COA 371453 CHRISTOPHER MCGHEE V CITY OF DETROIT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CHRISTOPHER MCGHEE, CRAIG BROWN,
JAMES WASHINGTON, JUNIUS PERRY, and
ORLANDO POTTS,
Plaintiffs,
and
NORMAN BROWN and SHANNON FERGUSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2026
1:46 PM
v No. 371453
Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF DETROIT, ERIC JONES, REGINALD
JENKINS, ROBERT DISTELRATH, and KEMIA
CROSSON,
LC No. 20-006272-CD
Defendants,
and
DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
LOCAL 344, MICHAEL NEVIN, THOMAS
GEHART, WILLIAM HARP, JOHN A.
CANGIALOSI, and CHRISTOPHER A. SMITH,
Defendants-Appellants.
CHRISTOPHER MCGHEE, CRAIG BROWN,
JAMES WASHINGTON, JUNIUS PERRY, and
ORLANDO POTTS,
Plaintiffs,
and

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NORMAN BROWN and SHANNON FERGUSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v No. 371516
Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF DETROIT, ERIC JONES, REGINALD
JENKINS, ROBERT DISTELRATH, and KEMIA
CROSSON,
LC No. 20-006272-CD
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
LOCAL 344, MICHAEL NEVIN, THOMAS
GEHART, WILLIAM HARP, JOHN A.
CANGIALOSI, and CHRISTOPHER A. SMITH,
Defendants.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Norman Brown1 and Shannon Ferguson were employed as firefighters for
defendant city of Detroit (the City) and were members of defendant Detroit Fire Fighters
Association Local 344 (DFFA). Both Brown and Ferguson went on “duty disability retirement”
because of injuries. While on duty disability retirement, the 2014 collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between the City and the DFFA became operative, which affected the seniority status of
firefighters who had taken duty disability retirement. The 2014 CBA was incorporated into the
City’s plan of adjustment (POA) entered in the City’s bankruptcy proceeding. Thereafter, Brown
and Ferguson, along with other plaintiffs,2 filed this action against the City and the DFFA alleging
numerous claims primarily related to their loss of seniority. The trial court granted in part and
denied in part the City’s and the DFFA’s motions for summary disposition.
In Docket No. 371453, the DFFA, and defendants Michael Nevin, Thomas Gehart, William
Harp, John A. Cangialosi, and Christopher A. Smith (the union defendants) appeal the trial court’s
1 References to “Brown” refer to plaintiff Norman Brown because plaintiff Craig Brown is not
participating in these appeals.
2 Because the other plaintiffs are not participating in these appeals, references to “plaintiffs” refer
collectively to Brown and Ferguson.

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order by leave granted,3 challenging the court’s denial of summary disposition regarding Brown’s
claims alleging violation of the duty of fair representation (DFR), promissory estoppel, and tortious
interference with a business relationship. In Docket No. 371516, the City and defendants Eric
Jones, Reginald Jenkins, Robert Distelrath, and Kemia Crosson (the City defendants) appeal by
leave granted4 the trial court’s order, challenging the court’s denial of plaintiffs’ claims alleging
breach of contract and promissory estoppel. We reverse the trial court’s orders in both appeals to
the extent that the court denied defendants’ motions and remand for entry of an order granting
summary disposition in favor of the union defendants in Docket No. 371453 and in favor of the
City defendants in Docket No. 371516.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from plaintiffs’ dispute with the DFFA, the City, and the individual
defendants because of the 2014 CBA’s seniority provisions. Before 2014, firefighters who went
on duty disability could return to work when able to do so and not only retain their previous
seniority but also accumulate seniority for the years they spent on duty disability. After the City
filed for bankruptcy protection in 2013, the DFFA and the City renegotiated the CBA and revised
the seniority provisions. Under the 2014 CBA, if firefighters on duty disability returned to work
within two years, they were able to retain their previous seniority. However, if they returned to
work after two years, they returned with zero seniority. The seniority provisions of the 2014 CBA
were less generous to firefighters than those of previous CBAs. The instant dispute arose after the
City failed to apply the new provisions universally, and some firefighters were granted seniority
according to the previous CBA, while others were granted seniority under the less generous
provisions of the 2014 CBA.
The 2014 CBA was incorporated into the City’s POA in the bankruptcy proceeding, and
the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to resolve controversies pertaining to enforcement of the
POA. In re Detroit, 653 BR 874, 883-886 (Bankr ED Mich, 2023). During the pendency of the
instant litigation, the DFFA moved in the bankruptcy court to hold plaintiffs in civil contempt.
The DFFA argued that plaintiffs, by seeking relief inconsistent with the 2014 CBA, violated the
POA, injunctions within the POA, and the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the POA. Id. at
877. The bankruptcy court determined that plaintiffs went on duty disability retirement before the
City filed its bankruptcy petition and before the 2014 CBA was adopted. Id. at 880. The court
also determined that because plaintiffs were on duty disability retirement for more than three years,
they could only return to active duty with zero seniority. Id.
Regarding plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case, the bankruptcy court noted plaintiffs’
admission in their amended complaint that they were subject to the seniority provisions in the 2014
CBA, which meant they lost their seniority. Id. at 881-882. However, the court acknowledged
plaintiffs’ allegations that some firefighters were initially allowed to retain their previous seniority
3 McGhee v Detroit, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 2, 2024 (Docket
No. 371453).
4 McGhee v Detroit, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 2, 2024 (Docket
No. 371516).

