Twin Pines v. Rice

- 782 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
Twin Pines, LLC, appellee, v.
Mary A. Rice, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed April 2, 2024. 	No. A-23-477.
1. Courts: Time: Judges: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. A
district court’s ruling on a motion to extend the time for filing a state-
ment of errors is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A judicial abuse
of discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly
untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional question does not
involve a factual dispute, the issue is a matter of law. An appellate court
reviews questions of law independently of the lower court’s conclusion.
3. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Personal jurisdiction is the power of
a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.
4. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. Before a court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must determine,
first, whether the long-arm statute is satisfied and, second, whether
minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state for
personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process.
5. Constitutional Law: Jurisdiction: States. Nebraska’s long-arm stat-
ute extends Nebraska’s jurisdiction over nonresidents having any con-
tact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S.
Constitution permits.
6. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. When a state construes its long-arm
statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permit-
ted, the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether jurisdiction
comports with due process.
7. Due Process: Jurisdiction. The Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 07:37 AM CDT

- 783 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
8. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. The determination of whether a
court has personal jurisdiction is not simply mechanical or quantitative,
but requires the consideration of the quality and nature of the defend-
ant’s activities to ascertain whether the defendant has the necessary
minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy due process.
9. Jurisdiction: States. Generally, specific jurisdiction permits suits that
arise out of or relate to a defendant’s activities in the forum state while
general jurisdiction allows all kinds of suits against defendants in their
place of domicile.
10. ____: ____. The expansion of states’ jurisdiction based on the minimum
contacts analysis did not supersede states’ jurisdiction over those physi-
cally present within their borders.
11. Due Process: Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
12. Jurisdiction: Service of Process. Being served in Nebraska subjects
the defendant to the jurisdiction of its courts.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Molly
B. Keane, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Douglas County, Marcela A. Keim, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
Louie M. Ligouri, of Ligouri Law Office, for appellant.
Gregory C. Scaglione, of Koley Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Welch, Judges.
Pirtle, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Twin Pines, LLC, brought an action against Mary A. Rice
in the county court for Douglas County. The service of sum-
mons was completed by the Nemaha County sheriff’s office
while Rice, who is not a Nebraska resident, was physically in
Nebraska. Upon Rice’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the county court dismissed the action. On appeal

- 784 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
to the district court for Douglas County, the district court
reversed the county court’s dismissal and found the instate ser-
vice of process was sufficient to subject Rice to the jurisdiction
of Nebraska courts. Rice now appeals that judgment. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2022, Rice sold a property located in Rock Port,
Missouri, to Twin Pines, a Missouri limited liability company.
Along with purchasing the property, Twin Pines also bought
most of the items in the home, including a gas range and dish-
washer. Twin Pines alleges that when Rice moved out of the
residence on August 3, she took the gas range and dishwasher
in violation of the agreement.
On August 26, 2022, Twin Pines filed a complaint in the
county court, seeking damages for Rice’s retention of the gas
range and dishwasher. On August 31, the Nemaha County
sheriff’s office served Rice at her place of work in Auburn,
Nebraska. Rice is not a Nebraska resident, and she asserts her
only connection to the state is that she works in Nebraska. On
September 9, Rice motioned to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
On October 27, 2022, a hearing was held on Rice’s motion
to dismiss. On November 29, the county court found there was
no connection between the lawsuit and the State of Nebraska,
so it dismissed the complaint.
On December 19, 2022, Twin Pines filed a notice of inten-
tion to prosecute an appeal and requested the production of
a bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions was filed in the
district court on February 1, 2023. On February 3, the dis-
trict court entered a scheduling order, which included, in rel-
evant part, that “[Twin Pines] shall comply with Neb. Ct. R.
[§] 6-1518.” Although the rule has since been amended, see
Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1518(B) (rev. 2023), at the time of the proceed-
ings, § 6-1518(B) (rev. 2022) stated:

