In re Interest of Ricardo T. et al.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
In re Interest of Ricardo T. et al.,
children under 18 years of age.
State of Nebraska, appellant, v. Cheyenne M.
and Julian T., appellees, and Oglala
Sioux Tribe, intervenor-appellee.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed January 12, 2024. 	Nos. S-23-234, S-23-236, S-23-237, S-23-238.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act: Federal Acts. The Indian Child Welfare Act
is intended to protect the best interests of Indian children and promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes
which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.
2. Indian Child Welfare Act: Federal Acts: Legislature: Public Policy.
In adopting the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act, the Legislature
declared that it was the policy of this state to cooperate fully with Indian
tribes in Nebraska in order to ensure that the intent and provisions of the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced.
3. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question
that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a
conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.
4. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case,
as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the matter before it.
5. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. When an appellate
court is without jurisdiction to act, the appeal must be dismissed. For an
appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final
order or judgment entered by the court from which the appeal is taken;
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals
from nonfinal orders.
6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Conditional orders are not appealable.
7. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Orders that specify that a
trial court will or will not exercise its jurisdiction based on future action
or inaction by a party are conditional and therefore not appealable.
8. Judgments. If an order looks to the future in an attempt to judge the
unknown, it is a conditional order.
Petitions for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Moore and Welch, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the County Court for Madison County, Ross A.
Stoffer, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Nathaniel T. Eckstrom, Deputy Madison County Attorney,
for appellant.
Nathan J. Stratton, of Stratton, DeLay, Doele, Carlson &
Buettner, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee Julian T.
Melissa A. Wentling, Adams County Public Defender, for
appellee Cheyenne M.
Dana L. Hanna, of Hanna Law Office, P.C., for intervenor-
appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Funke, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This consolidated appeal presents the question of whether
a juvenile court’s order granting a request to transfer cases
to the jurisdiction of a tribal court under the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 1 and the Nebraska Indian Child
Welfare Act (NICWA) 2 was a final, appealable order. Given
1 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (2018).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1501 to 43-1517 (Reissue 2016).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
the order’s language and the statutory framework governing
the transfer to tribal courts, we find that the order was condi-
tional and not appealable. We therefore affirm the Nebraska
Court of Appeals’ summary dismissal of the State’s appeals of
the order for lack of jurisdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Legal Background
[1,2] Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 with the stated
intent of
protect[ing] the best interests of Indian children and
. . . promot[ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture. 3
NICWA was enacted by the Nebraska Legislature in 1985
to clarify state policies and procedures regarding Nebraska’s
implementation of ICWA. 4 With NICWA, the Legislature
declared that it is the policy of this state to “cooperate fully
with Indian tribes in Nebraska in order to ensure that the
intent and provisions of [ICWA] are enforced.” 5
As relevant to this consolidated appeal, ICWA and NICWA
include provisions regarding the transfer of cases from a state
juvenile court to a tribal court. As set forth in § 43-1504(2),
the specific provision at issue prescribes as follows:
In any state court proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
3 25 U.S.C. § 1902. See, also, Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 143
S. Ct. 1609, 216 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2023) (U.S. Supreme Court recently
upholding constitutionality of certain provisions of ICWA).
4 § 43-1502.
5 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to
the jurisdiction of the primary tribe, absent objection by
either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the
Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe, except that
such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal
court of the primary tribe. 6
The comparable provision of federal law, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)
of 	ICWA, 	includes 	nearly 	identical 	language. 7 	Because
NICWA implements ICWA in Nebraska and the relevant
language of both acts is largely the same, for the sake of
consistency, we generally refer to the applicable provisions of
NICWA in our analysis, regardless of the parties’ usage.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
Beginning in 2018 and continuing into 2022, the State ini-
tiated proceedings in the county court for Madison County,
Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016) to adjudicate five children,
who are all siblings, in four related cases. Those children
are Ricardo T., Jovanni T., Mirella T., Leticia T., and Reina
T. Each child is an “Indian child” as defined by NICWA. 8
As each case was a child custody proceeding involving the
potential termination of parental rights, the Oglala Sioux Tribe
(the Tribe) moved to intervene in each case under the author-
ity of ICWA. 9 The Tribe’s motions were granted by the juve-
nile court.
