COA 362410 PEOPLE OF MI V TORREANNO SHAWN SMITH Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/15/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2025
2:15 PM
v No. 362410
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
TORREANNO SHAWN SMITH, LC No. 2021-013963-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Torreanno Shawn Smith, appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(b) (force or coercion). Smith was
sentenced to five months in jail and two years’ probation for his CSC-IV conviction. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of Smith’s inappropriate touching of a 16-year-old girl’s breast at an
indoor recreation venue. On July 22, 2021, complainant was working at the venue when 45-year-
old Smith arrived on the premises with a group of his friends and family. As complainant was at
the sales counter, Smith approached complainant to purchase prepaid cards to access the venue
attractions. Smith proceeded to advance numerous improper comments to complainant, including
calling her “babe,” and asking whether complainant was married and if not, whether she wanted
to be married. Later that evening, complainant was assigned to the venue’s laser tag staging space.
Smith entered the area, touched complainant’s left breast with his hand, laughed, apologized, and
walked away. Complainant was visibly upset, crying, and hid behind a counter. Smith approached
complainant inquiring why she was crying, and he expressed that complainant was beautiful, she
was doing a great job, and he intended to “ask her out.” Complainant subsequently reported the
incident to her manager, and complainant’s mother and the police were contacted. Smith left the
premises, but a venue employee was able to note the license plate number of the vehicle Smith
occupied. Smith was then identified, interviewed by the police, and charged with CSC-IV.
At trial, complainant identified Smith as the individual responsible for touching her breast,
and she testified regarding Smith’s inappropriate remarks toward her. Complainant further

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testified that the lighting in the laser tag area was dim compared to other sections of the venue and
that the flooring may have been uneven. Other employees of the venue corroborated complainant’s
assertions concerning Smith’s comments. Smith’s cousin, who was present at the venue the day
of the subject incident, advanced that Smith’s comments were nonsexual and that she did not see
Smith touch complainant. Detective Travis Horn further testified that he interviewed Smith on
August 25, 2021, during which Smith disclosed that he advanced “flirtatious” comments to various
venue staff members, but he denied touching complainant. Following the parties’ closing
arguments, the trial court issued jury instructions in compliance with Michigan’s Model Criminal
Jury Instructions for CSC-IV.1 Smith was convicted and sentenced as provided earlier. This
appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
A. JURY INSTRUCTION
Smith argues that the trial court erred by omitting the mens rea element of the CSC-IV
offense from its jury instructions. We disagree.
“A party must object or request a given jury instruction to preserve the error for review.”
People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 657; 620 NW2d 19 (2000); see also
MCR 2.512(C); MCL 768.29. This Court reviews claims of instructional error de novo. People v
Spaulding, 332 Mich App 638, 652; 957 NW2d 843 (2020). Smith failed to preserve this issue by
timely objecting to the omission of a mens rea instruction. This issue is unpreserved; thus, it is
reviewed under the plain-error standard. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-765; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1)
error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error
affected substantial rights.” Id. at 763. “The third requirement generally requires a showing of
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.
Criminal defendants are entitled to a properly instructed jury. People v Dobek, 274 Mich
App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). “Jury instructions must include all the elements of the offenses
charged against the defendant and any material issues, defenses, and theories that are supported by
the evidence.” Id. at 82. “Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety, and there is no error
requiring reversal if the instructions sufficiently protected the rights of the defendant and fairly
presented the triable issues to the jury.” Id. “A crime requiring a particular criminal intent beyond
the act done is generally considered a specific intent crime; whereas, a general intent crime merely
requires ‘the intent to perform the physical act itself.’ ” People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 266;
677 NW2d 66 (2004) (citation omitted). Stated alternatively, “the distinction between specific
intent and general intent crimes is that the former involve a particular criminal intent beyond the
act done, while the latter involve merely the intent to do the physical act.” People v Haveman,
328 Mich App 480, 485; 938 NW2d 773 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
1 M Crim JI 20.13 and 20.15.

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“This Court has held that criminal sexual conduct is a general intent crime, not a specific
intent crime.” People v Russell, 266 Mich App 307, 315; 703 NW2d 107 (2005). In considering
the proper language for jury instructions pertaining to CSC offenses, this Court has determined
that a defendant’s mens rea “is not relevant to this general intent crime,” rather, “a jury is properly
limited to a determination whether the defined conduct, when viewed objectively, could
reasonably be construed as being for a sexual purpose.” People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 647,
650; 567 NW2d 483 (1997).
Because Smith was charged with CSC-IV, a general intent offense, the trial court was not
required to provide a mens rea instruction, and its omission did not render the jury instructions
deficient. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of CSC-IV, enabling the jurors
to determine whether the alleged conduct constituted sexual contact accomplished through force
or coercion, as required for a conviction under MCL 750.520e(1)(b). In light of the foregoing, the
jury instructions, when viewed in their entirety, sufficiently protected Smith’s rights and fairly
presented the issues to be tried.
Smith further contends that his inappropriate remarks to complainant and other venue
employees constituted protected speech under the First Amendment and were improperly used to
establish that he intentionally touched complainant’s breast for a sexual purpose. We disagree.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no
law . . .abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” US Const, Am I. “The Michigan Constitution
provides the same protection under Const 1963, art 1, § 5, which states that ‘[e]very person may
freely speak, write, express and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of such right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech.’ ” Buchanan
v Crisler, 323 Mich App 163, 181; 922 NW2d 886 (2018). But the First Amendment “does not
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or
intent.” Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 US 476, 489; 113 S Ct 2194; 124 L Ed 2d 436 (1993).2
Evidence of a defendant’s previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in criminal
trials subject to evidentiary rules. Id. In this case, the prosecution’s use of Smith’s previous
statements plainly fell within the bounds of permissible use under Mitchell. Smith’s statements
were used as evidence of his intent in touching complainant for a sexual purpose, and Smith does
not contend that their admission otherwise breached the Michigan Rules of Evidence. See People
v Ish, 252 Mich App 115, 117-118; 652 NW2d 257 (2002) (holding “no error occurred in the
admission of defendant’s statement as proof of the necessary intent” for the underlying offense).
Accordingly, Smith’s free speech rights were not violated.
2 This Court has determined that “the rights to free speech under the Michigan and federal
constitutions are coterminous.” Burns v City of Detroit (On Remand), 253 Mich App 608, 620-
621; 660 NW2d 85 (2002). “Thus, federal authority construing the First Amendment may be used
in construing the Michigan Constitution’s free speech guarantee.” Id.