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when they returned to work and that defendants conspired to selectively enforce the seniority
provisions Id. at 882. The court ultimately determined that all of plaintiffs’ claims were “barred
and enjoined by the POA, with two possible exceptions.” Id. at 891. The court found that Brown’s
claim that he was improperly demoted from his Lieutenant rank for reasons unrelated to his
seniority and the 2014 CBA survived. Id. The court also determined that the POA did not preclude
Ferguson’s claim that he was wrongly denied his right to return to work for reasons unrelated to
his seniority and the seniority provisions of the 2014 CBA. Id. at 892. The court declined to
express its view of the merits of Brown’s and Ferguson’s surviving claims. Id. at 891-892.
In the trial court in the instant case, defendants moved for summary disposition on Brown’s
and Ferguson’s remaining claims. Defendants appeal the trial court’s orders denying summary
disposition with respect to plaintiffs’ claims alleging violation of the DFR, breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and tortious interference with a business relationship.
II. DOCKET NO. 371453
The union defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary
disposition as to Brown’s claims alleging violation of the DFR, promissory estoppel, and tortious
interference with a business relationship. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for
summary disposition de novo. Bailey v Antrim Co, 341 Mich App 411, 421; 990 NW2d 372
(2022). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is . . . entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lowrey
v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). A trial court deciding a motion
under subrule (C)(10) reviews the affidavits and other documentary evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence
“leave[s] open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Debano-Griffin v Lake Co,
493 Mich 167, 175; 828 NW2d 634 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The union defendants first assert that the statute of limitations barred Brown’s claims. An
appellate court “reviews de novo questions involving the interpretation and application of a statute
of limitations.” Dorko v Dorko, 504 Mich 68, 74; 934 NW2d 644 (2019). This Court has
acknowledged that a six-month statute of limitations applies to a DFR claim. McCluskey v
Womack, 188 Mich App 465, 469; 470 NW2d 443 (1991). “The six-month limitation period
begins to run from the time a final decision regarding the employees’ grievance has been made or
from the time the employees discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered, that no further action would be taken with respect to their grievance.” Id.
In February 2020, the DFFA filed a grievance with the City on Brown’s behalf because of
his demotion. On March 11, 2020, defendant Harp, on behalf of the DFFA, informed Brown that
the Department had denied the grievance, and the DFFA declined to pursue the matter to
arbitration. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the trial court on May 12, 2020. Therefore, Brown
filed his DFR claim well within the six-month limitations period, and the claim was timely.
Because the DFR claim was timely, the union defendants’ argument that Brown’s other claims
were untimely because he recast his DFR claim as tort claims to avoid the statute of limitations
lacks merit.

