COA 374854 IN RE FOOTE MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/10/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2025
1:43 PM
In re FOOTE, Minors.
No. 374854
Lenawee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 21-000112-NA
Before: YATES, P.J., and BOONSTRA and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor
children, VF and JF, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue
to exist), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to parent). On appeal,
respondent-mother blames the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) and the trial
court for impeding her efforts at reunification with her children. Also, respondent-mother asserts
that she was denied her due-process right to appeal her removal from her home. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
VF and JF are the youngest of seven children respondent-mother had with their father,1 and
the nine of them lived together. In August 2023, Children’s Protective Services (“CPS”) watched
in-home camera footage of the oldest child, MF, getting angry and kicking then-23-month-old VF
in the upper back, propelling her forward. Respondent-mother, who was on a nearby couch, made
no effort to check on VF or control MF. MF then hit respondent-mother with a shoe. Respondent-
mother started chasing MF through the home with the older children following her, and MF jumped
out of the kitchen window because the front door of the home was locked with a deadbolt.
When CPS workers visited the home on August 7, 2023, they found the home unsanitary,
unsafe, and covered in garbage. The also observed dead bugs and old food. VF was locked in the
1 Father voluntarily released his parental rights to VF and JF, so he is not a party to this appeal.

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bedroom, and respondent-mother did not know where the keys were. VF had not been medically
examined since being kicked because respondent-mother did not feel that that was necessary, but
she eventually agreed to have VF seen by a medical professional. When CPS workers expressed
concerns about the locked doors, behavioral issues, and condition of the home, respondent-mother
“did not see any issues with her behavior” and “believed [MF] is the problem in her home.”
In September 2023, the DHHS filed a petition asking the trial court to take jurisdiction over
all seven children based upon improper supervision, failure to protect, and physical neglect. The
petition cited 14 previous CPS contacts, and father stated that respondent-mother only participated
in services “due to the court involvement[,]” and he described her as a barrier to the family making
changes. The DHHS requested that the trial court place the children in father’s care with “in-home
jurisdiction” and order respondent-mother to leave the home pursuant to MCL 712A.13a(4). The
trial court authorized the petition, finding respondent-mother could be considered an abuser under
the statute and ordering her removal from the home. All the children were placed with father under
the supervision of the DHHS, and respondent-mother was afforded supervised parenting time.
On October 26, 2023, respondent-mother entered into a “Case Service Plan/Parent Agency
Agreement” that required her to take part in services, including individual counseling and “trauma
informed parenting classes” with Brenee Moore. Respondent-mother attended and participated in
sessions with Moore, but respondent-mother was not showing consistent benefit from the parenting
classes. She initially implemented what she learned during parenting time, but then she stopped.
In January 2024, VF and JF were removed from father’s care and placed in a licensed foster care
home. The foster parents reported that both of the children sometimes cried before parenting time
with respondent-mother because they did not want to attend, and afterwards struggled with severe
night terrors, eating regression, mean and aggressive behaviors, and bathroom accidents.
At the August 2024 permanency planning hearing, respondent-mother stated that she had
benefited from parenting classes, but foster care supervisor Leslie Conrad testified that respondent-
mother had not shown sufficient improvement in parenting skills to prevent further traumatization
of the children. VF and JF were experiencing significant behavior regressions after parenting time,
they could not sleep alone because of night terrors, and VF was peeling her fingernails and toenails
until they were raw. Hence, the trial court suspended respondent-mother’s parenting time.
In December 2024, Moore reported that respondent-mother had not attended counseling
since September. Respondent-mother requested Zoom sessions, claiming in-person appointments
were impossible because of her work schedule, but Moore recommended against Zoom sessions.
Respondent-mother was not exhibiting any benefit when talking about her parenting abilities, but
respondent-mother stated that her parenting time had been suspended before she could implement
the parenting skills she had learned, and she could not demonstrate any benefit if she could not see
her children.
At the February 24, 2025 termination hearing, the trial court found that respondent-mother
had not made progress addressing the conditions that caused removal, and those conditions could
not be rectified in a reasonable time considering the ages of the children and the fact that they had
been in foster care for most of their lives. The trial court found that statutory grounds existed to
terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), and the trial
court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. This appeal of right followed.

