COA 373855 IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF JK Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re CONSERVATORSHIP OF JK.
HEATHER HAYEK, conservator,
Petitioner-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2026
2:42 PM
v No. 373855
Macomb Probate Court
WILLIAM MICHAEL KAWA IV, LC No. 2024-248060-CA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and BORRELLO and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent challenges the probate court’s order requiring him to repay funds improperly
transferred from his mother, JK’s, bank account into his own. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
JK has two adult children: respondent, William Michael Kawa IV, and petitioner, Heather
Hayek. Kawa served as his mother’s caretaker for several years, as her dementia rendered her
progressively less able to care for herself or handle her finances. By late 2023, Hayek became
concerned that Kawa was not providing JK adequate physical care, misappropriated funds from
her bank accounts, and had improperly converted some of her assets. So, in 2024, Hayek
successfully petitioned the probate court to appoint her as JK’s conservator.
The ensuing probate-court proceedings were contentious, and Kawa repeatedly stymied
Hayek’s attempts to access JK’s residence, account for her assets, and retrieve her property (some
of which Kawa claimed as his own). Acting as conservator, Hayek eventually petitioned the
probate court for an order compelling Kawa to, in relevant part, “return all funds that he converted
for his own use or his business use.” Hayek also asked the court to order Kawa to provide an
accounting for a bank account in his and JK’s names, into which Hayek believed someone acting
on JK’s behalf had deposited $87,406.53 in 2017. Kawa, for his part, claimed the account was

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his; he added JK to the account in 2015 “for estate planning purposes”; and the 2017 deposit in
question was a gift from JK, which she made of her own free will and while sound of mind.
The probate court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition, at which it received evidence
and heard testimony from a longtime friend of JK, Hayek’s husband, Hayek, and Kawa.
Ultimately, the court found that the disputed deposit “was an act of conversion” and that JK was
entitled to the return of those funds. It therefore ordered Kawa to return the money.1 Kawa now
appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Kawa devotes most of his brief on appeal to argue that the three-year statute of limitations
set forth in MCL 600.5805 barred Hayek’s conversion claim, and the probate court erred to the
extent it tolled the statute of limitations on the basis of fraudulent concealment under
MCL 600.5855. A statute of limitations, however, is an affirmative defense that “must be raised
in a party’s first responsive pleading or by motion filed not later than [that] responsive pleading.”
Attorney General ex rel Dep’t of Environmental Quality v Bulk Petroleum Corp, 276 Mich App
654, 664; 741 NW2d 857 (2007), citing MCR 2.111(F)(2) and (3). See also MCR 5.001(B)(2)
(“References to ‘pleadings’ in the Michigan Court Rules also apply to petitions, objections, and
claims in probate court proceedings.”). Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the affirmative
defense. Dell v Citizens Ins Co of America, 312 Mich App 734, 753; 880 NW2d 280 (2015).
Here, Kawa waived his statute-of-limitations defense by raising it for the first time at the
evidentiary hearing, rather than in the response he filed to the petition from which this appeal
arises. The probate court thus properly concluded the conversion claim was not time barred, albeit
for a different reason (i.e., tolling). “It is axiomatic that we will not reverse when the probate court
has reached the right result, even if it has done so for the wrong reasons.” In re Estate of Stan, 301
Mich App 435, 448; 839 NW2d 498 (2013). Accordingly, Kawa is not entitled to relief on statute-
of-limitations grounds.2
B. CONVERSION FINDINGS
Kawa further argues the probate court erred to the extent it found that he engaged in
common-law conversion relative to the 2017 deposit. We disagree.
This Court reviews the probate court’s factual findings for clear error. In re
Conservatorship of Brody, 321 Mich App 332, 336; 909 NW2d 849 (2017). “A finding is clearly
erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made, even if there is evidence to support the finding.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
1 The evidentiary hearing and probate court’s ensuing order involved the resolution of additional
claims that Kawa does not challenge on appeal.
2 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the merits of Kawa’s fraudulent-concealment
arguments.

