Michael Williams v. Chantelle Hanley Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-CA-01094-COA

MICHAEL WILLIAMS APPELLANT

v.

CHANTELLE HANLEY WILLIAMS APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/05/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT GEORGE CLARK III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: FRANKLIN ALAN GARRISON
HEATHER MARIE ABY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER A. TABB
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/17/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Madison County Chancery Court granted Chantelle Williams a divorce from

Michael Williams for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancery court also

awarded Chantelle sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s two minor children.

Michael now appeals from the chancery court’s grant of the fault-based divorce and custody

determination.

¶2. Finding that the chancery court was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous in

granting the divorce and sole custody to Chantelle, we affirm.

FACTS

¶3. Michael and Chantelle Williams were married in Adams County, Mississippi. There
were two children born of the marriage. After thirteen years of matrimony, Chantelle filed

a complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Michael

responded by denying Chantelle’s allegations and filing a counterclaim requesting custody

of the couple’s minor children. The four years since their separation have been acrimonious.

¶4. Contemporaneously to filing her complaint for divorce, Chantelle sought, and was

granted, a domestic-abuse protection order against Michael. The order prohibited Michael

from contacting either Chantelle or their children. Shortly after, the couple agreed to modify

the order and allow Michael to have visitation, while Chantelle retained sole physical

custody. The modified order stipulated that neither party was permitted to take the children

out of the country, estrange the children from the other parent, or discuss the aspects of the

case with the children.

¶5. A year later, the chancery court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent and protect

the interests of the minor children. During this time the children had been in the physical

custody of Michael for approximately one year, despite the court order granting custody to

Chantelle. Not long after his appointment, the guardian ad litem filed a motion for contempt

against Michael. The chancery court found that Michael had failed to cooperate with the

guardian ad litem and had also discussed the litigation with the children. The chancery court

considered placing the children in the custody of the Department of Human Services due to

Michael’s flagrant disregard for the court, obstruction of the guardian ad litem’s

investigation, and his constant, intentional interference in the children’s relationship with

their mother. Michael had also failed to return Chantelle’s clothing and passports per the

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order. As a result of the chancery court’s findings, Michael was found in contempt, and he

was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail for two days.

¶6. The guardian ad litem subsequently asked to be discharged from the case. In his

motion, the guardian ad litem alleged that in addition to his failure to cooperate, Michael had

repeatedly threatened and harassed the guardian ad litem, the guardian ad litem’s family,

Chantelle’s former counsel, and others involved in the case. The guardian ad litem requested

to be discharged due to fears for his and his family’s safety.

¶7. A recorded conversation between Michael and the guardian ad litem was presented

to the court. In the recording Michael can be heard telling the guardian ad litem that he

hoped the guardian ad litem’s family members would get cancer and that the guardian ad

litem deserved for his wife to die. When discussing his frustrations with the guardian ad

litem and the court, Michael stated he understood why Timothy McVeigh “leveled the federal

[building].”

¶8. An emergency order was entered shortly thereafter. Michael had refused to allow the

guardian ad litem to meet with the children alone and refused to have the children

psychologically evaluated. He also openly discussed the litigation and his hatred for

Chantelle in front of the children. Michael repeatedly used racial slurs to describe the

chancellor, and made more threats to the guardian ad litem. In granting the emergency order,

the court placed the children in the sole custody of Chantelle. Michael was not permitted to

contact the children without approval by the counselor and the guardian ad litem.

¶9. The court then found Michael in contempt for a second time. Michael had taken the

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children outside of the United States in contravention of the court’s order. Further, Michael

continued contacting the children after a no-contact order was entered. Michael had also

failed to return Chantelle’s personal property, including her passports from the United

Kingdom and New Zealand. Michael was to be incarcerated until he reimbursed Chantelle

for her personal property and returned her passports.