- 785 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
Within 10 days of filing the bill of exceptions in
an appeal to the district court, the appellant shall file
with the district court a statement of errors which shall
consist of a separate, concise statement of each error a
party contends was made by the trial court. Each assign-
ment of error shall be separately numbered and para-
graphed. Consideration of the cause will be limited to
errors assigned, provided that the district court may, at its
option, notice plain error not assigned. This rule shall not
apply to small claims appeals.
Despite § 6-1518’s mandate and the court’s scheduling order,
Twin Pines did not file its statement of errors until March 29.
In this statement of errors, Twin Pines assigned the county
court erred in granting the motion to dismiss, finding that
Nebraska did not have personal jurisdiction over Rice, and
failing to find that Douglas County was an appropriate venue
for the action.
On June 1, 2023, the district court entered an order revers-
ing the county court’s dismissal of the case. The district court’s
order first excused Twin Pines’ untimely statement of errors. In
doing so, the court stated:
[T]here was no evidence that the delayed filing of the
statement of errors prejudiced Rice. The motion to dis-
miss only took up two issues, and the order stemming
from that motion only dealt with personal jurisdiction.
Twin Pines’ assignments of error were not a surprise to
Rice. Further, Rice’s briefing clearly articulates the cen-
tral issue, which indicates that the delayed statement of
errors failed to harm Rice significantly.
Next, citing precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
district court determined that the instate service of process
was sufficient for the court to have personal jurisdiction over
Rice. The court then declined to address the question of venue
because the county court did not previously address it. With
the district court’s reversal of the county court’s dismissal of
the action, Rice filed the present appeal on June 26, 2023.

- 786 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Rice assigns, reordered, combined, and restated, that the
district court erred by (1) excusing Twin Pines’ failure to file
its statement of errors in compliance with § 6-1518(B) of the
Uniform District Court Rules of Practice and Procedure and
in violation of the district court’s own scheduling order, (2)
reversing the county court’s factual finding that “the require-
ments of the Nebraska Long Arm Statute and the Due Process
Clause” had not been met for obtaining personal jurisdiction
over her, and (3) finding that Nebraska had personal jurisdic-
tion over her.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A district court’s ruling on a motion to extend the time
for filing a statement of errors is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See Houser v. American Paving Asphalt, 299 Neb.
1, 907 N.W.2d 16 (2018). A judicial abuse of discretion exists
if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition. Radmanesh v.
Radmanesh, 315 Neb. 393, 996 N.W.2d 592 (2023).
[2] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a fac-
tual dispute, the issue is a matter of law. Paw K. v. Christian
G., 315 Neb. 781, 1 N.W.3d 467 (2024). An appellate court
reviews questions of law independently of the lower court’s
conclusion. Id.
ANALYSIS
Statement of Errors
Rice assigns the district court erred in excusing Twin Pines’
failure to file its statement of errors within 10 days after the
filing of the bill of exceptions as required by its own schedul-
ing order and the then-operative § 6-1518(B). Rice argues that
because the district court was obligated to enforce its sched-
uling order and the court rule, Twin Pines’ noncompliance
should have limited the court’s review to plain error.

- 787 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
We determine that Rice’s assignment of error fails because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending the
time for Twin Pines to file its statement of errors. In Houser
v. American Paving Asphalt, supra, the Nebraska Supreme
Court discussed the district courts’ authority to extend the
filing deadline required by § 6-1518(B). The company’s bill
of exceptions was filed on January 7, 2016, and the company
filed its brief on March 21. However, it was not until the
homeowner filed his brief that the company realized it had
not filed a statement of errors. After the district court allowed
the company an extension, it filed its statement of errors on
April 15.
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that it was within
the district court’s discretion to extend the time for filing
a statement of errors in an appeal from the county court.
Houser v. American Paving Asphalt, supra. It reasoned that
“through their inherent judicial power, [district courts] have
the authority to do all things reasonably necessary for the
proper administration of justice.” Id. at 15, 907 N.W.2d at 26.
This inherent authority extends to allowing additional time
for filing a statement of errors. Houser v. American Paving
Asphalt, supra. As such, the court held a district court’s deci-
sion to excuse an untimely statement of errors will be upheld
absent an abuse of discretion. See id.
Although the Supreme Court determined the decision was
within the district court’s discretion, it found the district court
in Houser abused its discretion in extending the company’s
time to file its statement of errors. The court found this to
be an abuse of discretion because the statement was not filed
until after the homeowner’s brief was already submitted and
because the delay was solely due to the company’s negligence.
See id.
In the current case, the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in extending the filing deadline. The bill of exceptions
was filed on February 1, 2022, but Twin Pines did not file
its statement of errors until March 29. However, unlike in

