Eddie Gray Holt a/k/a Eddie Holt a/k/a Eddie Grey Holt v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KM-00121-COA

EDDIE GRAY HOLT A/K/A EDDIE HOLT A/K/A APPELLANT
EDDIE GREY HOLT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT THOMAS BAILEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES A. WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR
DISPOSITION: VACATED AND REMANDED - 08/13/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Eddie Gray Holt was convicted of simple domestic assault in municipal court. He

appealed to the county court, received a bench trial de novo, and was again convicted. Holt

then appealed to the circuit court, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to timely file his

appellate brief. Holt appeals that dismissal, arguing that he was entitled to notice and an

opportunity to file his brief. We agree. But the State argues for the first time on appeal that

the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction because Holt failed to timely prepay the costs

of his appeal. Because the record is insufficient to decide that issue, we vacate the circuit

court’s order dismissing Holt’s appeal and remand the case to the circuit court to determine
whether it obtained appellate jurisdiction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Holt was convicted of simple domestic violence in Meridian Municipal Court,

sentenced to serve ten days in jail, and ordered to pay a fine. He appealed his conviction to

the County Court of Lauderdale County, where he again was convicted following a bench

trial de novo. The county court entered its judgment of conviction on October 6, 2021. Holt

was again sentenced to ten days in jail and ordered to pay a fine, as well as court costs.

¶3. On the day the county court entered its judgment of conviction, Holt filed a notice of

appeal to the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. That same day, he also filed a “certificate

of compliance,” which certified that “the estimate cost of preparing the transcript on appeal

is $324.00” and that Holt’s counsel had “on or before th[at] day deposited the same with

Court Reporter Jacqueline Wahler.” The certificate of compliance also bears a handwritten

and initialed notation regarding additional court costs, but it does not expressly certify that

Holt had paid those costs.

¶4. On January 12, 2022, Wahler filed the transcript of Holt’s county court trial. On

March 25, 2022, the circuit clerk moved for an extension of time to prepare the record on

appeal, and the county court granted that extension, finding that,

on October 6, 2021, Counsel for [Holt] did timely file a Notice of Appeal,
Certificate of Compliance, and Designation of the Record. Bond payment and
advanced appeal cost were received by the Lauderdale Circuit Clerk’s office
on November 16, 2022 [sic].[1] On January 12, 2022, the Court Reporter
submitted the transcript which was filed on that day. Due to human error and

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The date should be November 16, 2021. The docket states that the court received
“$582.00 from [Holt’s attorney] for advanced appeal cost” on November 16, 2021.

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miscommunication the Circuit Clerk’s office has not timely filed the appeal
with the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County as of [March 29, 2022]. To
ensure no party is prejudiced by this delay, . . . the Motion for extension of
time shall be granted.

The circuit clerk completed and filed the record on April 4, 2022.

¶5. For nearly eight months, Holt took no action in his appeal. But after obtaining new

counsel, Holt recognized that the forty-day window to file his brief in the circuit court had

lapsed, see M.R.A.P. 31(b), and on November 30, 2022, he filed a motion for additional time

to file his brief. Holt argued that dismissal would be improper because the clerk never issued

a deficiency notice as required by Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(a)(2).

¶6. The State opposed Holt’s motion, and the circuit court dismissed the appeal, citing

Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 2(a)(2) and 31(b) and Holt’s months of inaction.

¶7. On appeal before this Court, Holt has raised the same issue. He argues that the circuit

court erred by dismissing his appeal because he never received an official deficiency notice

or an opportunity to cure the deficiency. The State fails to address that issue and instead

argues that this Court should affirm the dismissal of Holt’s appeal on the alternative ground

that the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction. According to the State, Holt failed to

comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-79

(Rev. 2019) by not posting a cost bond within thirty days of his conviction in county court.

In his reply brief, Holt argues that section 11-51-79 cannot impose jurisdictional

requirements that conflict with the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure. According to

Holt, the Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the filing of a notice of appeal is

sufficient to perfect the appeal. See MRCrP 30.1.

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ANALYSIS

¶8. We review a lower court’s dismissal of an appeal de novo. Smith v. City of Saltillo,

44 So. 3d 438, 440 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Likewise, we review jurisdictional issues de

novo. Gibson v. Bell, 312 So. 3d 318, 321 (¶10) (Miss. 2020).

