COA 368268 ESTATE OF BERNADINE ALLI V WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/19/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ALEXANDER ALLI, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF BERNADINE ALLI,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2025
9:27 AM
v No. 368268
Oakland Circuit Court
WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, doing
business as BEAUMONT HOSPITAL–TROY,
LC No. 2022-196315-NH
Defendant-Appellant.
DIANA HALL, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF VERONICA WILLIAMS-HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 368395
Oakland Circuit Court
WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, doing
business as BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEM,
BOTSFORD GENERAL HOSPITAL, doing
business as BOTSFORD HOSPITAL and
BEAUMONT HOSPITAL-FARMINGTON,
BEAUMONT HEALTH, FARMINGTON
EMERGENCY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES PLC,
BOTSFORD MEDICAL IMAGING PC, KRISTIN
M. KAMIENECKI, D.O., ALEX MARTIN, D.O.,
DAWN C. ZELENKA-JOSHOWITZ, D.O., and
MICHAEL ERIC ALPER, D.O.,
LC No. 2023-198733-NH
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: REDFORD, P.J., and CAMERON and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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These consolidated cases primarily involve the interpretation of the Pandemic Health Care
Immunity Act (PHCIA), MCL 691.1471 et seq. In Docket No. 368268, plaintiff, Alexander Alli,
as the personal representative of the estate of Bernadine Alli, pursued a medical-malpractice action
against defendant, William Beaumont Hospital.1 Defendant appeals by leave granted the trial
court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition. In Docket No. 368395, plaintiff, Diana
Hall, as personal representative of the estate of Veronica Williams-Hall, pursued a medical-
malpractice case against defendants, William Beaumont Hospital, Botsford General Hospital,2
Beaumont Health, Farmington Emergency Medicine Associates PLC, Botsford Medical Imaging
PC, Kristin M. Kamienecki, D.O, Alex Martin, D.O., Dawn C. Zelenka-Joshowitz, D.O., and
Michael Eric Alper, D.O. These defendants appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order denying
their motion for summary disposition.3
Although a coronavirus (COVID-19) diagnosis or treatment is not necessary to invoke
immunity under the PHCIA, there must still be “some connection” between the medical care
provided and the provider’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant immunity. Because
there was such a connection in Docket No. 368268, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. We also hold that plaintiff failed to show how the retroactive
application of the PHCIA was unconstitutional. However, in Docket No. 368395, because
defendants failed to produce evidence showing that such a connection existed, the trial court
properly denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. DOCKET NO. 368268
This medical-malpractice action arises from decedent Bernadine Alli’s fall while a patient
at Beaumont Hospital-Troy in April 2020.4 Bernadine, a 77-year old woman, presented to the
emergency department at Beaumont Hospital-Troy on April 22, 2020, complaining of back pain
from a recent back surgery, cough, weakness, fatigue, and nausea. Bernadine tested positive for
COVID-19, was placed in a COVID-19 unit, and treated for that virus. Because of her reported
back pain, she was given morphine as needed.
On April 25, 2020, a nurse noted that Bernadine had engaged in “some confused
conversation” and had an unsteady gait. The nurse entered an order for “High Risk Fall
Precautions.” On April 27, 2020, Bernadine was seen exhibiting confusion and having an inability
1 Doing business as Beaumont Health System.
2 Doing business as Botsford Hospital and Beaumont Hospital-Farmington.
3 This Court granted both applications for leave to appeal and consolidated the two cases. Estate
of Alli v William Beaumont Hosp, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 20,
2024 (Docket No. 368268); Estate of Williams-Hall v William Beaumont Hosp, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered March 20, 2024 (Docket No. 368395).
4 To avoid any confusion with plaintiff, Alexander Alli, who is the personal representative of
Bernadine Alli’s estate, we will refer to decedent as “Bernadine.”

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to understand her surroundings or comply with safety instructions. On April 28, 2020, Bernadine
fell out of her bed and sustained injuries, including a subdural hemorrhage, a subarachnoid
hemorrhage, lacerations to her face, and multiple fractures. Bernadine eventually was discharged
on May 7, 2020, to a subacute rehabilitation center. Bernadine died on June 6, 2022, in her
daughter’s home in North Carolina. Plaintiff alleged that Bernadine’s death was caused by the
fall.