- 788 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
Houser, neither party had filed their briefs before the state-
ment of errors was eventually filed. Twin Pines filed its brief 2
days later, on March 31, and Rice filed hers on April 7. Based
on this, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in extending Twin Pines’ time to file its statement
of errors.
Factual Finding
We next address Rice’s assignment of error in which she
contends the district court erroneously reversed the county
court’s factual finding. She argues the county court’s deter-
mination that “the requirements of the Nebraska Long Arm
Statute and the Due Process Clause” had not been met was a
finding of fact that the district court erroneously disturbed by
making its own factual finding. We disagree.
We determine this assignment of error fails because the
determination of personal jurisdiction in this matter is a ques-
tion of law. As stated previously, when a jurisdictional ques-
tion does not involve a factual dispute, the issue is a matter
of law. Paw K. v. Christian G., 315 Neb. 781, 1 N.W.3d 467
(2024). There are no disputed facts in this matter. Neither
party contests that Twin Pines is a Missouri company, that the
contract was made and executed in Missouri, that the subject
property is in Missouri, that Rice is not a Nebraska resident,
or that Rice was served while physically present in Nebraska.
The only question at issue is whether the instate service of
process was sufficient for Nebraska to have personal jurisdic-
tion over Rice, which is not a factual question, but a legal one.
Therefore, the county court’s finding was a legal determina-
tion. An appellate court reviews questions of law indepen-
dently of the lower court’s conclusion. Id. As such, the district
court had no obligation to accept the county court’s finding
and did not commit error by not doing so.
Personal Jurisdiction
Rice next assigns the district court erred in finding that
Nebraska courts have personal jurisdiction over her. She

- 789 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
argues Nebraska has no interest in hearing a case brought by
a Missouri company against a Missouri resident concerning
conduct that occurred in Missouri. With this, Rice asserts the
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction does not comply with
due process because she does not have the necessary minimum
contacts with Nebraska, it is not fair and reasonable, and it
violates principles of state sovereignty because the State of
Missouri has a greater interest in resolving the matter.
[3-6] We determine the county court has personal jurisdic-
tion over Rice because she was served with process while
physically in Nebraska. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a
tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.
Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 313 Neb. 135, 983 N.W.2d
134 (2023). Before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, the court must determine, first,
whether the long-arm statute is satisfied and, second, whether
minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum
state for personal jurisdiction over the defendant without
offending due process. Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 305 Neb.
693, 942 N.W.2d 226 (2020). Nebraska’s long-arm statute
extends Nebraska’s jurisdiction over nonresidents having any
contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far
as the U.S. Constitution permits. Yeransian v. Willkie Farr,
supra. When a state construes its long-arm statute to confer
jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permitted, the
inquiry collapses into the single question of whether jurisdic-
tion comports with due process. Id.
[7] The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution limits
a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592
U.S. 351, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021). In days
long gone, a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons was necessar-
ily limited by the geographic bounds of the forum. Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d
624 (2014) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed.
565 (1877)). However, the U.S. Supreme Court had changed

- 790 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
this rule in Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), where it transformed the
jurisprudence concerning personal jurisdiction. In that case,
the Court held that a tribunal’s authority was no longer purely
restricted to its territorial limits. See id. Instead, it stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”
Id., 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis omitted).
[8] Accordingly, since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, the determina-
tion of whether a court has personal jurisdiction is not simply
mechanical or quantitative, but requires the consideration of
the quality and nature of the defendant’s activities to ascer-
tain whether the defendant has the necessary minimum con-
tacts with the forum to satisfy due process. See Wheelbarger
v. Detroit Diesel, supra. In this sense, Internat. Shoe Co.
expanded the scope of state court jurisdiction. See Mallory v.
Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 139, 143 S. Ct. 2028,
216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023) (stating that minimum contact analy-
sis “[u]nquestionably . . . expand[ed]—not contract[ed]—state
court jurisdiction”).
[9] Elaborating on the minimum contacts analysis in sub-
sequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished
between specific, or case-linked, jurisdiction and general,
or all-purpose, jurisdiction. BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S.
402, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 198 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2017). Generally,
specific jurisdiction permits suits that “‘arise out of or relate
to’” a defendant’s activities in the forum state while gen-
eral jurisdiction allows all kinds of suits against defendants
in their place of domicile. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. at 359. This dichotomy