¶10. The court simultaneously entered yet another order of contempt against Michael. The

third contempt was for his failure to cooperate with and pay the guardian ad litem. Michael

was held in contempt until he paid the money owed to the guardian ad litem and petitioned

the court for release.

¶11. Michael represented himself at trial. After hearing all the proof, the chancery court

entered a judgment granting Chantelle a divorce and sole legal and physical custody of the

parties’ children. The chancery court found that Chantelle had proven habitual cruel and

inhuman treatment by providing evidence of Michael’s controlling, abusive behavior and its

negative effect on Chantelle’s health.

¶12. The chancery court went on to address custody of the children. After conducting a

thorough Albright1 analysis the court found that it was in the children’s best interest for

Chantelle to have sole physical and legal custody.

¶13. Aggrieved by the lower court’s decision, Michael now appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶14. Michael asserts two assignments of error on appeal. First, he argues the chancery

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Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).

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court erred in awarding Chantelle a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman

treatment because her testimony was uncorroborated. Second, Michael argues the custody

award should be reversed.

I. The chancery court did not err in granting Chantelle a divorce on
the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

¶15. Michael argues that the chancery court erred by granting Chantelle a divorce on the

ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. He alleges that the chancery court

erroneously relied on Chantelle’s uncorroborated testimony.

¶16. “We apply a limited standard of review when examining a chancellor’s decision in

domestic-relations matters.” Littlefield v. Littlefield, 282 So. 3d 820, 824 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2019). “We review the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the

appellee, and unless the chancellor’s judgment was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or

based on an erroneous legal standard, the judgment should stand.” Id. (internal quotation

marks for citations omitted).

¶17. A divorce may be granted to an injured party on the ground of habitual cruel and

inhuman treatment, including spousal abuse. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018). Cruel

and inhuman treatment is defined as “conduct that either: (1) endangers life, limb, or health,

or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the relationship unsafe for

the party seeking relief, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to render the marriage

revolting to the non-offending spouse, making it impossible to carry out the duties of the

marriage, therefore destroying the basis for its continuance.” Littlefield, 282 So. 3d at 824

(¶8); see also Russell v. Russell, 157 Miss. 425, 128 So. 270, 272 (1930). To succeed on this

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ground, “there must be a causal connection between the treatment and the actual or

threatened harm to the claimant’s health or well-being.” Littlefield, 282 So. 3d at 824 (¶8).

¶18. Spousal abuse under this ground may be established by showing “[t]hat the injured

party’s spouse engaged in a pattern of behavior against the injured party of threats or

intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, forced isolation, sexual extortion or sexual abuse,

or stalking or aggravated stalking . . . if the pattern of behavior rises above the level of

unkindness or rudeness or incompatibility or want of affection.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1.

¶19. “Upon review, we must employ a subjective standard, rather than an ordinary,

reasonable person standard, understanding that the impact of the conduct on the complaining

spouse is crucial.” Littlefield, 282 So. 3d at 827 (¶19) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶20. Chantelle testified at trial that Michael was both physically and mentally abusive and

that his behavior caused Chantelle to fear for her safety. Michael had threatened to shoot

Chantelle and often expressed his desire for her to die. He even admitted in his testimony

that he had said, “[T]he only resolution to this is for [Chantelle] to die and for the children

to get her social security[.]” Chantelle’s fear of Michael is so great that she sought and

obtained a domestic-abuse protection order against him.

¶21. There was also testimony about Michael’s sexual abuse. Chantelle described how

Michael attempted to sexually assault her on multiple occasions. Chantelle described one

attack wherein she reached for the phone to call for help, but Michael ripped it out of the wall

before she was able to use it. During another attack, Michael held her hands down to restrain

her while he attempted to sexually assault her, only relenting because he was unable to get

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an erection.

¶22. Chantelle sought medical attention as a direct result of Michael’s behavior. She

suffered from depression and suicidal ideation as a result of her abusive marriage to Michael.

