Flinn v. Strode

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
Jordyn Flinn, appellee, v.
Adam Strode, appellant.
Jordyn Flinn, appellee, v.
Amy Strode, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 6, 2026. 	Nos. S-25-064, S-25-065.
1. Moot Question: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A mootness deter-
mination that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an
appellate court as a matter of law, which an appellate court determines
independent of the lower court’s decisions.
2. Judgments: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court
must reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the deter-
mination made by the court below.
3. Moot Question: Protection Orders: Appeal and Error. The expiration
of a harassment protection order renders an appeal from its issuance and
affirmance moot.
4. Moot Question: Dismissal and Nonsuit. A moot case is subject
to dismissal.
5. Moot Question: Public Officers and Employees: Appeal and Error.
Nebraska recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doc-
trine, and in determining whether it applies in a given case, an appellate
court is required to consider (1) the public or private nature of the ques-
tion presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for
the guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of recurrence of
the same or a similar problem.
6. Criminal Law. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(a) (Reissue 2016),
the inquiry of whether the course of conduct directed at a specific per-
son serves a legitimate purpose consists of two parts: (1) whether the
actor genuinely holds a justifiable purpose for engaging in the course of
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
conduct and (2) whether the course of conduct is in logical service of
such purpose under the circumstances.
Appeals from the District Court for Lancaster County: Susan
I. Strong, Judge. Appeals dismissed.
Erik W. Fern, of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellants.
Trevin H. Preble and Coehn W. Preble, of Preble Law Firm,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ., and Welch, Judge.
Bergevin, J.
INTRODUCTION
In this consolidated appeal, Adam Strode and Amy Strode
each appealed from the district court’s affirmances of its previ-
ously issued ex parte harassment protection orders. 1 While this
case was pending on appeal, the issued and affirmed protection
orders expired, and the Strodes’ appeals have been rendered
moot. 2 However, because we have not previously addressed
the phrase “which serves no legitimate purpose” under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(a) (Reissue 2016), we determine that
the public interest exception to our mootness doctrine applies,
and we address the statutory language here.
BACKGROUND
Because we are not addressing the merits of the Strodes’
appeal, limited background information is necessary for our
discussion of the sole legal question. We focus on the facts
necessary thereto.
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09(9) (Cum. Supp. 2024). See, also, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 26-109(5) (Supp. 2025); 2025 Neb. Laws, L.B. 80, § 9.
2 See, Weatherly v. Cochran, 301 Neb. 426, 918 N.W.2d 868 (2018); Hron
v. Donlan, 259 Neb. 259, 609 N.W.2d 379 (2000).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
The Strodes and Jordyn Flinn are neighbors. The rear of the
Strodes’ home is adjacent to the rear of Flinn’s home. Their
backyards are separated by a narrow green commons area,
and the homes’ decks face each other. For the purpose of this
appeal, it suffices to say that substantial animosity existed
between the parties before Flinn filed her petitions for harass-
ment protection orders.
Flinn’s petitions for harassment protection orders were filed
on December 17, 2024, and concern events that occurred in
December 2024. In her petitions, Flinn alleged that she was
engaged in litigation against the Strodes, that the Strodes had
admitted in that case to utilizing police resources to obtain
information about her, and that after notice and citation by
“animal control” weeks earlier, the Strodes continued to allow
their dogs to “run at large.” Flinn further alleged that the
Strodes installed a work light as an exterior security light
and left it on for a full week, which work light shone into
Flinn’s home, and that the Strodes subsequently replaced the
work light with another to remediate the light that shone into
her next-door neighbor’s home—but not Flinn’s. Flinn also
alleged that she felt “like [she] was being followed at times
when [she] le[ft] her home,” and she claimed this feeling was
corroborated by an incident when she was walking her dog
in a neighboring residential neighborhood and the Strodes
stopped their vehicle when they were driving by to take pho-
tographs of her.
The district court granted Flinn’s petitions and issued ex parte
harassment protection orders that day, December 17, 2024. The
protection orders were ordered effective for 1 year. The Strodes
requested a show cause hearing, which came before the court
on January 14 and 16, 2025. Much evidence was adduced at
the show cause hearing. However, it is largely not relevant to
the issue of the meaning of a course of conduct “which serves
no legitimate purpose” under § 28-311.02(2)(a).
The Strodes asserted that when they stopped their vehicle
to take photographs of Flinn, they did so with the purpose of

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
documenting the length of Flinn’s dog leash in order to report
her potential violation of an ordinance. The Strodes generally
asserted four legitimate purposes for installing the work light
to illuminate their backyard. However, they can be summa-
rized into two purposes: for security and, simply, because it
was lawful for them to do so.
