AMY MCCORMICK V MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Chief Justice
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
May 8, 2026
SC: 168334
COA: 367598
Ct of Claims: 22-000159-MK
AMY MCCORMICK and ROBERT
MCCORMICK,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
On January 21, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
appeal the January 10, 2025 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the
application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the
question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring).
Although I concur in this Court’s order denying defendant’s application for leave to
appeal, I write separately to address the intersection between this Court’s decision in
Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), and the notice requirements of the Court
of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq.
MCL 600.6431(1) provides that
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be maintained
against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has
accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written
claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state or any
of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.
Stated differently, MCL 600.6431(1) establishes a precondition to filing suit against the
state. Christie, 511 Mich at 51. Plaintiffs allege that they could not timely comply with
the notice provision because defendant fraudulently concealed its identity as the party
liable for plaintiffs’ claims and that defendant’s actions thus tolled the one-year notice

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requirement of MCL 600.6431(1). The fraudulent-concealment provision is codified at
MCL 600.5855 and provides:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals
the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the
claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the
action may be commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is
entitled to bring the action discovers, or should have discovered, the
existence of the claim or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim,
although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
In Mays v Governor (Mays I), 323 Mich App 1, 43-44 (2018), the Court of Appeals
held that “when the fraudulent-concealment exception applies, it operates to toll the
statutory notice period [of MCL 600.6431(1)] as well as the statutory limitations period.”
This Court affirmed this aspect of Mays I by equal division in Mays v Governor (Mays II),
506 Mich 157, 186 (2020), but because we found that questions of fact remained, we
declined to prematurely consider whether any exceptions to the notice requirements
applied.
In Mays II, I wrote separately to express my belief that the fraudulent-concealment
exception of MCL 600.5855 tolls the statutory notice period of MCL 600.6431(1). Id. at
209 (BERNSTEIN, J., concurring). While the Court of Claims Act does not expressly
incorporate MCL 600.5855, I noted that if the fraudulent-concealment exception could not
be applied to toll the statutory notice period of MCL 600.6431 when a claim was
fraudulently concealed from a plaintiff for more than six months, a plaintiff’s otherwise
actionable claim would thus always fail on notice grounds. Id. at 209-210. Such a
circumstance—where a government actor manipulates a procedural nuance to run the clock
on a plaintiff’s otherwise justiciable claim—would run afoul of the purpose of the Court
of Claims Act, which is to allow injured people to bring suit against the government. See
Christie, 511 Mich at 57 (explaining that the Court of Claims Act is a “limited waiver of
the state’s sovereign immunity from suit”). To hold that the Legislature barred only non-
governmental actors from benefiting from their own fraud would be more than a little
disturbing, especially given that the language of the relevant statutes does not require such
a conclusion. I continue to stand by my previous position.
Justice ZAHRA dissents from the denial order in this case, as he also stands by the
position he staked out in Mays II, where he agreed with Justice MARKMAN that the
fraudulent-concealment exception of MCL 600.5855 cannot toll the statutory notice
provision of MCL 600.6431(1). He purports to find additional support for this position in
Christie, where we explained that by amending MCL 600.6431(1) to add both the phrase
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section” as well as an exception for claims brought
under the Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA), MCL 691.1751 et seq., the
Legislature “was clear that the only exception to MCL 600.6431(1)’s notice requirement