Plaintiff filed suit on the theory that the hospital staff did not properly identify and react to
Bernadine’s fall risk. Plaintiff also maintained that the hospital had an insufficient number of
nurses working and that the hospital failed to properly train and supervise its staff.
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that it was
entitled to immunity under Michigan’s PHCIA and the federal Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREP Act), 42 USC 247d-6d. In response, plaintiff argued that defendant was
not entitled to immunity under the PHCIA because Bernadine’s injuries arose out of general
nursing malpractice of failing to have appropriate fall-intervention measures in place and not out
of “health care services in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Plaintiff
also asserted that retroactive application of the PHCIA was unconstitutional because it purported
to alter rights that vested before its October 2020 enactment. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion, explaining that “this particular fact pattern is outside the intention of the legislation.”
B. DOCKET NO. 368395
The medical-malpractice action in this case arises from the treatment decedent Veronica
Williams-Hall received in the emergency room at Beaumont Hospital-Farmington Hills shortly
after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.5 Veronica was 66 years old when she presented to the
hospital on March 29, 2020, at approximately 1:00 a.m. Veronica’s primary complaint was “upper
center back pain” that she had been experiencing since approximately 10:30 p.m. The emergency-
room doctors concluded that Veronica’s pain was “most likely musculoskeletal,” and they
discharged her at 2:12 a.m. with pain medications and instructions to return if she developed any
“numbness or weakness in extremities[;] bowel or bladder incontinence[;] or worsening pain
despite medication.” At 2:30 a.m., Veronica called her daughter, Diana Hall, and informed her
that she was home but still in pain. At 11:00 a.m., Diana went to Veronica’s home and found her
unresponsive in bed. An autopsy revealed that Veronica had died from ruptured aortic dissection.6
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging medical malpractice. Plaintiff’s theory was
that defendants violated the standard of care with respect to how they failed to properly evaluate
5 To avoid any confusion with plaintiff, Diana Hall, who is the personal representative of Veronica
Williams-Hall’s estate, we will refer to decedent as “Veronica.”
6 An aortic dissection is a serious condition in which a tear occurs in the inner layer of the body’s
main artery, the aorta. Complications from aortic dissection include severe internal bleeding,
organ damage, stroke, and aortic regurgitation. Mayo Clinic, Aortic dissection
<https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/aortic-dissection/symptoms-causes/syc-
20369496> (accessed September 22, 2025).

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Veronica, which left her dissecting aortic aneurysm to go undiagnosed and untreated, resulting in
her death.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing
that they were entitled to immunity under the PHCIA and Executive Order No. 2020-30.
Defendants maintained that this immunity applied even though Veronica was not a COVID-19
patient because “they were using their resources in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Plaintiff in response argued that defendants’ interpretation of the PHCIA was overly broad and
inconsistent with the statutory language. Plaintiff instead maintained that any immunity only
applied when the person was injured “by reason of” COVID-19-related treatment and services,
which were not present in Veronica’s case. The trial court denied defendants’ motion, explaining
that defendants were reading the statute too broadly. These appeals followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. IMMUNITY GRANTED UNDER THE PHCIA
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A party is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) if, among other
things, the plaintiff’s claims are barred because of “immunity granted by law.” Parties may support
their respective positions with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.
MCR 2.116(G)(5). “The contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted by the
evidence provided.” Odom, 482 Mich at 466 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The proper interpretation of a statute is also reviewed de novo. Stanton v Battle Creek, 466
Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d 508 (2002).
2. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
The PHCIA was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Franklin v McLaren
Flint, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 366226); slip op at 4-5. As this
Court explained, “[t]he global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic was one of the most
threatening public-health crises of modern times.” Id. at ___; slip op at 4 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Following Governor Whitmer’s declared state of emergency on March 10, 2020,
she issued various executive orders in response to the health crisis. Id. Of particular relevance is
EO 2020-30, which was executed on March 29, 2020, and provided, in pertinent part:
Consistent with MCL 30.411(4), any licensed health care professional or
designated health care facility that provides medical services in support of this
state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is not liable for an injury sustained by
a person by reason of those services, regardless of how or under what circumstances
or by what cause those injuries are sustained, unless it is established that such injury
or death was caused by the gross negligence, as defined in MCL 30.411(9), of such
health care professional or designated health care facility.

