Scott Williams v. Lana Elizabeth Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00718-COA

SCOTT WILLIAMS APPELLANT

v.

LANA ELIZABETH WILLIAMS APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/22/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RHEA HUDSON SHELDON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CAMERON LEIGH BENTON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL V. RATLIFF
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 01/27/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Scott Williams appeals from a Lamar County Chancery Court’s judgment of divorce

and contempt. Scott initially sought a fault-based divorce against his wife, Lana Williams,

who counterclaimed for a divorce as well. The court issued a temporary order, and both

parties filed motions for contempt against each other for violations of that order. The court

bifurcated the fault issue from the property division issues, setting each for different trial

dates. A month before the trial on the fault issue, Scott moved to add an additional ground.

At the beginning of the trial, the court denied the motion to amend, and Scott presented his

evidence in support of his claim for divorce. At the end of Scott’s case, Lana moved to

dismiss, which the court took under consideration. In a written order, the court later granted
the motion to dismiss and held that Scott failed to prove a fault ground for the divorce.

¶2. Just before court reconvened to hear proof on Lana’s counterclaim for divorce, the

parties agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. They requested that

the court rule on the division of marital property, the motions for contempt, and attorney’s

fees. After the court entered its judgment granting the divorce and resolving these matters,

Scott appealed. On appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the chancellor erred

in denying his motion to amend his fault-based divorce pleading; (2) whether the chancellor

erred in refusing to admit and consider testimony of marital fault resulting in his complaint

for a fault-based divorce to be dismissed; (3) whether the chancellor failed to give proper

consideration to Scott’s proof of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment; (4) whether the

chancellor erred in dividing the marital debt; (5) whether the chancellor erred in its contempt

findings; (6) whether the chancellor erred in it distribution of the parties’ closely held

business; and (7) whether the cumulative errors of the chancellor warrant a new trial. After

reviewing the arguments of counsel and relevant precedent, we affirm in part and reverse

and remand in part.

Facts and Procedural History

¶3. Scott, age forty-four, married Lana, age thirty-one, in 2017. Both had children from

prior relationships. Lana’s three children were younger and lived with them in a home in

Hattiesburg, which Scott had purchased prior to the marriage in his own name. When they

married, Scott worked in construction, often out of town, and Lana worked at Wesley

Medical Center and then at Cosmetics Plastic Surgery Clinic performing ultrasounds. Lana

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had also started a business, Stork Secret I, in September 2016, where she performed

ultrasounds and sold children’s clothing and gifts. Stork Secret I, located in Hattiesburg, was

successful, and Lana opened a second store in D’Iberville (Stork Secret II) with a third-party

investor.

¶4. Until April 2018, Scott worked outside the home, but then he stopped his construction

work. He claimed Lana did not want him out of town so much and that she wanted his help

with the children and her business. He also started a carpet cleaning business with his son,

which he said failed because Lana’s business and the needs of the children took precedence.

Divorce Complaint and Answer

¶5. The parties separated on April 19, 2022, when Scott claimed he learned that Lana had

twice sought abortions during the marriage. This alarmed him because Scott had previously

undergone a vasectomy and could not have children. On May 17, 2022, Scott filed for

divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, habitual drunkenness, and

irreconcilable differences.

¶6. On June 21, 2022, Lana answered Scott’s complaint and counterclaimed for divorce

and temporary relief. She asserted that she had not become pregnant or undergone any

abortions during the marriage. She cited habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, constructive

desertion, habitual drunkenness, and irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce.

Temporary Order

¶7. On September 20, 2022, the chancery court issued a temporary order, giving Lana

temporary use and possession of the marital home and ordering her to pay the monthly

3
mortgage. Scott was ordered to ensure that Lana had direct access to the online mortgage

account so that payments could be timely made. Lana was given temporary use and

possession of a Jeep Grand Cherokee along with responsibility for the monthly note and

insurance. Scott was given use and possession of a Jeep Gladiator on which he would

maintain insurance. Lana was ordered to pay the notes on that vehicle for June, July and

August 2022, and Scott would begin paying the monthly note on September 1, 2022. The

court gave Scott the temporary use and possession of the parties’ boat and ordered him to pay

the notes and insurance. Lana was allowed to continue to operate the Hattiesburg Stork

Secret I store, and Scott was prohibited from entering or coming onto its premises. Lana also

would continue to oversee the operations of the D’Iberville store. Scott and the third party

owner were given access to the D’Iberville Stork Secret II store and access to business

accounts, sales reports, and tax returns, but they could not make any withdrawals from that

store’s business accounts. Scott was also ordered to secure employment and was restrained

from harassing Lana. The court set June 27, 2022, as the date of demarcation for purposes

of accumulation of marital assets. The court signed and entered the written order which

included these conditions on September 20, 2022, nunc pro tunc to June 27, 2022.

Interim Order and Motions for Contempt

¶8. The parties engaged in discovery, and on January 2, 2023, the court heard the motions

to compel filed by each and a motion for contempt that Lana had filed on September 21,

2022.1 The court’s resulting interim order noted that although Lana was given the use and

1
The motion was not included in the record.

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possession of the home, mortgage payments had not been made, and the mortgage was placed

into a forbearance period from May 2022 through December 2022. The court ordered Scott

to remit one month’s payment to Lana and ordered Lana to pay the rest and bring the account

current. The parties told the court that several of the other contempt issues had been

resolved, and the court held the unresolved contempt matters in abeyance.

¶9. On April 12, 2023, Scott filed a motion for contempt and for modification of the

temporary order. Scott alleged that he sent Lana a check for one month’s mortgage payment

on March 2, 2023. The check was cashed, but Scott later learned that the home entered into

foreclosure in April. In addition to Lana failing to pay the mortgage, Scott alleged that Lana

had failed to pay the Jeep Grand Cherokee note as well and that the Jeep had been

repossessed. Scott further asserted that Lana had sold the boat that Scott had been awarded

under the temporary order and kept the sale proceeds. Finally, Scott alleged that Lana failed

to complete and file tax returns as ordered by the court. Scott asked that the court modify the

temporary order to give him the use and possession of the marital home to secure it

financially and avoid further deterioration of the parties’ creditworthiness.

Motion to Amend

¶10. On April 13, 2023, Scott filed a motion to amend his divorce complaint to include

uncondoned adultery as a ground for divorce, claiming that he had intended to raise the

allegation when he filed his original complaint.2 Although trial was set for May 17, 2023,

Scott alleged that he would not oppose any request for a continuance Lana filed, and he

2
Scott had retained new counsel in the interim.

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personally filed his own motion for a continuance that same day. On May 5, 2023, Lana

responded in opposition to Scott’s motion to amend, alleging that the trial, which had been

set for a year, would have to be continued and that further discovery would be needed, which

would cause unreasonable and prejudicial delay of the matter.

