373895•COA 373895 IN RE SOCHA ESTATE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026
COA 373895 IN RE SOCHA ESTATE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026
373895Court Of Appeals12 mai 2026
Texte intégral
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re ESTATE OF NATHALIE I. SOCHA.
BRUCE R. SOCHA,
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2026
11:31 AM
v No. 373895
Cheboygan Probate Court
ROBYN CAMPEAU, PAM NEWMAN, and DAWN
BOGNER,
LC No. 24-015731-DE
Appellees.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this estate action, Bruce R. Socha, in propria persona, appeals as of right the probate
court’s order granting in part and denying in part his claims against the Estate of Nathalie I. Socha.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Nathalie passed away on December 24, 2023, and was survived by four children—Bruce, and
also Dawn Bogner, Robyn Campeau, and Pam Newman (collectively, appellees). Bruce applied
for informal probate of Nathalie’s will and was appointed personal representative of the estate. He
subsequently filed two claims against the estate—one for compensation related to care services
provided to Nathalie before her death in the sum of $120,302.40, and one for labor related to the
installation of two decks on Nathalie’s property in the amount of $7,500. To the first claim, Bruce
attached a log of hours with dates and pay rates, and stated, “I have been paid in full through
February 19th, 2022. Arrears starting February 21th [sic] 2022 until her death on December 24,
2023.”
Newman and Campeau, through counsel, filed separate objections to the claims. Newman
asserted that she was unaware of any contract between Bruce and Nathalie related to the claims,
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the back deck remained unfinished, Bruce had been living rent free with Nathalie since October
2016, and Bruce had already been compensated. Campeau asserted that shortly after Nathalie’s
death, Bruce said he had already been compensated, and that Bruce’s claim was just a ploy to get
Nathalie’s home, as the amount claimed equaled the value of the home.
Over two days, the probate court held an evidentiary hearing (during which Bruce was
represented by counsel) regarding the claims, and ultimately granted in part and denied in part
Bruce’s claims against the estate. Specifically, the court found, on the basis of the proofs, that
Nathalie and Bruce did have an agreement for Bruce to provide care, but that none of the evidence
presented unambiguously established the terms of the agreement related to hours and pay rate.
Acknowledging the presumption of gratuity when care is provided by a family member, the court
found $16.20 an hour at 40 hours per week to be reasonable compensation for the care Bruce
provided. The court then proffered that two years of care at that rate equaled $67,392, but
subtracted $59,720 (the compensation Bruce had already been paid) to award Bruce $7,672 for his
first claim against the estate. In turn, the court denied Bruce’s claim for compensation related to
the installation of the decks, again acknowledging the presumption of gratuity and reasoning, “The
decks were built six years prior to [Nathalie’s] death and if she had wanted to pay him labor for
the decks, it would have been paid prior to her death.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. COMPENSATION FOR CARE OF NATHALIE
Bruce first argues on appeal that the probate court erred by basing its compensation award
on a general 40-hour workweek, because he provided Nathalie 24-hour care during the time for
which he claimed compensation against the estate. We review an appeal of a probate court’s
decision on the record, rather than de novo. In re Lundy Estate, 291 Mich App 347, 352; 804
NW2d 773 (2011), citing MCL 600.866(1), and MCR 5.802(B)(1). Thus, we review “the probate
court’s factual findings for clear error and its dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion.” In
re Lundy Estate, 291 Mich App at 352. “A probate court abuses its discretion when it chooses an
outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes,” or “when it makes an error of
law.” In re Hernandez Supplemental Needs Trust, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024)
(Docket No. 366172); slip op at 8 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A factual finding is
clearly erroneous when this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” In re Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App 398, 403; 909 NW2d 289 (2017) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Bruce has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding him only
partial compensation, because the record and applicable law support the probate court’s ruling. As
the court acknowledged,
A presumption of gratuity arises where the plaintiff is related by blood or marriage
to the decedent . . . . Where a presumption of gratuity arises, the plaintiff may still
recover for services rendered under the theory of contract implied in fact. A
contract implied in fact arises when services are performed by one who at the time
expects compensation from another who expects at the time to pay therefor. The
issue is a question of fact to be resolved through the consideration of all the
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circumstances, including the type of services rendered, the duration of the services,
the closeness of the relationship of the parties, and the express expectations of the
parties. [In re Lewis, 168 Mich App 70, 74-75; 423 NW2d 600 (1988) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).]
The probate court found, consistent with Bruce’s testimony and argument at the evidentiary
hearing, that although Bruce and Nathalie did not have a written agreement to compensate Bruce
for the care services he provided, they did have an oral agreement. As the court reasoned, Bruce,
who had power of attorney over Nathalie’s finances and healthcare decisions beginning in 2017,
testified that he began helping care for Nathalie after a fall she had in 2016, and that he started
receiving compensation for that care from Nathalie in 2020. According to Bruce, although they
did not reduce the terms to writing, he and Nathalie had conversations about compensation in
exchange for care, and she wanted him to be paid. Indeed, he began paying himself1 from
Nathalie’s funds in 2020, and drafted a ledger for the proceedings showing the hours he allegedly
worked each week in 2022 and 2023, the amount he was paid, and the amount Nathalie allegedly
owed according to their agreement. Eventually, as Nathalie required increased care following a
stroke and the beginning of hospice care, he could only make partial payments to himself from
Nathalie’s accounts because, according to Bruce, there was not enough money for full payment.