I. The circuit court erred by dismissing Holt’s appeal for failure to
file a brief.

¶9. On appeal, there is no dispute that the circuit court dismissed Holt’s appeal without

the circuit clerk first providing written notice of the deficiency and fourteen days to cure the

deficiency. The dismissal of Holt’s appeal on that ground runs afoul of our precedent and

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2(a)(2) provides that

[w]hen either [the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals] . . . determines that
dismissal may be warranted under this Rule 2(a)(2), the clerk of the Supreme
Court shall give written notice to the party in default, apprising the party of the
nature of the deficiency. If the party in default fails to correct the deficiency
within fourteen (14) days after notification, the appeal shall be dismissed by
the clerk of the Supreme Court.

M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2).2 Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that it would deprive the appellant

of due process to dismiss the appeal without first providing official written notice of any

deficiency and an opportunity to cure. Van Meter, 774 So. 2d at 432 (¶4); accord Pilate v.

Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 282 So. 3d 566, 568-70 (¶¶9-12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

¶10. Here, there is no dispute that the clerk did not give Holt official written notice that his

appeal was deficient, nor was Holt allowed fourteen days to cure the deficiency. Moreover,

2
Although Rule 2(a)(2) refers to “the clerk of the Supreme Court,” the circuit clerk
is responsible for giving such notice in an appeal to the circuit court. Van Meter v. Alford,
774 So. 2d 430, 432 (¶3) (Miss. 2000).

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the State does not dispute that the circuit court erred by dismissing the appeal on this ground.3

Clearly, the circuit court erred by dismissing Holt’s appeal without first providing him

official written notice of the deficiency and an opportunity to cure.

II. The record is insufficient to determine whether the circuit court
had appellate jurisdiction.

¶11. Although the circuit court dismissed the appeal for an erroneous reason, the State

argues that we should affirm the dismissal because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over

the appeal. Specifically, the State contends that Holt failed to perfect his appeal because he

failed to post a cost bond within the time required by section 11-51-79. In response, Holt

argues that Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.1, which does not require a cost bond,

controls and overrides the requirements of section 11-51-79.

¶12. The Mississippi Constitution provides that the circuit courts shall have “such appellate

jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law,” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 156, thereby granting the

Legislature “the prerogative . . . to set the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts.” Belmont

Holding LLC v. Davis Monuments LLC, 253 So. 3d 323, 330 (¶30) (Miss. 2018). Relatedly,

the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that it has no authority “to establish [the circuit

courts’ appellate] jurisdiction through rules of procedure.” Id. Our Supreme Court has

clearly held that section 11-51-79’s cost bond requirement is a “jurisdictional requirement.”

Id. at 331 (¶33). Accordingly, the Rules of Criminal Procedure cannot, as Holt contends,

supersede the statutory requirements for perfecting an appeal to the circuit court. See id. at

326-31 (¶¶13-33); Gibson, 312 So. 3d at 322 (¶14).

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As noted above, the State fails to address the issue.

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¶13. Although section 11-51-79 appears in Title 11 of the Mississippi Code, which is

captioned “Civil Practice and Procedure,” the State argues that the statute applies to both

civil and criminal appeals. In relevant part, the statute reads:

Appeals from the law side of the county court shall be made to the circuit
court, and those from the equity side to the chancery court on application made
therefor and bond given according to law, except as hereinafter provided. . . .
Appeals from the county court shall be taken and bond given within thirty (30)
days from the date of the entry of the final judgment or decree . . . . Provided,
however, that when appeals are taken in felony cases which have been
transferred from the circuit court to the county court for trial, and have been
there tried, such appeals from the judgment of the county court shall be taken
directly to the Supreme Court.

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-79 (emphasis added). In Keller v. State, 330 So. 3d 788 (Miss. Ct.

App. 2021), we applied this statute and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of a criminal

appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the appellant’s failure to timely post a cost bond. Id.

at 790-91 (¶¶1-6). There, we accepted without analysis that the statute applied in criminal

cases.4 We now directly address that issue and agree with the State that the statute applies

to both civil and criminal appeals.