6 Compare with 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) of ICWA and § 43-1504(1) of NICWA
(providing that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
proceeding involving “Indian child” who is domiciled or residing within
tribe’s reservation or who is ward of tribal court).
7 Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (“[p]rovided, [t]hat such transfer shall be subject
to declination by the tribal court of such tribe”) (emphasis omitted).
8 § 43-1503(8).
9 See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). See, also, § 43-1504(3).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
In 2022, the State filed supplemental petitions to terminate
the parental rights of Cheyenne M. and Julian T., the natural
parents of all five children. Thereafter, in January 2023, after
the juvenile court had heard multiple days of trial on the
supplemental petitions to terminate parental rights, the Tribe
moved to transfer each case to the jurisdiction of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe Children’s Court (tribal court) in Pine Ridge,
South Dakota, under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of ICWA, and by
implication, § 43-1504(2) of NICWA. The children’s parents
then jointly filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction of each case
to the tribal court as well. The State objected to the motion to
transfer, arguing that because the motion was not filed until
several days after the termination trial began, there was good
cause to deny it.
The parties discussed the motion to transfer at a hearing on
January 10, 2023. The State first pointed to 25 C.F.R. § 23.116
(2022), a federal regulation promulgated by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to implement ICWA. That regulation, 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.116, provides: “Upon receipt of a transfer petition, the
State court must ensure that the Tribal court is promptly noti-
fied in writing of the transfer petition. This notification may
request a timely response regarding whether the Tribal court
wishes to decline the transfer.”
The State expressed to the juvenile court that because the
Tribe and the children’s parents had previously petitioned for
the transfer to the tribal court, this federal regulation required
the juvenile court to contact the tribal court to inquire if the
tribal court would accept the transfer. The Tribe did not dis-
agree with the State’s description of 25 C.F.R. § 23.116 but
said that the tribal court had a standing order not to decide
whether to accept a transfer until after the juvenile court
entered a conditional order granting the motion to transfer.
According to the Tribe, if the juvenile court were to grant
the motion, it would be dependent on the timely acceptance
by the tribal court. Thereafter, the State agreed that if the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
juvenile court transferred the matter, the tribal court was
entitled to decide whether to accept or decline the transfer.
On February 20, 2023, the juvenile court entered an order
granting the motion to transfer the cases to the tribal court after
finding that the “advanced stage” of a case no longer qualified
as good cause to deny a transfer under the ICWA guidelines
published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 10 The order con-
cluded by stating:
[T]he Motions to Transfer are granted. The Court further
requests that the Tribe file a written indication with the
Court in regard to its acceptance or declination of the
transfer. A status hearing is also set for March 28, 2023 at
9:30 a.m. unless the Tribe’s acceptance of the transfer has
been filed prior to that date and time.
The State then filed notices in each case of its intent to
appeal the order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court. At
the time the State filed notices of its intent to appeal, neither
the Tribe nor the tribal court had filed a written indication
with the juvenile court regarding its acceptance or declination
of the transfer.
The Tribe and the children’s parents moved for summary
dismissal of the State’s appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the transfer order was not final and
appealable, but, rather, was a conditional order that granted
the motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, subject
to the juvenile court’s receipt of an order from the tribal court
accepting jurisdiction. The State objected to the motions for
summary dismissal, arguing that the juvenile court’s order was
final and appealable.
