Patrick Newell a/k/a Patrick Latrelle Newell v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-KA-01137-COA

PATRICK NEWELL A/K/A PATRICK APPELLANT
LATRELLE NEWELL

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAL WILLIAMSON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/21/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. On November 27, 2017, a Jones County grand jury indicted Patrick Newell for

possession of twenty-two grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and as a

habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated sections 41-29-139 (Supp. 2016)

and 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015). After a jury trial on March 2, 2020, Newell was found guilty and

was sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections (MDOC), with twenty-five years to serve and the remaining five

years suspended on condition of the successful completion of five years of post-release
supervision. Newell was also ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 and court costs in the amount

of $427.50, for a total of $10,427.50. On direct appeal, Newell contends that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. His contention is based upon his attorney’s failure to

pursue a motion to suppress evidence of what he claims to be the product of an illegal search

and his attorney’s failure to object to the admission of testimony regarding other alleged “bad

acts.” Newell seeks to have his conviction and sentence reversed and his case remanded for

a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On January 13, 2017, Newell’s Tahoe was stopped by Investigator James Stiglett on

Highway 11 in the First Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi, for speeding.1 Once

Newell was stopped, Stiglett checked his license and asked him to step out of the vehicle.

Stiglett testified that Newell was breathing hard, sweating, and appeared nervous. At that

point, Stiglett asked Newell if there was “anything” in the vehicle and requested his consent

to search, which Newell refused. Within minutes, Lieutenant Robert Little and Investigator

Jeff Monk arrived on the scene to assist Stiglett with the stop. Little testified that Newell

was being evasive and otherwise acting nervous. Based upon Newell’s behavior, his

knowledge of Newell’s prior history with narcotics, and information from a reliable

confidential informant (CI), Stiglett left the scene to obtain a search warrant. Little testified

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Stiglett testified at trial that Newell was driving “up to forty-five” miles per hour in
a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone.

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that he allowed Newell and the passengers of the vehicle2 to leave the scene upon their

request; however, Little and Monk maintained custody of the vehicle until Stiglett obtained

a search warrant. After the warrant was signed, the investigators searched Newell’s vehicle

and found sandwich bags, rolling papers, a bag of ammunition, a glasses case that contained

methamphetamine,3 a digital scale with methamphetamine residue, and glass pipes. Law

enforcement later apprehended Newell at a local residence.

¶3. On January 17, 2017, Newell was interviewed by Patrol Sergeant Jared Lindsey. At

trial and after a brief conference between both attorneys, a video of Lindsey’s interview with

Newell was admitted into evidence and published to the jury without objection from defense

counsel. During the interview, Lindsey questioned Newell about the facts and circumstances

surrounding the traffic stop and search on January 13, 2017. Additionally, Newell was

questioned concerning his participation in or knowledge of other unsolved crimes and

investigations.

¶4. Following his indictment on November 27, 2017, Newell’s first attorney filed a

motion in limine to suppress on July 12, 2018, which alleged that the evidence seized

pursuant to the vehicle search should be excluded from evidence admitted at trial. This

motion was never brought before the court for a ruling. Newell proceeded to trial on March

2, 2020, with a second attorney and was found guilty as charged in the indictment. On March

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Newell’s wife and a small child were present in the vehicle at the time of the traffic
stop.
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Keith McMahan from the Mississippi Forensic Laboratory in Meridian testified, as
an expert, that the substance found was 21.98 grams of methamphetamine.

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13, 2020, Newell filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or for

a new trial, which was denied in an order entered on September 25, 2020. On October 14,

2020, Newell filed his notice of appeal. Newell also filed a pro se motion to quash his

indictment and vacate the judgment on November 6, 2020. His motion to quash and vacate

was denied in an order entered on November 6, 2020.

