Jeremy Jerome Brown v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-KA-01383-COA

JEREMY JEROME BROWN APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/18/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARK SHELDON DUNCAN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NESHOBA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: STEVEN SIMEON KILGORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/16/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jeremy Brown was convicted of one count of shooting into a dwelling and two counts

of aggravated assault. The Neshoba County Circuit Court sentenced Brown to serve ten

years for shooting into a dwelling and twenty years for each count of aggravated assault, with

all three sentences to be served consecutively in the custody of the Mississippi Department

of Corrections. Brown’s post-trial motion was denied. On appeal, he argues that the circuit

court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant used to seize

evidence from his home did not comply with Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.3.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS

¶2. On January 28, 2019, between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m., the Philadelphia Police Department

received several phone calls reporting “shots fired” near Loper Street and Walnut Street.

Neshoba County Deputy Todd Adcock assisted the police department by patrolling the area

to listen for gunfire. During his patrol, Deputy Adcock noticed a white SUV turn onto Loper

Street. He followed the vehicle and heard gunshots. Deputy Adcock also saw multiple

muzzle blasts coming from the driver’s side window of the vehicle. He briefly stopped,

confirmed no one was injured, and continued his pursuit. Deputy Adcock followed the white

SUV until it stopped in the driveway of an unknown residence. He notified the police

department of the vehicle’s location and responded to another call.

¶3. Officer Josh Ray arrived at the residence as Deputy Adcock was leaving. He knocked

on the door, but no one answered. Officer Ray went to the white SUV and shined a light

through the window. No one was inside the vehicle, but Officer Ray saw shell casings on

the floorboard. Brown’s sister approached from the end of the driveway and said the vehicle

belonged to her. She gave Officer Ray consent to search the vehicle, and he found and

collected eight shell casings from two different calibers—7.62 x 39 and .223. Based on law

enforcement’s investigation, Brown was a person of interest. Officers attempted to locate

Brown that night but were unsuccessful.

¶4. The following day around 2 p.m., a confidential informant told Officer Ray that he

saw Brown outside 381 Loper Street. Officer Ray immediately obtained a search warrant

from Judge Cumberland of the Neshoba County Justice Court. The items to be seized were

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a .233 rife, a .45 APC handgun, a 7.62 x 39 rifle, and a .40-caliber handgun. Notably, Judge

Cumberland did not put a time on the warrant or list the name of the law enforcement officer

to whom the warrant was delivered.1

¶5. Office Ray executed the warrant at 5:10 p.m. that same day. He found and seized the

following items: one Ruger pistol, one Diamondback AR-15, a DTI AR-15, a partial box of

7.62 x 39 ammunition, a full box and a partial box of Federal .223 ammunition, a partial box

of American Eagle ammunition, an empty 7.62 x 39 magazine, and a clear plastic bag

containing a green leafy substance. Brown was arrested at the residence when the items were

seized.

¶6. Tracey Talley and her niece Sunshine Spivey testified at trial. They were in Talley’s

vehicle when Brown began shooting in their direction. Approximately seven bullets struck

Talley’s vehicle, but neither Talley nor Spivey was injured. Talley testified that she went to

her parents’ house on Loper Street to pick up Spivey because Spivey heard gunshots and was

scared. As Talley and Spivey were leaving, a white SUV came down Loper Street. The

vehicle stopped in front of the house, and the driver opened his door and fired shots. Talley

and Spivey crouched to the floorboards of Talley’s vehicle as shots were fired at Talley’s

vehicle and at her parents’ house. Talley testified that the shooter drove a white four-door

SUV and identified photographs of the vehicle. She also identified Brown and testified that

she made eye contact with him before he started shooting. Spivey likewise identified Brown

as the driver and shooter and testified that she knew the vehicle belonged to Brown’s sister.

1
See MRCrP 4.3(3).

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¶7. During Officer Ray’s testimony, Brown moved to suppress the items seized during

the search. He argued that the search warrant was invalid because it did not include the

“exact time and date” as required by Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.3. The court

ultimately denied Brown’s motion and allowed the items into evidence. The details of the

motion to suppress hearing are discussed below.

¶8. The jury found Brown guilty of one count of shooting into a dwelling and two counts

of aggravated assault. Brown filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in

the alternative, a new trial. The court denied Brown’s motion, which resulted in this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this Court adopts a

mixed standard of review.” Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469, 482 (¶21) (Miss. 2010) (citing

Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (¶20) (Miss. 2006)). “Determinations of reasonable

suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Dies, 926 So. 2d at 917

(¶20); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs,

749 So. 2d 110, 113 (Miss. 1999)). “However, we are bound by the trial judge’s findings as

to the underlying ‘historical facts’ unless those findings are ‘clearly erroneous.’” Holloway

v. State, 282 So. 3d 537, 542 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Dies, 926 So. 2d at 917

(¶20)).