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The immunity conferred in this executive order was continued by Executive Order No. 2020-61,
but was rescinded on July 15, 2020, by Executive Order No. 2020-150.
After the issuance of these executive orders, the Legislature enacted the PHCIA with an
immediate effective date of October 22, 2020. 2020 PA 240. Section 5 of the PHCIA mirrored
the language of the earlier executive orders:
A health care provider or health care facility that provides health care
services in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is not liable
for an injury, including death, sustained by an individual by reason of those
services, regardless of how, under what circumstances, or by what cause those
injuries are sustained, unless it is established that the provision of the services
constituted willful misconduct, gross negligence, intentional and willful criminal
misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm by the health care provider or health
care facility. [MCL 691.1475.]
The Legislature explicitly made this act retroactive, applying to all claims “on or after March 29,
2020 and before July 14, 2020.” MCL 691.1477.
This Court has addressed the immunity granted by the PHCIA in three published opinions.
First, in Franklin, the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital on March 31, 2020, for shortness of
breath. Franklin, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1. He was diagnosed and treated for COVID-
19. Id. at ___; slip op at 1-2. On April 6, 2020, while the plaintiff was still in the hospital, bedsores
were first documented on his body. Id. at ___; slip op at 2. The plaintiff filed a medical-
malpractice suit premised on the failure to assess and treat the bedsores. Id. The plaintiff had
argued that in order to qualify for immunity under the PHCIA, the healthcare provided must have
been provided specifically to support the state’s response to the pandemic and not care provided
in the ordinary course of business. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court disagreed, and after
consulting various dictionary definitions, held that a defendant is protected under the statute “if it
provided any healthcare services that assisted, helped, or promoted the state’s reactions and actions
taken as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,” including “healthcare services that healthcare
facilities like defendant gave to those infected with COVID-19 and regular healthcare services
provided during the statutory period.” Id. at ___; slip op at 8. Simply put, the immunity provision
of MCL 691.1475 covers “both regular medical care and medical treatment specific to COVID-
19.” Id. The Court further reasoned that the consequence of redirecting hospital resources to
fighting the pandemic was that other areas of medical care necessarily lost resources. Id.
Second, in Skipper-Baines v Bd of Hosp Managers for City of Flint, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365137); slip op at 1, the 91-year-old decedent was admitted
to the hospital after being found unresponsive. The decedent was placed in a room with a mentally
unstable roommate who had a known propensity for violent outbursts. Id. The decedent
underwent a minor surgical procedure to treat gallbladder disease. Id. After being returned to his
room, the roommate attacked the decedent and inflicted serious harm. Id. at ___; slip op at 1-2.
The decedent’s health continued to decline, and he eventually died. Id. at ___; slip op at 2.
Notably, the decedent had contracted COVID-19 at some point after being admitted to the hospital.
Id. Decedent’s cause of death was “ ‘COVID-19 associated pneumonia and complications thereof
complicated by hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.’ ” Id.

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The Skipper-Baines Court held that the services that allegedly caused the decedent’s injury
were not given “in support of this state’s response to the pandemic.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3
(quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned:
The alleged negligent act was placing [the decedent] in a room with an unsafe
roommate, and the alleged omission was failing to deploy adequate safeguards to
protect the decedent from the roommate whom was known to be unsafe. It is clear
to us that neither of those were done in support of the pandemic response. There
certainly will be gray area with respect to whether medical services were offered in
support of the state’s pandemic response, but this particular case is black and white.
The alleged acts, omissions, and injuries were wholly unrelated to the pandemic,
so deeming defendant immune would contravene the Legislature’s clearly-
communicated intent to limit this immunization to services stemming from the
pandemic. The fact that the decedent apparently contracted COVID-19 at some
point following his admission does not change the fact that he was not being treated
at the hospital for COVID-19 or that the incident giving rise to this litigation was
completely separate. [Id. at ___; slip op at 3.]
