In Re Estate of Patricia Lovorn Eaves, and Estate of John Arthur Eaves Sr., Deceased: Tiffany Ladair Eaves Schlesinger and Paige Leigh Eaves Ray v. John Arthur Eaves Jr., Individually and As Former De Bonis Non

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CA-00692-COA

IN RE ESTATE OF PATRICIA LOVORN APPELLANTS
EAVES, DECEASED, AND ESTATE OF JOHN
ARTHUR EAVES SR., DECEASED: TIFFANY
LADAIR EAVES SCHLESINGER AND PAIGE
LEIGH EAVES RAY

v.

JOHN ARTHUR EAVES JR., INDIVIDUALLY APPELLEE
AND AS FORMER EXECUTOR DE BONIS NON

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/15/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES CHRISTOPHER WALKER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: REEVE G. JACOBUS JR.
J. CHASE BRYAN
MACY ELIZABETH MITCHELL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: SHELDON G. ALSTON
CLAIRE W. KETNER
E. CHARLENE STIMLEY PRIESTER
MELVIN VINCENT PRIESTER JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/10/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. John Arthur Eaves Sr. and Patricia Lovorn Eaves were married and had three children;

John Arthur Eaves Jr., Tiffany Ladair Eaves Schlesinger, and Paige Leigh Eaves Ray.

Patricia lost her battle with pancreatic cancer on March 22, 2020, leaving the bulk of her

estate to John Sr. Following Patricia’s death, John Sr. disposed of the majority of his estate

through conveyances to his and Patricia’s children and through an assignment of his law firm
to John Jr.1 John Sr. died on March 18, 2022.

¶2. After several unsuccessful meetings and conversations among the siblings regarding

John Sr.’s estate, John Jr. ultimately filed for probate. Tiffany and Paige filed various

pleadings in the probate of their parents’ consolidated estates challenging the validity of the

inter vivos conveyances and the law firm assignment.2 Tiffany and Paige believed these

transactions were the result of undue influence arising from an alleged confidential

relationship between John Sr. and John Jr. Tiffany and Paige further alleged that John Jr.

should be estopped from asserting that they were not entitled to certain promises made by

John Sr. and John Jr. upon which they detrimentally relied. Following a bench trial, the

chancellor denied Tiffany and Paige’s request to set aside the inter vivos conveyances and

the law firm assignment. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s opinion and judgment, they appeal.

In addition to the issues presented in the chancery court, Paige and Tiffany also assert that

the chancellor erred during trial by interfering with the cross-examination of an expert

witness, the duration and nature of which allegedly constituted prejudicial error. Finding no

error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1
John Sr. also fathered two children outside his marriage who lived in Ukraine.
Although John Sr.’s children from Ukraine claimed heirship, they did not join Paige and
Tiffany’s contest of the conveyances by John Sr., nor did they contest John Sr.’s will.
Therefore, no issues on appeal directly involve those children.
2
Although the Estates of John Sr. and Patricia were consolidated, the issues before
the chancery court and this Court on appeal exclusively pertain to John Sr.’s estate.

2
¶3. John Sr. and Patricia owned a substantial amount of real estate investments and assets.

John Sr. and Patricia owned property in Oxford, Jackson, Ocean Springs, Flora, and Winston

County, Mississippi, as well as Venezuela, Ukraine, and the Andover Subdivision in

Madison County, Mississippi. John Sr. and Patricia also lived on a large estate in Canton,

Mississippi, with a chapel and three houses known as Rosemeade, Rosebud, and Rosemore.

John Sr. owned a successful law practice in Jackson known by various names through the

years: Eaves Law Office, the Law Offices of John Arthur Eaves, or the John Arthur Eaves

Law Office. Although John Jr. owned his own law firm, he and John Sr. worked together on

cases and often shared attorney’s fees.3 One such matter involved a lawsuit filed relating to

the 1998 terrorist bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (“Sudan

lawsuit”).