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B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE/GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Smith argues that there was insufficient evidence to properly convict him of CSC-IV, or,
alternatively, that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
A conviction lacking sufficient evidence violates the accused’s right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307,
316; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979). “A defendant need not take any action to preserve a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Williams, 294 Mich App 461, 471; 811
NW2d 88 (2011). “Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo.” People
v Xun Wang, 505 Mich 239, 251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020). “When reviewing a defendant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Williams, 294 Mich App 461, 471; 811 NW2d
88 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The standard is deferential, and the reviewing
court “is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the
jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
To preserve a claim that a conviction is against the great weight of the evidence, a
defendant must move for a new trial in the trial court. People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599,
617; 806 NW2d 371 (2011). Smith did not move for a new trial in the trial court. Therefore, this
issue is unpreserved. “[W]hen a party fails to preserve a great-weight issue for appeal, an appellate
court will look for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Smith was convicted of CSC-IV pursuant to MCL 750.520e(1)(b). MCL 750.520e(1)(b),
as amended by 2023 PA 126,3 provides, “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth
degree if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person and . . .[f]orce or coercion is used
to accomplish the sexual contact.” “Force or coercion” includes, but is not limited to, the actual
application of physical force or physical violence, the threat of retaliation, force, or violence, and
the achievement of sexual contact through concealment or by the element of surprise. Former
MCL 750.520e(1)(b). “Sexual contact” is defined as:
the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s
intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a
sexual manner for:
(i) Revenge.
(ii) To inflict humiliation.
3 The subsequent amendment, effective September 27, 2023, did not substantially alter the cited
statute.

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(iii) Out of anger. [MCL 750.520a(q)].
To determine “whether [the] touching could be reasonably construed as being for a sexual purpose,
the conduct should be ‘viewed objectively’ under a ‘reasonable person standard.’ ” People v
DeLeon, 317 Mich App 714, 720; 895 NW2d 577 (2016) (citation omitted).
Smith contends that the prosecution failed to establish the sexual-contact element of the
underlying CSC-IV offense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, Smith’s improper remarks toward complainant before and after
touching her breast constituted sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer that Smith
intentionally touched complainant’s breast for a sexual purpose. See People v Aikens, ___ Mich
App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 368187); slip op at 4 (“Considering all of the
evidence of defendant complimenting [the complainant’s] appearance, going inside the house after
her, and the actions he took toward her on the couch, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude
that this was done for a sexual purpose.”) See also People v Darga, 349 Mich App 1, 16; ___
NW3d ___ (2023) (“Because a juror cannot look into a defendant’s mind, they often must rely on
circumstantial evidence to determine intent. To that end, though stated in the context of general
intent, a jury may presume that a person ‘intend[ed] the natural consequences of’ their actions.”)
(Citation omitted).
To the extent Smith contends that the evidence supports a possible innocent explanation
for the touching or challenges complainant’s credibility, such matters fall within the jury’s
province. As previously opined by the Michigan Supreme Court, when the question is one of
“credibility posed by diametrically opposed versions of the events in question,” the test of
credibility must be left with the trier of fact. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 466, 646-647; 576
NW2d 129 (1998). Accordingly, the disputed testimony about Smith’s intent and the very
occurrence of the alleged touching presented factual and credibility questions for the jury to
resolve. See Aikens, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4 (“There was conflicting evidence from
various witnesses at trial, but it was the role of the jury to hear that evidence and make its findings
of fact,” regarding the alleged sexually inappropriate acts). Further, complainant’s testimony, in
and of itself, was sufficient to establish the subject offense. See People v Horton, 341 Mich App
397, 404-405; 989 NW2d 885 (2022) (“In most criminal sexual conduct cases there are no
nonparticipant witnesses to the crime, which reduces the cases to weighing the defendant’s
credibility against that of the victim”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also People v
Alter, 255 Mich App 194, 203; 659 NW2d 667 (2003) (“The victim denied ever giving defendant
permission to have such sexual contact with her. This was sufficient evidence that defendant used
actual force to accomplish sexual contact”). In light of the foregoing, Smith failed to show that
the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence or that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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