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is contained ‘in this section’—in other words, in MCL 600.6431.” Christie, 511 Mich at
53, citing MCL 600.6431(5). Accordingly, Justice ZAHRA concludes that “the only
exception to the notice requirement expressed in MCL 600.6431 is the exception for WICA
claims found in MCL 600.6431(5).”
Unlike Justice ZAHRA, I do not believe that the amendments of MCL 600.6431(1)
or this Court’s interpretation in Christie forecloses application of MCL 600.5855 to MCL
600.6431(1). A plain reading of MCL 600.6431(1) reveals that the Legislature had
intended to exempt a certain class of cases—WICA causes of action—from the required
notice provision. This language merely reflects that WICA claims are the one situation in
which notice is not required to be provided to the government prior to the plaintiff’s filing
of suit. No more, no less. To use this language to prohibit application of the fraudulent-
concealment exception of MCL 600.5855 to all other claims brought against the state is
not supported by a plain reading of the statute as a whole.
I believe that the fraudulent-concealment exception of MCL 600.5855 tolled the
one-year notice period of MCL 600.6431(1) for plaintiffs’ claims. This conclusion is
faithful to the statutory scheme, is not inconsistent with our decision in Christie, and fulfills
the Legislature’s intent to provide claimants whose claims were concealed by deceitful
defendants the ability to litigate their otherwise justiciable claims. Accordingly, I join in
this Court’s decision to deny leave in this case.
WELCH, J., joins the statement of BERNSTEIN, J.
WELCH, J. (concurring).
Plaintiffs Amy McCormick and Robert McCormick are former law professors who
allege that the Michigan State University College of Law—formerly known as the Detroit
College of Law (DCL)1—breached agreements relating to their employment in 2019. In
2018, defendant Michigan State University (MSU) purchased Detroit College of Law
(DCL) and assumed its liabilities. Plaintiffs allege that MSU fraudulently concealed its
assumption of DCL’s liabilities from plaintiffs. For that reason, they did not sue MSU
until September 2022—four months after discovering the alleged fraudulent concealment.
This appeal asks whether plaintiffs complied with the Court of Claims Act’s one-
year notice requirement, MCL 600.6431(1). In the proceedings below, the Court of Claims
and the Court of Appeals correctly applied binding precedent, Mays v Governor, 323 Mich
App 1, 43-44 (2018) (Mays I), to hold that the alleged fraudulent concealment tolled the
1 Although DCL changed its name to Michigan State University College of Law before the
events that gave rise to this litigation, I refer to it as DCL to remain consistent with the
Court of Appeals’ opinion.

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statutory notice requirement. I take no issue with that holding. I write separately to observe
that the matter could also be resolved on alternative and arguably simpler grounds:
plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue until they discovered the fraudulent concealment in May
2022. And because plaintiffs filed their complaint four months after the accrual date, they
satisfied the one-year statutory notice requirement. See MCL 600.6431(1).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs served as tenured professors at DCL. In 2013, they negotiated away their
tenure rights. Robert retired and, in exchange, DCL provided him with special retirement
benefits. For her part, Amy agreed to remain on the DCL faculty as a professor emerita
and to teach one course per academic year. DCL agreed to provide Amy with the same
employee healthcare coverage it provided to her when she served as a tenured faculty
member.2
As plaintiffs negotiated with DCL over their tenure rights, DCL and MSU were
negotiating a merger or asset transfer. In October 2018, those negotiations bore fruit: MSU
and DCL executed a memorandum of understanding that MSU would purchase DCL.
Through that memorandum of understanding, DCL agreed to terminate its employees on
December 31, 2019, and MSU agreed to offer those employees contracts beginning on
January 1, 2020. Amy declined MSU’s employment offer, arguing that it violated
plaintiffs’ 2013 contracts. In response, DCL terminated Amy’s employment on December
31, 2019.
Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, MSU and DCL also signed an asset-transfer agreement
on December 12, 2019. That agreement provided that DCL would convey all of its assets
to MSU and that MSU would assume all of DCL’s liabilities and obligations.
Plaintiffs allege that DCL and MSU employees fraudulently told them that MSU
would not assume DCL’s liabilities. Based upon those assurances, plaintiffs sued DCL,
then a private entity, in the Ingham Circuit Court. The circuit court dismissed that matter
in mid-2022, holding that plaintiffs could not sue DCL because DCL had dissolved.
Plaintiffs allege that they did not learn about the asset-transfer agreement until May
2022. Four months after learning about the agreement, plaintiffs sued MSU in the Court
of Claims. MSU moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiffs failed to comply
with the Court of Claims Act’s one-year notice requirement, MCL 600.6431(1). The Court
of Claims denied that motion, holding that under Mays I, 323 Mich App at 43-44, the
2 This lawsuit primarily concerns Amy’s contract. Robert is a plaintiff because he argues
that among the consideration for his agreement to retire was Amy’s continued employment
at DCL.

