COA 374093 IN RE DELBRIDGE MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/17/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2025
10:06 AM
In re DELBRIDGE Minors.
No. 374093
Wayne Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 2024-000029-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his
minor children, KLD and KDD, under MCL 712.A19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. FACTS
In August 2023, the children in this case, KLD and KDD, then ages fourteen and thirteen,
were removed from their mother’s home after their infant brother died from fentanyl poisoning
while in the care of the children’s mother. At that time, respondent had not had contact with KLD
and KDD since the previous summer. The children’s mother admitted to Child Protective Services
(CPS) that she had a history of substance use and currently used cocaine and heroin. The children
were placed in the home of their maternal aunt.
Petitioner filed a petition requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction of KLD and KDD
and seeking termination of the parental rights of respondent as well as the children’s mother. After
a preliminary hearing, the trial court placed KLD and KDD, who were living with their aunt, under
petitioner’s supervision.
At the adjudication hearing, Johnathan Meade, a CPS investigator, testified that his last
contact with respondent was in September 2023, shortly after the death of the one-year old sibling
of KLD and KDD. Meade testified that respondent at that time told him that he could safely care
for KLD and KDD, and respondent had both housing and employment. Respondent was not
providing financial support for the children, however, and had not had contact with the children
since the summer of 2022. Meade testified that respondent gave no reason for his lack of contact

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with the children and made no attempt thereafter to visit with or to gain custody of the children;
he also had no further contact with Meade. The trial court assumed jurisdiction of KLD and KDD
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) on the basis that respondent had abandoned the children. The
trial court then found that statutory grounds existed for terminating respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion), (b)(ii) (failure to prevent harm to child’s sibling), (g)
(failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (likelihood child will be harmed if placed in
home of the parent).
The trial court thereafter held a hearing on the best interests of the children, during which
the children’s foster care case manager testified that the children have a substantial relationship
with their aunt and had lived with her for a considerable amount of their lives. The foster care
case manager testified that the aunt provided stability and permanence for the children; the children
felt safe and comfortable with their aunt and did not want to be reunified with respondent, though
the children wanted to continue contact with him. Both the children and the aunt told the foster
care case manager that they wanted the aunt to adopt the children and did not want a guardianship.
The foster care case manager testified that respondent had not had regular nor recent contact with
the children and respondent gave no reason for the lack of contact. In addition, KLD has several
allergies, and the foster care case manager opined that respondent would be unable to provide
adequate medical care. The foster care case manager also testified that respondent had been
evaluated by the Family Assessment Center, which recommended that the children not be reunified
with respondent.
At the conclusion of the best interests hearing, the trial court found that termination was in
the children’s best interests. The trial court reasoned that although the children’s placement with
a relative weighed against termination, respondent had a poor prognosis for reunification with the
children, lacked a healthy bond with them, and was unwilling to provide safety and permanence
for the children. In addition, the children and their aunt preferred adoption rather than a
guardianship. The trial court concluded that adoption was the best permanency goal to provide
permanence and stability for the children. The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights1
to KLD and KDD. Respondent now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that termination of his parental
rights was in the best interests of the children because (1) the children were placed with a relative,
which weighs against termination, and (2) the trial court failed to consider guardianship as an
alternative to termination of his parental rights. We disagree that the trial court erred by finding
that termination was in the best interests of the children.
We review for clear error the trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). In doing so, we focus on the child, not
the parent. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). A trial court’s decision
is clearly erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, this Court upon reviewing the entire
1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother.

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evidence “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Keillor,
325 Mich App 80, 93; 923 NW2d 617 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Once the trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating a parent’s rights has been
established, the trial court must terminate the parent’s rights if a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Lombard,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 5. When
determining the best interests of a child in a termination proceeding, the trial court is required to
weigh the available evidence and consider a wide variety of factors, including the child’s bond to
the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality,
the advantages of the foster home over the parent’s home, the length of time the child has been in
care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future,
and the parent’s compliance with the case service plan. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276-
277. A child’s placement with a relative is an explicit factor for the trial court to consider when
determining whether to terminate parental rights. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d
747 (2010). But although a child’s placement with a relative generally weighs against termination
of parental rights, that fact alone is not determinative. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347.
In this case, the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that
the children’s need for stability and permanence outweighed the fact of relative placement. The
evidence supported the determination that adoption best served KLD’s and KDD’s need for
stability and permanence. Respondent had abandoned the children, failing to have contact with
the children or support them financially, and assumed no responsibility for the children’s care or
wellbeing, although he had the means to do so. The children had lived for much of their lives with
their aunt, the aunt provided the children with stability and permanence, the aunt was eager to
adopt the children, and the children were eager to be adopted by the aunt. Because the
preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s best interest determination, the trial court
did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Respondent also argues that the trial court should have considered a guardianship for the
children rather than terminating his parental rights. MCL 712A.19a(9) authorizes a trial court to
appoint a guardian for a minor child in a termination of parental rights case. However, MCL
712A.19a(9) requires an alternative placement plan, such as a guardianship, only if (1) petitioner
demonstrates that “initiating termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s
best interests[;]” or (2) “the court does not order the agency to initiate termination of parental rights
to the child . . . .” In addition, a trial court can only appoint a guardian if a guardianship is in the
child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19a(9)(c); In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 359-360; 948 NW2d
131 (2019) (citations omitted).

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In this case, no such demonstration in support of guardianship was made. The trial court
considered and rejected the possibility that the children be placed in a guardianship with their aunt,
concluding that a guardianship was not the in the children’s best interests. The trial court reasoned
that the children had spent a considerable amount of time in the care of their aunt, who provided
the children with stability and permanence. The aunt and the children wanted adoption, and neither
the aunt nor the children wanted a guardianship. Respondent had virtually no contact with the
children for more than a year before the termination of his parental rights and made no effort to
provide for the children even after they were removed from the home of their mother, though
respondent had the financial ability to do so. We find no error in the trial court’s rejection of a
guardianship in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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