¶11. Lana also filed a motion to dismiss Scott’s contempt motion under Mississippi Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. She asserted that Scott had

failed to provide her with online access to the accounts in his name so she could make the

house and vehicle payments required of her. She also sought reimbursement for two boat

insurance payments that Scott had been required to pay that had been debited from her

account.

¶12. The court and the parties met on May 8, 2023, for a pre-trial conference. According

to Scott’s May 16, 2023 response to Lana’s motion for sanctions, following the May pre-trial

conference, the parties and their attorneys called the mortgage company and confirmed that

Lana had access to the mortgage account and could have made the payments required. The

parties ultimately arranged for a HUD loan of $28,004.95 to cover the amount owed, which

was paid through their mortgage company and tacked to the end of the mortgage.

¶13. Scott noticed his motions for contempt, for modification, for leave to amend his

complaint, and for a continuance for a hearing on May 17, 2023, the first day of trial.

Trial

¶14. On May 17, 2023, the court considered Scott’s motion to amend his complaint to

include adultery as a ground. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court denied the

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motion as untimely.

¶15. The court proceeded to hear Scott’s case for divorce. Scott began by testifying that

he worked in construction in Meridian when he and Lana met. She did not want him on the

road, so he left that job. Scott said they were starting businesses, including the carpet

cleaning business and Stork Secret I, and his job was to help with the businesses and with the

kids. His own two children were adults, and Lana had three minor children (two girls and

a boy). Scott said he knew it was hard on the kids with their parents being divorced, so he

wanted to be a “good guy that got along with them.”

¶16. Scott said that his and Lana’s relationship started to decline when he asked Lana if she

had had an abortion. At first, Scott testified that Lana denied it and offered to hire a private

investigator to prove it. Scott said he wanted to believe her because something like that

would ruin their reputation and affect their Stork Secret business, which offered free

sonograms to women who were uncertain about their pregnancy. But later in his testimony,

Scott testified that Lana admitted to him that she did have an abortion. Scott said that she

could not have conceived his child because he had had a vasectomy.

¶17. Scott testified that Lana handled all the family finances, which put some pressure on

the relationship because before they married, he was used to handling his own money. Now

he had to ask Lana if he needed or wanted money for anything. She allegedly controlled his

life, telling him what he would do each day, controlling the finances, and belittling him if he

made a mistake. Scott entered into evidence Facebook messages between him and Lana. At

one point, he blocked her calls, and she texted and threatened to cut off his phone. Scott also

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entered photos and a video he took of his face that showed scratches Lana made during an

argument. He submitted another video he took of them arguing about a rental car he had

been given when his car was being serviced. Scott agreed that Lana paid individuals, Kelly

Blackwell and Michaela Williams, to pick up the kids after school if he could not. He said

he drove a 2022 Jeep Rubicon Gladiator that cost him $58,000 or $60,000. It was financed

in his name because Lana said she needed to finance the ultrasound machine.

¶18. Scott’s next witness was his cousin by marriage Tammy Hobby. She said she saw

Scott and Lana frequently; they spent Christmases together and went on vacations together.

She would visit at Scott and Lana’s home about once a month. Tammy said that Scott had

performed quality control work and was always working. He saved up his money to buy the

house. Tammy confirmed that Lana didn’t like Scott “going off on the road.” Tammy said

she and Lana became close and that Lana wanted Scott to start a business or something so

he could work locally. Lana talked about possibly restoring furniture, that her own business

was not doing well, and that Scott was still having to pay for everything because her ex-

husband was behind on child support. Tammy also testified Lana told her that she had

cheated on Scott, that she hated herself for it, but that God forgave her, and it would never

happen again.

¶19. Scott next called Jimmy Hobby, Tammy’s husband. He testified to visiting Scott’s

house prior to the separation. He confirmed that he and Tammy and even Scott’s son were

unable to call Scott on the phone because Lana was blocking calls. But if she wanted to

speak to Scott, Lana would unblock it and speak to him. Jimmy felt this was her controlling

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Scott, just like she handled the money.

¶20. Scott then called four employees to testify. One, Gracie Necaise, worked at the

D’Iberville Stork Secret II store for two and a half years. She testified that she had concerns

the last few weeks when she worked at the Hattiesburg store because Lana came in twice,

drinking mimosas in a Yeti cup. Michaela Williams, Scott’s niece, testified that at work one

day during COVID-19, she knocked over a cup that Lana had been drinking from, and it

smelled of alcohol. On cross-examination, Michaela testified that Lana paid her to babysit

her children early in the marriage when Scott was still working in Meridian. She would pick

up the children from school because both Lana and Scott were working. Michelle Feck, the

manager of the Hattiesburg store until November 2021, testified that about three months

before she left, Lana started bringing in a man and sending Scott off on appointments.

Lana’s attorney objected, and the court ruled it would not hear any testimony concerning

alleged adultery. Michelle also said Lana often consumed alcohol and that she (Michelle)

would go to the liquor store to purchase it. Lana drank champagne mimosas, not every day,

but “randomly.”

¶21. The last employee witness, Sarah Gilmore, had worked at the Hattiesburg store. She

testified that in the beginning of April 2019, she and Lana went to Jackson to pass out

business cards at the abortion clinic. Sarah said she stayed in the car, waiting about forty

minutes while Lana was inside. She said she did not know anything about Lana having an

abortion—all she knew was they were going to Jackson to pass out business cards at the

clinic. However, Sarah admitted there were texts between her and Lana about Lana getting

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an abortion, but Lana was not pregnant. “There was no baby, so there was no abortion.”

Sarah said she told Scott that they had gone to Jackson, but she insisted there was no baby,

stating, “I didn’t physically help her get an abortion because there was no child.” However,

Sarah also said that Lana told her about having a “pregnancy scare,” but Sarah claimed she

knew nothing about Lana going to get an abortion.

¶22. Scott called his daughter, Chelsea Littlefield, who testified about an incident

concerning her own son and how she learned of Lana and Scott’s separation. Scott also

called his son, Cameron Williams, who had lived with Scott and Lana for several months

from the end of 2020 through early 2021. Cameron said that Scott was taking Lana’s

children to school at that time, and both Lana and Scott were working in the businesses. His

father would have to ask Lana for money or if they could purchase something. After the

separation, Scott had little money. So Cameron had to buy Scott gas and help with food.

Cameron also testified that Scott had lost his “QC” (quality control) certifications because

he had been out of the business so long.

¶23. Scott’s last witness was Britain Novanon, who met Scott when she moved to McLain

as a small child in 2001. Scott had lived in McLain prior to moving to Hattiesburg.

Novanon bought Scott’s trailer when he moved into his home. She did not know Lana

personally. Britain testified that Lana “was with” one of Britain’s good friends when Lana

was married to Scott, the implication being that Lana was having an affair. Britain said that

she learned this from that friend, not Lana, and the court sustained Lana’s objection to the

testimony as hearsay.