- 791 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
between general and specific jurisdiction dominates the con-
temporary framework for personal jurisdiction. See id.
[10] However, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the expansion of states’ jurisdiction based on the mini-
mum contacts analysis did not supersede states’ jurisdiction
over those physically present within their borders. In a plu-
rality opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin
County, 495 U.S. 604, 619, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d
631 (1990), Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, noted that
“[n]othing in International Shoe or the cases that have fol-
lowed it, however, offers support for the . . . proposition . . .
that a defendant’s presence in the forum is not only unneces-
sary to validate novel, nontraditional assertions of jurisdiction,
but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.”
In other words, Internat. Shoe Co. might have expanded the
scope for personal jurisdiction, but it did not do away with the
historical tradition that defendants are subject to jurisdiction
anywhere they are present. See Burnham v. Superior Court
of Cal., Marin County, supra. See, also, Mallory v. Norfolk
Southern R. Co., supra.
In Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, supra,
a New Jersey resident traveled to California to conduct busi-
ness and visit his children who had been brought there by his
estranged wife. While in California, he was served personally
with process for a California proceeding initiated by his wife to
increase his support obligation. Id. Relying on the framework
from Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.
Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), the New Jersey resident argued
the California court lacked jurisdiction over him on the basis
that he lacked minimum contacts with the state. While the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the tag or transient
jurisdiction was valid and that the California court had per-
sonal jurisdiction, the justices were unable to reach a majority
opinion as to the reasoning. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Marin County, supra.

- 792 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
[11] Justice Scalia’s opinion determined that the require-
ments of due process are satisfied when a defendant is physi-
cally present in the forum state. Id. He opined that “jurisdic-
tion based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., 495 U.S. at
619. In sum, Justice Scalia reasoned in Burnham that because
the American legal tradition had always acknowledged tag or
transient jurisdiction as conferring personal jurisdiction, it per
se comported with the requirements of due process.
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion generally agreed that
a defendant served with process while voluntarily present
in the forum state was subject to that state’s jurisdiction.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, supra.
However, he rejected the notion that tag jurisdiction “auto-
matically comports with due process simply by virtue of its
‘pedigree,’” noting that pursuant to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), “every
assertion of state-court jurisdiction, even one pursuant to a
‘traditional’ rule such as transient jurisdiction, must com-
port with contemporary notions of due process.” Burnham v.
Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, 495 U.S. at 629, 632.
Therefore, he believed due process also required an “‘inde-
pendent inquiry into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state
service rule.’” Id., 495 U.S. at 629.
Despite the justices’ differences in reasoning, the result was
a unanimous recognition that tag jurisdiction was constitution-
ally valid in most cases, at least where the defendant was vol-
untarily and knowingly in the forum state at the time process
was served. 4 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1067.3 (2017).
In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has given cre-
dence to the ongoing validity of tag jurisdiction. In Mallory
v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 143 S. Ct. 2028,

- 793 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023), an ex-employee domiciled in Virgnia
brought an action against the railroad in a Pennsylvania state
court. In asserting the state court had jurisdiction over the
railroad, the former employee pointed to a Pennsylvania stat-
ute requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania as a condition of registering to
do business in the state. Id. In a plurality opinion, the Court
determined Pennsylvania’s statute complied with the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., supra.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Gorsuch provided a history
of the Court’s jurisprudence concerning personal jurisdiction,
which included several comments about tag jurisdiction. In
doing so, he stated:
In [Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County,
495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631
(1990),] the defendant contended that [Internat. Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.
Ed. 95 (1945),] implicitly overruled the traditional tag
rule holding that individuals physically served in a State
are subject to suit there for claims of any kind. . . . This
Court rejected that submission. Instead, as Justice Scalia
explained, International Shoe simply provided a “novel”
way to secure personal jurisdiction that did nothing to
displace other “traditional ones.”
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U.S. at 139-40.
Later in the opinion, Justice Gorsuch discussed an argument
by the railroad where it attempted to assert that the filing of
paperwork in Pennsylvania was only a formality that did not
override the requirements of due process. In dismissing this
argument, Justice Gorsuch cited the “tag rule”: “Then there
is the tag rule. The invisible state line might seem a trivial
thing. But when an individual takes one step off a plane after
flying from New Jersey to California, the jurisdictional conse-
quences are immediate and serious.” Id. 600 U.S. at 145.