The Court of Appeals sustained the motions of the Tribe
and the parents and summarily dismissed the State’s appeal on
April 4, 2023, for lack of jurisdiction, 11 because the juvenile
10 See In re Interest of Tavian B., 292 Neb. 804, 874 N.W.2d 456 (2016).
11 See Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-107(B)(1) (rev. 2022).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
court’s order transferring the cases to the tribal court “was
not yet final and appealable.” The Court of Appeals went on
to state in its minute entry that, according to § 43-1504(2)
and this court’s decision in In re Interest of C.W. et al., 12 “[a]
transfer of a state court proceeding to the jurisdiction of the
primary tribe is subject to declination by the tribal court of
the primary tribe.”
The State petitioned this court for further review, which
we granted.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The State assigns, restated, that the Court of Appeals erred
in determining that the State’s appeals should be dismissed
because the juvenile court’s order transferring the cases to the
tribal court was not final and appealable.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[3] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
pendent of the lower court’s decision. 13
V. ANALYSIS
As the State asserts, the issue in this case is “whether the
[j]uvenile [c]ourt’s order transferring jurisdiction to the [tribal
court] was a final order subject to appeal or a conditional
order which could not be appealed.” 14 This question implicates
our familiar standards regarding appellate jurisdiction.
12 In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105 (1992),
overruled on other grounds, In re Interest of Zylena R. & Adrionna R., 284
Neb. 834, 825 N.W.2d 173 (2012).
13 In re Interest of Manuel C. & Mateo S., 314 Neb. 91, 988 N.W.2d 520
(2023), modified on denial of rehearing 314 Neb. 580, 991 N.W.2d 305.
14 Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 6.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
1. Appellate Court’s Duty to Determine
Whether It Has Jurisdiction
[4,5] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before
reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it. 15 When an appellate court is with-
out jurisdiction to act, the appeal must be dismissed. 16 For an
appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must
be a final order or judgment entered by the court from which
the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without
jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders. 17
[6] Of the categories of orders that are denominated as
“final orders which may be vacated, modified, or reversed”
by an appellate court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum.
Supp. 	2022), 	the 	only 	potentially 	applicable 	category 	is
“[a]n order affecting a substantial right made during a special
proceeding.” 18 We have previously held that a juvenile court
proceeding is a special proceeding for appellate purposes. 19
However, an order cannot qualify as a final, appealable order
that affects a substantial right under § 25-1902 when it is
“conditional.” We thus turn to our jurisprudence regarding the
characteristics of conditional orders, which we have held are
not appealable. 20
In Evert v. Srb, 21 a recent decision of this court discussing
conditional orders and judgments, we began by stating the
long held proposition that, generally, when an order leaves
no further action of the court to dispose of the cause pending,
15 In re Interest of Sayrah P., ante p. 436, 996 N.W.2d 623 (2023).
16 Id.
17 Id. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016).
18 § 25-1902(1)(b).
19 In re Interest of Sayrah P., supra note 15.
20 See Evert v. Srb, 308 Neb. 895, 957 N.W.2d 475 (2021).
21 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
the order is final and appealable. When the cause is retained for
further action by the court, the order is interlocutory and not
appealable. 22 However, after noting that proposition, we then
noted several other propositions from this court elaborating
on the nature of a conditional order. We again summarize and
restate those propositions below.
[7,8] Orders that specify that a trial court will or will not
exercise its jurisdiction based on future action or inaction
by a party are conditional and therefore not appealable. 23
Although they are not void as interlocutory orders, condi-
tional orders are wholly ineffective and void insofar as they
purport to be final orders because they are dependent upon
the occurrence of uncertain future events. 24 Such conditional
orders do not perform in the present and have no force and
effect as a final order or judgment from which an appeal can
be taken because they leave to speculation and conjecture as
to what their final effect may be. 25 In other words, if an order
looks to the future in an attempt to judge the unknown, it is a
conditional order. 26
22 Id. (citing Deuth v. Ratigan, 256 Neb. 419, 590 N.W.2d 366 (1999)). See,
also, Brozovsky v. Norquest, 231 Neb. 731, 437 N.W.2d 798 (1989); Anson
v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 25 N.W.2d 896 (1947); Smith v. Sahler, 1 Neb.