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¶24. After Scott rested, Lana moved to dismiss his complaint, arguing that Scott had failed

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her behavior either endangered his life or

created a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe. The

court took the motion under advisement and adjourned for the day.

June 2023, August 2023, and September 21, 2023 Orders

¶25. On June 12, 2023, the chancery court entered an order granting Lana’s motion to

dismiss Scott’s complaint for divorce. The court reviewed the testimony Scott presented and

found that Scott had failed to present credible proof to substantiate the fault grounds he had

pleaded.

¶26. On August 10, 2023, the chancellor signed an order, nunc pro tunc to May 17, 2023,

in which the court ordered that the Stork Secret businesses be professionally valued and

ordered that the parties agree on an expert, or submit recommendations to the court for the

court to appoint one. The court further appointed Becky Ladd to appraise the marital home.

The court then set trial dates in November 2023 for the continuation of the trial on the merits

of Lana’s complaint, for property valuation, and on the contempt issues remaining.

¶27. On September 21, 2023, the court appointed Robert D. King to perform the business

evaluation and ordered each of the parties to pay $2,500 for his services. On November 7,

2023, the court continued the case, resetting it for trial on February 27, 2024, and compelled

Lana to pay her half of King’s fee. As of January 8, 2024, Lana had not paid her share of the

fee, and Scott filed a motion for contempt against her.

Parties’ Voluntary Dismissal of Fault Grounds

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¶28. On February 24, 2024, Scott and Lana signed an “Irrevocable Consent Agreement and

Stipulation of Issues in Irreconcilable Differences Divorce.” In it, they agreed to dismiss

their fault grounds and identified the issues that they could not agree upon, including the

division of the marital estate, alimony, issues of contempt raised by each of the parties, and

attorney’s fees. The parties also signed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Fault Ground[s].” The

motion reviewed the two complaints that the parties had filed against each other and stated,

“[T]he parties ask the [c]ourt to dismiss the fault grounds alleged in the Complaint and

Counterclaim.” Both Lana and Scott, as well as their attorneys, signed the motion. They all

also signed an agreed order that was presented to the court granting the motion, dismissing

the fault grounds, and allowing them to proceed on the alternative ground of irreconcilable

differences.

Resumption of Trial

¶29. On February 27, 2024, the court reconvened and was presented with the irrevocable

consent agreement, the motion to dismiss the fault grounds and proceed on grounds of

irreconcilable differences, and the agreed order the parties had signed. The court signed the

order and confirmed that the parties were voluntarily dismissing their fault-based claims

against each other. The court stated that it would proceed to hear testimony on the remaining

issues of the division of the marital property and contempt motions. The court made it clear

that it would not consider fault in dividing the marital property, though fault was a factor that

could be legitimately considered under Ferguson v. Ferguson.3 In this case, the parties had

3
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi
Supreme Court set out eight factors that the court is to consider in attempting to equitably

12
dismissed their fault grounds, making fault irrelevant in the division of their property. The

court proceeded to hear testimony on the remaining issues.

¶30. Scott testified that under the temporary order, Lana had use and possession of the

home that he had purchased in 2016 in his name alone. The balance owed on the home to

Rocket Mortgage was $232,892.78, along with a note to HUD in the amount of $28,004.95.

This separate note was incurred to bring the account current when Lana had gotten behind

on the payments. According to the appraisal ordered by the court, the home was valued at

$350,000. Scott further testified that the 2021 Jeep Grand Cherokee, which had been

financed in his name, had been repossessed and sold, and $19,628.07 was still owed on it.

Scott explained that Lana had taken classes at the University of Southern Mississippi on how

to start a business, and he helped her start Stork Secret I. According to the business appraisal

ordered by the court, Stork Secret I was valued at $10,400. Scott testified that he completed

most of the inside work on the store with assistance from Lana’s father. Scott said that Lana

did not have any money at the time because she had gone through a divorce, was not getting

child support, and was just making ends meet. So he paid for everything. Scott said Lana

did not want him working on the road, and their plan was to build the businesses together.

He said he co-signed for the ultrasound machine.

¶31. Scott testified that when the Stork Secret stores were in operation, he picked up

supplies, ran errands, dropped off the children at school, mailed and shipped packages, and

divide marital property. Under the first Ferguson factor, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
held that “[m]arital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the
chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital
and family relationship.” Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 285 (¶26) (Miss. 2009).

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took clothing to be monogrammed. He said he discussed marketing with Lana and how to

make the business grow. Because Lana insisted on his not working out of town and her

needs, he turned down job opportunities. As a result, when he stopped doing that kind of

work, he lost his certified welder’s inspection license, which required him to work a certain

number of hours in the field. Scott testified that in the temporary order, he was given the

boat, but Lana sold it without his knowledge or permission. It was his understanding that in

the sale, the note was paid off. Scott asked the court for the home, the lawnmower, the

tractor, and the bed, as well as alimony.

¶32. As of the date of the trial, Scott said he was working temporarily on the construction

of an ammunitions plant in Tennessee as a field engineer and quality inspector. But the job

would be over in a few months. Currently, his employer was providing him housing, and

paid him $11,653 gross (net $9,253.95), along with a $100 per day per diem. He had no

garnishments “yet,” but he knew he owed $19,628.07 to Ally on the Jeep that was

repossessed. He drove a Jeep Gladiator Rubicon with a loan balance owed to Chrysler Credit

of $43,740.75. Scott said he owed Keesler Federal Credit Union about $10,000 and

Trustmark Bank $150 per month on credit cards. He said Lana used his name and purchased

a hot tub from Wayfair that he was paying $200 per month for.

¶33. On cross-examination, Lana’s attorney pointed out that her name alone is shown as

the owner of Stork Secret I. Scott stated that he was unaware of this, and he was trying to

get to the bottom of everything about the ownership of the businesses. Scott denied ever

refusing to work up front at the stores or saying that was not “a man’s job.” He also denied

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changing the passwords to the electronic accounts so that Lana could not pay the house and

Jeep notes. Scott stressed that when Lana’s attorney kept saying that “she paid” to have the

children picked up, really it was the businesses that paid the cost and the businesses were

jointly owned. When he was on the Gulf Coast tending to the business, he could not pick up

the children, so someone had to. Scott agreed that Lana obtained a loan for Stork Secret I,

but he denied that she paid off his credit card debt. He said he tried to start a cleaning

business with his son to have another stream of income, but he never got to run it like it

should have been run because Lana had him doing things for Stork Secret. Because the

cleaning business never made money, Lana wanted him to sell it.

¶34. After Scott rested, Lana testified. She said she never told Scott to refuse any jobs.

She stated that at Stork Secret I, she performed ninety-nine percent of the ordering and ninety

percent of the ultrasounds. Lana testified that she obtained a loan and used $40,000 from her

previous marriage settlement to open the business. Lana flatly denied that Scott worked for

the business as he claimed. She said other than installing some flooring and making the front

desk for the Hattiesburg store, for which she paid Scott, he did nothing else. When her

manager called in sick, he refused to work at the front desk “because it was woman’s work.”

