Sharon Richardson v. The Estate of Thomas James Richardson, Sr., Lillie Richardson, Thomas James Richardson, Jr., Tocha Richardson Ndao, Samuel Richardson, Antonio Richardson and Isaiah Thomas Richardson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CA-00650-COA

SHARON RICHARDSON APPELLANT

v.

THE ESTATE OF THOMAS JAMES APPELLEES
RICHARDSON, SR., LILLIE RICHARDSON,
THOMAS JAMES RICHARDSON, JR., TOCHA
RICHARDSON NDAO, SAMUEL RICHARDSON,
ANTONIO RICHARDSON AND ISAIAH
THOMAS RICHARDSON

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/18/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. J. DEWAYNE THOMAS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KENYA REESE MARTIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: MEL J. BREEDEN JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/20/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2022, Sharon Richardson filed a petition to confirm title in the Hinds County

Chancery Court against the heirs of her deceased ex-husband, Thomas J. Richardson Sr. In

the petition, Sharon sought to enforce two liens she had filed against real property owned by

Thomas in satisfaction of alleged monies owed from the couples’ 2004 divorce judgment.

The respondents (“the Estate”) moved for summary judgment, claiming there was no enrolled

monetary judgment to provide a basis for the liens. The chancery court granted the Estate’s

motion for summary judgment and expunged the liens from the county’s records. Sharon
appeals from the court’s judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Sharon and Thomas were divorced on May 5, 2004. In the chancery court’s judgment

of divorce, Sharon was granted child support of $175 per month, title to a 1996 Pontiac

Grand Prix automobile, and nineteen head of cattle valued at $850 each. Sharon appealed

the judgment, which this Court affirmed in part. Richardson v. Richardson, 912 So. 2d 1079,

1083 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). We determined, however, that Sharon was entitled to only

thirteen head of cattle, and we reversed the judgment in part and remanded “with instructions

to determine a more concrete value for the individual cattle, and to then award Sharon cattle

equal to one-third of the value of the herd, or if necessary, to direct that the herd be sold, and

Sharon be awarded one-third of the proceeds of the sale.” Id. at 1082 (¶7).1 However, the

record does not show that the chancery court made any further rulings on the matter.

¶3. Sixteen years later, on December 3, 2021, Sharon filed two notices of liens with the

chancery court against two parcels of real property Thomas owned, allegedly in satisfaction

of monies owed to Sharon from the 2004 divorce judgment. The stated amount of the lien

for each property was $99,869.54. Thomas died shortly thereafter;2 so Sharon filed a petition

to confirm title against the Estate on January 19, 2022, “seeking legal title to the two (2)

1
We also instructed the chancery court to clarify its ruling concerning the award of
thirty-four acres of timberland property. Richardson, 912 So. 2d at 1082 (¶8).
2
Although the precise date of Thomas’s death is not in the record, Sharon attached
a copy of a service leaflet to her petition showing that Thomas’s funeral service was held on
December 18, 2021. Sharon’s brief also states that Thomas died days after the liens were
filed.

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subject parcels of real property based upon the two (2) liens asserted in this matter.” The

Estate counterclaimed that (1) because there was no legal basis or statutory authority for the

liens, the liens should be expunged from the chancery clerk’s records; and (2) Sharon’s

petition was “frivolous and without substantial justification.”

¶4. On October 19, 2022, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming (1)

Sharon failed to show she did not receive the automobile; (2) there was no judgment from

the chancery court on remand regarding the value of the cattle (as ordered by this Court); (3)

there had been no “adjudication of past due child support”; and (4) that even if a judgment

lien existed, it had expired under statutory law, see Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-47 (Rev. 2019).

Sharon filed a response and her own motion for summary judgment. The chancery court held

a hearing on February 16, 2023. Sharon’s attorney argued that Sharon was owed $99,869.54

according to the lien ($15,000 for the Grand Prix, $5,000 in unpaid child support, $16,150

for the cattle, and $58,301.84 in interest). The Estate’s attorney asserted that there had been

no judgment enrolled in Hinds County.

¶5. The chancery court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate

on March 7, 2023. Noting that the divorce judgment referenced in Sharon’s petition “was

not enrolled in the Hinds County land roll judgments,” the chancery court concluded that

Sharon had “failed to establish any statutory or common law basis for the asserted liens

herein.” Sharon filed a motion to reconsider, arguing for the first time that this Court’s

mandate in Richardson created a debtor-creditor relationship between Thomas and Sharon;

therefore, a lien was created under Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-7-261 (Rev.