Chantelle provided her medical records showing that she had been treated for depression and

attempted suicide.

¶23. After the separation, Michael took all of Chantelle’s shoes, clothing, and passports.

Chantelle testified that “[t]here was nothing left in the wardrobe [with] which to clothe

[herself].” The court ordered Michael to return Chantelle’s personal items. The unrefuted

testimony is that Michael only returned one single shoe from each pair that Chantelle owned

and threw the shoes’ mates out with the garbage. Michael only returned her United States

passport. At the time of trial, Michael had yet to return her United Kingdom and New

Zealand passports.

¶24. Michael also sold Chantelle’s jewelry that she had inherited from her grandmother,

which was worth around $30,000. During a recorded conversation, Chantelle confronted

Michael about selling the jewelry. Instead of denying that he had sold it, he responded, “I

needed the money.” The jewelry was never returned to Chantelle, and so the chancery court

assigned its value to Michael during the equitable division of the marital assets. Michael’s

award was lowered by $30,000. He did not appeal or challenge this judgment.

¶25. Likewise, Michael exerted financial control over Chantelle. Both parties testified that

Michael removed Chantelle’s name from their joint checking account—the account in which

her money was deposited. Michael then added their nine-year-old son as a signatory to the

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account. When Michael would travel for work, Chantelle was required to get her own child’s

approval in order to have money.

¶26. Michael’s controlling and threatening behavior was also evidenced in his interactions

with the guardian ad litem. Michael threatened and harassed the guardian ad litem to the

extent that he sought to be discharged from the matter—something he had never done in any

prior case. In addition to threats, Michael attempted to control and impede the guardian ad

litem’s investigation. He refused to allow the guardian ad litem to meet with the children

alone; he insisted on being present for every interaction.

¶27. During recorded phone conversations with the guardian ad litem, Michael expressed

that he did not wish for Chantelle to be involved in the children’s lives at all. He believed

that Chantelle “doesn’t deserve” to have a relationship with her children. Michael also

stated, in the children’s presence, that their mother had “abandoned” them. He continued to

reinforce his desire that Chantelle die so that the children could receive her Social Security

benefits.

¶28. Ultimately, the chancery court found that “[d]uring the course of the marriage,

Michael Williams would constantly yell at Chantelle Hanley Williams, belittle her, and

attempt to have sexual relations with her” and that this “behavior caused Chantelle Hanley

Williams to seek and obtain medical treatment.”

¶29. Mindful of our limited standard of review in domestic-relations matters, we “will not

reverse a [chancery court’s] decree of divorce unless it is manifestly wrong as to law or fact.”

Reed v. Reed, 839 So. 2d 565, 569 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). We find no error or abuse

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of discretion in the chancery court’s findings and conclusions.

¶30. Michael’s core argument on appeal is that Chantelle’s testimony regarding the

habitual cruel and inhuman treatment was uncorroborated. Yet the statute defining the fault-

based grounds for divorce was amended in 2017.2 The Legislature eliminated the

corroboration requirement and instead provided that “[s]pousal domestic violence abuse may

be established through the reliable testimony of a single credible witness, who may be the

injured party[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018) (emphasis added).

¶31. In its judgment, the chancery court explicitly found Chantelle to be a credible witness.

In contrast, the chancery court found that “Michael Williams’ demeanor, conduct, and

testimony was, at times flippant, condescending, evasive and [] that Michael Williams lacked

credibility as a witness.” This finding explicitly echoes the statute. See also Littlefield, 282

So. 3d at 825 (¶9) (holding that a grant of divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and

inhuman treatment will be upheld where the chancery court’s “main source of evidence came

by way of [the wife’s] sworn testimony”).

¶32. Given the plain language of the statute, the overwhelming proof presented at trial, and

our deferential standard of review, we find no error in the chancery court’s judgment. Even

though not required in this case, Chantelle’s testimony was corroborated by the recorded

conversations substantiating Michael’s behavior, Michael’s own testimony, and the testimony

of the guardian ad litem. The grant of divorce is affirmed.

