COA 374801 HASSAN M AHMAD V UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
HASSAN M. AHMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2026
10:53 AM
v No. 374801
Court of Claims
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, LC No. 17-000170-MZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, the University of Michigan, appeals as of right the order and final judgment of
the Court of Claims ordering the production of certain documents held by one of its libraries—the
Bentley Library—to plaintiff and awarding plaintiff $1,000 in punitive damages under MCL
15.240(7). We vacate the portion of the trial court’s order awarding punitive damages, but
otherwise affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case was provided in an earlier appeal:
Dr. John Tanton—“an ophthalmologist and conservationist,” according to the
University, and “a figure widely regarded as the grandfather of the anti-immigration
movements,” according to plaintiff—donated his personal writings,
correspondence, and research (collectively, “the Tanton papers”) to the Bentley
Library’s collection. His donation included 25 boxes of papers, but boxes 15-25
were to remain closed for 25 years from the date of accession, i.e., until April 2035,
purportedly in accordance with the terms of the gift.
Plaintiff filed a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.,]
request with the University, seeking all of the Tanton papers, including those found
in boxes 15-25 and marked as “closed.” The University eventually denied
plaintiff’s request, asserting that the Tanton papers were closed to research until
April 2035 and were therefore not “public records” subject to FOIA disclosure

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because they were not “utilized, possessed, or retained in the performance of any
official University function.”
Following plaintiff’s unsuccessful administrative appeal, he filed suit in the
Court of Claims. The Court of Claims granted the University’s motion for
summary disposition, concluding that the Tanton papers are not “public records.”
[Ahmad v Univ of Mich, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued June 20, 2019 (Docket No. 341299), 1-2 (Ahmad I).]
Plaintiff appealed, and this Court reversed, holding that the Tanton papers were public records. Id.
at 5-6. Defendant appealed this Court’s decision to our Supreme Court, which affirmed this Court
by equal division. Ahmad v Univ of Mich, 507 Mich 917 (2021) (Ahmad II).
On remand, defendant argued that all of the Tanton papers plaintiff sought were subject to
(1) the personal privacy exemption of FOIA, (2) the Michigan Community Foundation Act
(MCFA), MCL 123.901 et seq., and (3) the Library Privacy Act (LPA), MCL 397.601 et seq. It
also argued that it was entitled to summary disposition because its “constitutional autonomy”
precluded the Court of Claims from compelling disclosure of the Tanton papers. Plaintiff asserted
that defendant failed to explain how the privacy exemption applied and that defendant was
wrongfully withholding documents. The Court of Claims determined that it was bound by this
Court’s determination in Ahmad I that the Tanton papers were public records subject to FOIA. It
reasoned that Dr. Tanton had waived any personal-privacy interest in the papers when he gifted
them to defendant, and ordered defendant to produce the documents with sensitive information
related to Tanton’s “patients, friends, family, and correspondents” redacted. Relevant to this
appeal, plaintiff also requested civil fines and punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7). The Court
of Claims denied civil fines, but awarded plaintiff punitive damages. Defendant now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied
FOIA.” ESPN, Inc v Mich State Univ, 311 Mich App 662, 664; 876 NW2d 593 (2015). “This
Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied the
relevant statutes.” Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441; 894 NW2d 753 (2016). Factual
determinations in a FOIA case are reviewed for clear error, and this Court “must defer to the trial
court’s view of the facts unless the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made by the trial court.” King v Mich State Police Dep’t, 303 Mich App 162,
174-175; 841 NW2d 914 (2013). Issues of constitutional interpretation are also reviewed de novo.
Mich Dep’t of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184, 190; 749 NW2d 716 (2008).
III. PUBLIC RECORDS
Defendant first argues that the Tanton papers are not public records. Despite this Court’s
prior holding otherwise, defendant asserts this panel should “consider the issue anew” and
conclude that the Tanton papers are not public records. We disagree.
“The law-of-the-case doctrine is a judicially created, self-imposed restraint designed to
promote consistency throughout the life of a lawsuit.” Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d
789 (2021). Under this doctrine, legal determinations “determined by the appellate court will not