The Court went on to clarify that immunity does not apply only when the patient is being treated
for COVID-19; but there must be “some connection” with the hospital’s response to COVID. Id.
at ___; slip op at 4. As an example, the Court suggested that “if an unrelated emergency was not
timely dealt with because hospital staff were overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients,” immunity
could apply. Id. The Court noted that its holding was consistent with Franklin because the
Franklin Court likewise did not hold that all hospitals that treated COVID-19 were immune from
all malpractice actions not premised on gross negligence. Id., citing Franklin, at ___; slip op at 9.
Finally, in Jokinen v Beaumont Hosp Troy, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 370983); slip op at 1, the decedent was admitted to the hospital on April 8, 2020,
because she was suffering from an altered mental state after a fall. Although there were signs of
bruises on the decedent’s body, there was no indication of any pressure-related injuries, such as
bedsores. Id. The decedent was evaluated as a medium-to-high risk for developing pressure-
related injuries. Id. On April 10, 2020, a skin tear was noticed and treated over the next 10 days.
Id. at ___; slip op at 1-2. Almost two weeks after being admitted, the decedent was discharged
from the hospital and transferred to another facility where her condition continued to deteriorate.
Id. at ___; slip op at 2. The decedent was repeatedly assessed for COVID-19 symptoms, but no
symptoms were ever noted. Id. On May 12, 2020, the decedent was admitted to the hospital with
a sacral decubitus ulcer,7 and she passed away two days later. Id.
While applying Franklin and Skipper-Baines, the Jokinen Court held that immunity from
the PHCIA did not apply to the defendants because, unlike the plaintiff in Franklin, the decedent
7 “Bedsores also are called pressure ulcers, pressure injuries and decubitus ulcers.” Mayo Clinic,
Bedsores (pressure ulcers) <https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/bed-
sores/symptoms-causes/syc-20355893> (accessed September 22, 2025).

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was not admitted with symptoms of COVID-19 and was never treated for COVID-19. Id. at ___;
slip op at 7. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that any deficiency in care was “a
byproduct of the very demand, restrictions, protocols, uncertainties, and overall chaos considered
by the governor and the legislature.” Id. The Court stressed that the trial court granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and under that subrule, only the pleadings are considered. Id.
Because nothing in the complaint suggested that any factual basis for the defendants’ argument
exists, this Court reversed the grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).8 Id.
3. APPLICATION TO DOCKET NO. 368268
The circumstances of Bernadine’s case, for all relevant purposes, are indistinguishable
from the circumstances in Franklin. As in Franklin, Bernadine was diagnosed and treated for
COVID-19. Although the alleged malpractice in the instant case related to the failure to identify
and take steps to mitigate any risk of Bernadine falling out of her bed, this type of medical care
would be “regular medical care” in support of the state’s response to the pandemic, and under
Franklin, is still covered under the PHCIA.9 Therefore, defendant is entitled to immunity under
the PHCIA, and the trial court erred by ruling otherwise.10
4. APPLICATION TO DOCKET NO. 368395
Applying the holdings of Franklin, Skipper-Baines, and Jokinen to the present case, it is
undisputed that Veronica did not have COVID-19 and was not treated for COVID-19. But as
Skipper-Baines instructs, that is not dispositive. The key is whether there was “some connection”
between Veronica’s injuries and defendants’ response in support of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Skipper-Baines, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. The burden was on defendants to show that
immunity from the PHCIA applied. See AFSCME v Detroit, 267 Mich App 255, 261; 704 NW2d
712 (2005) (“The moving party has the initial burden to support its claim for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) . . . by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary
evidence.”). In support of their motion for summary disposition, defendants cited no evidence to
show that their treatment of Veronica was connected to their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Instead, defendants merely averred that the PHCIA afforded blanket protection to all healthcare
providers during the pertinent period. As noted, there must be some connection between the
injuries and the provider’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Because defendants failed to
8 The Court expressly limited its analysis to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and declined to address whether
summary disposition was warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7), which allows review of submitted
evidence.