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alleged fraudulent concealment tolled the statutory notice requirement. The Court of
Appeals majority affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. McCormick v Mich State
Univ, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 10, 2025
(Docket No. 367598). MSU’s application to this Court for leave to appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court of Claims Act’s notice requirement provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be
maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim
has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a
written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state
or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or
agencies. [MCL 600.6431(1).]
A plaintiff’s failure to comply with that notice requirement “provides a complete defense
in an action against the state or one of its departments.” Fairley v Dep’t of Corrections,
497 Mich 290, 292 (2015).
At issue in this case is whether fraudulent concealment tolls the statutory notice
requirement. “ ‘Fraudulent concealment means employment of artifice, planned to prevent
inquiry or escape investigation, and mislead or hinder acquirement of information
disclosing a right of action. The acts relied on must be of an affirmative character and
fraudulent.’ ” Reserve at Heritage Village Ass’n v Warren Fin Acquisition, LLC, 305 Mich
App 92, 122 (2014), quoting Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Detroit Archdiocese,
264 Mich App 632, 642 (2004). MCL 600.5855 governs claims impeded by fraudulent
concealment. The statute provides that:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals
the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the
claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the
action may be commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is
entitled to bring the action discovers, or should have discovered, the
existence of the claim or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim,
although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
[MCL 600.5855.]
In Mays I, the Court of Appeals held that MCL 600.5855 tolls the Court of Claims
Act’s notice requirement. See Mays I, 323 Mich App at 43-44. That published opinion
bound the Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals in this case to hold that MSU’s alleged

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fraudulent concealment tolled the notice requirement.3 For that reason, I take no issue with
the opinions of the Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals majority.4
I write separately to explain that there is another, arguably simpler reason to hold
that plaintiffs complied with the statutory notice requirement: their claims did not accrue
until May 2022. Accordingly, tolling was not necessary.
The general accrual statute for civil actions provides that:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs
from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in
sections 5829 to 5838, and in cases not covered by these sections the claim
3 We affirmed all but one aspect of Mays I by equal division in Mays v Governor, 506 Mich
157, 167 (2020) (Mays II). Mays II consists of five separate opinions, and the lead opinion
declined to address whether fraudulent concealment tolls the Court of Claims Act’s notice
requirement. In a concurring opinion, Justice BERNSTEIN opined that Mays I held correctly
that fraudulent concealment tolls the notice requirement. Id. at 209-210 (BERNSTEIN, J.,
concurring). I agree with the analysis set forth in Mays I and in Justice BERNSTEIN’s Mays
II concurrence. I also agree with—and join—Justice BERNSTEIN’s concurring statement
in this matter. In that statement, Justice BERNSTEIN argues persuasively that neither our
opinion in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), nor the Legislature’s
amendments of MCL 600.6431(1) affect the validity of the analysis set forth in Mays I and
Justice BERNSTEIN’s Mays II concurrence.
4 Dissenting, Judge M. J. KELLY argued that Mays I did not apply in this case because
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment. To support that argument, the
dissent relied on a single conclusory and unsupported sentence from Doe, 264 Mich App
at 641, which stated that “only actions after the alleged injury could have concealed
plaintiff’s causes of action against defendant because actions taken before the alleged
injury would not have been capable of concealing causes of action that did not yet exist.”
See McCormick (KELLY, M. J., dissenting), unpub op at 2. Based upon that sentence, the
dissent argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment because the
alleged fraudulent concealment occurred before the alleged breach. See id.
Doe does not control. As the Court of Appeals recognized in Hope-Jackson v
Washington, 311 Mich App 602, 618 n 3 (2015), Doe concerned a plaintiff who “claimed
that the cause of action had been concealed and made no claim that” the defendant’s
identity “had been concealed.” Hope-Jackson limited Doe to situations in which a
defendant conceals a cause of action, rather than a liable party’s identity. See id. Because
plaintiffs in this case allege that MSU concealed the liable party’s identity, the Court of
Appeals dissent’s reliance on Doe was misplaced. See id.

