COA 373754 ESTATE OF KATHLEEN M MACHELSKI V GREAT LAKES PHYSICIANS ORG Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/6/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MARSHA SCHROEDER, Personal Representative
of the ESTATE OF KATHLEEN M. MACHELSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 06, 2026
2:19 PM
v No. 373754
Bay Circuit Court
GREAT LAKES PHYSICIANS ORGANIZATION,
PC,
LC No. 2020-003450-NH
Defendant,
and
SUBBARAO CHAVALI, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, the Estate of Kathleen M. Machelski, by its personal representative Marsha
Schroeder, appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order granting partial summary disposition
to defendant, Dr. Subbarao Chavali, under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse in part and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 Estate of Kathleen M Machelski v Great Lakes Physicians Org, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered June 5, 2025 (Docket No. 373754).

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I. FACTS
On May 9, 2016, Kathleen Machelski visited Dr. Subbarao Chavali to help manage her
atrial fibrillation,2 and Dr. Chavali prescribed her Coumadin3 therapy. Machelski had a high level
of Coumadin in her system after several months of treatment, and plaintiff alleges that the high
level of Coumadin resulted in a subarachnoid hemorrhage or stroke. Machelski was treated in a
hospital and a rehabilitation facility for the side effects and complications from the stroke. More
than a year after her stroke, Machelski fell and suffered a brain bleed that ultimately led to her
death. The parties dispute, and the ongoing litigation concerns, whether this fall was caused from
complications of the stroke.
Machelski’s daughter, Marsha Schroeder, filed this wrongful death action on behalf of
Machelski’s estate, alleging that Dr. Chavali was negligent in providing medical care to
Machelski.4 Throughout the pendency of the case, plaintiff argued that Machelski had been
providing household and caretaking services to her husband prior to her death and, therefore, the
damages for Dr. Chavali’s alleged negligence included the loss of her caretaking services. Dr.
Chavali filed a motion for partial summary disposition as to any of plaintiff’s claims for damages
that included the loss of Machelski’s caretaking services to her husband. After Dr. Chavali filed
his motion for partial summary disposition, our Supreme Court released Daher v Prime Healthcare
Servs.-Garden City, LLC, 515 Mich 254; 29 NW3d 136 (2024), which Dr. Chavali argued
supported his motion.
The trial court dismissed “[p]laintiff’s claims for loss of earning capacity damages and loss
of household services” because it found that it was obligated to do so under Daher. Specifically,
it held that our Supreme Court had interpreted MCL 600.2922(6) to allow recovery for only the
damages listed in the statute, and because household services is a separate and distinct form of
damages not specifically listed in MCL 600.2922(6), it must be excluded.
We granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue “whether the trial court erred when it
determined that MCL 600.2922(6) does not authorize recovery for the value of services that would
have been performed by the decedent.”5
2 Atrial fibrillation is an irregular heart rhythm. This condition increases a person’s chance for
blood clots and strokes.
3 Coumadin is a blood thinner that helps reduce the risk of blood clots.
4 Plaintiff also named Great Lakes Physicians Organization, P.C., in the complaint, and alleged
that they were vicariously liable for Dr. Chavali’s alleged negligence. However, Great Lakes
Physicians Organization was later dismissed by stipulation without prejudice.
5 Estate of Kathleen M Machelski v Great Lakes Physicians Org, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered June 5, 2025 (Docket No. 373754).

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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for
partial summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s claims for damages. Whether “a particular kind
of damages is recoverable for a given cause of action is a question of law,” Daher, 515 Mich at
261, and this Court reviews questions of law, as well as a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
summary disposition, de novo, Smith v Beaumont Health, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2026) (Docket Nos. 167716 and 167720), slip op at 8, 12. Defendant moved for summary
disposition in relevant part under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In reviewing a motion brought
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and it is properly granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party
is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A genuine issue of material
fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves
open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich
at 183. This Court also reviews “de novo matters of statutory interpretation.” Bowerman v Red
Oak Mgt Co., Inc., ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket no. 167718), slip op at 7
(citation omitted). “The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent
that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Wrongful Death Act (WDA)
excludes the loss of household or caretaking services. Our Legislature has established that
“[a]ctions on claims for injuries which result in death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the
injured person except pursuant to” the WDA. MCL 600.2921. Our Supreme Court has
characterized MCL 600.2921 and MCL 600.2922 as a “filter” through which an underlying claim
may proceed. See Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75, 88; 746 NW2d 847 (2008).
Under MCL 600.2922(6), the Legislature limited the damages that may be recovered in a
wrongful-death action, notwithstanding the damages that might be recoverable in the underlying
action. That subsection provides, in relevant part:
In every action under this section, the court or jury may award damages as
the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable, under all the circumstances
including reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses for which the
estate is liable; reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while
conscious, undergone by the deceased during the period intervening between the
time of the injury and death; and damages for the loss of financial support and the
loss of the society and companionship of the deceased. [MCL 600.2922(6).]
Our Supreme Court, in Daher instructed that it was important to consider the history of the
changes to the WDA in light of judicial interpretation. Daher, 515 Mich at 264-266. The
Legislature first enacted the predecessors to MCL 600.2921 and MCL 600.2922 in 1939. See 1939
PA 297. When it enacted 1939 PA 297, the Legislature altered two earlier statutes—referred to as
the death act and the survival act—which separately provided for recovery of certain damages by
the decedent and the decedent’s survivors. See 1948 CL 691.583 (stating that the WDA repealed
1848 PA 38 and 1915 PA 314 to the extent that they were inconsistent with the new act). Over

