secretary also argued that there is no conflict between
subsection (2) and article VI, § 1, because in Berry, we
interpreted the term “‘resided within’” in the predecessor to
the current article VI, § 1, to mean “‘domiciled in.’” The
Secretary then posited a hypothetical person, “Joe,” who the
Secretary claimed qualifies as an elector under article VI, § 1,
and “is eligible to vote” in the county where a parent is regis-
tered to vote under subsection (2). In this hypothetical,
both of Joe’s parents were United States citizens domi-
ciled in Saunders County, where they owned a home and
intended to remain. Joe’s parents, who are missionaries,
moved to South America, where Joe was born and where
the family continued to live for many years, always
intending to return to Nebraska. Joe is a United States
citizen. . . . After reaching eighteen, Joe remained abroad,
never registered to vote in another State, and never
intended to make a foreign country his long-term home.
In their response, the appellants did not dispute that the
introducer of the 2005 bill intended to “‘allow’” the children
of “‘UOCAVA qualified citizens’” to “‘register and vote’”
in the same Nebraska jurisdiction as their parents. However,
the appellants claimed that subsection (2) “did not provide the
legal mechanism” for these children to vote. Instead, the appel-
lants claimed these children “already had an existing right
to vote” under subsection (1) as overseas citizens. Further,
the appellants noted that the Secretary’s evidence showed
that the number of persons who voted in Nebraska under
12 Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 146 S. Ct. 513, 223 L.
Ed. 2d 357 (2026).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
subsection (2) was greater in the 2020 and 2024 general elec-
tions than in the 2026 primary.
(c) Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The appellants also moved for summary judgment in their
favor. In so doing, the appellants relied on affidavits from the
chief of staff of the RNC, Riggins, and Dingman that mir-
rored the allegations of the complaint, as well as federal and
state voter registration forms. The federal form required regis-
trants to give their address in the U.S. state or territory where
they are registering to vote, but explains that “[f]or overseas
citizens, [this] is usually the last place you lived before mov-
ing overseas. You do not need to have any current ties with
this address.”
Based on this evidence, the appellants argued that they all
have standing. The appellants claimed, summarized, that the
RNC has shown associational standing, that vote dilution is
a cognizable injury under Nebraska law, and that Dingman
has standing as a candidate under Bost and because she
must “expend campaign resources to account for votes cast
by persons ineligible under the Nebraska Constitution.” The
appellants also claimed they have standing under Thompson
v. Heineman 13 because the case involves “‘matters of great
public concern.’”
The appellants continued to maintain that “Joe” does not
represent a constitutional application of subsection (2), because
he “has the right to vote” in Nebraska under subsection (1).
Instead, the appellants claimed that subsection (2) served to
enfranchise 	persons 	like 	“Joe’s” 	hypothetical 	“23-year-old
brother who is over the age of majority, has no intention
of returning to Nebraska, has established domicile in South
America, and does not consider himself a Nebraskan. His only
ties to Nebraska are his parents.”
13 Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
Cite as 322 Neb. 612
In response, the Secretary argued that “[e]ven if Joe could
register” under subsection (1), that “would not negate his eligi-
bility” under subsection (2).
(d) District Court’s Order
After a hearing, the district court ruled against the appellants
and in favor of the Secretary on the parties’ competing motions
for summary judgment. The appellants’ amended complaint
was dismissed with prejudice.
As to standing, the court acknowledged that the Nebraska
Constitution 	differs 	from 	the 	federal 	Constitution, 	that
Nebraska courts do not always adopt federal case law regard-
ing standing, and that the appellants had cited no Nebraska case
recognizing “electoral integrity or political legitimacy,” without
more, as sufficient for common-law standing. Nonetheless, the
court said that because Bost was recently decided and we had
not yet considered whether to adopt its reasoning, Dingman
could not be said to lack standing based on the articulation in
Bost of candidates’ interest in “‘the integrity of the election—
and the democratic process by which they earn or lose the sup-
port of the people they seek to represent.’”
The court then opined that the appellants would face another
“jurisdictional hurdle” if they were correct that those reg-
istered to vote under subsection (2) are “non-Nebraskans.”
The court noted that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
requires that all persons whose interests may be affected by
the declaratory judgment be made parties. 14 However, the
court explained that insofar as those who “register to vote and
vote” under subsection (2) are not parties here, the Secretary,
by and through the Attorney General, could not serve as their
representative under the parens patriae doctrine if they were
not Nebraska domiciliaries.
Finally, the court concluded the appellants had failed to
show that subsection (2) is facially unconstitutional because
14 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,159 (Reissue 2016).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
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they “do not dispute that Joe meets all requirements of
§ 32-939(2) [and] is enfranchised under [a]rt. VI, § 1.” The
court acknowledged the appellants’ argument that under Los
Angeles v. Patel, 15 “Joe” is not a constitutional application of
subsection (2) because he is “eligible to vote” under subsec-
tion (1). However, the court said that Patel is distinguishable
because in Patel, “[t]he proposed constitutional scenarios . . .
were not actual applications of the [challenged] ordinance,”
whereas “Joe’s circumstances fall squarely within the text of
§ 32-939(2).” The court also observed that “unlike in Patel,
the alternative basis for Joe’s . . . eligibility” to vote arises not
from case law, but from another statutory provision that, unlike
subsection (2), does not specify in which county persons like
“Joe” may “register to vote and vote.”
The appellants appealed the judgment of the district court,
and the Secretary cross-appealed. We moved the matter to our
docket, 16 and we granted leave for the Democratic National
Committee to submit a brief as an amicus curiae.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The appellants assign, restated, reordered, and consolidated,
that the district court erred in (1) ruling against them and
in favor of the Secretary on the parties’ competing motions
for summary judgment; (2) failing to order the inclusion of
any indispensable party and entering judgment on the parties’
claims insofar as an indispensable party was lacking; and (3)
failing to find that subsection (2) conflicts with article VI, § 1,
and is facially unconstitutional.
The Secretary cross-appeals, assigning, restated, that the
district court erred (1) in concluding that Dingman has pre-
election standing as a candidate and (2) insofar as it implic-
itly determined that Dingman and Riggins have standing
15 Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 192 L. Ed. 2d 435
(2015).
16 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
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as voters or that the RNC has standing as an association
or organization.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual dis-
pute presents a question of law. 17
[2,3] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of
summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. 18 An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reason-
able inferences in that party’s favor. 19
[4] The constitutionality of a statute and constitutional inter-
pretation are questions of law, and an appellate court is obli-
gated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached
by the trial court. 20
[5] Statutory interpretation also presents a question of law. 21
V. ANALYSIS
1. Jurisdiction
[6,7] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the matter before it. 22 Here, we must
determine whether the appellants have standing and whether
an indispensable party is absent. Standing is a jurisdictional
17 Kellogg v. Mathiesen, 320 Neb. 223, 26 N.W.3d 651 (2025).
18 Bar at the Yard v. Friends Family, 321 Neb. 606, 35 N.W.3d 813 (2026).
19 Id.
20 See N’Da v. Golden, 318 Neb. 680, 18 N.W.3d 570 (2025).
21 Wahl v. Wahl, 321 Neb. 819, 37 N.W.3d 633 (2026).
22 Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital, 321 Neb. 918, 38 N.W.3d 508
(2026).