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accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done
regardless of the time when damage results. [MCL 600.5827.]
We have explained that “the date of the ‘wrong’ referred to in MCL 600.5827 is ‘the date
on which the defendant’s breach harmed the plaintiff, as opposed to the date on which
defendant breached his duty.’ ” Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 150 (2017), quoting Moll
v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 12 (1993). Therefore, to determine when a claim
accrues, the Court must generally “determine the date on which plaintiffs first incurred the
harms they assert.” Frank, 500 Mich at 150.
At common law, courts would sometimes apply a discovery-based analysis for
accrual. See McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 514 Mich 1, 14 (2024). We
ended that practice in Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378
(2007). We have recognized, however, “that statutory discovery rules, such as MCL
600.5855 concerning fraudulently concealed claims, ‘exclusively authorize discovery-
based tolling under certain circumstances.’ ” McLain, 514 Mich at 15, quoting Trentadue,
479 Mich at 398. Thus, although “the discovery rule no longer applies to claims subject to
the general accrual statute or to other accrual statutes that do not include this concept,” it
still applies under the fraudulent concealment statute. McLain, 514 Mich at 15 & n 9. See
also Trentadue, 479 Mich at 391 (“MCL 600.5855 provides for essentially unlimited
tolling based on discovery when a claim is fraudulently concealed.”).
In short, plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue until they discovered the alleged fraudulent
concealment in May 2022. And because plaintiffs filed their complaint four months later,
they satisfied the Court of Claims Act’s notice requirement.5 See MCL 600.6431(1).
Accordingly, tolling was not necessary.
5 Dissenting, Justice ZAHRA takes issue with my reliance on McLain. First, he writes that
“[t]he focal point of the Court’s analysis in McLain was MCL 600.5851b(1)(b), not MCL
600.5855.” Although Justice ZAHRA is correct that the facts in McLain implicated MCL
600.5851(1)(b), we opined that our analysis also applied to MCL 600.5855. See McLain,
514 Mich at 15 n 9 (“[T]he Legislature has explicitly provided for discovery rules in some
contexts. Among them are actions alleging medical malpractice, MCL 600.5838a(2),
actions brought against certain defendants alleging injuries from unsafe property, MCL
600.5839(1)(b), and actions alleging fraudulent concealment of the claim or the identity of
any person who is liable for the claim, MCL 600.5855.”). Second, Justice ZAHRA asserts
that even if the discovery rule applies to MCL 600.5851b(1)(b), it does not apply to MCL
600.5855 because the two statutes are structured differently. As we wrote in McLain,
however, “the language in MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) is virtually indistinguishable from the
codification of a discovery rule in MCL 600.5855, concerning fraudulent concealment.”
Id. at 20. Finally, and relatedly, Justice ZAHRA argues that “MCL 600.5855 quite clearly
contemplates that it applies where there is fraudulent concealment after a claim accrues.”

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HOOD, J., joins the statement of WELCH, J.
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s decision to deny leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals
applied its decision in Mays v Governor (Mays I)1 to conclude that the fraudulent-
concealment exception in MCL 600.5855—a provision of the Revised Judicature Act
(RJA)2—is capable of tolling the one-year statutory notice provision set forth in MCL
600.6431, which is part of the Court of Claims Act (COCA).3 The Court of Appeals
majority then went on to hold that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether that
exception applies under the facts of this case. In keeping with my position in Mays v
Governor (Mays II),4 I instead conclude that the fraudulent-concealment exception cannot
toll the one-year statutory notice provision. This conclusion is mandated by the plain
language of MCL 600.6431 and by this Court’s recent decision in Christie v Wayne State
Univ,5 in which this Court unanimously opined that the only exception to the notice
requirement in MCL 600.6431(1) is contained within the text of MCL 600.6431 itself.
Given my conclusion that MCL 600.5855 does not apply to MCL 600.6431, I need not
consider whether the alleged facts support its application in this case. Plaintiffs failed to
comply with MCL 600.6431’s notice requirement, and defendant is therefore entitled to
summary disposition. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Amy McCormick and Robert McCormick were employed as law
professors by Michigan State University College of Law or Detroit College of Law (DCL)
before it merged with defendant, Michigan State University (MSU). In April 2013, the
parties negotiated terms whereby Robert McCormick agreed to retire and Amy McCormick
agreed to continue as a professor emerita. On December 31, 2019, however, all DCL
But MCL 600.5855 never mentions claim accrual. Instead, it refers to the “existence of a
claim,” without any reference to whether fraudulent concealment tolls claim accrual.
1 Mays v Governor, 323 Mich App 1 (2018) (Mays I).
2 MCL 600.101 et seq.
3 MCL 600.6401 et seq.
4 Mays v Governor, 506 Mich 157 (2020) (Mays II).
5 Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023).