ANALYSIS

¶5. Newell’s sole assertion on appeal is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

at trial. More specifically, he alleges that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to pursue

a motion to suppress the introduction of evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle

on January 13, 2017, and (2) failing to object to the testimony presented at trial regarding

prior alleged “bad acts.”

¶6. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

the standard for which an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be proved:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or a death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

(Emphasis added). In Sandlin v. State, 312 So. 3d 1191, 1197-98 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.

2020) cert. denied, 312 So. 3d 730 (Miss. 2021), this Court stated in part:

Both prongs of the Strickland test must be proved or the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel fails. [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687]. As to the first prong,

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this Court has held that “the accused is not entitled to errorless counsel, and
not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight. Each case is to be decided on the
totality of the facts of the entire record.” Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 476
(Miss. 1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence . . . .” Id. at 477. “Because of
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” Wilcher v. State, 863 So. 2d 776, 796 (¶30)
(Miss. 2003) (citing Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984)). In
determining what falls into the category of trial strategy, this Court has held
that “[c]ounsel’s choice of whether or not to file certain motions, call certain
witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections falls within the
ambit of trial strategy.” Hill v. State, 850 So. 2d 223, 226 (¶14) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing Scott v. State, 742 So. 2d 1190 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
1999)). Further, “[a] strategic decision to pursue less than all plausible
lines of defense will rarely, if ever, be deemed ineffective if counsel first
adequately investigated the rejected alternative.” Cole v. State, 666 So. 2d
767, 776 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243,
1253-54 (5th Cir. 1982)[negative history omitted)]). . . .

(Emphasis added).

¶7. In Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Bell v. State, 202

So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶12) (Miss. 2016)), the Mississippi Supreme Court said:

“[G]enerally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more appropriately
brought during post-conviction proceedings.” Bell v. State, 202 So. 3d 1239,
1242 (Miss. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dartez v. State,
177 So. 3d 420, 422-23 (Miss. 2015)). This Court will address such claims on
direct appeal when “[1] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of
constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate that the record is
adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact by a trial judge able
to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc.[,] are not needed.” Id. (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Read v. State, 430 So.
2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983)). This Court has also resolved ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal when the record affirmatively
shows that the claims are without merit. See, e.g., Swinney v. State, 241 So.
3d 599, 613 (Miss. 2018); Ashford v. State, 233 So. 3d 765, 779-81 (Miss.

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2017); see also M.R.A.P. 22.

Because the State did not stipulate that the record is adequate in the case at hand, we must

examine the record to determine whether it “affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of

constitutional dimensions” or whether the record “affirmatively shows that the claims are

without merit” before this Court will consider a Strickland analysis.

I. MOTION IN LIMINE TO SUPPRESS

¶8. First, Newell alleges that his counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue a motion in

limine that could have excluded incriminating evidence discovered when the officers

searched his vehicle. A motion in limine to suppress was filed on July 12, 2018, but was

never brought before the court for a ruling. There is no evidence in the record that any other

written motion or motion made ore tenus attacking the admissibility of evidence seized

during the search was ever brought before the court. The sandwich bags (Exhibit 1), tobacco

papers (Exhibit 2), bag of ammunition (Exhibit 3), sunglasses case (Exhibit 4), digital scales

(Exhibit 5), glass pipes (Exhibit 6), and methamphetamine (Exhibit 7) were all admitted into

evidence at trial without objection. Because there was no hearing to determine whether the

warrant was supported by probable cause, the record does not contain the officer’s affidavit

or underlying facts and circumstances he presented to the judge. The record does not contain

a copy of the executed search warrant allowing for the search of Newell’s vehicle.

¶9. In Donerson v. State, 812 So. 2d 1081, 1085 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), this Court

stated that “when this court is reviewing a finding of probable cause by a lower court, we are

not to review de novo whether there was probable cause or not, but our job is simply to

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[e]nsure that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s determination of probable

cause.” Because the record is not fully developed regarding Newell’s ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claim related to counsel’s failure to pursue suppression of the fruits of the search,

this portion of his claim cannot be decided on direct appeal and must be raised in an

appropriate post-conviction proceeding.