When he would not help around the house, she had to pay others to do yard work, pick up

the children, and clean. Lana said Scott did not want to work and spent his days riding the

roads and visiting family and friends. From her point of view, Scott did nothing to help the

Hattiesburg store.

¶35. Lana testified that after the first hearing when she was awarded the temporary use of

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the home, Scott put the home into a forbearance program, and she was unable to make the

mortgage payments. She explained the difficulty in making payments and how she had to

call Rocket Mortgage, deal with automated responses, and then finally speak with a person

to complete the transaction. She asked the court to be able to stay in the home until the end

of the school year and then have the home sold and the profit split. Lana testified that the

Jeeps were also in Scott’s name, and when she and Scott were together, the payment was

automatically drafted from her bank account. But Scott changed the password to the account

and stopped the autopay, so she could no longer pay for the Jeep Grand Cherokee that she

was temporarily awarded, causing it to be repossessed. She then had to purchase another

vehicle (a Tahoe) to use. Lana also confirmed for the court that she and Scott each had

separate Wayfair accounts.

¶36. Concerning items in the home, Lana testified that Scott was awarded the temporary

use and possession of the boat, but he had to pay the note and insurance on it. After he

missed two payments on both, she spoke to her attorney, who told her she could sell the boat.

Lana said the boat and the account were in her name, so she could lawfully sell it, though she

acknowledged that she did not ask the court’s permission to do so. She did not profit from

the sale because she sold it for the loan balance. Lana said the taxes could not be finished

and filed because the D’Iberville store was still involved in litigation with the third party who

held an interest in it. That person refused to sign documents to file the taxes.

¶37. Lana asked the court for alimony and for attorney’s fees because she had offered to

proceed with the divorce on a no-fault ground, but he insisted on having his day in court,

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costing her a whole day of attorney’s fees.

¶38. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court asked the parties to each submit proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Opinion and Final Judgment

¶39. On May 22, 2024, the court issued its opinion and final judgment in the matter. The

court reviewed the background and course of proceedings and began with the division of the

marital property. The court had previously set the date of demarcation for the accumulation

of marital assets as June 27, 2022, the effective date of the temporary order. The court

created a chart of the parties’ “marital assets subject to division,” assigned values, and totaled

the marital assets at $132,140. The court did the same for “marital debt,” which, according

to the court, totaled $378,100. The court listed the home as a marital asset but listed only

the equity value in it ($88,323), not the appraised value of $350,000. The court included the

entire balance of the mortgage owed on the home, $243,428, as a marital debt.

¶40. The court then set out the Ferguson factors that it considered, including, the

substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property; the degree to which each spouse

has expended, withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of the marital assets or any prior

distribution; the market and emotional value of the assets; the value of assets not ordinarily

subject to distribution, such as property brought to the marriage; tax and other economic,

contractual, or legal consequences owed by the parties; the extent to which property division

may be utilized to eliminate periodic payments; the needs of the parties for financial security;

and any other significant factor.

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¶41. The court made factual findings for each Ferguson factor. The court found that both

parties contributed to the accumulation of the assets. The court further noted that Lana sold

the boat without Scott’s knowledge, that she was unable to pay the Jeep Grand Cherokee

note, and that the vehicle was repossessed. The court also noted that both Lana and Scott

wanted to stay in the home. The court said it did not find the value of assets brought into the

marriage to be a factor to consider, nor did the court consider the economic, contractual, or

legal consequences of the property division to be a factor either. Concerning the parties’

need for financial security, the court noted that Scott was employed as a field engineer and

that Lana was employed as a cardiovascular ultrasound technician and owned Stork Secret I.

The court took notice of a $200,000 judgment against Lana personally, which was the result

of litigation brought by her investor.

¶42. The chancellor then proceeded to award Scott ownership of the marital home but

awarded Lana $44,161.50 for her share of the equity accrued in the home, which Scott was

ordered to pay by September 1, 2024. Lana was awarded ownership of Stork Secret I as well

as the vehicles in her possession and various items of personal property. The court also made

her solely responsible for payment of the debt on the Tahoe ($62,000), a 2014 Audi

($8,000),4 several credit cards, and a Best Buy account. She was awarded $600 from a joint

checking account. The court calculated the total award of her share of the marital assets to

4
Neither party testified about the Audi. On her May 15, 2022 Rule 8.05 financial
statement, Lana listed a 2014 Audi Q 7 registered in her name but driven by one of her
children. See UCCR 8.05. Lana listed the loan balance at $8,000 but gave the vehicle no
value. However, Lana did not list this vehicle in her February 2024 Rule 8.05 financial
statement.

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be $66,656.50.

¶43. The chancellor made Scott responsible for the payment of the remaining Rocket

Mortgage house loan ($243,428), Chrysler Capital ($46,396), and other bank obligations.

However, Lana was responsible for mortgage payments for May, June, and July 2024. She

was to vacate the home by July 31, 2024. Scott was awarded $600 from the joint checking

account, and one half of the value of Stork Secret I ($5,200). See infra note 9. The court

reduced the amount Scott owed to Lana for her equity in the home by the $5,200 she owed

him for his interest in Stork Secret. The court also awarded some personal items to Scott and

valued his total award of the marital estate at $65,450.50.

¶44. The court further found that its distribution of the assets alleviated the need for

alimony. The court proceeded to set out the law on issues of contempt and to determine

whether either party had prevailed on their motions for contempt. The court noted that the

parties had resolved several of the contempt issues prior to the hearing on January 3, 2023.

Of the remaining issues Lana raised, the court only found merit regarding Scott’s failure to

pay the boat and automobile insurance payments he owed for the months of June and July

2022, causing $397.84 to be debited from Lana’s account. Finding Scott in contempt for not

reimbursing Lana for these payments, the court awarded her a $397.84 judgment, which Scott

was ordered to pay before July 1, 2024.

¶45. Concerning Scott’s motion for contempt, the court found that Lana’s ability to pay

the mortgage and the Jeep notes was taken away, and as a result, the Jeep was repossessed.

Although her contempt was not willful, her inability to make the payments did not alleviate

19
her obligation to pay them. The court found it equitable for the parties to share the deficit

balance owed on the Jeep after its repossession. Lana’s share, $9,818.45, would be deducted

from the award of equity in the home, as would another $9,500 for her failure to pay the

mortgage payments she was responsible for. Therefore, Scott had to pay Lana only

$19,643.05 for her equity in the marital home, which represented her equity, less his equity

in Stork Secret, and credit for the contempt payments Lana owed.

¶46. After considering the McKee factors, see McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss.