II. The child custody determination was proper.

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The divorce was granted on June 28, 2018. Therefore, the new version of the
statute is applicable.

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¶33. Michael challenges the chancery court’s custody determination on two grounds. First,

he contends that the custody order should be vacated due to perceived shortcomings in the

chancery court’s Albright analysis. Secondly, he argues that the chancery court

impermissibly relied on the guardian ad litem’s hearsay evidence in making its custody

determination.

A. The chancery court properly analyzed each Albright factor.

¶34. We have long held that “the polestar consideration in child custody cases is the best

interest and welfare of the child.” Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005. To determine the child’s

best interest, the court weighs the following factors: (1) the age, sex, and health of the child;

(2) “the continuity of care prior to the separation”; (3) the parenting skills of each parent;

(4) “the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care”; (5) “the employment of the

parent and responsibilities of that employment”; (6) the “physical and mental health and age

of the parents”; (7) “emotional ties of [the] parent and child”; (8) the moral fitness of each

parent; (9) “the home, school, and community record of the child”; (10) the preference of the

child; (11) the stability of the home environment; and (12) “other factors relevant to the

parent-child relationship.” Id.

¶35. Michael relies on Parra v. Parra, 65 So. 3d 872 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), and Pelligrin

v. Pelligrin, 224 So. 3d 555 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), to support his argument that the chancery

court’s custody determination should be reversed for failure to make findings of fact on each

Albright factor. Parra and Pelligren hold that a “it is reversible error if the chancellor does

not articulate the reasoning behind the finding for each Albright factor.” Parra, 65 So. 3d

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at 876 (¶10); see also Pelligren, 224 So. 3d at 563 (¶40). In Parra and Pelligren, we

reversed the lower court’s custody award for failure to analyze and apply each of the Albright

factors to the facts of the case. Parra, 65 So. 3d at 876 (¶12); Pelligren, 224 So. 3d at 563

(¶40). In both of those cases, the lower court’s judgment merely stated which parent was

awarded custody with no mention of Albright, its factors, or even the best interest of the

children. Parra, 65 So. 3d at 876 (¶11); Pelligren, 224 So. 3d at 559 (¶14).

¶36. This case is different. The chancery court in the present case carefully analyzed each

Albright factor and provided support for its determination. “We will reverse a chancery

court’s decision regarding child custody determinations only when the decision of the trial

court was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was

employed.” Martin v. Martin, 282 So. 3d 703, 708 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation

mark omitted).

¶37. Having found that the chancery court properly applied the correct legal standard and

that its decision was neither manifestly wrong or erroneous, we find no error.

B. Michael failed to preserve his hearsay challenges for appeal.

¶38. Michael takes issue with the chancery court’s disposition of custody due to its alleged

reliance on hearsay. Specifically, Michael argues the chancery court erroneously relied on

the guardian ad litem’s reports and testimony.

¶39. At trial, testimonial evidence was provided by Michael, Chantelle, and the guardian

ad litem. The guardian ad litem testified to information he had collected during his

investigation, as well as his first-hand knowledge and experience from interacting with the

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family. Michael failed to contemporaneously object to those portions of the testimony that

might have been subject to hearsay rulings. “As there was no contemporaneous objection

to testimony based on hearsay, the trial court was not afforded an opportunity to rule on

specific testimony on the hearsay evidence issue.” McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868,

884-85 (¶54) (Miss. 2010). “The well-recognized rule is that a trial court will not be put in

error on appeal for a matter not presented to it for decision.” Id.

¶40. We find that Michael failed to preserve this error for appeal, and it is therefore

without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶41. The chancery court was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous and did not apply

an erroneous legal standard. Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s granting of divorce

and sole custody to Chantelle.

¶42. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.

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