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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. EVNEN
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component of a party’s case, because only a party who has
standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court. 23 The absence
of an indispensable party in a declaratory action, such as this
one, is also jurisdictional, because if an indispensable party
has not been joined, the district court has no jurisdiction to
determine the controversy. 24 And where a lower court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or ques-
tion, an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the
merits of that claim, issue, or question. 25
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that we have
jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal because one
of the appellants has standing and no indispensable party
is absent.
(a) Standing
[8] Standing involves a real interest in the cause of action,
meaning some legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the
subject matter of the controversy. 26 “[T]he U.S. Constitution
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to certain ‘[c]ases’
and ‘[c]ontroversies,’ . . . and federal courts have inter-
preted that language to impose standing requirements for
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction . . . .” 27 However,
the Nebraska Constitution has no analogous requirement. 28
Instead, Nebraska courts rely on the common-law standing doc-
trine except where the Legislature provides for standing that is
broader or more restrictive than the common-law baseline. 29
23 Kellogg, supra note 17.
24 See Powers v. Board of Directors of Elmwood Tower, 320 Neb. 906, 31
N.W.3d 599 (2026).
25 See Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD, 319 Neb. 1, 21 N.W.3d 34
(2025).
26 In re Adoption of Faith F., 313 Neb. 491, 984 N.W.2d 640 (2023).
27 Griffith v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 304 Neb. 287, 291, 934 N.W.2d
169, 173-74 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
28 See Griffith, supra note 27.
29 See id.