¶4. Patricia passed away in March 2020, leaving a holographic last will and testament

dated June 7, 2009. In Patricia’s will, she appointed John Sr. as executor, and she left all her

property to John Sr. She also left $1,000 to “each of [John Sr.’s] children.” During the

reading of Patricia’s will, John Sr. allegedly mentioned that any settlement he received from

the Sudan lawsuit would be equally split between him and John Jr. According to Tiffany and

Paige, John Sr. also promised that there would be a one-third split among them and John Jr.

of his share of the fees. John Jr. testified that it was actually his idea to have a one-third split,

3
John Jr. and Tiffany testified that it was always assumed among the siblings that
John Jr. would receive the law firm after John Sr.’s death.

3
and he did not recall John Sr. making statements consistent with Tiffany and Paige’s claims.

¶5. After Patricia’s death, Tiffany and her husband moved into Rosemeade to take care

of John Sr. On April 21, 2020, John Sr. executed a holographic last will and testament

appointing John Jr. as executor. The will included specific devises of property to John Jr.,

Paige, and Tiffany, gave each of his children $10,000, and split any residuary equally among

John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany. The will also provided that John Jr. would receive twenty acres

of the Rosemeade property, Paige would receive Rosemore, and Tiffany would receive

Rosebud. The rest of Rosemeade would be split equally among the three children. Several

weeks later, John Sr. named John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany as the payable-on-death beneficiary

on three certificates of deposit (CD) worth $250,000 at RiverHills Bank. John Sr. named all

his grandchildren as the beneficiaries of an additional CD worth $25,000. On June 8, 2020,

John Sr. added John Jr. as the payable-on-death beneficiary on all his bank accounts at

RiverHills Bank. Tiffany testified that John Sr. was competent at the time he executed his

will in April 2020.

¶6. On July 25, 2020, John Sr. assigned all his cases, clients, fees and interest due, money

in any and all operating or trust business accounts, and the entirety of his law firm to John

Jr. Renee Hitt, John Jr.’s paralegal, drafted and notarized the assignment.4 During trial and

on appeal, Tiffany and Paige argued that there was no evidence that the assignment of John

4
Testimony at trial revealed that although Renee was John Jr.’s paralegal, she
occasionally would work for John Sr. as well.

4
Sr.’s trust account, business accounts, and clients were implemented. However, law firm

employees testified that during this time period, John Sr. stopped taking on new clients or

cases, and he began coming into the office less. John Sr. did continue to participate in calls

pertaining to the Sudan lawsuit settlement and handled personal matters, and his bank

accounts remained in effect.5

¶7. Prior to his death, John Sr. gave John Jr. his power of attorney, which allowed John

Jr. “upon [John Sr.’s] disability or incapacity” to “collect and distribute Receivables in

accordance with that certain Purchase Agreement . . . by and between Law Offices of John

Arthur Eaves and Champlain Funding Co LLC.” John Jr. testified that he and his father took

out an advance on the legal fees from the Sudan lawsuit, and they both lived off this money.

John Jr. testified that the power of attorney was never utilized.

¶8. On August 3, 2020, John Sr., both individually and as executor of Patricia’s estate,

executed deeds granting various pieces of property to John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany

(individually and some to all three together). On September 15, 2020, nine of those deeds

were recorded in Hinds County. Renee testified that John Sr. would ask her to draft these

documents and keep them until he told her to record them at a later date.

¶9. On June 5, 2021, John Sr. executed a specific medical power of attorney appointing

5
Judy Carver, a long-time employee of Eaves Law Office, helped John Sr. with his
personal finances. She testified that during the summer of 2020, John Sr. told her that
everything with the law firm would go to John Jr. and that he “was her new boss.” She also
testified that John Sr. told her there was no need to change the name on the bank accounts
because he and John Jr. had the same name.

5
John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany as his attorneys in fact to make any health care decisions for him

if he became unable to give informed consent. The power of attorney specified that Tiffany

would have the final word if they could not agree on decisions concerning John Sr.’s health

care. The same day, John Sr. signed five quitclaim deeds related to various properties across

Mississippi. He deeded the following to John Jr.: 739.5 acres in Oxford, the Holman

Addition in Louisville, the Winston County property, and the Ocean Springs property.