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employees were terminated, and MSU provided an opportunity for these employees to be
hired as MSU employees the next day. Amy McCormick declined the offer.
Plaintiffs then brought a breach-of-contract action against MSU regarding their
original employment contracts with DCL. MSU moved for summary disposition, arguing
that it has governmental immunity because plaintiffs did not file their notice of intent to
bring a claim within one year of the accrual of their claim, as is required by MCL 600.6431.
Plaintiffs responded that the notice period set forth in MCL 600.6431 was tolled under
MCL 600.5855 because MSU fraudulently concealed an agreement that MSU would
assume DCL’s liabilities by failing to notify plaintiffs of its existence until May 2022.
The Court of Claims initially ruled that silent fraud was insufficient to demonstrate
fraudulent concealment but allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint to establish the
fraudulent concealment. After the amendment, MSU renewed its motion for summary
disposition, which the Court of Claims denied, ruling that the allegations in plaintiffs’
complaint, taken as true, supported a claim for fraudulent concealment that would toll the
statutory notice period under MCL 600.5855. MSU moved for reconsideration, which the
Court of Claims denied.
MSU then appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Court of Claims in
an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Court of Appeals majority held that a genuine
issue of material fact existed regarding whether MSU’s representatives fraudulently
misrepresented its liability for DCL’s contractual obligations and whether plaintiffs relied
on those misrepresentations when filing their claim against MSU more than one year after
their claim accrued. The dissenting judge accepted the premise that the fraudulent-
concealment exception may apply to toll MCL 600.6431’s notice period but believed that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment under MCL 600.5855.
Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the
application.
II. ANALYSIS
At issue is whether the fraudulent-concealment exception set forth in MCL
600.5855 applies to the statutory notice period in MCL 600.6431(1). The Court of
Appeals, relying on its opinion in Mays I, accepted that it does, and proceeded to hold that
the facts as alleged by plaintiffs supported its application in this case. I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, because I conclude that the fraudulent-concealment
provision does not apply to toll the notice requirement contained in MCL 600.6431.
MCL 600.6431 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be
maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim

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has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a
written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state
or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or
agencies.
* * *
(5) This section does not apply to a claim for compensation under the
wrongful imprisonment compensation act, 2016 PA 343, MCL 691.1751 to
691.1757.
This language of MCL 600.6431 is broad and unambiguous—“[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this section, a claim may not be maintained against this state”6 unless the
claimant files a written claim or written notice of intention to file a claim with the clerk of
the Court of Claims within one year after the claim has accrued.
As this Court unanimously explained in Christie,7 MCL 600.6431 creates a
condition precedent to suing the state in the Court of Claims and avoiding the application
of governmental immunity. Christie held that “the notice requirements of MCL
600.6431(1) apply to all claims against the state, including those filed in the circuit court,
except as otherwise exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself.”8 The Court reasoned that
“[s]atisfaction of the rules of the forum for the Court of Claims, including the notice
requirement, was mandatory to overcome the state’s sovereign immunity,”9 and, as this
Court previously held, a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirement of MCL
600.6431 “provides a complete defense in an action against the state or one of its
departments.”10
At issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals is correct that the fraudulent-
concealment exception set forth in MCL 600.5855 can apply to toll the notice requirement
in MCL 600.6431. MCL 600.5855 states:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals
the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the
6 Emphasis added.
7 See Christie, 511 Mich at 51.
8 Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 61-62.
10 Fairley v Dep’t of Corrections, 497 Mich 290, 292 (2015).