1982),5 the court denied Lana’s request for $7,140 in attorney’s fees, finding that she was

financially able to pay them. Further, the court denied both parties’ request for attorney’s

fees for the contempt motions they filed because the court found them both in contempt.

Appeal

¶47. On June 21, 2024, Scott appealed, raising the following issues: (1) whether the

chancellor erred in denying his motion to amend his fault-based divorce pleading; (2)

whether the chancellor erred in refusing to admit and consider testimony of marital fault

resulting in his complaint for a fault-based divorce to be dismissed; (3) whether the

chancellor failed to give proper consideration to Scott’s proof of habitual cruel and inhuman

treatment; (4) whether the chancellor erred in dividing the marital debt; (5) whether the

5
In McKee, 418 So. 2d at 767, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the
assessment of attorney’s fees was within “the sound discretion of the trial court” and that the
appropriate amount “depends on consideration of, in addition to the relative financial ability
of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and
novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, as well as the degree of responsibility
involved in the management of the cause, the time and labor required, the usual and
customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to the acceptance of the case.”

20
chancellor erred the contempt findings; (6) whether the chancellor erred in the distribution

of the closely held business of the parties; and (7) whether the cumulative errors of the

chancellor warrant a new trial.

Standard of Review

¶48. “The findings of a chancellor in domestic relations matters will not be disturbed [on

appeal] unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal

standard was applied.” O’Neal v. O’Neal, 17 So. 3d 572, 574 (¶11) (Miss. 2009) (citing Irby

v. Est. of Irby, 7 So. 3d 223, 228 (¶9) (Miss. 2009)). “Substantial, credible, and reasonable

evidence is required to support a chancery court’s factual findings.” In re Conservatorship

of Geno v. Geno, 365 So. 3d 287, 296 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

Discussion

I. Whether the chancery court erred in denying Scott’s motion to
amend his fault-based divorce complaint, in excluding testimony of
marital misconduct, and in failing to consider his proof of habitual
cruel and inhuman conduct.

¶49. The first three issues Scott argues on appeal deal with rulings the chancery court

allegedly made in considering the fault-based divorce complaint he filed. Specifically, he

claims that the chancery court erred in denying his motion to amend to add uncondoned

adultery as a ground, in not considering evidence from which Lana’s adultery could be

inferred, and in finding insufficient proof of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. However,

these issues were waived when Scott consented to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable

differences.

¶50. A consent agreement to proceed on a divorce based on irreconcilable differences

21
“operates as a withdrawal and cancellation of any previously asserted fault-based grounds

for divorce made by either party.” O’Neal, 17 So. 3d at 577 (¶25). In O’Neal, the husband

filed for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at 573 (¶2). The

wife answered and counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of cruel and habitual inhuman

treatment and habitual drunkenness. Id. at (¶3). Both parties included irreconcilable

differences as an alternative ground. Id. The parties then filed a consent agreement, agreeing

to a divorce due to irreconcilable differences and setting out the issues to be resolved by the

chancellor. Id. at (¶4). After the court’s bench ruling on those issues, the parties both filed

post-trial motions, on which the court did not rule. Id. at 57 (¶¶5-6). A year later, the wife

filed a motion to set aside the judgment of divorce, arguing that the parties had not

withdrawn the fault-based grounds as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-

2(5), which provided:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, no divorce shall
be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a
contest or denial; provided, however, that a divorce may be granted on the
ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial,
if the contest or denial has been withdrawn or cancelled by the party filing
same by leave and order of the court.

The chancery court denied the wife’s motion, and on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court

affirmed, holding:

[W]hen the parties fully and properly execute a mutual-consent agreement to
a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, under the requirements
prescribed by the Legislature in subsection (3), the Act establishes that the
parties intend to and do withdraw all contests and denials. Thus, the consent
agreement operates as a withdrawal and cancellation of any previously asserted
fault-based grounds for divorce made by either party.

22
Id. at 577 (¶25). The Supreme Court cited its holding in Irby, 7 So. 3d at 237 (¶43), where

the wife sought to set aside the court’s no-fault divorce decree by arguing that despite

entering into a consent agreement to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, the

parties never formally withdrew the fault grounds stated in their original pleadings. The

chancery court rejected this argument, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, pointing

out that each party voluntarily agreed to be bound by the court’s decision and that the consent

they granted could not be withdrawn by either party without leave of court. Id. at (¶46). The

O’Neal Court noted that the irreconcilable differences statute “permits parties to bargain on

the premise that reaching an agreement will avoid the necessity of presenting proof at trial.”

Id. at (¶49).

¶51. In Cossey v. Cossey, 22 So. 3d 353 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), we cited both O’Neal and

Irby. There, the parties filed pleadings against each other, alleging grounds of adultery,

desertion, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, as well as irreconcilable differences. Id. at

355 (¶3). Then the parties filed a consent agreement, agreeing to a divorce on the basis of

irreconcilable differences and setting out twenty-three areas of dispute for the chancellor to

decide. Id. at (¶4). The husband appealed the chancellor’s final judgment, arguing, among

other things, that the court did not have the authority to grant the divorce because the parties

did not withdraw their former fault-based claims. Id. at 356 (¶11). We rejected the

husband’s argument, citing O’Neal and Irby, and stated that these decisions make it

exceedingly clear that no withdrawal of the fault-based grounds initially asserted was

necessary. Id. at 357 (¶12).

23
¶52. “A court may decide contested issues in a divorce based on irreconcilable differences,

but the court is limited to the resolution of those issues specifically identified and personally

agreed to in writing by the parties.” Sanders v. Sanders, 281 So. 3d 1043, 1052-53 (¶37)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Sanders, the wife filed for

divorce and the husband answered and counterclaimed for divorce and custody. Id. at 1048

(¶8). Ultimately, the parties withdrew their fault-based claims and consented to an

irreconcilable differences divorce, leaving child custody and visitation to the chancellor to

decide. Id. On appeal after the court’s denial of injunctive relief, we held that any issue that

was not specifically listed for the chancellor to decide was waived on appeal, including the

husband’s request for injunctive relief. Id. at 1052-53 (¶37). As precedent, we cited Leblanc

v. Leblanc, 271 So. 3d 494, 509 (¶70) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), where a party waived pending

contempt issues by failing to specify them in her consent to an irreconcilable differences

divorce.

¶53. In the case at hand, after Scott’s unsuccessful attempt to prove fault grounds for a

divorce, the parties signed an “Irrevocable Consent Agreement and Stipulation of Issues in

Irreconcilable Differences Divorce.” In it, they specifically stated that they were dismissing

their fault grounds and then identified the issues they requested the court to decide. This

document was not the only one the parties signed withdrawing their fault grounds; they also

filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Fault Ground[s]” in which they asked the court to dismiss

their fault grounds. They signed an agreed order that was presented to the court granting the

motion, dismissing the fault grounds, and allowing them to proceed on the alternative ground

24
of irreconcilable differences. Clearly, by signing these documents, both Scott and Lana were

abandoning the fault grounds they had pled.