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The union defendants next argue that the trial court erred by finding that there existed a
genuine issue of material fact regarding Brown’s DFR claim. “To prevail on a claim of unfair
representation, a charging party must establish a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation
and also a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.” Goolsby v Detroit, 211 Mich App 214,
223; 535 NW2d 568 (1995) (Goolsby II). The DFR is imposed on unions to prevent them from
acting wrongfully or arbitrarily against an individual employee. Technical, Professional, and
Officeworkers Ass’n of Mich v Renner, 513 Mich 57, 80; 15 NW3d 524 (2024). A union’s
responsibility of fair representation “is comprised of three distinct responsibilities: (1) to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, (2) to exercise its discretion
with complete good faith and honesty, and (3) to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Goolsby v Detroit, 419
Mich 651, 664; 358 NW2d 856 (1984) (Goolsby I) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A
union breaches its DFR if it fails to comply with any one of these responsibilities. Id.
When contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the language
as written. Harper Woods Retirees Ass’n v Harper Woods, 312 Mich App 500, 508; 879 NW2d
897 (2015). “A contract is unambiguous, even if inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, when it
fairly admits of but one interpretation.” McCoig Materials, LLC v Galui Constr Inc, 295 Mich
App 684, 694; 818 NW2d 410 (2012). Conversely, a contractual provision is ambiguous if it
irreconcilably conflicts with another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a
single meaning. Royal Prop Group, LLC v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc, 267 Mich App 708, 715; 706
NW2d 426 (2005). Every word, phrase, and clause in a contract must be given effect, and any
interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory must be avoided.
McCoig Materials, 295 Mich App at 694. “Only when contractual language is ambiguous does its
meaning become a question of fact.” Coates v Bastian Brothers, Inc, 276 Mich App 498, 504; 741
NW2d 539 (2007).
The 2014 CBA provides for a firefighter’s promotion to Lieutenant in the fire prevention
division:
b. To be eligible for transfer or promotion to a classification outside of the
Firefighting Division, an Employee must satisfy the following prerequisites:
* * *
ii. For promotions to Lieutenant classifications (arson, fire prevention,
community relations): Sixty (60) months experience in the Detroit Fire Department.
* * *
vi. No Employee may be promoted to a position covered by this section
H.3 unless he or she has completed at least thirty (30) months in the classification
immediately below the vacancy, except for promotion to the Communications
Division.
* * *

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d. Selection. In filling vacancies outside the Firefighting Division that are
subject to this Section H.3, the Executive Fire Commissioner, or his or her designee,
will make a selection based upon performance upon an Administered Examination.
The weights assigned to the four (4) criteria that compose the Administered
Examination shall be as follows:
i. Seniority: 45%
ii. Written Examination: 25%
iii. Evaluation and Discipline History: 15%
iv. Oral/Proficiency Interview: 15%
The 2014 CBA defines seniority as
the length of continuous service within the Department without interruption or
breaks. Seniority, as defined above, is established to serve as a basis for
determining Employee seniority rights provided for in this Agreement including
the order of demotion or lay off in the event of a reduction in force and the
reemployment rights of Employees.
Brown correctly asserts that he met the prerequisite for his promotion by having 60 months
of experience in the firefighting division. However, contrary to his argument that seniority was
not a component of his particular promotion, seniority accounted for 45% of the selection criteria
for a promotion to Lieutenant in the fire prevention division, in addition to the written examination,
disciplinary history, and an interview. As previously discussed, Brown did not have any seniority
when he returned to work after his 18-year absence. Consequently, Brown’s demotion did not
breach the CBA because seniority was a part of the selection process for the promotion, and Brown
had no seniority. Moreover, because Brown’s DFR claim involved the seniority provisions of the
2014 CBA, it should have been dismissed pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. While the
bankruptcy court did not preclude Brown’s claim based on his allegations that his demotion was
unrelated to his seniority or the seniority provisions of the 2014 CBA, the bankruptcy court
expressed no view regarding the merits of the claim. In re Detroit, 653 BR at 891. The DFFA’s
motion for summary disposition went beyond the pleadings reviewed by the bankruptcy court, and
an examination of Brown’s promotion pursuant to the 2014 CBA reveals that seniority was a
component of the promotion. The trial court erred by denying summary disposition with respect
to Brown’s DFR claim.
The union defendants next argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for
summary disposition regarding Brown’s promissory estoppel claim. To establish a claim of
promissory estoppel, a party must demonstrate “(1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should
reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promise, and (3) that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature in circumstances such
that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.” Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal
Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679, 713; 950 NW2d 502 (2019) (quotations marks and
citation omitted).