Tiffany and Paige both testified that John Sr. mentioned on several occasions that some or

all of the Oxford property would be equally split among all three of them. However, John Jr.

testified that John Sr. told him that he gave him the Oxford property because he was in a

better position to satisfy the repayment of loans against the property. John Sr. also deeded

six acres in Oxford to John Jr., Tiffany, and Paige. Renee drafted and notarized all these

deeds. Renee testified that she recorded them after approval from John Sr. Paige testified that

the day these deeds were drafted, she remembered taking John Sr. to the doctor for radiation

treatment, and he was in pain. She also testified that she was living with John Sr. at the time,

and she did not recall Renee coming to Rosemeade to present the quitclaim deeds to John Sr.

Also in June 2021, John Sr. insisted on and was able to travel to Ukraine by himself.

¶10. On January 28, 2022, Renee recorded two deeds for the Oxford property on John Sr.’s

behalf, and he executed a bill of sale to John Jr. for his property in Venezuela.6 On February

6
The bill of sale for the Venezuela property was signed and notarized, but it was
never recorded.

6
25, 2022, five quitclaim deeds were allegedly executed by John Sr. The details of those deeds

are as follows: (1) 309 Magnolia Street and a property in Oxford known to the family as the

“Thacker Mountain Chalet” to John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany equally; (2) all of John Sr.’s

Andover property to John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany equally; (3) a leasehold in Flora to Paige;

(4) twenty-one acres at Rosemeade to John Jr.; and (5) the remainder of Rosemeade to John

Jr., Paige, and Tiffany equally. He also executed an assignment to John Jr. for his Ukrainian

property.

¶11. In March 2022, John Sr. was admitted to Baptist Hospital. According to testimony,

John Sr. called his banker of fourteen years, Jud Watkins, to ask him to add John Jr. to all his

accounts in case he became incapacitated. Jud came to the hospital to have John Sr. sign the

paperwork to create a new joint bank account in his and John Jr.’s name. Jud and John Jr.

testified that only Jud went into the hospital room with John Sr. Jud also testified that nothing

made him suspect that John Sr. lacked free will or that he was under the control of anyone.

¶12. On March 18, 2022, John Sr. died. In April 2022, there was a reading of John Sr.’s

will. Tiffany testified that it was her understanding that John Jr. would be handling John Sr.’s

estate. At this same meeting, John Jr. allegedly promised Tiffany and Paige that he would

give them a portion of the Sudan lawsuit settlement. Renee was present at the meeting to

answer any questions Tiffany and Paige had after the reading of the will. At the conclusion

of the meeting, John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany agreed to obtain appraisals for John Sr.’s various

properties. They had several meetings and conversations about the appraisals and the Sudan

7
lawsuit settlement.

¶13. On December 23, 2022, Paige sent an email to John Jr. and Tiffany reiterating how

they “agreed” the Sudan lawsuit settlement should be handled. John Jr. testified that he did

not respond to Paige’s email because he was not going to be forced into acknowledging what

he believed to be an inaccurate statement. John Jr. maintained that he was going to give

Tiffany and Paige portions of the Sudan lawsuit settlement, but he was not obligated to do

so.

¶14. In January 2023, John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany held an unsuccessful meeting regarding

John Sr.’s estate and appraisals of his properties. During this meeting, John Jr. presented a

binder to Tiffany and Paige detailing how John Sr.’s assets would be distributed. On January

23, 2023, John Jr. filed a “Petition for Probate of Last Will and Testament, Appointment of

Executor, and for Letters Testamentary.” Tiffany and Paige filed an emergency motion to

freeze assets, appoint special masters, compel inventory, and remove John Jr. as executor.

¶15. During the lengthy trial, the chancellor heard testimony from eleven witnesses,

including two expert witnesses, and received several exhibits. John Jr. presented the expert

testimony of a forensic psychologist, Dr. Max Wachtel. Dr. Wachtel testified that John Sr.

had testamentary and contractual capacity when he signed the contested documents and the

law firm assignments. On rebuttal, Paige and Tiffany offered the testimony of a psychiatrist,

Dr. Mark Webb. He testified that he believed John Sr. had testamentary capacity, but he also

believed John Sr. was more likely than not overtaken by undue influence because he was

8
physically and mentally weak.

¶16. On May 15, 2024, the chancellor entered a detailed opinion and judgment denying

Paige and Tiffany’s request to set aside quitclaim deeds and the law firm assignment and

denying all other requests before the court.7 On May 30, 2024, the chancellor confirmed and

recognized the opinion and judgment as a final judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b).