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claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the
action may be commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is
entitled to bring the action discovers, or should have discovered, the
existence of the claim or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim,
although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
This provision of the RJA allows for the tolling of a statutory limitations period for two
years if a defendant has fraudulently concealed the existence of a claim for which that
defendant is liable. When relying on this exception, a plaintiff “must plead in the complaint
the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment” and “prove that
the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to
prevent subsequent discovery.”11
The Court of Appeals previously considered the interplay between MCL 600.5855
and MCL 600.6431 in Mays I. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged an inverse-condemnation
claim and constitutional claims against the state and several agencies following the change
in the source of drinking water for the city of Flint. The defendants moved for summary
disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirement in MCL
600.6431, and the Court of Claims denied the defendants’ motion. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, reasoning that the Legislature clearly intended to incorporate MCL 600.5855 into
the COCA and that “read[ing] MCL 600.5855, as imported into the [COCA], and MCL
600.6431 in harmony require[d] the conclusion that when the fraudulent-concealment
exception applies, it operates to toll the statutory notice period as well as the statutory
limitations period.”12
This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals by equal division in Mays II.13 Given this
Court’s holding that questions of fact remained as to when the plaintiffs sustained their
injuries and thus when their claims accrued, the Court did not consider whether MCL
600.5855 tolls the notice period in MCL 600.6431. But Justice BERNSTEIN and Justice
MARKMAN authored separate opinions addressing this issue. Justice BERNSTEIN opined
that the fraudulent-concealment exception applies to toll the statutory notice period because
“the omission of a fraudulent-concealment exception to MCL 600.6431 is not reconcilable
with the Legislature’s intent to provide claimants with two years from the date of discovery
to bring suit for harm that was fraudulently concealed, as expressed in MCL
600.6452(2).”14
11 Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp, 220 Mich App 303, 310 (1996).
12 Mays I, 323 Mich App at 43-44.
13 Mays II, 506 Mich 157.
14 Id. at 209 (BERNSTEIN, J., concurring).

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I continue to fully agree with Justice MARKMAN’s response to Justice BERNSTEIN
and with Justice MARKMAN’s resulting conclusion that “[t]he fraudulent-concealment
statute only constitutes an exception to statutes of limitations and does not constitute an
exception to the statutory notice provision at issue here.”15 As Justice MARKMAN stated:
The fraudulent-concealment statute itself asserts that it allows an action to be
brought under certain circumstances “although the action would otherwise
be barred by the period of limitations,” MCL 600.5855; it does not state that
an action can be brought although the action would otherwise be barred by
the statutory notice provision. Therefore, the fraudulent-concealment statute
simply does not pertain in the present context. . . .
This is further evidenced by the fact that the Legislature incorporated
the fraudulent-concealment exception into the statute-of-limitations
provision of the [COCA], but not into its statutory notice provision. MCL
600.6452(1) of the [COCA] provides that the statute of limitations is three
years in an action against the state. MCL 600.6452(2) of the [COCA]
provides that “[e]xcept as modified by this section, the provisions of RJA
chapter 58, relative to the limitation of actions, shall also be applicable to the
limitation prescribed in this section.” The fraudulent-concealment statute,
MCL 600.5855, is a “provision[] of RJA chapter 58, relative to the limitation
of actions,” and thus is applicable to the statute-of-limitations provision of
the [COCA]. On the other hand, the statutory notice provision of the
[COCA] does not similarly incorporate the fraudulent-concealment statute.
Given that the Legislature chose to incorporate the fraudulent-concealment
statute into the statute of limitations but not into the statutory notice
provision, we should presume absent evidence to the contrary that this was
purposeful and should not summarily incorporate the fraudulent-
concealment statute where it has not been placed by the lawmaking body of
our state government.[16]
15 Id. at 283 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 283-284. Expounding on this reasoning, MCL 600.6431 is not a statute of
limitations. In Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 142 (2017), quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed), this Court defined a “statute of limitations” as a “ ‘law that bars
claims after a specified period; specif[ically], a statute establishing a time limit for suing
in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued.’ ” Under this definition, MCL
600.6431 is not a statute of limitations because it does not establish a time limit for suing
the state; MCL 600.6431 instead sets a deadline by which a claimant must provide notice
to the state. Indeed, the COCA contains its own statute of limitations in MCL 600.6452.