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be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain
materially the same.” Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259; 612 NW2d 120
(2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, as a general rule, an appellate court’s
determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in
subsequent appeals.” Id. at 260.
Defendant argues this Court should “exercise its discretion” and not apply the law-of-the-
case doctrine in this appeal. In support of this contention, it cites to Duncan v Michigan, 300 Mich
App 176, 189; 832 NW2d 761 (2013), for the proposition that the law-of-the-case doctrine “has
been described as discretionary—as a general practice by the courts to avoid inconsistent
judgments—as opposed to a limit on the power of the courts.” While this is true, defendant gives
short shrift to the sentence that immediately follows, which recognizes that “this Court’s
mandatory obligation to apply the doctrine when there has been no material change in the facts or
intervening change in the law.” Id. Indeed, “[e]ven if the prior decision was erroneous, that alone
is insufficient to avoid application[.]” Id.
Defendant attempts to avoid this Court’s “mandatory obligation[,]” id., to follow its prior
decision by arguing that this case now presents with a “different procedural posture,” which gives
this court the benefit of a more complete record. Defendant summarily contends that “to the extent
this Court’s earlier ruling was in any way guided by factual assumptions about the uses to which
the Bentley Library might put the Closed Tanton Papers in exercising its governmental functions,
there are no longer such factual questions[,]” but provides no examples or argument as to what this
Court’s alleged “factual assumptions” were in the prior appeal, let alone how the more complete
record debunks these alleged assumptions. An appellant may not “simply announce a position or
assert an error in [its] brief and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for the claims, or unravel and elaborate the appellant’s arguments, and then search for authority to
either sustain or reject the appellant’s position.” DeGeorge v Warheit, 276 Mich App 587, 594-
595; 741 NW2d 384 (2007). Consequently, this issue is abandoned. Id. at 595. Similarly,
defendant provides no argument or authority to support why its statement that “three of six Justices
hearing the case believed this Court’s determination was erroneous[,]” while the “other three
Justices did not defend this Court’s reasoning on the merits[,]” somehow excuses this Court from
obeying the law-of-the-case doctrine. As such, this, too, is abandoned. Id.
Because there has been no material change in facts or law, this Court is bound by the law-
of-the-case doctrine, Duncan, 300 Mich App at 189, and this Court’s prior determination that the
Tanton papers are public records is final. Ahmad I, unpub op at 5.
IV. EXEMPTIONS
Defendant next argues that the personal-privacy exemption, as well as the MCFA and LPA,
exempt the Tanton papers from disclosure. We disagree.
A. PERSONAL PRIVACY
FOIA exemptions in MCL 15.243 are narrowly construed, and the party asserting the
exemption bears the burden of proof. Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 119; 614 NW2d 873
(2000). The personal-privacy exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(a), exempts disclosure of

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“[i]nformation of a personal nature if public disclosure of the information would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.” “Our Supreme Court has interpreted this
exemption to encompass two elements: first, the information must be of a personal nature, and
second, the disclosure of the information must constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an
individual’s privacy.” Larry S. Baker, PC v Westland, 245 Mich App 90, 94; 627 NW2d 27 (2001).
Defendant’s argument in support of this exemption focuses on Dr. Tanton’s privacy
interests. It alleges the Tanton papers are exempt from disclosure because they were Dr. Tanton’s
private documents, and his desire to keep them private is reflected in the condition he attached to
his donation that the papers be kept “closed” until 2035. But our Supreme Court has held that
deceased individuals do not have privacy rights against disclosure under FOIA. Swickard v Wayne
Co Med Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 548-549; 475 NW2d 304 (1991). Dr. Tanton died in 2019, and,
as a result, his privacy rights extinguished. Defendant does not allege that any living individuals
have privacy interests that would be invaded by disclosure of the Tanton papers. Therefore, the
privacy exemption is inapplicable.
B. MCFA
As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that the MCFA was enacted after defendant denied
plaintiff’s FOIA request. But we need not consider whether the MCFA is retroactive because its
predecessor, MCL 397.381, as amended by 1998 PA 370, had substantively similar language. The
MCFA provision at issue provides:
A public library may receive and accept gifts and donations of real,
personal, or intangible personal property, for the library, and shall hold, use, and
apply the property received for the purposes, in accordance with the provisions, and
subject to the conditions and limitations, if any, set forth in the instrument of gift.
[MCL 123.905(3).]
MCL 397.381(1) contained the same relevant language, that the donation recipient “shall hold,
use, and apply the property received for the purposes, in accordance with the provisions, and
subject to the conditions and limitations, if any, set forth in the instrument of gift.” Because the
relevant language is the same in both statutes, and MCL 397.381 predates defendant’s denial of
plaintiff’s FOIA request, a retroactivity analysis is unnecessary.
Defendant argues that the Tanton papers are exempt from disclosure under MCL
15.243(1)(d), which exempts “[r]ecords or information specifically described and exempted from
disclosure by statute[,]” and the MCFA is such a statute. Defendant reads MCL 15.243(1)(d) too
broadly.
It is axiomatic that statutory language expresses legislative intent. A
fundamental principle of statutory construction is that a clear and unambiguous
statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation. Where the statute
unambiguously conveys the Legislature’s intent, the proper role of a court is simply
to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case. [King v
Mich State Police Dep’t, 303 Mich App 162, 175; 841 NW2d 914 (2013) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).]