¶17. On June 24, 2024, Tiffany and Paige filed an amendment to the designation of record

on appeal requesting that the trial transcript be time-stamped, and they requested that the

court reporter produce the audio recording made during the cross-examination of Dr.

Wachtel. On July 22, 2024, the chancellor sua sponte entered an order ruling that the court

reporter’s audio recordings were work product and shall not be included as part of the official

appellate record. Aggrieved, Paige and Tiffany appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18. “A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are manifestly wrong

or clearly erroneous, or unless the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard. If the

chancellor’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, [our

appellate courts] will not reverse.” Wright v. Roberts, 797 So. 2d 992, 997 (¶14) (Miss. 2001)

(citing In re Est. of Grantham, 609 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Miss. 1992)). “Questions of law are

7
Notably, the chancellor provides a thorough analysis of John Sr.’s mental capacity,
but Paige and Tiffany maintain that John Sr. never lacked the requisite mental capacity to
execute his will, the deeds, or the assignment at issue.

9
reviewed de novo.” Crotwell v. T&W Homes, 318 So. 3d 1117, 1121 (¶11) (Miss. 2021)

(quoting Browder v. Williams, 765 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (¶12) (Miss. 2000)).

DISCUSSION

I. Inter Vivos Gifts

¶19. We first address Tiffany and Paige’s argument that the deeds and law firm assignment

fail to meet the requirements associated with valid inter vivos gifts. A party attempting to

prove that an inter vivos gift was made must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1)

the donor was competent to make a gift, (2) the donation was a voluntary act by a donor with

donative intent, (3) the gift was complete and not conditional, (4) delivery was made, and (5)

the gift was irrevocable. In re Estate of Ladner, 909 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (¶9) (Miss. 2004).8

There is no evidence or testimony in the record to support a finding that the assignment and

the deeds were conditional. The language of the assignment was clear, and testimony from

the firm’s employees shows that John Sr. ceded operational control. The assignment was

signed by John Sr. and John Jr. and notarized. Thus, the assignment became irrevocable upon

execution and delivery. As to the deeds, specifically, there is a presumption that the deeds

were delivered and became effective the day they were recorded. See Morrow v. Morrow,

129 So. 3d 142, 147 (¶17) (Miss. 2013). Tiffany and Paige failed to rebut the presumption

that the recorded contested deeds were delivered. Accordingly, we find that the quitclaim

8
Paige and Tiffany only contest the last three elements. It is undisputed that John Sr.
was competent and had the required donative intent.

10
deeds and the assignment were valid inter vivos gifts made by John Sr.

¶20. We next address Tiffany and Paige’s argument that the chancellor erred by finding

several inter vivos gifts valid because an alleged confidential relationship existed between

John Sr. and John Jr. Tiffany and Paige also allege that John Sr. was in poor health and must

have been under the influence of John Jr. when he made various inter vivos gifts, particularly

the quitclaim deeds and assignment. The chancellor found that Tiffany and Paige failed to

prove the existence of a confidential relationship, and even if the sisters had successfully

invoked the presumption of undue influence, John Jr. rebutted any presumption by clear and

convincing evidence.

¶21. Mississippi law on confidential relationships and undue influence is well settled and

applies “to both inter vivos and testamentary transactions.” Est. of Warren v. Maharrey, 402

So. 3d 167, 183 (¶59) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Wright, 797 So. 2d at 998 (¶16)).

Mississippi law clearly recognizes that “an inter vivos gift is a perfectly lawful means of

transferring real property in this state.” In re Est. of Lane, 930 So. 2d 421, 425 (¶11) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Burt, 507 So. 2d 32, 36 (Miss. 1987)). Gifts of real

property between family members are a normal occurrence, and our courts will not act when

a conveyance from a parent to a child is a purely voluntary act. Id. In fact, “a deed from a

parent to a child alone and of itself raises no presumption of undue influence since, in the

absence of evidence to the contrary, the parent is presumably the dominant party. This is true

even though the parent is aged, or aged and infirm.” Id.