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[9-11] Common-law standing generally focuses on whether
the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. 30 That
injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal
sense. 31 A complainant must allege an injury to itself that is
distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the
alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. 32 Further, a litigant must show that its injury
can be fairly traced to the challenged action and is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision. 33 We have also phrased
the standing inquiry as “whether the plaintiff demonstrated a
‘direct injury’ as a result of the action or anticipated action of
the defendant and emphasized that it is generally insufficient
for a plaintiff to have ‘merely a general interest common to
all members of the public.’” 34
In 	this 	case, 	the 	trial 	court 	found 	standing 	based 	on
Dingman’s interests as a candidate for elected office, and on
appeal, the parties agreed that among the appellants, Dingman
as a candidate has the best claim to standing. As such, we
turn first to the question of whether candidate standing as
described in Bost is consistent with Nebraska’s common-law
standing doctrine.
The appellants essentially argue that the theory of candi-
date standing they put forth involves an injury in fact. The
appellants primarily argue that in light of Bost, candidates
should be seen to “‘have a concrete and particularized interest
in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elec-
tions, regardless of whether those rules harm their electoral
prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.’” 35
30 In re Application A-19594, 315 Neb. 311, 995 N.W.2d 655 (2023).
31 Id.
32 Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788
N.W.2d 252 (2010).
33 Id.
34 Griffith, supra note 27, 304 Neb. at 292, 934 N.W.2d at 174.
35 Brief for appellants at 18 (quoting Bost, supra note 12).

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The Secretary, on the other hand, argues that candidates
cannot be seen to have standing “qua candidates” to “chal-
lenge election rules” 36 because there was no corresponding
cause of action at common law. The Secretary acknowledges
that the court could “nonetheless update the common law to
create a ‘bespoke standing rule for candidates.’” 37 However,
the Secretary claims there is “[n]o compelling reason” for
doing so here, 38 insofar as the Legislature has provided a
means for candidates to challenge the results of an election
“[i]f illegal votes have been received . . . sufficient to change
the results.” 39
We agree with the appellants that in light of Bost, the
injury alleged by Dingman as a candidate suffices to give
her standing to challenge the constitutionality of subsection
(2) insofar as that statute “govern[s] the counting of votes
in [her] election.” 40 The Secretary is correct that Bost is not
binding on Nebraska courts. 41 However, we find the reasoning
in Bost regarding the harm that “[d]epartures from the preor-
dained rules” 42 cause to candidates to be persuasive given the
facts and circumstances of this case.
In Bost, a candidate for U.S. Congress in Illinois chal-
lenged a state law requiring officials to count mail-in ballots
postmarked or certified no later than election day and received
36 Brief for appellee at 33.
37 Id. at 36 (quoting Bost, supra note 12, Barrett, J., concurring in the
judgment). See, also, Green Plains Trade Group v. Archer Daniels Midland
Co., 320 Neb. 882, 898, 31 N.W.3d 577, 587 (2026) (courts having power
to modify common-law rules “‘from time to time as changed conditions
and new states of fact require’”).
38 Brief for appellee at 36.
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1101(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
40 See Bost, supra note 12, 607 U.S. at 83.
41 See, e.g., Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln, 319 Neb.
723, 24 N.W.3d 891 (2025).
42 Bost, supra note 12, 607 U.S. at 79.

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within 2 weeks of election day. 43 The trial court and an inter-
mediate appellate court found that the candidate lacked stand-
ing. 44 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. 45 As relevant here,
the Supreme Court concluded that candidates “have an obvious
personal stake in how the result is determined” in their elec-
tion and that “[d]epartures from the preordained rules” cause
them concrete harm. 46 The Supreme Court also concluded
that the harm to candidates when the “preordained rules” are
not followed is “in no sense ‘common to all members of the
public.’” 47 The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[v]oters
. . . also have a ‘general interest’ in an accurate vote tally.” 48
But the Supreme Court said candidates’ interest “differs in
kind” because they “spend untold time and resources seeking
to claim the right to voice the will of the people.” 49
In this case, assuming that the appellants’ claim that subsec-
tion (2) conflicts with article VI, § 1, has merit, 50 Dingman
has a cognizable interest in that statute not being implemented
in an election for which she is a candidate. The harm that she
would suffer as a candidate if votes were cast in her election
by unlawful voters is sufficiently concrete in light of Bost. That
harm is also sufficiently particularized in light of Bost.
Because we conclude that Dingman has standing as a can-
didate, we need not address the parties’ arguments on appeal
regarding the RNC’s standing as an association or Riggins’
43 See Bost, supra note 12.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id., 607 U.S. at 79.
47 Id., 607 U.S. at 78.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Heiden v. Norris, 300 Neb. 171, 912 N.W.2d 758 (2018)
(because standing focuses on person bringing claim, and not merits of
claim, legal and factual validity of claim presented must be assumed when
standing is considered).