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MCL 15.243(1)(d) unambiguously provides an exemption for records that are “exempted
from disclosure” by other statutes. In other words, the statute itself must expressly proscribe
disclosure for the exemption to apply. While the MCFA and its predecessor statute require that
the recipient hold donations “in accordance with the provisions, and subject to the conditions and
limitations, if any, set forth in the instrument of gift[,]” the prohibition on disclosure cited by
defendant is one made by the donor, not the statute. Cf, e.g., MLive Media Group v Grand Rapids,
321 Mich App 263, 271-272; 909 NW2d 282 (2017) (involving statutes specifically forbidding
disclosure of wiretapped or eavesdropped information); King, 303 Mich App at 176-178 (involving
a statute forbidding disclosure of polygraph information). Dr. Tanton, not the MCFA or
MCL 397.381, was the one who forbade disclosing the Tanton papers. Thus, the
MCL 15.243(1)(d) exception is inapplicable.
C. LPA
Defendant next argues that the LPA provides a second basis for exempting disclosure under
MCL 15.243(1)(d). This argument fails for the same reason as the MCFA argument. Defendant
relies on MCL 397.605, which states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a regulation adopted by
the governing body of the library, the selection of library materials for inclusion in
a library’s collection shall be determined only by an employee of the library.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law or by a regulation adopted by the
governing body of the library, the use of library materials shall be determined only
by an employee of the library.”
These provisions do not expressly proscribe or exempt disclosure. Therefore, MCL 15.243(1)(d)
is inapplicable.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
Defendant next argues that disclosure of the Tanton papers violates its constitutional
autonomy. We disagree.
Art 8 § 51 of the Michigan Constitution provides, in relevant part:
The regents of the University of Michigan and their successors in office
shall constitute a body corporate known as the Regents of the University of
Michigan . . . . [The] board shall have general supervision of its institution and the
control and direction of all expenditures from the institution’s funds. [Const 1963,
art 8, § 5.]
1 In its brief, defendant cites art 3 § 5, but this appears to be a typographical error, as that article
concerns intergovernmental agreements. Instead, Const 1963, art 8, § 5 concerns the controlling
boards of public universities, including the University of Michigan.