11
¶22. However, this Court will act if the existence of a confidential relationship is proved

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 425 (¶12). Once a confidential relationship is

proved, “[t]he burden shifts then to the one who wishes to uphold the gift to rebut the

presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Caspelich, 22 So. 3d 1199, 1205 (¶19)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court has defined a confidential relationship

as follows:

Whenever there is a relationship between two people in which one person is
in a position to exercise dominant influence upon the other because of the
latter’s dependency upon the former, arising either from weakness of the mind
or body, or through trust, the law does not hesitate to characterize such a
relationship as fiduciary in character.

In re Smith, 170 So. 3d 530, 536 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). In the case before us, the

chancellor found that “John Sr.’s poor health and age assuredly created the potential for the

fostering of a confidential relationship, but there were natural safeguards in place.”9 The

chancellor also noted that although John Sr. was physically weak at times, he still traveled

internationally by himself and remained highly independent. When determining whether a

confidential relationship exists, the following factors are to be considered:

(1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others, (2) whether one
person maintains a close relationship with another, (3) whether one person is
provided transportation and has [his] medical care provided for by another, (4)
whether one person maintains joint accounts with another, (5) whether one is
physically or mentally weak, (6) whether one is of advanced age or poor
health, and (7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one

9
The chancellor also noted that John Jr., Tiffany, and Paige all seemed to be in a
confidential relationship with John Sr.

12
[person] and another.

In re Est. of Laughter, 23 So. 3d 1055, 1063 (¶31) (Miss. 2009) (citing In re Est. of Holmes,

961 So. 2d 674, 680 (¶17) (Miss. 2007)).

¶23. If Paige and Tiffany were able to demonstrate the existence of a confidential

relationship between John Sr. and John Jr., a rebuttable presumption of undue influence

would arise regarding any inter vivos transactions between them. See Holcombe v. Est. of

King, 365 So. 3d 1037, 1043 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (finding that a party must first

establish a confidential relationship existed before addressing the question of undue

influence). The record reveals that Paige and Tiffany failed to demonstrate the existence of

a confidential relationship between John Sr. and John Jr. Paige, Tiffany, and John Jr. all

assisted in the care of John Sr. Paige and Tiffany took care of John Sr. more often than John

Jr. Paige and Tiffany drove John Sr. to his appointments, and they both lived with him at

some point after the death of Patricia. Paige and Tiffany’s expert witness testified that he

believed John Sr. had a confidential relationship with John Jr., Paige, and Tiffany. Paige and

Tiffany also received payment for their services as caregivers for John Sr.

¶24. Although a power of attorney existed between John Sr. and John Jr., there was

undisputed testimony that the power of attorney was never used. Several witnesses testified

John Sr. was not solely reliant on any caregiver when he executed the contested documents.

There was overwhelming testimony from witnesses that John Sr. was self-sufficient and not

dependent on anyone when it came to making his own financial and estate-planning

13
decisions. During the time the contested documents were executed, John Sr. still negotiated

contracts, traveled internationally alone, represented himself in real estate closings, and wrote

checks.

¶25. After our review of the record and considering relevant factors, we find the inter vivos

gifts were valid, and the chancellor correctly held that John Jr. and John Sr. did not have a

confidential relationship that would render the inter vivos gifts and assignment invalid.

Accordingly, we find that the chancellor’s findings were supported by substantial credible

evidence and not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.

II. Doctrines of Equitable, Promissory, and Quasi Estoppel

¶26. Tiffany and Paige next argue that they relied on the actions of John Jr. and changed

their position in reliance on John Sr. and John Jr.’s promise to give them a portion of the

Sudan lawsuit settlement. The chancellor found that the doctrines of equitable, promissory,

and quasi estoppel were inapplicable because there was no evidence presented at trial that

Tiffany and Paige suffered a detriment in reliance on any gratuitous promise by John Jr. On

appeal, Tiffany and Paige specifically contend that the chancellor erroneously applied the

doctrines of equitable, promissory, and quasi estoppel.

A. Equitable Estoppel

¶27. “A party asserting equitable estoppel must show (1) that [she] has changed [her]

position in reliance upon the conduct of another and (2) that [she] has suffered detriment

caused by [her] change of [her] position in reliance upon such conduct.” Merideth v.