310 (1871).
23 Evert, supra note 20; Stevens v. Stevens, 292 Neb. 827, 874 N.W.2d 453
(2016).
24 See, Evert, supra note 20; Fitzgerald v. Community Redevelopment Corp.,
283 Neb. 428, 811 N.W.2d 178 (2012); Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb.
917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006); Custom Fabricators v. Lenarduzzi, 259
Neb. 460, 610 N.W.2d 391 (2000); State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258
Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999).
25 See, Evert, supra note 20; In re Interest of Giavonni P., 304 Neb. 580,
935 N.W.2d 631 (2019); Fitzgerald, supra note 24; Jensen v. Jensen, 275
Neb. 921, 750 N.W.2d 335 (2008).
26 See, Evert, supra note 20; Nichols v. Nichols, 288 Neb. 339, 847 N.W.2d
307 (2014); Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
2. Transfer Order Was Not
Final and Appealable
The State argues that the juvenile court’s order transfer-
ring the cases to the tribal court was a final, appealable order
because it was entered during a special proceeding and affected
a substantial right. The State further contends that the order
was not conditional because if the tribal court accepted the
transfer, there was no additional action to be completed by the
juvenile court to divest itself of jurisdiction. The Tribe and the
children’s parents, on the other hand, argue that the order was
not final and appealable because it was conditional as the tribal
court could decline the transfer and the matters would remain
in the juvenile court. Based on the language of the order, read
in light of NICWA’s provisions regarding the procedure for the
transfer of a case from juvenile court to a tribal court, we agree
with the Tribe and the parents.
(a) Language of Juvenile Court’s Transfer
Order Was Conditional
We turn first to the language of the juvenile court’s order.
As noted above, the juvenile court “order[ed] that the Motions
to Transfer [were] granted,” but then “further request[ed] that
the Tribe file a written indication with the Court in regard to
its acceptance or declination of the transfer.” As a preliminary
matter, we understand this reference to the Tribe to mean the
tribal court, because it is the tribal court, not the Tribe, that has
the authority to decline the transfer of a case from a juvenile
court under NICWA. 27
The State argues that because the order “did not specify that
any action from the [t]ribal [c]ourt was required for the trans-
fer to take place,” 28 but, rather, requested that the tribal court
27 § 43-1504(2).
28 Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 6 (emphasis
in original); supplemental brief for appellant in support of petition for
further review at 11 (emphasis in original).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
indicate whether it accepted or declined the transfer, the order
was “self-operating” 29 and final; thus, there was nothing further
that the juvenile court needed to do to effectuate the transfer.
We disagree with the State’s reading of the transfer order.
While the transfer order granted the Tribe’s and parents’
motions to transfer, it requested that the tribal court indicate
whether it would accept or decline the transfer. We thus read
the order as granting the transfer to the tribal court, subject to,
or conditioned upon, the tribal court’s subsequent acceptance
or declination of the transfer. The order granting the transfer
was dependent on a future event, that being the tribal court’s
acceptance or declination of the transfer. We therefore agree
with the Tribe and the parents that the order was “interlocutory
and nonappealable.” 30
It is immaterial that the “[j]uvenile [c]ourt did not indicate
that any further action . . . was required in order to complete
the transfer,” 31 as the State argues. By indicating that the tribal
court could choose to accept or decline the transfer, the order
reflected that the transfer was not final until some further
action occurred. The order was therefore dependent on the
occurrence of uncertain future events, left to speculation as to
what its final effect would be, and looked to the future in an
attempt to judge the unknown. Accordingly, it was conditional
and not appealable. 32
After oral argument, the State was granted leave to file a
supplemental transcript that showed the tribal court entered
an order dated March 27, 2023, accepting the transfer of the
cases. That acceptance has no bearing on our analysis, because
it came after the State filed its notices of appeal.
29 Objection of appellant to motion for summary dismissal at 3.
30 Joint brief for appellees in opposition of petition for further review at 5.
31 Supplemental brief for appellant in support of petition for further review
at 11.