¶54. Moreover, after dismissing Scott’s complaint and hearing Lana’s counterclaim for

divorce, the chancery court was presented with the parties’ signed irrevocable consent

agreement and stipulation of issues for the court to decide. The chancellor reviewed the

agreement on the record and signed the agreed order. Further, the court specifically stated

that it would not consider the fault of the parties, one of the Ferguson factors used to

determine the division of marital property, because Scott and Lana had voluntarily dismissed

the fault grounds in their complaints. Scott did not object or preserve for appeal any of his

fault grounds but dismissed them altogether. Then the court heard evidence concerning the

remaining issues for resolution, i.e., the division of the marital property, the contempt issues,

and attorney’s fees request.

¶55. In light of clear precedent, we hold the issues of whether the chancery erred in not

allowing Scott to amend his complaint and add another fault ground, or whether the court

erred in excluding evidence of marital misconduct, were waived because Scott withdrew his

claim for a fault divorce and consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences.

II. Whether the chancellor erred in dividing the marital debt.

¶56. Although Scott raises two errors he claims the chancellor made in dividing the marital

debt (the inclusion of the Tahoe debt as marital debt and the disproportionate share of the

debt that the chancellor placed on him), in essence Scott challenges the overall equitable

distribution of the assets and debts ordered by the court.

25
¶57. “Equitable division of assets begins with the chancellor’s classification of assets as

marital versus non-marital.” Fleishhacker v. Fleishhacker, 39 So. 3d 904, 907 (¶13) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2009) (citing Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914-15 (Miss. 1994)). Marital

property is all property acquired or accumulated during a marriage. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at

915. Such assets are subject to equitable distribution unless the asset was owned before the

marriage, was a gift or inheritance, or was acquired with separate funds. Id. However, assets

and debts cease to be marital and become separate after a date set by the chancellor, known

as the date of demarcation, which can be the date of separation (at the earliest) or the date of

the divorce (at the latest). Collins v. Collins, 112 So.3d 428, 431-32 (¶9) (Miss. 2013).

¶58. “In dividing marital property, [c]hancellors must (1) classify the parties’ assets and

liabilities as marital or separate pursuant to Hemsley, (2) determine the value of the property,

and then (3) divide the marital property equitably, employing the Ferguson factors as

guidelines in light of each parties’ separate property.” Thompson v. Thompson, 380 So. 3d

945, 953 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ferguson

factors include: “(1) contribution to the accumulation of the marital property; (2) dissipation

of the assets; (3) the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution”; (4) “[t]he

value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such

distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired

by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse”; (5) “[t]ax and other

economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the

proposed distribution”; “(6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for

26
alimony; (7) the financial security needs of the parties; and (8) any other factor that in equity

should be considered.” Chapman v. Chapman, 395 So. 3d 447, 456 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App.

2024); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). If one party is left with a

deficit after the division of assets, the chancery court could then consider alimony based on

the value of the nonmarital assets. Sandoval v. Sandoval, 89 So. 3d 77, 80 (¶8) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2011). On appeal, “this Court reviews the chancellor’s equitable division of the parties’

marital estate under the familiar manifest-error standard of review.” Mosher v. Mosher, 192

So. 3d 1118, 1124 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 174 So. 3d 925,

929 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)).

Tahoe and Jeep Grand Cherokee Debts

¶59. Scott first challenges the inclusion of the Tahoe debt as marital debt. The

classification of the Tahoe debt, however, depends on an understanding of the events

surrounding the Jeep Grand Cherokee that the parties owned during the marriage and why

Lana later purchased the Tahoe. On June 27, 2022, the chancellor held a temporary hearing

and set that day as the date of demarcation for the accumulation of marital assets and debt

of the parties. The court also awarded Lana the use and possession of the Jeep Grand

Cherokee, a marital asset, and required her to pay the monthly note owed to Ally Financial

(Ally) and maintain insurance. The account with Ally was in Scott’s name alone. Thereafter,

when Lana failed to make the monthly payments, Ally repossessed the Jeep and sold it in

December 2022. However, the sale did not pay off the balance, and there remained a

deficiency owed of $19,628.07.

27
¶60. Scott filed a motion for contempt against Lana on this issue, and in her response Lana

stated that prior to the separation and divorce action, the Jeep account was paid with an

automatic draft on her bank account.6 Lana alleged Scott had discontinued that automatic

payment, and she could not reinstate it. She stated she was forced to remit payment through

mailing a check each month and hoped that it would be properly applied to the correct

account, or she had to wait on the phone to speak to a customer service representative. But

Lana never alleged or testified that she actually mailed any payments or that Ally had

misapplied her payments. Nor did she plead or testify that she was financially unable to

make the payments. It only became inconvenient, but not impossible, for her to make

payments when she could not make them online. Accordingly, the account went into default,

and the Jeep was repossessed because of Lana’s failure to pay.

¶61. After the Jeep’s repossession, and well after the date of demarcation, Lana purchased

the Tahoe in her name, incurring a $62,000 debt. In the divorce opinion and judgment, the

chancellor only dealt with the Jeep Grand Cherokee in its discussion of the second Ferguson

factor, i.e., whether either spouse had disposed of a marital asset. There, the court stated that

Lana was unable to make the Jeep payment because Scott refused to give her access to the

online payment portal. However, the chancellor did not note that Lana admitted that she

could make payments by mail or by phone. The chancellor then considered the Tahoe debt

as marital debt but did not list or value the vehicle as a marital asset that Lana retained. The

6
However, the record reflects that after they were married, Lana paid everything
through her business bank accounts. The parties testified that they decided to purchase the
Jeeps (a Grand Cherokee and a Rubicon) new because of the travel between the stores.

28
court also listed the deficiency owed to Ally on the Jeep Grand Cherokee as a marital debt,

but the court did not enter the amount of the deficiency on its chart of marital debt and

include that amount in its overall calculations. Instead, later in its contempt findings, the

chancellor found it “equitable” that both parties split the Ally deficiency debt and calculated

Lana’s share as $9,818.45.

¶62. The record in this case does not support the chancellor’s findings concerning the Jeep

Grand Cherokee’s repossession and deficiency or concerning the Tahoe and its financial

obligation. Because the Tahoe was purchased and solely owned by Lana well after the date

of demarcation, it was Lana’s separate, not marital, property, and the debt owed on it was not

marital debt but a separate obligation incurred solely by Lana.