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Justice MARKMAN also rejected the concurrence’s argument that failing to read a
fraudulent-concealment exception into the statutory notice provision would result in
entirely reading out MCL 600.6452(2), the COCA’s statute-of-limitations provision,
opining that
MCL 600.6452(2) does more than incorporate the fraudulent-concealment
statute into the statute-of-limitations provision of the Court of Claims Act;
rather, it incorporates all the “provisions of RJA chapter 58, relative to the
limitation of actions” into the statute-of-limitations provision of the Court of
Claims Act. Therefore, failing to read a fraudulent-concealment exception
into the statutory notice provision of the Court of Claims Act would not
“entirely” result in reading out MCL 600.6452(2).[17]
This analysis is sound and equally applicable to the dispute before us.
This Court’s recent opinion in Christie, unaddressed by the Court of Appeals in this
case, reinforces this conclusion. As explained in Christie, in 2020, the Legislature added
to MCL 600.6431(1) the words “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section” while
simultaneously adding Subsection (5), which states that MCL 600.6431 “does not apply to
a claim for compensation under the wrongful imprisonment compensation act, 2016 PA
343, MCL 691.1751 to 691.1757 [(WICA)].”18 As this Court unanimously stated in
Christie, “With this language, the Legislature was clear that the only exception to MCL
600.6431(1)’s notice requirement is contained ‘in this section’—in other words, in MCL
600.6431.”19 Therefore, the only exception to the notice requirement expressed in MCL
600.6431 is the exception for WICA claims found in MCL 600.6431(5). To read into MCL
600.6431 an exception for claims involving fraudulent concealment under MCL 600.5855
would not only improperly insert words into MCL 600.6431, but would essentially render
its “in this section” language meaningless.20 The Court of Appeals in this case therefore
departed from both this Court’s holding in Christie and the Legislature’s policy choice as
expressed through the plain language of MCL 600.6431 by reading an additional exception
Accordingly, the time periods set forth in MCL 600.6431 cannot be subject to tolling under
MCL 600.5855, which by its plain language applies only to the applicable “period of
limitations.”
17 Mays II, 506 Mich at 285 n 12 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).
18 See Christie, 511 Mich at 49 & n 23.
19 Id. at 53.
20 See Aspey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 131 (2007) (“A statute is rendered nugatory when
an interpretation fails to give it meaning or effect.”).

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into the language of MCL 600.6431. As emphasized in Christie, MCL 600.6431 means
what it says—all claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431, must
comply with the notice requirement.
Plaintiffs do not convincingly distinguish Christie, but instead make a rather
superficial argument that, because the fraudulent-concealment provision of MCL 600.5855
and the COCA are both part of the RJA, they must be read in pari materia, and the RJA’s
fraudulent-concealment provision therefore applies to the COCA. But this argument
effectively imports an extra-statutory exception into the COCA, expanding the list of
exceptions beyond the Legislature’s sole carveout for WICA claims in MCL 600.6431.
Tellingly, the RJA (and thus MCL 600.5855) is incorporated in MCL 600.6452 of the
COCA, which sets forth the applicable statute of limitations.21 To read MCL 600.5855 (or
other provisions of the RJA) into MCL 600.6431 would undermine the Legislature’s
intentional choice to incorporate sections of the RJA in certain provisions of the COCA,
but not others. For these reasons, I conclude that MCL 600.5855 is incapable of tolling
MCL 600.6431’s notice period.
The contrary conclusion seriously erodes the state’s sovereign immunity from direct
suit. As explained by the Attorney General as amicus curiae, the Court of Appeals
essentially grafted a savings provision onto MCL 600.6431, despite this Court’s repeated
warning that “when the Legislature specifically qualifies the ability to bring a claim against
the state or its subdivisions on a plaintiff’s meeting certain requirements that the plaintiff
fails to meet, no saving construction . . . is allowed.”22 And in theory, this savings clause
could apply to all claims against the state going forward merely by a pleading of fraudulent
concealment. Yet a majority of this Court today denies leave to appeal without endorsing
Justice BERNSTEIN’s reasoning in Mays II or otherwise weighing in on the jurisprudentially
significant question of whether MCL 600.5855 tolls the notice provision of MCL 600.6431.
I would take this opportunity to clarify the law and answer this question in the negative.
III. CONCLUSION
21 See MCL 600.6452(2) (“Except as modified by this section, chapter 58, relative to the
limitation of actions, also applies to the limitation under this section.”).
22 McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 746 (2012). As further explained by the Attorney
General, the Court of Appeals did not attempt to apply any portion of MCL 600.6431 to
MCL 600.5855, such as allowing plaintiff one year from discovery of the alleged
fraudulent concealment to comply with the COCA’s notice requirement, mirroring the one-
year requirement set forth in that statute. The Court of Appeals instead appears to have
afforded plaintiffs a full two years from their alleged discovery of the fraudulent
concealment.