ANALYSIS

¶10. Brown’s sole argument on appeal is that the search warrant was invalid because it did

not specify the time the warrant was issued or the name of the law enforcement officer to

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whom the warrant was delivered. Thus, he argues that any evidence seized from that invalid

search warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures.2

¶11. Admittedly, Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.3(3) does require such contents

to be included:

Every search warrant issued by the court shall:

(1) command the law enforcement officer to search, within a specified time not
to exceed ten (10) days, the person(s) or place(s) named in the search warrant
and to return the warrant and an inventory of the thing(s) seized to the court
as designated in the warrant;

(2) designate the court to which the warrant and an inventory of the thing(s)
seized shall be returned; and

(3) be signed and dated by the judge, showing the exact time and date and
the name of the law enforcement officer to whom the warrant was
delivered for execution.

(Emphasis added).

¶12. During the hearing on Brown’s motion to suppress, Officer Ray testified about his

request for the search warrant. Shortly after 2 p.m. on January 29, 2019, after he was notified

of Brown’s whereabouts, he submitted a signed statement of the underlying facts and

circumstances and an affidavit to Judge Cumberland. Specifically, Officer Ray stated that

gunshots had been fired around 2 a.m. on Loper Street the day before. He further stated that

he had spoken with Talley, who told him that as she was backing out of the driveway, Brown,

driving a white SUV, started shooting into her vehicle and her mother’s house. Officer Ray

2
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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also stated that on January 29, 2019, at 2 p.m. a confidential informant located Brown at 381

Loper Street in Philadelphia, Mississippi.

¶13. Judge Cumberland, the judge who signed the warrant, also testified during the

hearing. He stated that on January 29, 2019, Officer Ray requested a search warrant. Based

on the totality of circumstances and documents provided to him, he believed that probable

cause existed to execute the warrant. Judge Cumberland signed and dated the warrant but

did not specify the time it was issued.

¶14. Rule 4.3’s time-requirement is consistent with the Mississippi Supreme Court’s

seminal decision in Taylor v. State, 137 Miss. 217, 102 So. 267, 268 (1924):

We think it is necessary that some time shall be fixed in a search warrant for
the return thereof, and that after that time it becomes functus officio, and
cannot be executed. If the return day named in the warrant does not fix the
time limit within which the warrant may be executed, and an officer may retain
a warrant in his possession until four days after its return day, and then validly
execute it, he may retain it four weeks or four months, or such other time as he
may desire. We do not think that it was ever contemplated that a search
warrant should be held by an officer as a weapon, to be used at his
discretion.

(Emphasis added). Rule 4.3 requires the warrant’s time and date be transfixed in an effort

to ensure that the search warrant does not become stale or used as a coercive police tactic.

Additionally, Rule 4.3 attempts to give force to prior Mississippi Supreme Court precedent

prohibiting unlimited time for the execution of warrant once issued. See Taylor, 137 Miss.

217, 102 So. at 268. That requirement prohibits the potential for coercive police tactics as

recognized by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Taylor.

¶15. Here, the record shows that Officer Ray learned of Brown’s location at 2 p.m. on

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January 29, 2019, and immediately requested a search warrant. He was the officer who

executed the warrant at 5:10 p.m. that same day. The judge who signed and authorized the

warrant testified at the suppression hearing about the information provided by the police to

him. Based on that information, the judge found probable cause as required by the

Constitution before issuing the search warrant. Because the officer executed the warrant

within mere hours of its issuance, the laudable goals of execution of the warrant within ten

days were met. Although the warrant technically violated Rule 4.3, the search and seizure

actions by the government in this case were in conformance with the Constitution. Thus, we

find that the warrant’s failure to provide the exact time was harmless error because the

warrant was clearly executed within hours of issuance and within the mandated ten-day time

frame. We further find that the warrant’s failure to include the name of the designated

officer was harmless error because the record is clear that Officer Ray was the officer who

requested and received the warrant. In conclusion, the goals of Rule of 4.3 were met, and

to hold the search warrant in this case invalid would, without doubt, put form over

substance.3

¶16. Further, Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because there was

probable cause for the warrant.4 In his request for the search warrant, Officer Ray provided

3
This opinion does not stand as precedent for the proposition that the government can
ignore the dictates of Rule 4.3 without consequence. Rather, under the unique
circumstances of this case and the arguments presented, the alleged deficiencies concerning
compliance with Rule 4.3 were harmless and did not violate constitutional demands.
4
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

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ample information connecting Brown to the shooting. Accordingly, we find no reversible

error and affirm Brown’s convictions and sentences.

¶17. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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