9 Plaintiff acknowledges that after applying the holding of Franklin, defendant is entitled to
immunity. He contends that Franklin was incorrectly decided; however, this Court is bound by
Franklin. MCR 7.215(J)(1). Further, because Franklin was reasonably decided, we decline to
convene a conflict panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3).
10 Because we hold that defendant was immune from suit under the PHCIA, we decline to address
the other basis for defendant’s motion for summary disposition—whether it was also immune from
suit under the PREP Act.

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offer any evidence to show how this necessary nexus existed, the trial court properly denied
defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PHCIA
In Docket No. 368268, plaintiff argues that if immunity applies under the PHCIA, then we
should affirm in any event because the PHCIA is unconstitutional as a result of its retroactive
application depriving plaintiff of a vested right. We disagree.
Although the trial court never addressed the constitutionality of the PHCIA, plaintiff did
raise the issue in response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition. See Glasker-Davis v
Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020) (“[I]ssue preservation requirements
only impose a general prohibition against raising an issue for the first time on appeal.”); Truel v
Dearborn, 291 Mich App 125, 137; 804 NW2d 744 (2010) (“Although an appellee need not file a
cross-appeal to argue an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision, an appellee cannot
obtain a decision more favorable than the decision rendered by the trial court.”). Therefore, we
will review it.
When a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the statute is presumed
constitutional, and the challenging party bears a heavy burden of rebutting that presumption.
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 260; 615 NW2d 218 (2000); see also Zdrojewski v Murphy, 254
Mich App 50, 75; 657 NW2d 721 (2002) (“The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute
has the burden of proving the invalidity of the law.”). Plaintiff claims that the PHCIA is
unconstitutional because it, in essence, took away Bernadine’s vested right of being able to sue
defendant (without it having immunity). “[C]onstitutional due process principles act to prevent
retrospective laws from divesting property rights or vested rights.” GMAC LLC v Treasury Dep’t,
286 Mich App 365, 377; 781 NW2d 310 (2009). Assuming that the ability to sue a party without
immunity on a claim of medical malpractice is a vested right, see Buhl v Oak Park, 507 Mich 236,
246-247; 968 NW2d 348 (2021) (treating a suit against a city for negligence without application
of the open-and-obvious doctrine as a vested right), this argument fails for one primary reason. At
the time when the claim accrued on April 28, 2020, EO 2020-61 was in effect and provided the
same immunity described in the later-enacted PHCIA.11 Consequently, when plaintiff’s claim
accrued, defendant was already entitled to the same immunity that would later be codified by the
PHCIA. Therefore, Bernadine’s ability to sue defendant was no different on April 28, 2020, as
compared to after the PHCIA was enacted in October 2020, which vitiates plaintiff’s constitutional
argument.
III. CONCLUSION
In Docket No. 368268, because defendant was entitled to immunity under the PHCIA, the
trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand
11 Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of any of the Governor’s executive orders.

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for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction. In Docket
No. 368395, we affirm the denial of defendants’ motion for summary disposition.12
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Sima G. Patel
12We note, in addition to the three published cases discussed, our Court has addressed the questions
raised in these matters in several unpublished decisions as well and arrived at essentially the same
conclusions as in the published decisions. See Anderson v Ascension Providence Hosp,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 18, 2024 (Docket No.
365559) (applying PHCIA immunity when the plaintiff sought mental-health treatment for a risk
of suicide for pandemic-related stress and suffering a fall when left unassisted by the defendant
hospital); Harris v Rhema-Belmont Operating, LLC, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued January 27, 2025 (Docket No. 367678) (applying PHCIA immunity where a
decedent developed pressure wounds and died while she was being treated for COVID-19 related
pneumonia); Monroe v St Joseph Hosp, Pontiac, Trinity Health-Mich, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 21 2025 (Docket No. 368667) (applying PHCIA
immunity to a patient admitted with generalized weakness, low blood pressure, and a diagnosis of
likely COVID-19 who suffered pressure wounds while in the defendant’s care); Pakenas v
McLaren Macomb, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11,
2025 (Docket Nos. 369752 and 372858) (finding PHCIA immunity did not apply to the claims of
a patient who slipped and fell in a pre-discharge shower when briefly left unattended and the
patient had never been treated or diagnosed with COVID-19).

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