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I conclude that MCL 600.5855’s fraudulent-concealment exception cannot toll
MCL 600.6431’s notice provision.23 Given this conclusion, I need not consider whether
23 In her concurrence, Justice WELCH opines that MCL 600.5855 tolls the accrual date
rather than the statute of limitations. Accordingly, she concludes that plaintiffs’ claims did
not accrue until they discovered the alleged fraudulent concealment in May 2022, meaning
their complaint was timely filed under MCL 600.6531(1). I disagree with Justice WELCH.
In my opinion, MCL 600.5855 does not function as a discovery-based accrual statute in
this case.
This Court has on numerous occasions held that MCL 600.5855 tolls the statute of
limitations. See Trentadue v Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 479 Mich 378, 388 (2007) (“The
[RJA], at . . . [MCL] 600.5855, provides for tolling of the period of limitations in certain
specified situations.”); see also Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 147 (2017) (“[T]he running
of a statutory period of limitations may be tolled pursuant to . . . MCL 600.5855[.]”).
Indeed, MCL 600.5855 explicitly refers to a party bringing an action that would “otherwise
be barred by the period of limitations.” (Emphasis added.) In concluding that MCL
600.5855 tolls the accrual date, the concurrence cites our recent decision in McLain v
Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 514 Mich 1, 16 (2024), in which a majority of this
Court held that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b)—which provides that a plaintiff “may commence
an action . . . at any time before . . . [t]hree years after the date the individual discovers, or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the individual’s
injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the criminal sexual conduct”—is
a “discovery rule” that changes the accrual date for minor victims of criminal sexual
conduct, not an alteration of the statute of limitations. The focal point of the Court’s
analysis in McLain was MCL 600.5851b(1)(b), not MCL 600.5855. I do not believe that
MCL 600.5855 functions as an accrual tolling statute for the same reasons that I did not
believe MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) functions as such a statute, as expressed in my separate
opinion in McLain. Plaintiffs’ contract claim against defendant does not fall under MCL
600.5829 through MCL 600.5838. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim against defendant accrued
“at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when
damage results.” MCL 600.5827. I see no language in MCL 600.5855 that alters the
general rule of accrual in MCL 600.5827.
Moreover, MCL 600.5855 is structured differently than MCL 600.5851b(1)(b); in
my view, MCL 600.5855 quite clearly contemplates that it applies where there is fraudulent
concealment after a claim accrues. And again, unlike MCL 600.5815b(1)(b), MCL
600.5855 explicitly refers to permitting an action that would “otherwise be barred by the
period of limitations,” suggesting that it tolls the limitations period. Furthermore, even if
MCL 600.5855 could function as a discovery accrual provision in some instances, for the
reasons I have already articulated, MCL 600.5855 simply does not apply to MCL 600.6431.
It is notable that the Legislature incorporated the fraudulent-concealment exception into
the statute-of-limitations provision of the COCA, MCL 600.6452(1), but not into its

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MCL 600.5855 is applicable under the facts of this case. Plaintiffs failed to comply with
MCL 600.6431, and defendant is therefore entitled to summary disposition. Accordingly,
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
statutory notice provision. Finally, even if MCL 600.5855 could apply to toll the accrual
date in this case, I tend to agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that it would not apply
to the facts of this case.
I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
Clerk
May 8, 2026

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