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omitted). “We defer to the probate court on matters of credibility,” giving “broad deference to
findings made by the probate court because of its unique vantage point regarding witnesses, their
testimony, and other influencing factors not readily available to the reviewing court.” In re
Conservatorship of Murray, 336 Mich App 234, 240; 970 NW2d 372 (2021) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
There are two distinct forms of conversion: common law and statutory. Aroma Wines &
Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 339-340, 361; 871 NW2d 136 (2015).
Though the record is unclear regarding which supported the probate court’s conversion findings,
Kawa’s appellate brief only addresses common-law conversion. Because he has abandoned any
statutory-conversion argument by failing to brief it, Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich,
498 Mich 68, 88; 869 NW2d 213 (2015), we focus only on common-law conversion.
“Under the common law, conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted
over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.” Aroma Wines,
497 Mich at 346 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Money can constitute real property for
purposes of conversion. Dunn v Bennett, 303 Mich App 767, 778; 846 NW2d 75 (2013).
However, it must have been obtained “without the owner’s consent to the creation of a debtor and
creditor relationship.” Citizens Ins Co of America v Delcamp Truck Ctr, Inc, 178 Mich App 570,
575; 444 NW2d 210 (1989). And on review of the record, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction the probate court was mistaken to the extent it found that Kawa converted funds from
JK’s bank account.
There is no dispute someone transferred $87,406.53 from JK’s account into an account
belonging to Kawa (but also bearing JK’s name). According to Kawa, JK gifted him that money
in the interest of fairness after Hayek failed to repay a $100,000 loan JK previously gave her.
Testimony from both Hayek and a friend of JK, however, undermined this claim.
To be sure, both testified that JK would not have given something to one of her children
and not the other, and Hayek confirmed her receipt of the $100,000 loan. But each expressed
disbelief that JK gifted Kawa the money in question. And while Kawa claimed JK gifted him the
$87,406.53 to use for his own purposes (i.e., to purchase commercial property for his business),
Hayek testified that the previous $100,000 loan had been for a cottage all three regularly used.
What is more, Hayek claimed that she and Kawa had been treated equally in accordance with JK’s
practice and preferences on the previous loan: in keeping with an arrangement between the three
of them, Hayek paid Kawa approximately half of the loan amount in lieu of repaying JK. Hayek
insisted she would have known about any monetary gift JK gave Kawa, because the three discussed
“every penny”—including, for example, the $100,000 loan (which they all discussed before JK
gave it to Hayek). Had JK gifted Kawa the $87,406.53, Hayek claimed, “[i]t wouldn’t have been
a secret.”
The deposit slip accompanying the transfer, likewise called into question Kawa’s testimony
that he and JK were “probably there together” when the transfer occurred. Though the deposit slip
bore JK’s name, Kawa admitted that the address listed on the slip belonged instead to his fiancé.
He offered no explanation for this discrepancy beyond their addresses being “close.” And after
providing equivocal testimony regarding how they completed the transfer and who filled out the
accompanying deposit slip, Kawa admitted the handwriting on it appeared to be his own. Though

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he insisted that he “couldn’t just take” the money himself because he was not a “signer” on JK’s
source account, no other evidence at the evidentiary hearing corroborated that claim.
With these competing factual recitations, the probate court’s determination regarding
whether Kawa wrongfully asserted dominion and control over the $87,406.53 rested largely on a
credibility contest between Hayek and Kawa. The court resolved that contest in Hayek’s favor,
expressly finding Kawa’s testimony “not credible” and “self-serving.” That is a credibility
determination to which we owe deference, Conservatorship of Murray, 336 Mich App at 240, and
we see no reason in the record to disturb it. Considering Hayek’s testimony and the deposit slip
(together with Kawa’s admission that it bore his handwriting), the probate court did not clearly err
by finding that Kawa improperly transferred the $87,406.53 from JK’s account to his own.
Disagreeing, Kawa relies solely on his “wholly uncontradicted” testimony that he was not
a signatory to JK’s account and therefore could not transfer the money without her involvement.
He provides, however, no authority for his apparent proposition that a fact finder must accept as
true unrebutted—but also uncorroborated—testimony that it finds incredible. See In re Temple
Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 122, 139; 748 NW2d 265 (2008) (“An appellant may not merely
announce his or her position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
or her claims.”). Deferring to the probate court’s determination that Kawa’s testimony lacked
credibility, there is simply no indication in the record that Kawa needed JK’s participation to
effectuate the transfer, nor that JK knew he transferred the $87,406.53 in question.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the probate court’s order requiring Kawa to return the funds.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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