The district court found no credence in the Strodes’ asserted
legitimate purposes. It found that the Strodes engaged in a
course of conduct directed at Flinn “meant to” intimidate her
and that, implicitly, a reasonable person would be intimidated
by the Strodes’ course of conduct. It concluded that “[t]his is
a clear case of harassment” and affirmed its ex parte harass-
ment protection orders. Accordingly, the orders would remain
in effect for 1 year from the date they were issued—until
December 17, 2025.
Adam and Amy each filed a timely appeal, which separate
appeals were consolidated and moved to our docket on our
own motion. 3
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
As mentioned above, because the harassment protection
orders have expired, we do not address the Strodes’ assign-
ments of error. Instead, we only address the meaning of a
course of conduct “which serves no legitimate purpose” under
§ 28-311.02(2)(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A mootness determination that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which an appellate court determines independent of the lower
court’s decisions. 4
[2] When an appeal calls for statutory interpretation or
presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an
3 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-102(C) (rev. 2022).
4 See City of Hastings v. Sheets, 317 Neb. 88, 8 N.W.3d 771 (2024).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determina-
tion made by the court below. 5
ANALYSIS
Mootness
[3,4] This court has consistently recognized that the expira-
tion of a harassment protection order renders an appeal from
its issuance and affirmance moot. 6 Mootness refers to events
occurring after the filing of a suit that eradicate the requi-
site personal interest in the dispute’s resolution that existed
at the beginning of the litigation. 7 An action becomes moot
when the issues initially presented in the proceedings no
longer exist or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome of the action. 8 A moot case is one that seeks
to determine a question that no longer rests upon existing
facts or rights—i.e., a case in which the issues presented
are no longer alive. 9 The central question in a mootness
analysis is whether changes in circumstances have forestalled
any occasion for meaningful relief. 10 A moot case is subject
to dismissal. 11
Here, the harassment protection orders issued by the dis-
trict court have expired. Accordingly, the Strodes now lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome of their appeals. The
expiration of the harassment protection orders has forestalled
any occasion for meaningful relief.
[5] As a general rule, a moot appeal is subject to summary
dismissal. 12 However, Nebraska recognizes a public interest
5 State v. Dolinar, 319 Neb. 565, 24 N.W.3d 30 (2025).
6 See, Weatherly v. Cochran, supra note 2; Hron v. Donlan, supra note 2.
7 City of Hastings v. Sheets, supra note 4.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
exception to the mootness doctrine, and in determining whether
it applies in a given case, an appellate court is required to con-
sider (1) the public or private nature of the question presented,
(2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for the
guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of recur-
rence of the same or a similar problem. 13 In this case, these
three factors all weigh in favor of us addressing the meaning
of a “legitimate purpose” under § 28-311.02(2)(a). We elect to
do so.
“Legitimate Purpose”
The definition of harassment is provided by § 28-311.02(2)(a):
“Harass means to engage in a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies,
threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legiti-
mate purpose.”
The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent. 14 Statutory
interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning. 15 It is not within the province
of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not war-
ranted by the language; neither is it within the province of
a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a
statute. 16 In construing a statute, the legislative intention is to
be determined from a general consideration of the whole act
with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the
particular topic under which the language in question is found,
and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that
of a particular part considered separately. 17 Statutes pertaining
13 See, id; NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 314 Neb. 748, 993 N.W.2d 105
(2023).
14 Khaitov v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 319 Neb. 932, 25 N.W.3d 739
(2025).
15 Id.
16 Johnson v. City of Omaha, 319 Neb. 402, 23 N.W.3d 420 (2025).
17 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
to the same subject matter should be construed together; such
statutes, being in pari materia, must be construed as if they
were one law, and effect must be given to every provision. 18
To give effect to all parts of a statute, a court will attempt to
reconcile different provisions so they are consistent, harmoni-
ous, and sensible and will avoid rejecting as superfluous or
meaningless any word, clause, or sentence. 19
The Strodes argue that we should conclude the word “legiti-
mate” means “lawful.” 20 In support, the Strodes cite Black’s
Law Dictionary’s first definition of “legitimate”: “[c]omplying
with the law, an applicable rule or regulation, or a recognized
principle; lawful.” 21 Thus, they reason, “all lawful conduct
regardless of . . . the person’s subjective motivation for the
conduct” serves a legitimate purpose, 22 and “for conduct to
‘serve[] no legitimate purpose’ it must be unlawful conduct.” 23
We are unpersuaded by the Strodes’ argument.