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Respondent-mother faults the DHHS and the trial court for impeding her reunification with
her children, and she insists that she was denied due process when she was removed from the home
she shared with her children. We will address these issues in turn.
A. IMPAIRMENT OF REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
Respondent-mother contends that she was denied reasonable efforts to reunify her with her
children because the DHHS and the trial court actively impeded her ability to obtain reunification.
Ordinarily, this Court reviews “for clear error the trial court’s factual finding that petitioner made
reasonable efforts to reunify respondents with the child.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338;
990 NW2d 685 (2022). But unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial
rights. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). The plain-error standard
requires respondent-mother to show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) “the
plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412
(2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A plain error “affects substantial rights if it caused
prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761
NW2d 253 (2008). Reversal is warranted only if the plain error “seriously affect[ed] the integrity,
fairness, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 311; 964
NW2d 881 (2020). On appeal, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings that
reasonable efforts toward reunification were made, but she insists the trial court created the barriers
to reunification used as a basis for terminating her parental rights. Because respondent-mother did
not advance that argument in the trial court, we can only conduct a review for plain error.
Generally, the DHHS has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family
before requesting termination of parental rights. In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d
637 (2017). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the [DHHS] must create a service plan outlining
the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and
to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86. Although the DHHS has to “expend reasonable efforts to
provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of
respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248;
824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, a respondent must “demonstrate that [she] sufficiently benefited
from the services provided.” Id.
Here, respondent-mother received a trauma assessment, individual and family counseling,
trauma-informed parenting classes, case management, and supportive visitation services. Further,
VF and JF were provided with trauma assessments, and family team meetings were held regularly
to determine family supports and needs. In sum, respondent-mother and her children were offered
a wide range of services in an effort to accomplish reunification.
The record reveals that respondent-mother participated in services, but she did not benefit
from those services. Respondent-mother began counseling and trauma-informed parenting classes
with Moore in October 2023, but by March 2024, she had not shown any benefit and was resistant
to acknowledging a need for change. Although there were periods when respondent-mother made
progress with her parenting skills, VF and JF continued to exhibit negative behavior after parenting
time, crying beforehand and struggling afterwards with night terrors, eating regression, bathroom

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accidents, and mean and aggressive behaviors. VF began picking her fingernails and toenails until
they were raw. Because of the harm that it was causing the children, the trial court chose to suspend
respondent-mother’s parenting time in August 2024. After that, the negative behavior of VF and
JF decreased, and they were successfully toilet training and sleeping in their own beds.
Respondent-mother insists the trial court prevented her from demonstrating the parenting
skills she had learned by suspending her parenting time. At the time of the suspension, respondent-
mother had been exercising parenting time for almost one year. Despite consistently attending and
participating in parenting classes with Moore, respondent-mother had not shown any benefit from
them. She did not consistently exhibit the ability to parent her children without traumatizing them.
Respondent-mother contends that if she had not been removed from the home, she would not have
had to move an hour away, yet the trial court used the fact that she stopped seeing Moore as a basis
to terminate her parental rights. The trial court stated, however, that respondent-mother’s parental
rights were being terminated because of her lack of progress and her failure to benefit from trauma-
informed parenting classes. Therefore, respondent-mother’s failure to benefit from services, rather
than any lack of reasonable efforts by the DHHS or interference by the trial court, was the barrier
that prevented reunification. Accordingly, neither the trial court nor the DHHS can be faulted for
impeding respondent-mother’s reunification with her children.
B. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
Respondent-mother argues that, as a matter of due process, she should have been given the
same opportunity to appeal her removal from the home as she would have been afforded to appeal
the removal of her children from the home. Whether child protective proceedings “complied with
a respondent’s substantive and procedural due process rights is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 268; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (citation omitted).
But “an unpreserved claim of constitutional error is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial
rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because respondent-mother did not present a
due-process claim in the trial court, our review is confined to a search for plain error that affected
her substantial rights.
The DHHS petitioned the trial court to remove the children from respondent-mother’s care
and custody and remove respondent-mother from the home pursuant to MCL 712A.13a(4), which
permits the removal of a parent if a petition that alleges abuse is authorized, there is probable cause
to believe the parent was the abuser, and the abuser remaining in the home “presents a substantial
risk of harm to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.” MCL 712A.13a(4); In re
Benavides, 334 Mich App 162, 170; 964 NW2d 108 (2020). At the preliminary hearing, the trial
court authorized the petition, and after concluding that respondent-mother was an abuser under the
statute, ordered her removed from the home.
Respondent-mother does not dispute the abuse or the basis for removal. Instead, she claims
that the trial court made the wrong decision by removing her because father thereafter was unable
to manage the home and the children. Respondent-mother contends that she suffered irreparable
harm because she was unable to appeal the removal order, but she fails to identify any error in the
trial court’s determination to remove her, much less anything sufficient to reverse that decision on
appeal. Thus, we find no error at all, much less plain error, in the trial court’s decision to remove

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her from the home pursuant to MCL 712A.13a(4). Accordingly, any appeal of that ruling, whether
immediately after her removal from the home or at any later point, would have been unsuccessful.
Beyond that, under MCR 3.993(A)(1), “any order removing a child from a parent’s care
and custody” is an order appealable of right. Both of the children were removed from respondent-
mother’s care and custody when they were placed in father’s custody under the care of the DHHS,
while respondent-mother was removed from the home and given supervised parenting time. Thus,
respondent-mother could have appealed of right at that juncture, but she failed to do so. Her failure
to exercise her right to appeal cannot be blamed on the trial court, nor can it support any relief on
this appeal on the basis of a due-process theory.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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