II. PRIOR “BAD ACTS” EVIDENCE

¶10. Secondly, Newell argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to

testimony and evidence concerning alleged prior “bad acts.” More specifically, Newell

argues that his video interview with Lindsey and Stiglett’s and Little’s trial testimony was

“substantially more prejudicial than probative under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, and

the admission of the evidence deprived [him] of his fundamental right to a fair trial.”

¶11. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) provides in part:

Where the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the
appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall
constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issues in post-conviction
proceedings.

The comment to Rule 22(b) further provides in part:

Under this provision, issues such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to object to evidence offered by the state or to argument by the
state must be raised on direct appeal. Other post-conviction issues which
cannot be raised at the time of appeal because they involve actions or inactions
outside the record are not waived since they cannot practically be raised
without further development or investigation.

M.R.A.P. 22(b) cmt. (emphasis added). All the alleged prejudicial testimony was included

in the trial transcripts and Newell’s video interview was played for the jury, introduced as

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an exhibit at trial, and included in the record on appeal. Therefore, we find that the record

is sufficient to consider Newell’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal

pertaining to the admission of evidence of alleged prior “bad acts.”

A. Video Interview

¶12. Lindsey interviewed Newell on January 17, 2017. Lindsey testified at Newell’s trial

and the video interview was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 8 and played for the jury.

Before the interview was played for the jury and after the judge asked Newell’s counsel if

there was any objection, Newell’s attorney said, “[C]ould [I] just ask Ms. Martin a question

about the disc?” After an “off-the-record” discussion noted in the trial transcript, Newell’s

counsel responded he had no objection. During the interview, Lindsey asked very few

questions about the actual traffic stop and vehicle search that occurred on January 13, 2017.

While the interview did elicit information about Newell’s history with drugs, the vast

majority of the interview was spent gleaning information about an apparently bigger target

named “Mon.” Lindsey asked questions about where “Mon” lived, a description of “Mon’s”

house, the quantity of drugs that “Mon” keeps on hand and sells, whether “Mon” deals guns,

whether “Mon” had a vehicle, whether “Mon” ever used Newell’s truck, and whether “Mon”

was involved in a gang. Newell provided the information and answered Lindsey’s questions.

While Newell denied ownership of the methamphetamine and denied knowing the

methamphetamine was in his vehicle, he admitted in the interview that his fingerprints may

be on the bag of methamphetamine found in his car during the January 13th search. Newell

also testified that “Mon” did not have a car and did borrow his car on occasion to get drugs

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from other locations. Finally, Lindsey spent a significant amount of time asking Newell what

information he could give them that would “knock their socks off” and assist them with a

bigger drug or gun bust or unsolved murder case.

¶13. Newell’s attorney relied on the information disclosed in Newell’s interview to assert

a defense in his closing argument. Counsel stated in part:

You saw a video interview of Mr. Newell in which he said some pretty
reprehensible things. . . . He didn’t talk about having any drugs under the seat
in his truck. In fact, he said – you heard officer Lindsey ask about “Mon.”
Who is “Mon”? We don’t know. “Mon’s” name never came up in this
investigation except in that interview, but Mr. Newell said that “Mon” had
driven his truck. That “Mon” was the drug dealer, and it was apparent from
the interview that Officer Lindsey had some interest in “Mon.” “Mon” was a
big fish. They want to take “Mon” down. Well, Mr. Newell said that “Mon”
would borrow his truck, leave be gone for seven or eight minutes and come
right back. That he used his truck all the time. Can you say for sure that if that
is the case and “Mon,” this big bad drug dealer who Officer Lindsey wanted
but we never heard about except in that interview, had used Mr. Newell’s
truck, could Mr. Newell have known that it was under his seat? Did he
intentionally, purposefully possess what was found under the seat? And is it
possible that “Mon” borrowed his truck, left it under the seat, and that’s why
Mr. Newell was so eager to walk away once the police started searching his
vehicle? He didn’t think he had anything to hide.