¶63. Moreover, the chancellor erred in failing to hold that Lana had dissipated a marital

asset (the Jeep Grand Cherokee) when she failed to make payments on it as ordered. Lana

knew that she was not limited to making payments on the Jeep through automatic drafts on

her account or online and that she could make them by mail or by phone. She never claimed

to be financially unable to make the payments, nor did she seek the court’s approval to stop

making payments as ordered and secure another vehicle. Lana’s unilateral actions resulted

in the loss of the Jeep and a dissipation of a marital asset. See Knight v. Knight, 195 So. 3d

895, 901-02 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (listing husband’s failure to pay the mortgage as

required in a temporary order, which resulted in the home’s foreclosure, as one of several

actions by the husband that constituted dissipation of assets).

¶64. Accordingly, we find that the chancery court was manifestly wrong in not finding that

29
Lana had dissipated a marital asset (the Jeep Grand Cherokee) and in considering the Tahoe

debt a marital debt. On remand, in its revision of the equitable division of the marital

property, the chancery court should consider the Tahoe as Lana’s separate property and the

Tahoe debt as non-marital debt. Further the court should hold Lana responsible for the full

deficiency of $19,628.07 owed to Ally on the Jeep. In addition, neither the Ally deficiency

debt nor the Tahoe debt should be included in the calculation of the total marital debt.

Overall Division of Assets and Debts

¶65. Scott argues that the chancery court erroneously assigned him a disproportionate

(77%) share of the marital debt. Lana counters that the chancellor did not err because Scott

was allocated a disproportionate share of the parties’ assets, especially if the court had

considered the appraised value of the home, $350,000.

¶66. Before we can determine if the chancery court manifestly erred in its division of the

marital estate, we must determine if the court correctly identified the marital assets and

marital debts. We have already noted the court’s error in including the Tahoe and Ally debts

as marital.7 From our review of the record, we note other errors in the chancery court’s chart

of marital assets and debt, including, first, the court did not list a value for the Jeep Rubicon

although Scott testified that he paid $58,000 or $60,000 for it. In addition, the court listed

the outstanding loan on that vehicle owed to Chrysler Capital as $49,396, when Scott

reported the balance on his February 2024 Rule 8.05 financial statement as $43,740.75. Prior

7
We also note that Lana listed the outstanding balance owed on her last Rule 8.05
financial statement (February 2024) as $53,978.48, not $62,000 as the chancery court has
listed.

30
to that, in Scott’s June 2022 Rule 8.05 financial statement, the balance on the Rubicon was

$56,034.18. Lana did not include the vehicle on her financial statements and neither party

presented any testimony on the debt. So it is unclear what the chancery court used to set the

amount at $49,396. Second, the court did not include or value the 2014 Audi Q7 on the list

of marital assets although the court included an outstanding loan amount of $8,000 as a

marital debt. In her May 2022 Rule 8.05 financial statement, Lana listed a 2014 Audi as a

vehicle owned by the parties. She listed no value for it but stated that the loan balance on

this vehicle was $8,000. Lana did not include this vehicle on her February 2024 financial

statement and Scott did not list it on either of his financial statements. Neither party testified

about this vehicle, its value, or any loan balance. With such little information in the record

about when this vehicle was purchased, and if the parties even still had it at the time of the

final hearing, it is unclear to us how it should have been classified or whether the debt was

still outstanding. The court provided no explanation for its treatment of this vehicle and the

debt associated with it.

¶67. We further note that the chancery court valued the home at only the equity the parties

held in it, rather than at its appraised value, $350,000. A Ferguson factor analysis requires

a determination of the fair market value of the assets. Aron v. Aron, 832 So. 2d 1257, 1260

(¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Both Lana and Scott listed the value of the home as $350,000

on their Rule 8.05 financial statements. Thus, the chancery court should have included the

full fair market value in its chart on marital assets, especially since the court included the full

amount of the outstanding mortgage.

31
¶68. Overall, because it is unclear how the chancery court determined what property was

marital, and how and why it valued the marital assets as it did, we are unable to determine

if the chancellor did, in fact, accomplish the task of complying with the guidelines of

Ferguson. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the court’s judgment in part concerning the

division of the marital property and debt for reconsideration by the chancery court in light

of the holdings of this Court.

III. Whether the chancellor erred in its contempt findings.

¶69. Scott challenges the chancery court’s holdings and orders concerning the contempt

motions filed by the parties concerning the arrearage on the house payments, the repossession

and deficiency owed on the Jeep Grand Cherokee account, and the sale of the boat.

House Payments

¶70. On June 27, 2022, the court awarded the use and possession of the home to Lana and

ordered her to make monthly payments. Lana claimed that Scott failed to provide her with

the means to access the account and make the payments. The mortgage entered forbearance

from June through December 2022. In September 2022, Lana filed a motion for contempt

against Scott, bringing her difficulty in making payments to the court’s attention. The court

heard the motion on January 2, 2023, ordered Scott to pay Lana one payment by March, and

ordered Lana to pay the rest of the notes to bring the account current.

¶71. On April 12, 2023, Scott filed a motion for contempt against Lana because, although

he had sent her his one month’s mortgage payment, Lana had not brought the account

current. Lana filed a motion to dismiss Scott’s contempt motion, asserting that the mortgage

32
account was solely in Scott’s name and again asserting that he had blatantly refused to

provide her with the needed information to make the lump sum payment to bring the

mortgage out of forbearance and that foreclosure had begun. After a pre-trial conference in

May 2023, the parties resolved the matter with the mortgage company to stop the foreclosure

by securing a HUD loan in the amount of $28,004.95, which was tacked to the end of the

mortgage loan so the account could become current. It appears that after May 2023, Lana

made the monthly mortgage payments, and what was at issue in the contempt proceedings

was the amount she did not pay from June 2022 through April 2023.

¶72. In its final judgment, the chancery court ruled on Scott’s motion for contempt in

which Scott argued that Lana was responsible for these eleven months of non-payment that

he was now obligated to pay. Although the court found that Lana had a reason for not

paying, the court ruled that she still owed the money. The court did not calculate the full

amount of the payments owed but, instead, only ordered Lana to pay $9,500 with no

explanation of how the court arrived at that amount.

¶73. We agree with the chancellor that, no matter Lana’s reasons, she was in contempt of

the court’s orders by failing to pay the monthly mortgage payments for the period she had use

and possession of the home. She did not argue an inability to pay or any other reason that

would support a reduction in the amount she owed. According to the Rocket Mortgage

statement entered as an exhibit, the arrearage owed through April 2023 was $22,904.36. The

parties arranged a loan with HUD to cover the arrearage, and Rocket Mortgage agreed to tack

these payments to the end of the note, which meant they were included in the full mortgage

33
balance that the court listed as a marital debt and assigned to Scott. If Lana resumed

payments after April 2023—there being no evidence to the contrary—Lana then owed that

balance for eleven months, for a total of $22,904.36.

¶74. In a similar case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a husband owed his ex-wife

the full mortgage arrearage when he failed to make the monthly court-ordered payments.