Bruce testified further that he and Nathalie agreed to compensation in 2020 at a starting
rate of $16.20 per hour because he quit his job at Prairie Farms where he had been receiving that
same pay. And he provided the care she needed because Nathalie did not want to go to a nursing
home.
Bogner testified that she did witness one discussion between Bruce and Nathalie in 2020
regarding an agreement for him to quit his job so that he could care for her. She also read from a
document she had originally planned to submit to the court, but ultimately declined to2, stating:
I was a witness to the verbal agreement between my mother and brother regarding
compensation regarding her long-term care. My mother did not want multiple
caregivers. This was tried, and she was not happy with it, and she did not want to
go to a nursing home. She wanted to remain in the home. She specifically stated
that she wanted my brother to leave his job and be her caretaker.
From this evidence, the probate court reasonably concluded that a verbal compensation
agreement existed between Bruce and Nathalie. However, the evidence also supports the court’s
determination that the exact terms of that agreement were “murky,” as well as the court’s ultimate
award on the claim.
1 Bruce testified that because he had power of attorney over Nathalie’s finances, he had the
authority to write checks on her behalf.
2 Bogner testified that she initially wrote the letter because she thought Bruce had not been
provided any compensation for his care services, but that she later found he had already been
compensated.
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Bruce asserts specifically that because the court found that he essentially provided Nathalie
24-hour care during the time period related to his claim, the court’s decision to compensate him
for only 40 hours per week constitutes a “clear and demonstrable error that contradicts the Courts
[sic] own record.” While the court did acknowledge that Bruce was essentially on call at all times
for Nathalie’s care,3 its decision to award compensation for only 40 hours per week was reasonable
and supported by the record. The record demonstrates that Bruce had lived in Nathalie’s home
rent-free since 2016, well before the alleged compensation agreement in 2020, and that he never
paid rent or utility bills. Bruce also stated that he cared for Nathalie in a number of ways, including
helping her transfer to bed and use the bathroom. Further, the list of essential duties in his claim
included assistance with ambulation, personal grooming, medication administration, and
preparation of meals.
From the evidence above, and in light of the presumption of gratuity, In re Lewis, 168 Mich
App at 74-75, the trial court’s award of compensation for 40 hours per week, rather than the 112
hours per week claimed, was reasonable. In exchange for providing care, Bruce enjoyed free room
and board, and despite the on-call nature of the care, from the responsibilities listed, it is highly
unlikely Bruce was actually working, i.e., carrying out those responsibilities, for 112 hours each
week, which equates to 16 hours per day. Nor would it be likely that Nathalie would have agreed
to pay Bruce more than she financially could have. Accordingly, the probate court did not abuse
its discretion by basing its compensation award on a 40-hour workweek.
Bruce also asserts that he was a live-in domestic caregiver under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 29 USC 201 et seq., and entitled to compensation for 16-hour days under 29 CFR
785.15. As we do not see where Bruce raised this argument below, it is waived. Tolas Oil & Gas
Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289-290; 14 NW3d 472 (2023).
Regardless, even if the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA applied to Bruce’s care for
Nathalie, this is an action involving a claim against the estate related to an oral compensation
agreement with Nathalie, not a suit for wages under FLSA.
B. REIMBURSEMENT FOR LABOR
Bruce’s second argument on appeal is that the probate court erred by denying his claim for
the labor he put into installation of the decks on Nathalie’s property. In doing so, Bruce asserts
that the court erred by basing its decision on the presumption of gratuity rather than a contract
implied in fact. But the presumption of gratuity applies to Bruce’s installation of the decks, In re
3 The court stated on the record:
And you know, I don’t think 40 hours is unreasonable. That’s a pretty significant
task to take care of somebody each and every day, make sure they’re taken care of.
I mean, there’s -- are they actually physically doing 40 hours a week? Perhaps not.
But even when you’re not working there are times when you have to tend to the
needs, or you’re just sort of on call within your own home. You know, the ability
to go out . . . I mean those things are somewhat eliminated or restricted because the
responsibilities. . . . So I think a 40 hour week to provide 24/7, 365 for almost two-
year in home care is, I don’t think it’s unreasonable.
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Lewis, 168 Mich App at 74-75, and the record supports the court’s denial of the claim. Consistent
with the court’s findings, the decks portrayed in the pictures offered by Bruce and admitted into
evidence at the evidentiary hearing do not appear as if they should have taken 300 hours over three
years to build, as Bruce asserts, and Bruce began construction on the decks in 2018. Thus, it was
likely that if Nathalie had agreed to pay Bruce for the labor, she would have done so much earlier.
Moreover, Terry Campeau, Robyn’s husband, testified that the decks were unfinished in 2022
when he visited the home, and Newman testified that the decks were not handicap accessible and
boards were loose. Accordingly, the probate court’s decision to deny Bruce’s claim for
compensation related to installation of the decks was reasonable and, therefore, did not amount to
an abuse of discretion. In re Hernandez Supplemental Needs Trust, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
at 8.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
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