It is clear from counsel’s closing argument that he relied on the contents of the video

interview to present his defense. During the interview, Newell denied that the

methamphetamine found belonged to him and said he did not know the drugs were in his

vehicle. The defense attempted to create a reasonable doubt that the drugs belonged to

Newell by showing that the methamphetamine could have been left in Newell’s vehicle by

the elusive “Mon.” Further, when the court asked Newell’s counsel if there was any

objection to the video interview being entered into evidence, he requested a conference with

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counsel opposite before answering the court’s question. After an off-the-record discussion,

Newell’s counsel responded, “No objection, Your Honor.” It can be inferred by counsel’s

request for a conference with counsel opposite that Newell’s counsel made an informed and

strategic decision to refrain from objecting to the admission of the video interview. The

admission of Newell’s interview placed his defense before the jury (that the drugs belonged

to “Mon”) without Newell having to testify at trial. The interview was replete with

information regarding “Mon’s” drug activity, which Newell relied upon in his defense. For

those reasons, we find that Newell has failed to successfully satisfy the first prong of the test

set forth in Strickland that his counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to object to the

admission of the video interview at trial.

B. Stiglett’s and Little’s Trial Testimony

¶14. Stiglett and Little each testified at trial in behalf of the State. During direct and cross-

examination, they both testified about a prior controlled sale where a CI purchased drugs

from Newell out of the same vehicle that Newell was driving on January 13, 2017. This

information was primarily elicited by defense counsel’s questions to the officers, such as

“Did you know that was Mr. Newell before you pulled him over?”; “What was your purpose

for asking him to step out of his vehicle?”; and “What gave you probable cause to search his

vehicle that day?” One of Newell’s arguments at trial was that the January 13th traffic stop

for speeding was pretextual and that in reality, Stiglett stopped Newell’s vehicle because of

the information recently received from a CI. It is clear from the trial transcript that it was

counsel’s objective to question the real purpose of the stop and search in an effort to cast

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doubt on the reliability of the officers’ testimonies. Arguably, counsel’s failure to object to

testimony concerning the alleged prior CI purchase from Newell and in eliciting such

testimony during his examination of witnesses was part of his strategy to attack the officers’

motive for the traffic stop and ultimately the vehicle search. For those reasons, we find that

Newell has failed to successfully prove the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland that

his counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to object to and elicit testimony regarding

alleged prior “bad acts.”

¶15. Finally, regardless of whether Newell successfully proved the first prong of the

Strickland test, to prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Newell would also

have to prove that the “deficient performance prejudiced [his] defense. This requires [a]

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable.” Johns v. State, 926 So. 2d 188, 194-95 (¶31) (Miss. 2006). In the

case at hand, the officers testified that they found suspected drugs and drug-related items in

Newell’s vehicle, and those items were introduced into evidence at trial for the jury’s review.

Further, an expert from the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory testified that the substance in

the glasses case retrieved from Newell’s car was tested and found to be methamphetamine.

In light of the physical evidence presented at trial, it is highly unlikely that the final outcome

of the trial would have been any different despite counsel’s performance.

CONCLUSION

¶16. After review, we find that the record is not adequate for this Court to address the

portion of Newell’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim pertaining to counsel’s failure

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to pursue the motion in limine to suppress the evidence obtained from Newell’s vehicle

search. Therefore, that portion of Newell’s claim is dismissed without prejudice so that he

may raise it in a properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief if he so chooses.

However, after reviewing the record as it pertains to Newell’s claim resulting from counsel’s

failure to object to certain evidence and testimony concerning alleged prior “bad acts,” we

find the record sufficient for review of that claim. But we find that this argument has no

merit, and therefore Newell’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

¶17. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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