Shumake v. Shumake, 233 So. 3d 234, 242 (¶27) (Miss. 2017). In that case, when the parties

divorced, the mortgage owed to the lender was in arrears. Id. at 241 (¶23). The court

ordered Mr. Shumake to pay the arrearage and bring the account current. Id. He failed to

do so and Mrs. Shumake filed a motion for contempt because she had been forced to

refinance the home to include the $10,468 arrearage. Id. at (¶24). The chancellor rejected

Mr. Shumake’s argument that he had discharged his portion of the debt in his bankruptcy,

and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s ruling that he still owed Mrs.

Shumake the arrearage. Id. at (¶27). The Supreme Court held that “[p]lainly, the

chancellor’s intent was for Mr. Shumake immediately to pay the first mortgage arrearage, and

Ms. Shumake would not be responsible for that debt.” Id. at 242 (¶27). The Court also

affirmed the chancellor’s order that Mr. Shumake pay his wife the full amount owed because

she ended up having to pay the full amount of the debt to the lender. Id.

¶75. In the case at hand, Scott is having to pay the full amount ($22,904.36) to the

mortgage company for those months Lana did not, a debt that Lana was obligated to pay.

Accordingly, the chancellor erred in requiring Lana to pay only $9,500, and not the full

amount, to Scott.

34
Jeep Grand Cherokee Debt

¶76. We have already dealt with the Jeep Grand Cherokee issue in our discussion of the

accuracy of the marital assets and debts. We reiterate that Lana failed to make the payments

as ordered by the court, resulting in the repossession and resale of the Jeep. We find that

under these facts, the chancery court erred in requiring Scott to pay any portion of the

deficiency. We reverse and remand in part for the court to enter an order requiring Lana to

pay the full amount of the deficiency owed.

Boat

¶77. Scott argues that the chancellor erred in not sanctioning Lana for her unilateral sale

of the boat that was awarded to Scott under the temporary order. Testimony from both

parties established that they purchased the boat during the marriage. Thus, the boat was

marital property. Per the temporary order, Scott was given use and possession of the boat

and was responsible for the payments and insurance. In his June 2022 Rule 8.05 financial

statement, Scott indicated that the monthly payment was $435.22 and that $38,652.71 was

still owed on the boat. At trial, Lana testified that when Scott failed to make two payments

or pay the insurance on the boat, she sold it for the outstanding balance. She testified that

she consulted her attorney prior to the sale, but she did not obtain Scott’s consent, nor did she

obtain the court’s permission.

¶78. Neither the temporary order nor the interim order required Lana to do anything about

the boat or its payments. Therefore, her actions did not violate any order of the court and,

thus, could not be the basis of a contempt action. Rather, her unilateral sale of the boat

35
would more appropriately be considered as a possible dissipation of a marital asset. To

determine this, we note that Mississippi has no specific test for discerning the dissipation of

marital assets. Brown v. Brown, 350 So. 3d 1169, 1182 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). In that

case, we found it was reasonable to look to whether the assets in question were actually

wasted or misused. Id. Clearly, in this case, Lana was not unjustly enriched because she did

not retain any proceeds of the sale, which were used to pay the balance of the indebtedness

owed. Scott submitted no evidence that he was damaged in any way and appears to agree in

his brief that the sale of the boat did not negatively impact him.8 In fact, its sale benefitted

both parties by relieving them of a significant debt. Therefore, we find no error by the

chancery court in not finding Lana in contempt or sanctioning her for her sale of the parties’

boat.

IV. Whether the chancellor erred in it distribution of the closely held
business of the parties.

¶79. Scott next argues that the chancery court erred in awarding ownership of Stork Secret

to Lana and only half of the business valuation him. He contends that he left his career when

he married Lana to help build the business and was dependent on Stork Secret for his income

thereafter.9 However, Scott cites no authority or precedent to support his position that he was

8
Scott states in his brief, “While financially, the sale of the boat does not appear to
have negatively impact[ed] Scott, Lana’s actions were purely self serving.”
9
Scott also contends that the judgment is unclear as to whether the court was
awarding Lana only Stork Secret I or both Stork Secret stores. However, the only valuation
in the record is the valuation of “Stork Secret LLC,” which is Stork Secret I. The testimony
in the record showed that Stork Secret II’s ownership included a third party and the chancery
court correctly included only Stork Secret I as Lana and Scott’s marital property.

36
entitled to more than half of the business valuation, and thus he is procedurally barred from

raising them on appeal. We have held:

“Arguments advanced on appeal must contain the contentions of the Appellant
with respect to the issues presented and the reasons for those contentions with
citations to the authority, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” M.R.A.P.
28(a)(6). Failure to cite authority to support an argument renders an issue
procedurally barred. Read v. S. Pine Elec. Power Ass’n, 515 So. 2d 916, 921
(Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we will not consider this issue
on appeal.

Wackenhut Corp. v. Fortune, 87 So. 3d 1083, 1094 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); see also

Howard Indus. Inc. v. Hayes, 392 So. 3d 1216, 1234 (¶53) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (finding

issue procedurally barred when party failed to cite authority in a worker’s compensation

case), aff’d, 376 So. 3d 1201 (Miss. 2023). In the case at hand, because Scott has cited no

authority to support his argument, the issue is procedurally barred.

V. Whether the cumulative errors of the chancellor warrant a new
trial.

¶80. Scott finally argues that if any single error by the chancellor is not sufficient to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. Because we have

addressed his issues and reversed in some instances and affirmed others, we find no need to

address or utilize the cumulative error doctrine in determining the outcome of his appeal.

Conclusion

¶81. Because Scott voluntarily dismissed his fault-based grounds for divorce and

proceeded to obtain an irreconcilable differences divorce, on appeal, he waived the issues of

the chancery court’s denial of his motion to amend his fault-based complaint and the

chancery court’s alleged refusal to admit evidence of marital misconduct or habitual cruel

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and inhuman treatment. Further, the chancellor erred by not finding that the Tahoe is non-

marital property and the Tahoe debt and the Jeep Grand Cherokee deficiency owed to Ally

are Lana’s responsibility alone. Further, because we are unable to determine if the chancellor

equitably divided the parties’ marital assets and debt, we reverse and remand the property

division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we affirm the

chancery court’s ruling that Scott be awarded half of the value of Stork Secret I, $5,200.

¶82. Concerning the chancery court’s findings of contempt, we reverse the chancery court’s

ruling that Lana only pay $9,500 on the arrearage of the mortgage payments she failed to pay

and remand for the chancery court to enter an order requiring her to repay the full arrearage

amount to Scott. We also reverse the chancery court’s ruling concerning the deficiency owed

on the Jeep Grand Cherokee and remand for the chancery court to enter an order requiring

that Lana pay the full amount of the deficiency owed to Ally. We affirm the chancery court’s

judgment concerning the boat and hold that Lana’s sale of the parties’ boat did not violate

any outstanding court order and did not dissipate a marital asset.

¶83. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY
AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND EMFINGER, J.,
CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. WEDDLE, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.

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