We note that the Strodes’ proposed meaning of “legitimate,”
i.e., “permitted by law,” is synonymous with “lawful” and
“legal.” 24 If a person must engage in illegal conduct in order
for the person to engage in conduct that constitutes harass-
ment, the intent of the Legislature set forth in § 28-311.02(1),
particularly to “protect victims,” would largely be defeat-
ed. 25 Such an interpretation would also render the offense of
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Brief for appellant in case No. S-25-064 at 19; brief for appellant in case
No. S-25-065 at 19.
21 Black’s Law Dictionary 1082 (12th ed. 2024).
22 Brief for appellant in case No. S-25-064 at 19; brief for appellant in case
No. S-25-065 at 19.
23 Brief for appellant in case No. S-25-064 at 23; brief for appellant in case
No. S-25-065 at 23.
24 See Merriam-Webster Thesaurus 416 (2005).
25 See, also, In re Interest of Jeffrey K., 273 Neb. 239, 728 N.W.2d 606
(2007).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
stalking, 26 which requires the perpetrator to willfully harass
another, largely superfluous: If only illegal conduct could
constitute harassment, there would be no need to criminalize
willful harassment.
The 	statutes 	concerned 	with 	harassment 	and 	stalking
expressly recognize that lawful conduct can be of such a nature
to rise to the level of harassment, and in extreme cases, the
criminal offense of stalking. 27 For example, § 28-311.02(2)(b)
plainly contemplates that “telephoning, contacting, or other-
wise communicating with [a] person” may serve no legitimate
purpose, even though telephoning, contacting, and commu-
nicating with a person is permitted by law. We have recog-
nized that harassment may consist of making phone calls and
sending text messages, even though making phone calls and
sending text messages are, themselves, lawful activities. 28 We
decline to adopt the Strodes’ proposed meaning of “legiti-
mate” as it is used within § 28-311.02(2)(a).
Instead, we find the next two definitions of “legitimate”
from Black’s Law Dictionary more appropriate in the context
of § 28-311.02(2)(a): “2. In accordance with logic and sound
reasoning; justifiable <a legitimate conclusion>. 3. Normal
or regular in type or kind; genuine, authentic, or valid <a
legitimate 	complaint>.” 29 These 	definitions 	more 	properly
26 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.03 (Reissue 2016).
27 See id.
28 See Diedra T. v. Justina R., 313 Neb. 417, 984 N.W.2d 312 (2023).
29 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 21 at 1082. See, The Century
Dictionary of the English Language 3403 (1889) (“[j]ustly based on the
premises; logically correct, allowable, or valid: as, a legitimate result;
legitimate arguments or conclusion”); The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1004 (5th ed. 2016) (“[v]alid or justifiable”
and “[b]ased on logical reasoning”); “Legitimate,” Merriam-Webster.com,
https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legitimate (last visited Jan. 29,
2026) (“being exactly as intended or presented : neither spurious nor
false” and “conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and
standards . . . also : fair or reasonable : valid”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
FLINN v. STRODE
Cite as 320 Neb. 813
focus on the legitimacy of the purpose for the conduct, as
§ 28-311.02 requires.
Additionally, we note that reading § 28-311.02(2)(a) in pari
materia with § 28-311.02 (2)(b), the course of conduct must
evidence a continuity of that legitimate purpose. As a justice
of the Michigan Supreme Court succinctly stated when con-
sidering that state’s stalking statute, even when “a legitimate
purpose is established, the essential question must be how the
defendant’s conduct at issue serves that legitimate purpose.” 30
[6] Accordingly, we hold that under § 28-311.02(2)(a), the
inquiry of whether the course of conduct directed at a spe-
cific person serves a legitimate purpose consists of two parts:
(1) whether the actor genuinely holds a justifiable purpose
for engaging in the course of conduct and (2) whether the
course of conduct is in logical service of such purpose under
the circumstances.
Due to the expiration of the harassment protection orders,
we do not consider whether the evidence showed that the
Strodes’ course of conduct directed at Flinn had no legiti-
mate purpose.
CONCLUSION
Because the harassment protection orders in this case have
rendered the Strodes’ appeals moot, we dismiss their appeals.
Appeals dismissed.
30 Nastal v. Henderson & Associates Invest., 471 Mich. 712, 727, 691
N.W.2d 1, 9 (2005) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting; Kelly, J., agrees).