¶14. “Courts have a duty to give statutes a practical application consistent with their

wording, unless such application is inconsistent with the obvious intent of the legislature.”

Nissan N. Am. Inc. v. Tillman, 273 So. 3d 710, 715 (¶15) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Miss. State

& Sch. Emps.’ Life & Health Plan v. KCC Inc., 108 So. 3d 932, 936 (¶10) (Miss. 2013)).

4
On appeal before this Court, Keller had ignored the circuit court’s order of
dismissal, section 11-51-79, and its requirement of a cost bond. Keller, 330 So. 3d at 791
(¶5). As this Court noted, “Keller completely fail[ed] to address the circuit court’s order
dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction”; instead, he “challenge[d] the sufficiency of
the evidence” against him and alleged that the county court committed “various other errors”
during his trial de novo. Id.

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“[T]he ultimate goal of this Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the

legislative intent.” Id. (quoting Wayne Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Morgan, 224 So. 3d 539, 542 (¶8)

(Miss. 2017)). “[T]his Court always starts statutory interpretation by looking at the plain

language of the statute.” Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027 n.4 (Miss.

2011). We also consider “the statute’s historical background, its subject matter, and the

purposes and objects to be accomplished.” Bell v. State, 160 So. 3d 188, 193 (¶14) (Miss.

2015) (brackets omitted).

¶15. Looking first to its plain language, section 11-51-79 generally governs all appeals

from county court, providing that “[a]ppeals from the law side of the county court shall be

made to the circuit court, and those from the equity side to the chancery court.” Miss. Code

Ann. § 11-51-79. Moreover, the statute’s only exception presupposes that it generally

governs criminal appeals. The statute excludes only a specific subset of criminal appeals

from its coverage, stating—as an exception to the circuit courts’ general appellate

jurisdiction—that “appeals . . . in felony cases which have been transferred from the circuit

court to the county court for trial, and . . . there tried, . . . shall be taken directly to the

Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis added). This exception clearly implies that the statute

governs all other criminal appeals from county court. Thus, the statute’s plain language

indicates that it applies to civil and criminal appeals alike.

¶16. Moreover, while we acknowledge that the statute is presently codified in Title 11 of

the Mississippi Code, which is captioned, “Civil Practice and Procedure,” the statute’s

present location in Title 11 is not significant. To begin with, the Legislature has provided

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that “captions” “used to describe the substance of a title . . . of the Mississippi Code . . . shall

not constitute a part of the Mississippi Code . . . unless specifically so provided by law.”

Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-81(1)-(2) (Rev. 2019). Indeed, such captions “may be revised by a

publisher of the code as the publisher deems appropriate.” Id. § 1-3-81(3). Thus, Title 11’s

descriptive “caption” is not law. In addition, other provisions of Title 11 clearly apply to

both civil and criminal cases.5 Indeed, the provision that immediately follows section 11-51-

79 in Title 11 expressly applied to both civil and criminal cases.6 Thus, despite its caption,

Title 11 clearly includes statutes that apply in criminal cases.

¶17. The statute’s historical background also supports our conclusion that it applies in

criminal cases. This provision was previously codified in parts of the 1930 Code and 1942

Code that were simply titled “Courts” or “County Courts.”7 The Legislature has not

significantly amended its language over time.8 This indicates that from its enactment, the

5
See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-3-37 (Rev. 2019) (“In all cases, civil and criminal,
a judgment or decree appealed from may be affirmed as to some of the appellants and be
reversed as to others . . . .”).
6
See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev. 2019) (“[T]here shall be no appeal from the
circuit court to the Supreme Court of any case civil or criminal which originated in a justice
of the peace, municipal or police court and was thence appealed to the county court and
thence to the circuit court unless in the determination of the case a constitutional question
be necessarily involved and then only upon the allowance of the appeal by the circuit judge
or by a judge of the Supreme Court.”). This part of section 11-51-81 was held
unconstitutional in Jones v. City of Ridgeland, 48 So. 3d 530, 537 (¶16) (Miss. 2010).
7
See Miss. Code Ann. § 1616 (1942) (in Title 10, “Courts,” and Chapter 5, “County
Courts”); Miss. Code Ann. § 704 (1930) (in Chapter 17, “County Courts”).
8
The statute was enacted in 1926. 1926 Miss. Laws ch. 131. It was amended in
1940 to direct “[a]ppeals from the law side of the county court . . . to the circuit court, and
those from the equity side to the chancery court.” 1940 Miss. Laws ch. 229, § 1.