32 See, id.; Fitzgerald, supra note 24.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
(b) Juvenile Court’s Order Was
Conditional Under NICWA
Our reading of the transfer order as conditional also reflects
the statutory framework set forth in NICWA regarding requests
to transfer jurisdiction from a state juvenile court to a tribal
court. 	Again, 	the 	applicable 	provision 	of 	NICWA 	states
as follows:
In any state court proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to
the jurisdiction of the primary tribe, absent objection by
either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the
Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe, except that
such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal
court of the primary tribe. 33
Several aspects of this statute, as applied to the present
case, are not in dispute. As noted above, the children in this
consolidated appeal are all “Indian children” as defined by
§ 43-1503(8) of NICWA, and the Tribe is their primary tribe.
The state court proceedings at issue were for the termina-
tion of parental rights to the children. The children were not
domiciled or residing within their tribe’s reservation, and
the Tribe and the children’s parents petitioned to transfer the
proceeding to the tribal court within the jurisdiction of the
children’s tribe.
Accordingly, under § 43-1504(2), the juvenile court was
statutorily required to transfer the cases to the tribal court,
unless one or more of the following exceptions were met: (1)
good cause existed for denying the transfer, (2) either par-
ent objected to the transfer, or (3) the tribal court declined
the transfer. 34 As mentioned, the juvenile court rejected the
33 § 43-1504(2) (emphasis supplied). Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
34 See, also, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).

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315 Nebraska Reports
IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
State’s arguments that there was good cause to deny the trans-
fer, and the parents did not object to the transfer; they sought
it. Therefore, the only basis for which the cases would not
have been transferred to the tribal court was if the tribal court
declined the transfer.
At its core, we find that the “subject to declination by the
tribal court” language of § 43-1504(2) of NICWA requires us
to treat the juvenile court’s order here as conditional rather
than final and appealable. The transfer was “subject to,” or
dependent and conditioned upon, whether the tribal court sub-
sequently declined the transfer. When the juvenile court’s order
granting the transfer was entered, the tribal court had not yet
indicated whether it would accept or decline the transfer. Of
course, the tribal court could have declined the transfer, and
if so, the cases would remain the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The juvenile court’s order was thus the triggering event
that began the transfer process.
The State also argues that because the relevant statutory
language does not specify any action that a tribal court must
affirmatively take to accept the transfer of jurisdiction, but
instead provides only that the transfer is subject to the tribal
court’s declination, the transfer was complete upon the entry
of the juvenile court’s order. At the same time, however,
the State concedes that the transfer was complete “unless
the [t]ribal [c]ourt declined the case and sent it back” 35 and
“unless the tribal court subsequently declines the transfer and
returns jurisdiction to the juvenile court.” 36 In taking the latter
position, the State effectively concedes the characteristic that
makes the transfer order conditional and not appealable.
In our reading of § 43-1504(2), even if the juvenile court
finds that no parent has objected to the transfer and that
there is not good cause to deny the transfer, the tribal court
35 Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 7.
36 Objection of appellant to motion for summary dismissal at 2.

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IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
always has the statutory discretion to decline the transfer of a
case to its jurisdiction, and the transfer of the case from the
juvenile court to the tribal court is final and completed only
if the tribal court does not subsequently decline the transfer.
Without knowing whether the tribal court will decline the
transfer, declination is always possible. Such uncertainty ren-
ders the juvenile court’s transfer order conditional.
Our determination is consistent with our decision in In re
Interest of C.W. et al., which appears to be the only previous
case wherein a Nebraska court had the opportunity to address
whether a juvenile court’s order granting a request to trans-
fer jurisdiction to a tribal court was final and appealable. 37
There, we affirmed the juvenile court’s decision to vacate a
previous order it had entered granting the transfer to a tribal
court and instead retain jurisdiction over the case before the
transfer had been accepted by the tribal court. 38 In doing so,
we likened the transfer order to an offer to the tribal court that
the juvenile court had the option to revoke prior to the tribal
court’s acceptance. 39
We find this reasoning from In re Interest of C.W. et al. to
further illustrate why the transfer order here is conditional.