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standing as a registered voter. In an action where multiple
appellants seek identical injunctive or declaratory relief, as is
the case here, once the court determines that one of the appel-
lants has standing, it need not decide the standing of the others
in order to determine that the action is justiciable. 51
There were additional theories of standing argued before
the district court. However, those theories were not raised on
appeal and, as noted above, we would not need to decide them
even if they had been so raised, because Dingman has standing
as a candidate.
(b) Indispensable Parties
[12,13] The rule in a declaratory judgment action, such as
this, is that all who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration sought are indispensable parties,
and when all such parties have not been joined, the district
court has no jurisdiction to determine the controversy. 52 In a
declaratory judgment action, a party is “indispensable” when
the party has an interest in the controversy to an extent that
such party’s absence from the proceedings prevents the court
from making a final determination concerning the controversy
without affecting such party’s interest. 53
The appellants claim that the “[d]istrict [c]ourt erred to the
extent it determined” that an indispensable party was absent.
The appellants also claim that insofar as the district court con-
cluded that an indispensable party was absent, it erred in not
ordering that party be joined and in entering a judgment on the
merits in the absence of an indispensable party.
The Secretary, in contrast, maintains that insofar as those
who “register to vote and vote” under subsection (2) are
Nebraska domiciliaries, they are not indispensable parties
because the Attorney General can represent their interests
51 Stewart v. Heineman, 296 Neb. 262, 892 N.W.2d 542 (2017).
52 Powers, supra note 24.
53 Id.

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under the parens patriae doctrine. However, the Secretary
claims that if the appellants were to prevail on their claim
that subsection (2) is unconstitutional, those who “register to
vote and vote” under this subsection would be indispensable
parties, and the district court’s judgment should be vacated
and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss it without
prejudice for failure to join an indispensable party.
We begin with the appellants’ claims, which are without
merit. The district court did not determine that an indispens-
able party was absent. To the contrary, the district court con-
cluded that “the absence of the 116 individuals registered to
vote in Nebraska” under subsection (2) was “not a jurisdic-
tional defect,” even though the rights and interests of those
individuals would necessarily be affected by a declaration
that subsection (2) is unconstitutional, because the Attorney
General can represent their interests under the parens patriae
doctrine. 54 And insofar as the district court did not find that
an indispensable party was absent, it cannot have erred in not
requiring that party to be joined or in entering a judgment in
the case despite the absence of an indispensable party.
Turning next to the Secretary’s argument, we need not
address his claim that if the appellants are correct that sub-
section (2) is unconstitutional, the cause should be remanded
with the instructions described above. This is because, for the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that the appellants failed
to prove § 32-939(2) is facially unconstitutional.
2. Merits of Appellants’ Claims
Regarding Subsection (2)
[14,15] Having ascertained that we have jurisdiction over
this appeal and cross-appeal, we now turn to the merits of
the appellants’ facial challenge to subsection (2). A facial
54 See, e.g., Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 269 Neb. 664, 694
N.W.2d 668 (2005) (under parens patriae doctrine, when state is party
to suit involving matter of sovereign interest, it is presumed to represent
interests of all its citizens).

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challenge is a challenge to a statute, asserting that no valid
application of the statute exists because it is unconstitutional
on its face. 55 Generally, a facial challenge seeks to void the
statute in all contexts for all parties. 56 A plaintiff can succeed in
a facial challenge only by establishing that no set of circum-
stances exists under which the act would be valid, i.e., that the
law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. 57
In essence, the appellants argue that subsection (2) has no
constitutional application because “Joe” is an overseas citi-
zen “authorized to register under [s]ubsection (1)(d),” 58 and
is not among those to whom subsection (2) “purport[s] to
expand the franchise.” 59 Instead, the appellants claim that the
only persons authorized to “register to vote and vote” under
subsection (2) are persons “legally domiciled in a foreign
country” and, thus, not qualified to vote under article VI,
§ 1. 60 The Secretary disputes that subsection (1) authorizes
“Joe” to vote in Nebraska. However, the Secretary also claims
that even if “Joe” is authorized to vote under subsection (1),
he would still be “authorized to vote under the plain text of
subsection (2).” 61
(a) Meaning of Subsection (1)
[16,17] Because much of the parties’ dispute turns upon
whether “Joe” is covered by subsection (1), we turn first
to the language of that subsection. Statutory interpretation
begins with the text, and the text is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. 62 It is not within the province of a court
55 N’Da, supra note 20.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Reply brief for appellants at 7.
59 Id. at 8.
60 Id. at 7.
61 Brief for appellee at 17.
62 State v. Ansell, ante p. 28, 38 N.W.3d 788 (2026).

