COA 377703 GINA M GIRIMONT V CLAYTON J EVERETT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/19/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
GINA M. GIRIMONT, formerly known as GINA M.
EVERETT,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2026
1:21 PM
v No. 377703
Monroe Circuit Court
CLAYTON J. EVERETT, LC No. 22-041936-DM
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MALDONADO and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals1 the trial court’s order modifying the parties’ parenting time schedule and
determining which school EE would attend. Plaintiff argues that this order constituted a change
in the established custodial environment warranting a higher burden of proof, that the trial court
improperly applied the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23 by holding her reasonable reaction
to EE’s groin injury against her, and finally that the trial court’s determination that EE should
attend the school advocated by defendant was against the great weight of the evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties divorced in December 2022. In the divorce it was determined that they would
share joint legal and physical custody of their child, EE. At that time, EE was not yet in school
because of her age. Plaintiff was awarded parenting time from Wednesday afternoon to Friday
morning, and defendant was awarded parenting time from Monday morning to Wednesday
morning. They alternated weekends and followed a holiday schedule that gave them equal
1 As discussed more fully in part III, although we agree with defendant that plaintiff cannot appeal
the trial court’s order as of right, in the interest of judicial economy, we treat the claim of appeal
as an application and exercise our discretion to grant leave to appeal. Wardell v Hincka, 297 Mich
App 127, 233 n 1; 822 NW2d 278 (2012).

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parenting time. Initially, both parties lived in Canton, Michigan. However, defendant later moved
to Jackson, Michigan, and then Mason, Michigan, which was approximately 78 miles away.
In April 2024, defendant remarried. Defendant and his new wife then adopted four
children and had one biological child together. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved to modify EE’s
custody. She argued that defendant had moved almost an hour away without discussing the move
with her, did not provide EE with stability, and showed an inability to coparent. Defendant argued
that plaintiff had failed to allege any factual reason why EE’s custody should change. The trial
court ultimately denied the motion to change custody of EE.
Particularly relevant for the issues presented on appeal, during defendant’s parenting time
in January 2025, EE injured her groin. While EE was in the children’s wing at church, EE tried to
climb over a baby gate and injured herself. A church employee told defendant about the accident
after the fact. EE told defendant that she had hurt her leg. But after checking her legs, defendant
did not see any injury and so he did not tell plaintiff about the incident. When EE then told plaintiff
about the injury and plaintiff saw the redness in EE’s groin, she contacted Children’s Protective
Services (CPS) and took EE to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. It was found that EE
had a straddle injury, which was consistent with falling on a baby gate. Plaintiff did not contact
defendant at any point or inform him that she took EE to the hospital.
Throughout these proceedings, various issues arose while plaintiff and defendant were
coparenting, including EE’s need for speech therapy, whether she needed to attend daycare, minor
injuries EE received at defendant’s home, who could pick up and drop off EE from parenting time,
and whether EE could participate in a Christmas pageant at church. As evidenced by the list of
issues brought to the trial court’s attention, communication and the parties’ ability to coparent had
been consistently strained.
In March 2025, plaintiff moved to change parties’ parenting time and determine a
kindergarten for EE. Plaintiff wanted to enroll EE in the Plymouth-Canton school district, at
Eriksson Elementary School, while defendant wanted to enroll EE in the Mason school district, at
the Harvey Education Center. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that EE
beginning school was a sufficient change to warrant a modification of parenting time. Although
the trial court found that the majority of the best-interest factors weighed equally between the
parties, the trial court concluded that factor (j) (willingness and ability to facilitate a close
relationship between the child and other parent) weighed in defendant’s favor because plaintiff
had attempted to alienate EE from defendant.
Accordingly, the trial court modified the parties’ parenting time for defendant to have EE
during the week and one weekend a month during the school year, and for two 10-day periods in
the summer. On the other hand, plaintiff was to have EE on all other weekends during the school
year and for the majority of the summer. They would also follow the Monroe County Friend of
the Court holiday schedule. Further, the trial court determined that EE would attend school at
Harvey. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied. This appeal followed.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We apply three standards of review in child custody cases. Merecki v Merecki, 336 Mich
App 639, 644; 971 NW2d 659 (2021).
The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. In a child
custody dispute, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on
appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of
evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a
major issue. Specifically, we review under the great-weight-of-the-evidence
standard the trial court’s determination whether a party demonstrated proper cause
or a change of circumstances. A finding of fact is against the great weight of the
evidence if the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. An abuse
of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s discretionary rulings such as
custody decisions. An abuse of discretion, for purposes of a child custody
determination, exists when the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and
logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise
of passion or bias. Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error. A trial court
commits legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets or applies the law. [Id.
at 644-645 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
When reviewing the findings of the trial court, we recognize that the trial court is “in a superior
position to make accurate decisions concerning the custody arrangement that will be in a child’s
best interests.” Sabatine v Sabatine, 513 Mich 276, 285; 15 NW3d 204 (2024) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Therefore, we defer to the trial court’s determination of credibility. Berger
v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008).
III. JURISDICTION
At the outset, we agree with defendant that plaintiff did not have an appeal by right of the
trial court’s order modifying parenting time. An appellant has an appeal as of right “in a domestic
relations action” when there is “a postjudgment order that, as to a minor, grants or denies a motion
to change legal custody, physical custody, or domicile[.]” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). In the present
case, plaintiff argues that the trial court’s order, which purports to be an order modifying parenting
time, was actually an order changing physical custody.
If plaintiff’s assertion was correct, then this Court would have jurisdiction under
MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). However, as will be discussed, the trial court merely modified the parenting
time of the parties. Plaintiff’s parenting time was reduced by 26 days, which is insufficient to
change the established custodial environments with plaintiff and defendant. See Rains v Rains,
301 Mich App 313, 341; 836 NW2d 709 (2013) (holding that a 27 day change in parenting time
was “not likely to change whom the child naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities
of life, and parental comfort, and, therefore, does not rise to the level of a change in custody”).
Thus, plaintiff did not have an appeal as of right under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). Nonetheless, we
address plaintiff’s appeal as if it were an application in which we granted leave. Wardell v Hincka,
297 Mich App 127, 233 n 1; 822 NW2d 278 (2012).