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2021).3 Sharon also claimed that the chancery clerk’s office was responsible for enrolling

the judgment under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-7-189 (Rev. 2019). The Estate

noted in its response, however, that section 11-7-189 “outlines the procedure imposed on the

circuit clerk to enroll a judgment when a judgment is rendered in circuit (or county) court at

the close of the term of circuit (or county) court”; the statute does not address chancery court

practice.

¶6. After a hearing, the chancery court denied the motion to reconsider on May 16, 2023.

In its order, the court determined that section 85-7-261 was “inapplicable as the liens asserted

by [Sharon] are not those ‘created and mentioned’” under the statute and because “[t]he cited

code section does not address a judgment lien or a lien purportedly based on a divorce

decree.” The court further found that Sharon “failed to establish any properly enrolled

judgment upon which her liens may be predicated; there are no disputed material facts that

would alter this finding of law.”

¶7. The chancery court entered a final judgment on May 18, 2023, dismissing Sharon’s

petition to confirm title with prejudice, granting the Estate’s counterclaims in part, and

expunging the notices of liens from the county land records. Sharon appeals from the

3
Section 85-7-261 (lien creation) provides:

Unless otherwise expressly provided, the liens created or mentioned in this
chapter shall exist by virtue of the relation of the parties, and without any
writing, or if in writing, without recording; and the rights and liens conferred
may be asserted and enforced by the assigns and personal representatives of
the lienor.

Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-261.

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chancery court’s final judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment is subject to de novo

review. Noone v. Noone, 127 So. 3d 193, 195 (¶4) (Miss. 2013). “Summary judgment is

appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Smith v. Dodd, 328 So. 3d 772,

774 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing M.R.C.P. 56(c)).

DISCUSSION

¶9. Sharon argues that the chancery court’s decision to grant summary judgment “is

flawed in two aspects:” the court failed (1) to consider this Court’s opinion in Richardson

“as a final judgment”; and (2) “to conduct an evidentiary hearing to properly consider the

legality of Sharon’s liens.” Summarily, Sharon contends that our mandate “created a

debtor-creditor relationship, which authorized the liens filed by Sharon in this matter.”

¶10. In Richardson, our Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the chancery court’s

final judgment for further proceedings regarding the value of the cattle award. There is

nothing in the record demonstrating that those proceedings ever took place (as Sharon

acknowledged). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held,

From time immemorial, we have adhered to the basic and elementary rule that
our appellate affirmance ratifies, confirms, and declares that the trial court
judgment was correct as if there had been no appeal. Upon issuance of our
mandate, the trial court simply proceeds to enforce the final judgment. The
execution of the mandate of this Court is purely ministerial.

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Collins v. Acree, 614 So. 2d 391, 392 (Miss. 1993). Furthermore, as our disposition was not

to affirm but to reverse and remand (in part), there was no final “order” created by our

mandate. Therefore, we find no merit to Sharon’s argument that our mandate created a

debtor-creditor relationship between Thomas and Sharon.

¶11. Even were we to accept Sharon’s argument that our mandate somehow had the “legal

effect” of an enrolled judgment, her claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-47 provides in part: “A judgment or decree

rendered in any court held in this state shall not be a lien on the property of the defendant

therein for a longer period than seven years from the rendition thereof, unless an action be

brought thereon before the expiration of such time.” Sharon filed her liens in 2021, sixteen

years after our mandate was issued. She claims that because the chancery court never ruled

on the cattle valuation issue, the statute of limitations was tolled. However, as the Estate

notes, “Sharon never pursued any action . . . seeking a determination of any amounts due

from Thomas to Sharon” as a result of this court’s ruling.

¶12. As to the second issue, there is no evidence of an enrolled monetary judgment that

would provide the basis for the liens on Thomas’s real property. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-

7-197 (Rev. 2019) (providing that a judgment “shall not be a lien upon or bind the property

of the defendant within the county in which such judgments or decrees may be rendered, until

an abstract thereof shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county

and enrolled on the judgment roll”). Furthermore, the cited statutory authority to support

Sharon’s argument that her liens were valid—Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-7-

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189—is not applicable to chancery court practice and procedure. See supra ¶5.

¶13. Viewing the evidence in the light more favorable to Sharon as the non-movant, we

find no triable issues of fact. Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s final judgment.

¶14. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

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