PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND GRANT

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND GRANT
Docket No. 378351
LC No. 82-002924-01-FC
Daniel S. Korobkin
Presiding Judge
Michael F. Gadola
Christopher P. Yates
Judges
The motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED.
Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(2), in lieu of granting the application for leave to appeal, we
VACATE the trial court’s October 31, 2025 order and REMAND this matter to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this order. Given the procedural stance of this case, the trial court erred by
granting defendant relief from judgment, in the form of resentencing, while simultaneously refusing to
recharacterize his motion as one seeking relief from judgment under MCR subchapter 6.500. See MCR
6.501; MCR 6.429(A) & (B)(4); People v Leigh, 505 Mich 978 (2020); People v Barner, 500 Mich 1057
(2017). See also People v Green, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 3, 2025
(Docket No. 376685) (holding that the defendant in that case had “satisfie[d] the requirements for relief
under MCR 6.508(D)”) (emphasis added). On remand, the trial court should vacate any orders or judgments
that it may have entered as a result of its October 31, 2025 order granting resentencing. Then, similar to the
procedure contemplated in MCR 6.502(D), the trial court should afford defendant 90 days to decide whether
to consent to having the disputed motion recharacterized as a motion for relief from judgment before it is
ruled upon, to instead amend that motion, or to withdraw it altogether.
In light of the foregoing, the motion for stay pending appeal is DENIED as moot.
This order is to have immediate effect. MCR 7.215(F)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge
Korobkin, J. (concurring).
Under our court rules, a decision to grant peremptory relief must be unanimous. MCR 7.211(C)(4).
With the understanding that a nonunanimous resolution could cause a significant delay in further
proceedings in the trial court, and that such delay would not be in the public interest, I concur in the relief
provided by this order. In my view, the fact that the trial court’s orders are vacated for the reasons stated
should not be interpreted as implying that defendant should not receive a prompt resentencing as the trial

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court had intended. To the contrary, there appears to be no question that defendant satisfies the
requirements for relief under MCR 6.508(D), see People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 357332); slip op at 5, lv gtd ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 118 (2025), and that Eads is
binding precedent notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal, see MCR
7.215(C)(2). Therefore, assuming defendant consents, the trial court may “treat the defendant’s motion
for resentence as a motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D)” and “grant relief in the form
of an order vacating the defendant’s . . . sentence and resentencing [him] . . . .” People v Jimenez, 465
Mich 871 (2001); see also Green, unpub order, supra.

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