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Legislature intended this provision to govern both civil and criminal appeals from county

courts to circuit courts.

¶18. Finally, we note that the official comment to Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure

30.1 cites section 11-51-79, implicitly recognizing that it applies in criminal cases. MRCrP

30.1 cmt.

¶19. For all these reasons, we conclude that section 11-51-79 applies in both civil and

criminal cases. Therefore, as in Keller, we conclude that a criminal defendant’s failure to

comply with the statute’s jurisdictional requirements requires dismissal of the appeal.

¶20. We now turn to whether Holt satisfied section 11-51-79’s requirements, specifically

whether he timely posted a cost bond.

¶21. Under section 11-51-79, “a party seeking to appeal a county court judgment” “must

file notice of the appeal and post a bond” “within thirty days of the entry of the judgment.”

Gibson, 312 So. 3d at 321 (¶12) (emphasis added) (quoting T. Jackson Lyons & Assocs. P.A.

v. Precious T. Martin Sr. & Assocs. PLLC, 87 So. 3d 444, 448 (¶12) (Miss. 2012)). “The

bond required for appeals from county court is a cost bond, which is commonly referred to

as an appeal bond.” Keller, 330 So. 3d at 790 (¶3) (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

“The requirement of a cost bond may be satisfied by simply prepaying the costs of preparing

the record, including the preparation of a trial transcript.” Id. “Indeed, because parties

typically pay this cost rather than posting a bond for the amount, it has been said that there

is no longer a ‘bond’ for prepayment of costs.” Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, “our Supreme Court has made clear that the cost bond (or prepayment of costs)

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required by section 11-51-79 ‘is jurisdictional because it is a statutory requirement for an

appeal.’” Id. at (¶4) (emphasis added) (quoting T. Jackson Lyons & Assocs., 87 So. 3d at 451

(¶23)). This means that “if the appellant fails to timely [post] his cost bond, his appeal is not

perfected, and the circuit court has no choice but to dismiss the case for lack of appellate

jurisdiction.” Id. at 791 (¶4) (citing Gibson, 312 So. 3d at 324 (¶25)). Therefore, Holt was

required to prepay the costs of his appeal within thirty days of the entry of the judgment in

the county court. If he failed to do so, the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction.

¶22. The State argues that Holt failed to timely prepay the costs of his appeal to the circuit

court, but the record is contradictory and insufficient for this Court to determine whether Holt

met that requirement. Holt’s prior counsel certified that Holt prepaid the costs of the appeal,

or at least part of the costs, on October 6, 2021—the same date the judgment of conviction

was entered in county court. But the only docket entry for prepayment of appeal costs

reflects that payment was made on November 16, 2021—forty-one days after the judgment

of conviction and eleven days beyond the statute’s jurisdictional deadline. Based on this

conflict in the record, it is not clear to this Court when Holt actually prepaid the costs of his

appeal. Therefore, we remand the case to the circuit court to determine when Holt prepaid

the costs of his appeal and whether the circuit court obtained appellate jurisdiction.9

CONCLUSION

9
Cf. Justin Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 72 (2012)
(“[W]hen a court of appeals recognizes jurisdictional issues overlooked by the [trial] court,
it makes sense to charge [trial] courts with the task of investigating. When a [trial] court
fails to assure itself that the record contains sufficient jurisdictional facts, the appellate court
should reverse and remand, as they already do on an ad hoc basis.”).

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¶23. The circuit court erred by dismissing Holt’s appeal for failure to file a brief because

Holt was not provided with notice of the deficiency and an opportunity to cure. Because it

is unclear whether Holt satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of section 11-51-79, we

vacate the circuit court’s order of dismissal and remand the case to the circuit court to

determine when Holt prepaid the cost of his appeal and whether the circuit court obtained

appellate jurisdiction.

¶24. VACATED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND
EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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