PEOPLE OF MI V JERMAINE MARZELL JONES

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Chief Justice
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
June 12, 2026
SC: 169845 & (25)
COA: 376328
Oakland CC: 2021-277286-FH
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
JERMAINE MARZELL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
On order of the Court, the motion to expedite is GRANTED. The application for
leave to appeal the March 23, 2026 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is
DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed
by this Court.
HOOD, J. (concurring).
I respectfully concur in the denial of the application for leave to appeal. I agree with
the denial because of the present posture of the case, and the Court of Appeals still has the
ability to grant the relief requested by defendant, Jermaine Marzell Jones, if necessary to
fully address his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
By way of background, Jones requests raw data related to a DNA analysis that was
part of the evidence leading to his convictions related to firearm possession. Jones filed a
claim of appeal through appellate counsel. His counsel retained an expert to review the
prosecution’s DNA findings, and the expert needed certain materials to perform her review.
Counsel sought disclosure of the DNA evidence presented at trial from the Oakland County
Sheriff’s Office and was provided with three files, but none of them contained
electropherograms, which counsel explained were the graphs that depicted the DNA
profiles of the samples that were tested.1 Counsel subsequently moved to compel the
1 See United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, DNA for the Defense
Bar (June 2012), p 171, available at <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/237975.pdf>
(accessed June 2, 2026) [https://perma.cc/M3RB-U9BV] (defining “electropherogram” as

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evidence, asking for discovery of the electropherograms relied on by the prosecution’s
expert. The prosecution refused, arguing that there is no court rule requiring postconviction
discovery. The trial court denied the motion to compel without holding a hearing.
Appellate counsel moved to compel the evidence in the Court of Appeals, raising
the same arguments. The Court of Appeals denied the motion without an explanation.
Despite the denial of his motion, his appeal is still pending in the Court of Appeals. Now
Jones seeks leave to appeal here. He asserts that his counsel cannot complete his brief
without those data.
I agree with the denial of Jones’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal
because it is premature, and the Court of Appeals is still positioned to adequately address
the central issue in his pending appeal: DNA evidence. At the outset, I acknowledge this
is an underdeveloped area of our caselaw. As of the date of this statement, I have not
located a Michigan case directly addressing a defendant’s right (at the trial level—let alone
in an appellate posture) to seek raw data related to DNA analysis (i.e., bench notes, lab
logs, electropherograms, etc.). And as jurists, our technical understanding of DNA analysis
is often less than precise.
I write separately to emphasize that any competent challenge to fact or opinion
testimony on DNA usually requires disclosure and review of electropherograms, bench
notes, and lab logs, among other things (for example, the type of analytical software used
during the analysis if software was used). In other words, a competent challenge requires
the data that underpin the expert’s conclusions. See MCR 6.201(A)(3). This is true for at
least two reasons. First, the discovery is necessary to identify potential Confrontation
Clause issues (i.e., one witness testifying to a team’s work). See Bullcoming v New Mexico,
564 US 647, 651-652, 655 (2011) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not allow
one analyst to offer “surrogate testimony” based on a “testimonial certification” report and
data collected and analyzed by a different analyst who was not available to testify at trial);
Smith v Arizona, 602 US 779, 793-804 (2024). Second, without the underlying data
supporting an expert’s opinions (i.e., the electropherograms that an expert is analyzing and
translating into layperson’s terms), a defendant must essentially take the expert’s word for
it.
“[t]he graphic representation of the separation of molecules by electrophoresis or other
means of separation”). See also United States v Barton, 909 F3d 1323, 1328 (CA 11, 2018)
(explaining that an electropherogram is “a visualization of the genetic data from which [an]
analyst conducts [DNA] profile analysis”).

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
June 12, 2026
a0609
3
Clerk
Arguably, at the trial level, a defendant is entitled to what Jones now seeks. See
MCR 6.201(A)(3) (mandating disclosure upon request of an expert’s curriculum vitae,
report or written description of the proposed testimony, the expert’s opinion, “and the
underlying basis of that opinion”). Practitioners routinely identify electropherograms
along with lab logs and bench notes as necessary discovery for effective challenges. See,
e.g., United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, DNA for the Defense
Bar (June 2012), pp 23-31, available at <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/237975.pdf>
(accessed June 3, 2026) [https://perma.cc/M3RB-U9BV]. See also American Bar
Association, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, DNA Evidence (3d ed), pp 90-92,
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/
dna_evidence.pdf> (accessed June 2, 2026). That is at least true at the trial level.
Fast forward to the present posture of this case. I question Jones’s ability to establish
prejudice in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without a review of the data
underpinning the DNA expert’s opinions. Put differently, if the raw data underlying the
DNA evidence is not exculpatory (for example, a potentially exculpatory peak discovered
through an independent analysis of an electropherogram),2 then the failure to obtain it
would not be prejudicial. Of course, at this juncture, it is questionable how a defendant
could establish prejudice without obtaining the raw data that trial counsel never got.
In sum, I agree with the denial because the merits of Jones’s appeal are still before
the Court of Appeals. Although his motion was denied, the panel that ultimately addresses
his case may still grant the relief he requests.
2 See DNA for the Defense Bar at 24 (addressing “exculpatory peaks”); see also Barton,
909 F3d at 1328-1329 (explaining the analysis of “peaks” on an electropherogram).

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