Although § 43-1504(2) speaks to how the tribal court could
have subsequently declined the juvenile court’s transfer order,
In re Interest of C.W. et al. demonstrates that the juvenile
court could also revoke its “offer” to transfer the cases to
the tribal court before the tribal court accepted the transfer
and retain jurisdiction. Such a possibility further renders the
transfer order conditional. The State does not challenge the
validity of In re Interest of C.W. et al. In fact, the State con-
cedes that the juvenile court here could have done as the In
re Interest of C.W. et al. court did and enter a “conditional
37 In re Interest of C.W. et al., supra note 12.
38 Id.
39 Id.

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IN RE INTEREST OF RICARDO T. ET AL.
Cite as 315 Neb. 718
order of transfer.” 40 But we disagree with the State that such a
conditional order was not indeed entered here.
Looking beyond In re Interest of C.W. et al., the State
asserts that in Nebraska, “[o]rders of a juvenile court decid-
ing a motion to transfer to tribal court[s] have generally been
regarded as final orders.” 41 To the contrary, Nebraska courts
have previously only found, either explicitly or implicitly,
that an order denying a parent’s or tribe’s request to transfer
jurisdiction to a tribal court was a final order that the parent or
tribe could appeal. 42 Nebraska courts have never directly held
that an order, like the one here, granting a parent’s or tribe’s
request to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court was a final
order from which the State could appeal.
(c) State Effectively Agreed Transfer
Order Was Conditional
We also observe that the State effectively agreed that the
transfer order was conditional at the January 10, 2023, hear-
ing wherein it and the Tribe discussed the procedure set
40 Objection of appellant to motion for summary dismissal at 2.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., In re Interest of Tavian B., supra note 10; In re Interest of Zylena
R. & Adrionna R., supra note 12; In re Interest of Jayden D. & Dayten J.,
21 Neb. App. 666, 842 N.W.2d 199 (2014); In re Interest of Melaya F. &
Melysse F., 19 Neb. App. 235, 810 N.W.2d 429 (2011); In re Interest of
Leslie S. et al., 17 Neb. App. 828, 770 N.W.2d 678 (2009), abrogated on
other grounds, In re Interest of Zylena R. & Adrionna R., supra note 12;
In re Interest of Lawrence H., 16 Neb. App. 246, 743 N.W.2d 91 (2007);
In re Interest of Enrique P. et al., 14 Neb. App. 453, 709 N.W.2d 676
(2006); In re Interest of Brittany C. et al., 13 Neb. App. 411, 693 N.W.2d
592 (2005). See, also, In re Interest of Manuel C. & Mateo S., supra note
13; In re Interest of Jassenia H., 291 Neb. 107, 864 N.W.2d 242 (2015);
In re Interest of J.L.M. et al., 234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377 (1990); In
re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983); In re
Interest of Shane L. et al., 21 Neb. App. 591, 842 N.W.2d 140 (2013); In
re Interest of Louis S. et al., 17 Neb. App. 867, 774 N.W.2d 416 (2009),
abrogated on other grounds, In re Interest of Zylena R. & Adrionna R.,
supra note 12.

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forth in 25 C.F.R. § 23.116. At that time, the Tribe informed
the juvenile court that it was the tribal court’s policy to not
accept jurisdiction “until after the [juvenile] court has basi-
cally conditionally granted a motion to transfer” and that
after the juvenile court does so, “the tribal court immediately
informs the [juvenile] court whether it will accept jurisdic-
tion or not.” The Tribe then conveyed that the order transfer-
ring jurisdiction would be dependent upon the tribal court’s
acceptance. The State responded that if the juvenile court did
decide to transfer the cases, that the tribal court was “entitled
. . . to decide whether to receive it or not,” and that the tribal
court was “entitled to make the court where the motion’s filed
to make their decision first too. And then if [the tribal court
does not] accept it, it just stays here.” We take the State’s
statement here to reflect its agreement to a transfer procedure
that is consistent with the framework in NICWA and in In re
Interest of C.W. et al. In other words, the State essentially
agreed that if the juvenile court entered a transfer order, it
would be treated as conditional.