- 794 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
Even Justice Barrett’s dissent in Mallory gives support to
the endurance of tag jurisdiction as a means to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant. While Justice Barrett
took issue with the plurality’s determination that “registration
jurisdiction” for a corporation is just as valid as “tag jurisdic-
tion,” she did not contest the primary finding in Burnham
v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, 495 U.S. 604, 110
S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1990), that tag jurisdiction
remains an effective basis for general jurisdiction:
In Burnham, we acknowledged that tag jurisdiction
would not satisfy the contacts-based test for general
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, we reasoned that tag juris-
diction is “both firmly approved by tradition and still
favored,” making it “one of the continuing traditions
of our legal system that define[s] the due process stan-
dard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” . . . Burnham thus permits a longstanding and
still-accepted basis for jurisdiction to pass International
Shoe’s test.
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 171, 143
S. Ct. 2028, 216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023) (Barrett, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
In the matter at hand, Rice contends the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Burnham and comments in Mallory are
nonbinding upon this court because those decisions were only
plurality opinions. There is support for this view, because the
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is not bound
by plurality opinions because they do not represent the views
of a majority of the court. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 481 U.S. 69, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67
(1987). See, also, Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 129
S. Ct. 538, 172 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
With this assertion, Rice argues we should not rely on the
holding in Burnham and the comments in Mallory.
Instead, Rice maintains we should look to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct.

- 795 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), along with many other cases,
where the Court has signaled the predominance of the mini-
mum contacts analysis. In Shaffer, the Court concluded that
“all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny.” 433 U.S. at 212. With this, Rice contends that
despite her being served in Nebraska, we must still evaluate
whether she has the necessary minimum contacts with the
state to satisfy due process as described in Internat. Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed.
95 (1945).
However, in both Mallory and Burnham, the U.S. Supreme
Court signaled against this reading of Shaffer. In Mallory,
Justice Gorsuch stated that the Court “has previously cau-
tioned litigants and lower courts against (mis)reading Shaffer
as suggesting that International Shoe discarded every tradi-
tional method for securing personal jurisdiction that came
before.” 600 U.S. at 141. Justice Scalia also commented on the
holding in Shaffer in his Burnham opinion:
The logic of Shaffer’s holding . . . does not compel the
conclusion that physically present defendants must be
treated identically to absent ones. As we have demon-
strated at length, our tradition has treated the two classes
of defendants quite differently, and it is unreasonable to
read Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction.
495 U.S. at 621. While we acknowledge that these comments
are also nonbinding as they are within the same nonbinding
plurality opinions discussed above, they certainly constitute
persuasive authority.
But 	even 	if 	we 	were 	to 	disregard 	the 	comments 	of
Justices Scalia and Gorsuch regarding Shaffer, the holding in
Burnham, and the discussions in Mallory, due to their non-
binding nature, we must give effect to the precedents of the
Nebraska Supreme Court. In Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb.
992, 581 N.W.2d 416 (1998), the Nebraska Supreme Court,

- 796 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
in a unanimous decision, cited to Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Burnham to find that Nebraska courts have jurisdiction over
defendants served within the state.
[12] In Stewart v. Hechtman, supra, the court held that
Nebraska courts could exercise jurisdiction over a Florida resi-
dent because he was served in Nebraska. In its decision, the
court first cited to Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copymation, Inc.,
178 Neb. 239, 132 N.W.2d 788 (1965), where it stated:
“Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judg-
ments in personam was grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant’s person. Presence within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to the rendi-
tion of a judgment personally binding the defendant.
Now, however, as capias ad respondendum has given
way to personal service of summons or other forms
of notice, due process requires only that to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it . . . .”
Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb. at 997, 581 N.W.2d at 420.
However, the court went on to cite Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, 495 U.S.
604, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1990), for the propo-
sition that “service of process confers state court jurisdiction
over [a] physically present nonresident, regardless of whether
he was only briefly in state or whether [the] cause of action is
related to his activities there.” Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb.
at 997, 581 N.W.2d at 420. With this, the court concluded that
being served in Nebraska subjected the defendant to the juris-
diction of its courts. See Stewart v. Hechtman, supra.
Accordingly, we conclude that serving Rice while she was
physically present in Nebraska subjected her to the jurisdiction
of Nebraska courts and complied with the requirements of due
process. Consequently, the district court did not err in reversing
the judgment of the county court.

- 797 -
Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
32 Nebraska Appellate Reports
TWIN PINES v. RICE
Cite as 32 Neb. App. 782
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in extending the time for Twin Pines to file its statement
of errors. Additionally, we determine the district court did not
err in making its own legal determination and reversing the
county court’s dismissal of the action, because the county court
had personal jurisdiction over Rice.
Affirmed.