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the years, our Supreme Court and this Court have interpreted the limitations on damages provided
under the WDA as it existed in various forms.
In Baker v Slack, 319 Mich 703, 713-715; 30 NW2d 403 (1948), our Supreme Court
interpreted an earlier version of the WDA, which stated that a family member of the decedent
could recover for pecuniary injuries, to hold that the person claiming damages from the decedent’s
death must show that he or she was entitled to support or maintenance from the decedent.
Specifically, the Court recognized that while a husband could recover for the loss of his wife’s
services as a pecuniary injury, family members could not always recover a decedent’s lost future
earnings as a pecuniary injury on the ground that the family member would have inherited some
portion of the lost income. Id. at 714-715.
In Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 383 Mich 251; 174 NW2d 836 (1970), our Supreme Court
held that, because the statute then limited damages to pecuniary injuries, the WDA did not allow
compensation for loss of companionship. Id. at 277-278. Instead, it limited the damages that could
be recovered to those damages suffered by persons who depended on the deceased for support or
services. Id. at 262-263. The Legislature responded to that decision by amending the WDA to
remove the reference to pecuniary injury and adding loss of society and companionship as a form
of compensable damages. See Crystal v Hubbard, 414 Mich 297, 322; 324 NW2d 297 (1982)
(stating that the Legislature amended the statute to remove the pecuniary injury language and
added the loss of society and companionship language as a clear rejection of the majority’s
decision in Breckon).
In 2008, this Court interpreted the most recent version of the WDA and held that the
Legislature’s decision to insert the word “including” into MCL 600.2922(6) before listing the
damages that could be recovered demonstrated that the Legislature did not intend to limit the
damages to the enumerated types. See Thorn v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp, 281 Mich App 644, 650-
653; 761 NW2d 414 (2008), overruled by Daher, 515 Mich at 282. For that reason, this Court
held that damages for the loss of services were recoverable under the WDA. Id. at 658-661. This
Court then clarified, on the basis of the statutory amendment, that the WDA permitted damages
for lost earnings. See Denney v Kent Co Rd Comm, 317 Mich App 727, 732; 896 NW2d 808
(2016), overruled in part by Daher, 515 Mich at 282.
As discussed above, our Supreme Court recently interpreted the WDA in Daher, which
involved whether the estate of a deceased 13-year-old child could recover the child’s future
earnings on behalf of his family members. Daher, 515 Mich at 259-261. In so doing, our Supreme
Court rejected the interpretation from Thorn that the Legislature’s decision to add the term
“including” to the WDA’s list of recoverable damages abrogated the decision in Baker and was
intended to make the list of damages that could be recovered open-ended. Id. at 277-279. Our
Supreme Court concluded that damages for lost future earnings were not recoverable under the
current version of the WDA. Id. at 282.
Importantly, however, “loss-of-services” damages is distinct from “damages for lost future
earnings,” and, as this Court has recently held, “loss-of-services damages remain available under
the WDA following Daher, as they have been since Michigan’s death act was enacted in 1848.”
Demott v VHS Harper-Hutzel Hosp, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket

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No. 369500); slip op at 9.6 In the current case, the trial court held that MCL 600.2922(6),
prohibited any damages for the loss of Machelski’s caretaking services when considering our
Supreme Court’s decision in Daher, 515 Mich at 259-261. But, as this Court held in Demott, loss-
of-services damages are still recoverable under the WDA.
Defendant argues that this Court’s holding in Demott is somehow contrary to our Supreme
Court’s holding in Daher, but defendant ignores that our “Supreme Court has never held that loss-
of-services damages are unavailable under the WDA.” Demott, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at
8. Daher did not address the issue of loss-of-services damages, but Demott makes clear that “loss-
of-services damages remain available under the WDA. . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 9. Therefore, the
trial court erred when it held that plaintiff was prohibited from seeking damages for the loss of
Machelski’s services under Daher.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court denied recovery for social security benefits when
it determined that plaintiff could not recover for lost future-earning capacity. But, as defendant
concedes, the trial court has made no determination concerning the decedent’s social security
benefits. Therefore, this issue is not properly before this Court and will not be considered.
Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
6 Our Supreme Court has recently granted leave to appeal in Demott. Specifically, our Supreme
Court instructed the parties to brief:
(1) whether the wrongful death act (WDA), MCL 600.2922, permits recovery of
damages for the loss of a decedent's household services and, specifically, for loss
of services of a minor child after the age of majority; (2) if the WDA does permit
such damages, whether a claim for lost services by an infant decedent is too
speculative; and (3) if such a claim is permitted under the WDA as a matter of law
and is not inherently too speculative, whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to show
a reasonable expectation of services. [Demott v VHS Harper-Hutzel Hospital, ___
Mich ___, ___; 28 NW3d 708 (2025) (Docket No. 168977).]

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