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In plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Brown alleged that the union defendants promised that
when he returned to work he would keep his accumulated seniority. However, the bankruptcy
court barred and enjoined any claims that included plaintiffs’ seniority rights after returning to
work from duty disability retirement. In re Detroit, 653 BR at 891-892. The modification of
seniority rights provision was binding on Brown. Id. at 891. Brown also asserts that defendants
promised that he would not be disciplined without just cause. The trial court dismissed Brown’s
just cause claim, and Brown did not appeal the dismissal of that claim. Brown is not entitled to
relief by recasting his just cause claim as a promissory estoppel claim. The trial court erred by
failing to dismiss Brown’s promissory estoppel claims.
The union defendants next argue that the trial court erred by denying summary disposition
regarding Brown’s tortious interference with a business relationship claim. Brown alleged that he
had a business relationship and expectancy with the City, of which the union defendants had
knowledge. Brown asserted that the union defendants intentionally and improperly interfered with
that business relationship. He alleged that the union defendants committed per se wrongful acts
and acted with malice, causing a breach of the relationship between Brown and the City. Brown
maintained that he lost seniority, earnings and other benefits of employment because of the union
defendants’ actions.
“The elements of tortious interference with a contract are (1) the existence of a contract,
(2) a breach of the contract, and (3) an unjustified instigation of the breach by defendant.” Knight
Enterprises v RPF Oil Co, 299 Mich App 275, 280; 829 NW2d 345 (2013) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). To prove a breach to establish a tortious interference claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “the defendant induced or otherwise caused nonperformance of the contract.”
Int’l Outdoor, Inc v SS Mitx, LLC, 349 Mich App 212, 237; 27 NW3d 365 (2023) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). A plaintiff “must allege the intentional doing of a per se wrongful act or
the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the purposes of invading the
contractual rights or business relationship of another.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A wrongful act per se is an act that is inherently wrongful or an act that can never be justified
under any circumstances.” Badiee v Brighton Area Sch, 265 Mich App 343, 367; 695 NW2d 521
(2005). “If the defendant’s conduct was not wrongful per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate
specific, affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference.” CMI Int’l, Inc
v Intermet Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002). “Where the defendant’s
actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons, its actions would not constitute improper
motive or interference.” Hope Network Rehab Servs v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 342 Mich
App 236, 246; 994 NW2d 873 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, in
such circumstances, the actions “cannot be wrongful per se.” Id. at 246-247.
Although Brown had 60 months of experience in the firefighting division, as previously
discussed seniority made up 45% of the selection criteria for a promotion to Lieutenant in the fire
prevention division, in addition to the written examination, discipline history, and an interview.
Because Brown had no seniority when he returned to work after 18 years, his tortious interference
claim should have been dismissed. Moreover, Brown failed to present any evidence that the union
defendants’ actions were not motivated by legitimate business reasons, were improperly
motivated, or caused a nonperformance of a contract. Consequently, he failed to establish that the
union defendants’ conduct was wrongful per se. See Hope Network Rehab Servs, 342 Mich App

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at 246. The trial court erred by denying the union defendants’ motion for summary disposition as
to Brown’s tortious interference claim.
III. DOCKET NO. 371516
The City defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary
disposition with respect to Brown’s and Ferguson’s breach of contract claims. To establish a
breach of contract claim, a party must show by a preponderance of evidence that there was a
contract, the contract was breached, and the breach resulted in damages. Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens
Constr Inc, 495 Mich 161, 178; 848 NW2d 95 (2014).
As discussed above, Brown did not establish a breach of the 2014 CBA because the criteria
for his promotion included seniority. Therefore, the trial court should have dismissed Brown’s
breach of contract claim as well.
Ferguson argues that defendants’ refusal to return him to work violated the disciplinary
procedures set forth in the 2014 CBA, which provides the Department with “the right to discipline,
discharge, demote, and/or suspend Employees for just cause.” The CBA also affords employees
the right to contest disciplinary action with the procedure provided in Article 10 of the 2014 CBA.
Under that provision, if it is determined that disciplinary action is warranted, the Department must
provide the employee with written notice of any potential action. The employee may then appeal
the matter within seven days of the notice. Ferguson has failed to provide any support for his
contention that defendants’ failure to return him to work within 25 years of his anniversary date
was disciplinary. And although Ferguson asserts the letter he received from defendant Crosson
regarding the voluntary quit was a disciplinary action, he did not appeal the action within seven
days of the notice. Accordingly, he has failed to establish a breach of contract, and the trial court
erred by failing to dismiss his breach of contract claim.
Finally, the City defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for
summary disposition as to Brown’s and Ferguson’s promissory estoppel claims. We agree.
Brown’s promissory estoppel claim against the City defendants fails for the same reason that his
promissory estoppel claim against the union defendants fails. Ferguson claims that he was
promised he would not be disciplined without just cause, but that was the substance of his just
cause claim pleaded in the amended complaint, and he did not appeal the trial court’s dismissal of
his just cause claim. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the City defendants’ motion for
summary disposition with respect to Brown’s and Ferguson’s promissory estoppel claims.
We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the
union defendants in Docket No. 371453 and the City defendants in Docket No. 371516. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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