14
Merideth, 987 So. 2d 477, 484 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Turner v. Terry, 799 So.

2d 25, 37 (¶42) (Miss. 2001)). Tiffany and Paige argue that they “relied on the conduct of

John Jr. in the conduct of their father’s estate, the handling of the Sudan lawsuit settlement,

and unwittingly allowed him to take advantage of their trust.”

¶28. “When applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘the test is whether it would be

substantially unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to

believe and take action thereon.’” Craig v. City of Yazoo City, 104 So. 3d 172, 175 (¶10)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, City of Clinton v. Welch, 888 So.

2d 416, 427 (¶51) (Miss. 2004)). Tiffany and Paige testified that John Jr. and John Sr. told

them that the Sudan lawsuit settlement would be equally split among them. According to

testimony at trial, at their final meeting regarding the distribution of assets, John Jr. presented

a binder that allegedly included a settlement offer to give Tiffany and Paige a portion of the

Sudan lawsuit settlement.10 However, Tiffany and Paige did not agree to those figures

because they believed they were entitled to more based on previous conversations about the

Sudan lawsuit settlement. Here, there is no evidence or testimony that Paige and Tiffany

changed a prior position in reliance upon John Jr.’s alleged conduct or promise, nor did they

show how they suffered any detriment or injury in reliance upon John Jr.’s conduct or

10
The chancellor initially did not allow the settlement binder to be admitted for the
purpose of proving the validity of Tiffany and Paige’s claim. The binder was later admitted
for the limited purpose of testimony to an alleged plan by John Sr. and John Jr. to distribute
the estate.

15
promise. Accordingly, we find that there was no error in the chancellor’s finding that the

doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be enforced.

B. Promissory Estoppel

¶29. Tiffany and Paige next argue that “John Jr. should be estopped from failing to pay the

Sudan lawsuit settlement into the estate for distribution in accordance with the will and the

promise that John Sr. and John Jr. made to them.” “[T]he elements of promissory estoppel

are: (1) the making of a promise, even though without consideration, (2) the intention that

the promise be relied upon and in fact is relied upon, and (3) a refusal to enforce it would

virtually sanction the perpetuation of fraud or would result in other injustice.” Beasley v.

Sutton, 192 So. 3d 325, 335 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Thompson v. First Am. Nat’l

Bank, 19 So. 3d 784, 788 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). “Promissory estoppel differs from

equitable estoppel ‘in that the representation is promissory rather than as to an existing fact.’”

Id. (citing Weible v. Univ. of S. Miss., 89 So. 3d 51, 67 (¶52) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)).

¶30. Tiffany and Paige contend that they allowed John Jr. to move into Rosemeade and live

there rent-free in reliance on his promise to honor his father’s wishes to give them a portion

of the Sudan lawsuit settlement. However, we note that the quitclaim deed John Sr. executed

on February 25, 2022, gave John Jr. an ownership interest in Rosemeade. Based on our

review of the record, John Jr. may have promised Tiffany and Paige a portion of the Sudan

lawsuit settlement, but they again failed to show how they relied on John Jr.’s promise. As

co-tenants of Rosemeade, each of the siblings has equal rights to occupy the property.

16
Although Tiffany and Paige contend that they would not have allowed John Jr. to move into

Rosemeade and live there rent-free if it were not for his promises to honor John Sr.’s alleged

wishes, John Jr. has the right, as a co-tenant, to live in Rosemeade.11 Therefore, we find that

chancellor did not err in finding promissory estoppel does not apply here.

C. Quasi Estoppel

¶31. Tiffany and Paige argue that the chancellor erroneously applied the doctrine of quasi

estoppel to the claim that the Sudan lawsuit settlement funds should have been made part of

the estate. Quasi estoppel “precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a right

inconsistent with a position it has previously taken, and applies when it would be

unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he

acquiesced, or from which he accepted a benefit.” Home Base Litter Control LLC v.

Claiborne County, 183 So. 3d 94, 101-02 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In his final judgment, the chancellor noted how the sisters profited from their

reliance on the Andover quitclaim deed but now seek to set it aside. He also pointed out how

they cashed checks worth thousands of dollars from their father after the point they now

allege he was incapacitated and incapable of divesting himself of his property. Paige and

Tiffany specifically contend that in reliance on John Jr.’s statements, they did not seek to

have an independent executor appointed for ten months after John Sr.’s death, allowed

John Jr. to live at Rosemeade rent-free, and relied on him to fulfill their father’s promise to

11
Notably, Paige stated in her brief that a partition action is pending.

17
them. Nonetheless, Paige and Tiffany again have failed to show how they have been

disadvantaged or how it would be unconscionable to allow John Jr. to maintain his position.

Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not err in finding the doctrine of quasi estoppel

applies here, but it does not apply to John Jr.’s behavior because neither sister shows how she

has been disadvantaged or how John Jr. repudiated any obligations.

III. Cross-examination of an Expert Witness

¶32. In their last assignment of error, Tiffany and Paige argue that the chancellor

“interfered with the prosecution of the case by improperly limiting cross examination in

violation of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 611(b).” Rule 611(b) provides that a court may not

limit cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting

the witness’s credibility. MRE 611(b). An expert witness is subject to “wide-open

cross-examination” on “any matter that is relevant.” Murray v. Gray, 321 So. 3d 1166, 1180

(¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Redding v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 169 So. 3d 958, 964

(¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)). While defense counsel has wide latitude in cross-examination,

“the trial court in its discretion has the inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant

matters.” Farmer v. State, 301 So. 3d 731, 734 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Mixon

v. State, 794 So. 2d 1007, 1013 (¶20) (Miss. 2001)).

¶33. During the cross-examination of John Jr.’s expert witness, Dr. Wachtel, about undue

influence, Paige’s counsel attempted to go through John Jr.’s deposition transcript. On

appeal, Paige argues that the chancellor indicated that if the line of questioning was to

18
continue, he would end the day and push the trial to a later date. However, as the appellee

correctly points out, Paige’s counsel failed to make a proffer of Dr. Wachtel’s testimony. It

is well established that “[w]hen testimony is not allowed at trial, a record of the proffered

testimony must be made in order to preserve the point for appeal.” Jackson v. State, 245 So.

3d 433, 441 (¶45) (Miss. 2018) (quoting Green v. State, 89 So. 3d 543, 554 (¶28) (Miss.

2012)). The record does not include a proffer; therefore, this issue has not been properly

preserved for appeal. Accordingly, this issue is procedurally barred.

¶34. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find this issue is without merit. Our review

of the record reveals that the chancellor did not limit the cross-examination of Dr. Wachtel

but, instead, tried to prevent Paige’s counsel from causing unnecessary delay by reading a

deposition transcript. Rule 611(a)(2) provides that “the court should exercise reasonable

control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence” to avoid

wasting time. Johnson v. State, 311 So. 3d 1161, 1173 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). On cross-

examination, Paige’s counsel first stated, “In Mississippi, once a—so confidential

relationship is kind of a separate entity. It doesn’t have to be conflated with the act of undue

influence. Do you understand that the way I’m presenting it? You can disagree. That’s the

way I understand.” Counsel for John Jr. objected, stating that Dr. Wachtel needed a question

as opposed to his interpretation of the law. The chancellor stated, “A question would be

nice.” Later in the cross-examination of Dr. Wachtel, Paige’s counsel seemingly attempted

to read into the record a few pages of John Jr.’s deposition transcript. He stated, “If you want

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to[,] I just want to go over these three pages here and read it. And if you would, to make it

clear, I’ll ask the question, and you can answer.” In an attempt to avoid Paige’s counsel

wasting time by reading through three pages of a deposition transcript on the third day of

trial, the chancellor asks Paige’s counsel to ask a question. After Paige’s counsel tried to

explain that he wanted to read through the transcript because Dr. Wachtel did not remember,

the chancellor interrupted him and asked what their schedules were for Monday. He added,

“Mr. Jones doesn’t want to do what I asked, so what are y’all doing Monday?” Counsel and

the witness provided their scheduling conflicts, and the court took a short recess. After the

recess, Paige’s counsel tendered the witness.

¶35. After our review of the record, we find that the chancellor acted within his discretion

when he requested Paige’s counsel to ask Dr. Wachtel a question and not read three pages

of a deposition transcript.

CONCLUSION

¶36. Based on the foregoing reasons, we find that the chancellor’s findings were supported

by substantial credible evidence and not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Accordingly,

we affirm the chancellor’s final judgment.

¶37. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND
McCARTY, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.

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