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This provision “limit[s] the Legislature’s power[,]” because it “may not interfere with the
management and control of universities.” Federated Publications, Inc v Bd of Trustees of Mich
State Univ, 460 Mich 75, 86-87; 594 NW2d 491 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The constitution grants the governing boards authority over the absolute management of the
University, and the exclusive control of all funds received for its use.” Id. at 87 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). That is, “[l]egislative regulation that clearly infringes on the university’s
educational or financial autonomy must . . . yield to the university’s constitutional power.” Id.
But this does not mean “that universities are exempt from all regulation.” Id.
The Legislature “can validly exercise its police power for the welfare of the people of this
State,” and a university “can lawfully be affected thereby.” Regents of Univ of Mich v Mich
Employment Relations Comm, 389 Mich 96, 108; 204 NW2d 218 (1973) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). The university is supreme “[w]ithin the confines of the operation and allocation”
of its funds, but “there is no reason to allow the Regents to use their independence to thwart the
clearly established public policy of the people of Michigan.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
We disagree with defendant’s assertion that ordering disclosure here would infringe on its
academic discretion “to enter into charitable gift agreements with restrictions.” Applying FOIA
and requiring disclosure has no impact on defendant’s ability to receive charitable gifts with
restrictions attached. The fact that a valid FOIA request can override a donor’s restrictions has no
impact on defendant’s authority over its educational and financial decisions. Federated
Publications, Inc, 460 Mich at 87. It may impact the authority of individual donors who place
restrictions on their gifts, but it is defendant’s constitutional autonomy, not that of individual
donors, that is at issue here. Defendant’s constitutional autonomy is not a shield against the
requirements of FOIA simply because of a private decision made by an individual donor. Indeed,
such an outcome directly contradicts Michigan public policy, see, e.g., MCL 15.231(2) (noting
Michigan’s public policy that citizens “are entitled to full and complete information regarding the
affairs of government”), which cannot be thwarted by defendant’s independence, Regents of Univ
of Mich, 389 Mich at 108.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Finally, defendant argues that the Court of Claims erred in awarding punitive damages to
plaintiff. We agree.
Underlying this issue is the Legislature’s amendment of MCL 15.240. Before amendment,
MCL 15.240(7) provided, in relevant part:
If the circuit court determines in an action commenced under this section
that the public body has arbitrarily and capriciously violated this act by refusal or
delay in disclosing or providing copies of a public record, the court shall award, in
addition to any actual or compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount
of $500.00 to the person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public
record. [MCL 15.240(7), as amended by 1996 PA 553.]
But in 2014, the Legislature amended the statute, which now provides, in relevant part:

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If the court determines in an action commenced under this section that the
public body has arbitrarily and capriciously violated this act by refusal or delay in
disclosing or providing copies of a public record, the court shall order the public
body to pay a civil fine of $1,000.00, which shall be deposited into the general fund
of the state treasury. The court shall award, in addition to any actual or
compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount of $1,000.00 to the person
seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of a public record. [MCL 15.240(7).]
Plaintiff argues that the Legislature’s decision to split the paragraph into sentences has the
effect of “decoupling” punitive damages from the necessary showing of an arbitrary and capricious
violation by the public body. Plaintiff further alleges that recent unpublished cases from this Court
have erroneously relied on Local Area Watch v Grand Rapids, 262 Mich App 136; 683 NW2d 745
(2004), because Local Area Watch was decided before the 2014 amendment changes that are at
issue here. Since the statute was amended, however, this Court has repeatedly rejected similar
arguments by plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. See, e.g., McIntosh v Rockford, unpublished
per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 20, 2019 (Docket Nos. 343125 and
344169); Ostaszewski v Lansing, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
November 15, 2018 (Docket No.343537); Petersen v Charter Twp of Shelby, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 15, 2016 (Docket No. 329545);
Katayama v Troy, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 10,
2015 (Docket No. 323459). While unpublished opinions are not precedentially binding under the
rule of stare decisis, MCR 7.215(C)(1), these opinions demonstrate that this Court has
continuously recognized that Local Area Watch remains binding even after MCL 15.240(7) was
amended.2 As such, “[t]he prerequisites to an award of punitive damages” are still “a court-ordered
disclosure and a finding that the defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to provide
the requested information.” Local Area Watch, 262 Mich App at 153 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because the Court of Claims declined to find that defendant acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, and, as a result, denied civil fines, its award of punitive damages was erroneous.
The Court of Claims’s award of $1,000 in punitive damages is vacated. We affirm in all
other respects.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
2 Indeed, in MLive Media Group v Grand Rapids, 321 Mich App 263, 275; 909 NW2d 282 (2017),
this Court impliedly agreed that Local Area Watch was still binding when, after ruling in the
plaintiff’s favor, it ordered the trial court to “determine whether [the plaintiff was] entitled to
punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).” (Quotation marks and citation omitted). If the
amendment truly “decoupled” punitive damages from the arbitrary-and-capricious requirement,
this Court would have merely ordered the trial court to award punitive damages, because they
would be mandatory in all respects.

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