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to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the
language; neither is it within the province of a court to read
anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute. 63
The appellants’ arguments have shifted over time, as the
Secretary notes. Notably, the appellants no longer argue that
“Joe’s” right to vote in Nebraska derives from subsection (1)
“as they did at the summary judgment stage.” Instead, the
appellants claim that “Joe’s” right to vote derives from article
VI, § 1, and subsection (1) merely “establishes the proce-
dure for ‘Joe’ to register to vote.” 64 However, the appellants
continue to maintain that “[i]ndividuals like ‘Joe’ who, by
virtue of their parents’ status as Nebraska residents, have been
domiciled in Nebraska their whole lives, are plainly ‘overseas
citizens’ and therefore” covered by subsection (1) and, thus,
cannot be seen to represent a constitutional application of sub-
section (2). 65
[18] We disagree. The term “overseas citizen” is not defined
for purposes of the Election Act. However, as the Secretary
argues, in construing that term, we must presume that the
Legislature knows the language used in a statute and that if
a subsequent act on the same or similar subject uses different
terms in the same connection, a change in the law is intend-
ed. 66 In other words, insofar as the Legislature used the term
“never resided” when they adopted subsection (2) in 2005,
and not the preexisting term “[o]verseas citizens,” they are
presumed to have been referring to different persons. The
legislative history materials cited by the Secretary, while
not dispositive, support that view, 67 as does the definition of
63 MLB Advanced Media v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 321 Neb. 515, 36 N.W.3d
165 (2026).
64 Reply brief for appellants at 7.
65 Id.
66 In re Estate of Psota, 297 Neb. 570, 900 N.W.2d 790 (2017).
67 Brief for appellee at 16 (discussing Floor Debate, L.B. 401, 99th Leg., 1st
Sess. 2537 (Mar. 30, 2005)).

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“‘overseas voter’” set forth in federal law. 68 We also note that
the federal voter registration form, which the appellants them-
selves claimed was used by persons registering to vote and
apply for ballots under subsection (1), indicates that “overseas
citizens” are persons who have “lived” in the United States
“before moving overseas.” A person who “has never resided
in the United States” inherently never “lived” in the United
States prior to moving from the country.
(b) Meaning of Subsection (2)
Having rejected the view that “Joe” is an “[o]verseas citi-
zen” for purposes of subsection (1), we now turn to subsec-
tion (2). In their initial brief on appeal, the appellants took
the view that subsection (2) also applied to at least some
“[o]verseas voters.” 69 It is unclear from the appellants’ reply
brief whether they continue to hold that view. However, even
assuming that they are now of the view that subsection (2)
has no application to “Joe,” we conclude him to be within
the plain meaning of that subsection. As described by the
Secretary, “Joe” is the age of an elector, 70 he is citizen of
the United States, he resides outside the United States, he
has never resided in the United States, he is not registered
to vote in any other state of the United States, and he has a
parent who is registered to vote within Nebraska. As such, he
is “eligible to register to vote and vote” in a Nebraska county
where a parent is a registered voter.
68 See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5)(B) and (C).
69 Brief for appellants at 30 (“[s]ubsection (2) purports to do two things: (A)
replicate the registration process for a narrow swathe of qualified overseas
citizen voters; and (B) establish an alternative standard of qualification
for voters in Nebraska, which does not require constitutional residency
so long as the person has never “resided” in the United States, has not
registered to vote in any other state, and has a parent registered to vote in
Nebraska”).
70 See Neb. Const. art. VI, § 1.