Based on the reasons stated, we find that the transfer order
from which the State appeals was a conditional order that could
not qualify as final and appealable. As a result, no appellate
court had jurisdiction to entertain the State’s appeals, and the
appeals must be dismissed.
We understand the State’s concern that its appeals of the
transfer order were the “only recourse” 43 and “only oppor-
tunity for further review” of the juvenile court’s decision to
transfer the cases to the tribal court. 44 However, insofar as our
determination that the transfer order was conditional and not
appealable was predicated in part on the fact that at the time
the State’s appeals were initiated, it was unknown whether
the tribal court would decline the transfer, we observe that
43 Objection of appellant to motion for summary dismissal at 4.
44 Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 7 (emphasis
omitted).

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compliance with the federal regulations and guidelines imple-
menting ICWA could remove such uncertainty about the tribal
court’s action in future cases.
As the State initially observed at the January 10, 2023, hear-
ing, before effectively abandoning its position, the relevant
federal regulations and guidelines call for the State court to
contact the tribal court upon receipt of a transfer petition to
provide it with the opportunity to determine whether it wishes
to decline jurisdiction. 45 In fact, some courts have found that
it is reversible error for a juvenile court to rule on a request
to transfer to a tribal court without first notifying the tribal
court of the proposed transfer and ascertaining whether the
tribal court would accept jurisdiction, as is required under
the regulations and guidelines. 46 By following this procedure,
the juvenile court’s order would not be dependent upon some
future acceptance by a tribal court and presumably would be
final and appealable.
Alternatively, if no acceptance has been received from the
tribal court prior to the determination of the motion to trans-
fer, the juvenile court should enter a second order transferring
the matter to the tribal court after receipt of acceptance from
the tribal court. The State could then request a stay of the
juvenile court’s order transferring the case to the tribal court
as a way of ensuring that the State has an opportunity to con-
test the juvenile court’s decision to transfer the matter. 47
45 See, 25 C.F.R. § 23.116; U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act F.3 at 47 (Dec.
2016). See, also, In re Interest of Tavian B., supra note 10, 292 Neb. at
810, 815, 874 N.W.2d at 461, 463 (finding that Bureau of Indian Affairs
guidelines implementing ICWA are nonbinding and do not have force of
federal regulations, but are nonetheless “persuasive and instructive” and
provide “framework of best practices” for compliance with ICWA).
46 See, e.g., In re Shawnda G., 247 Wis. 2d 158, 634 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. App.
2001). See, also, In re J.W.C., 363 Mont. 85, 265 P.3d 1265 (2011).
47 See, e.g., In re M.M., 154 Cal. App. 4th 897, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273 (2007);
In re Cal. E., Nos. 4-22-0930, 4-22-0931, 4-22-1053, and 4-22-1054, 2023
WL 4037629 (Ill. App. June 16, 2023).

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We are aware that several courts have held that once the
tribal court accepts the transfer, the state court loses jurisdic-
tion to enter any subsequent orders. 48 Neither party cited these
cases, and we find them factually distinguishable and unper-
suasive. Here, although the tribal court accepted jurisdiction,
the juvenile court had yet to enter a final order transferring
the cases, and as such, the juvenile court did not lose jurisdic-
tion of the matters.
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the State’s
appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to the lack of a final,
appealable order.
Affirmed.
48 J.P. v. State, 506 P.3d 3 (Alaska 2022); In re M.M., supra note 47;
Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hovis, 847 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.
Okla. 1994), reversed on other grounds 53 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995).