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Joe also meets the qualifications of an elector under article
VI, § 1. The district court stated that the appellants “concede[d]
that Joe is enfranchised under [a]rt. VI, § 1.” The appellants
do not directly dispute that statement on appeal, but they do
at times use language that could be taken to mean they take
no position as to whether “Joe” is a Nebraska resident for
purposes of article VI, § 1. 71 However, even assuming that
the appellants do dispute that “Joe” is qualified to vote under
article VI, § 1, we disagree.
This and other courts have previously recognized that chil-
dren acquire their parents’ domicile at birth and that such
domicile “continues until a new one, a ‘domicile of choice,’ is
acquired.” 72 We have also stated that to acquire a domicile by
choice, there must be both (1) residence through bodily pres-
ence in the new locality and (2) an intention to remain there. 73
Under these precedents, Joe acquired domicile in Nebraska at
birth even though he had never been there, and there is no sug-
gestion that he has resided in a new locality with an intention
to remain there.
Because “Joe” meets the requirements of subsection (2) and
is qualified to vote under article VI, § 1, we conclude that the
71 See brief of appellants at 30 (“[t]he State’s hypothetical Joe is either
a Nebraska resident or he is not, and neither answer helps the State’s
argument. Subsection (1) already covers every Nebraska resident who
lives abroad. So, if the person the State imagines is a resident, Subsection
(1) lets him register and Subsection (2) adds nothings. If he is not a
resident, he is not qualified to vote under the Constitution at all, and
Subsection (2) is doing the very thing the Legislature may not do”).
72 State v. Jensen, 269 Neb. 213, 218, 691 N.W.2d 139, 144 (2005). See,
also, Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48-49,
109 S. Ct. 1597, 104 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989) (“[i]t is undisputed in this case
that the domicile of the mother (as well as the father) has been, at all
relevant times, on the Choctaw Reservation. . . . Thus, it is clear that at
their birth the twin babies were also domiciled on the reservation, even
though they themselves had never been there”); State ex rel. Frasier v.
Whaley, 194 Neb. 703, 234 N.W.2d 909 (1975).
73 Acklie v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 313 Neb. 28, 982 N.W.2d 228 (2022).

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appellants have failed to prove that subsection (2) is facially
unconstitutional. We determine there is at least one constitu-
tional application of subsection (2).
3. Standard Used in Reviewing
Appellants’ Facial Challenge
The appellants also claim that the district court “misapplied
the standard for determining whether [they] stated a valid
facial challenge.” 74 However, insofar as that argument is based
on their view that subsection (2) “does no actual work with
respect to ‘Joe’s’ eligibility to vote,” 75 the argument is without
merit because “Joe” is not an overseas citizen covered by sub-
section (1). Instead, “Joe” is a U.S. citizen “residing outside
the United States, who has never resided in the United States,”
and who is “eligible to register to vote and vote” in a Nebraska
county where one of his parents is registered to vote.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dingman has standing as a candidate to challenge the con-
stitutionality of subsection (2), and we otherwise have jurisdic-
tion over the appeal. However, the appellants failed to prove
subsection (2) is facially unconstitutional. As a result, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.
74 Brief for appellants at 16.
75 Reply brief for appellants at 7.
Cassel, J., dissenting.
I dissented from this court’s decision in Forbes v. Nebraska
Democratic Party, 1 upon which the appellants rely in urging
that Pamela Dingman has common-law standing as a candidate
for Lancaster County engineer. I likewise dissent today.
1 Forbes v. Nebraska Democratic Party, ante p. 282, ___ N.W.3d ___
(2026).

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I rely upon the same case law regarding common-law stand-
ing recited by the majority opinion and, in the interest of
brevity, do not restate it here. I do not find Dingman’s claim
of injury to be direct, concrete, distinct and palpable, or fairly
traceable to the challenged action. I did not agree that in
Forbes, the appellant there had a cognizable interest in a politi-
cal party’s nomination of a replacement candidate. The facts
here, which the majority opinion accurately recites, likewise
fail to support Dingman’s asserted injury.
The majority opinion neither cites nor discusses Forbes,
despite the argument asserted by the appellants. Instead, the
majority opinion relies upon a recent decision of the U.S
Supreme Court. 2
Although the Court’s decision deserves this court’s respect
and consideration, it does not control. The majority plainly
states that “[t]he Secretary is correct that [the Court’s decision]
is not binding on Nebraska courts.” I agree. Here, the claim
is based solely on Nebraska law and does not assert any basis
under federal law.
Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds the Court’s deci-
sion to be “persuasive given the facts and circumstances of
this case.” I disagree. The deputy Secretary’s affidavit informs
us of the number of votes cast under the challenged section
in comparison to the total voters over the last three election
cycles and sets forth the following table:
2 See Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71, 146 S. Ct. 513, 223
L. Ed. 2d 357 (2026).

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These numbers establish that the claimed harm is neither actual,
imminent, nor palpable. The purported harm resembles a droplet
in a deluge. I acknowledge that under other circumstances,
standing might exist. But not here. I would dismiss the appeal,
and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.