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IV. MODIFICATION OF PARENTING TIME
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court’s order did more than modify the parties’ parenting
time and, in effect, changed the established custodial environment. We disagree.
“The purposes of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., are to promote the best
interests of the child and provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted
custody changes.” Merecki, 336 Mich App at 645 (citation and quotation marks omitted). When
there is a child custody dispute, the Child Custody Act authorizes a trial court to grant custody and
determine parenting time. Id. Physical custody is a child’s living arrangements, while parenting
time “is the time a child spends with each parent.” Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 79-80;
900 NW2d 130 (2017).
To modify a previous child custody order, the party seeking modification must establish
proper cause or a change in circumstances before the custody matter may be reopened. Merecki,
336 Mich App at 645-646. See also MCL 722.27(1)(c). “[A] proper cause or change in
circumstances is a significant circumstance regarding one or more of the best-interest factors that
has the potential for a significant effect on the well-being of the child or children whose custody
is at issue.” Id. at 646. If the movant fails to establish proper cause or a change in circumstances,
no child custody hearing may be held. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508; 675
NW2d 847 (2003).
“Whereas the primary concern in child custody determinations is the stability of the child’s
environment and avoidance of unwarranted and disruptive custody changes, the focus of parenting
time is to foster a strong relationship between the child and the child’s parents.” Shade v Wright,
291 Mich App 17, 28-29; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). A requested change in parenting time does not
require the same initial determination of proper cause or change in circumstances, unless the
change in parenting time would result in a change to the established custodial environment. Id.
at 26-27. “[A] lesser, more flexible, understanding of proper cause or change in circumstances is
applicable to a request to modify parenting time.” Marik v Marik (On Remand), 325 Mich App
353, 367-368; 925 NW2d 885 (2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Normal life changes,
such as getting older and activities changing, do not warrant a change in a child’s custodial
environment. Shade, 291 Mich App at 29. However, these changes are likely sufficient to revisit
the issue of parenting time. Marik, 325 Mich App at 368-369.
Again, if modifications to parenting time “will not change whom the child naturally looks
to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established
custodial environment will not have changed.” Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 86; 782 NW2d
480 (2010). If a proposed parenting time modification does not change the established custodial
environment, the proponent of the change must demonstrate that it is in the child’s best interests
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 93.
In the present case, the trial court concluded that there was an established custodial
environment with both parties and that its modification of the parenting time order did not change
that environment. Under the initial parenting-time schedule, both parties had roughly 182
overnights with EE per year, splitting time throughout the week and alternating weekends. Under
the new parenting time schedule, plaintiff now has roughly 156 overnights and defendant has 209

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overnights.2 This is a difference of 26 overnights. Rather than splitting time throughout the week,
under the new parenting-time schedule, defendant has EE during the week so she can attend school,
and plaintiff has EE primarily on the weekends and during the majority of the summer.
Strictly in terms of overnights with EE, the change in parenting time here is the same as
the parenting-time change in Rains, 301 Mich App at 341, in which the trial court similarly reduced
one party’s parenting time from 209 overnights to 182 overnights. As previously mentioned, this
Court said that such a change was “not likely to change whom the child naturally looks to for
guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, and, therefore, does not rise to
the level of a change in custody.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff makes no
argument that differentiates this case from Rains or suggests that the change in parenting time will
change to whom EE looks for guidance and comfort. Plaintiff’s only argument is that the trial
court’s order relegates her to a “weekend parent,” but this assertion alone is not enough to show
that the parenting-time modification changes the established custodial environment and also
ignores the circumstances of this case.
The rather provocative and often-invoked phrase “weekend parent” comes primarily from
the case Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526; 752 NW2d 47 (2008). In Powery, the mother
intended to move from Ludington to Traverse City and proposed a modification of the parenting-
time schedule, which prompted the father to move for a change of custody. Id. at 529. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with
both parties and concluded that the mother had not shown that the move to Traverse City was in
the child’s best interest. Id. at 529-530. The trial court changed the existing custody order by
awarding weekly physical custody to the father during the school year in the event that the mother
chose to remain in Traverse City. Id. at 530. On appeal, this Court agreed that “the evidence
presented at the motion hearing showed that if plaintiff moved to Traverse City, either she or
defendant would be relegated to the role of a ‘weekend parent,’ ” which was different from the
“equally active” role that both parties had taken in their child’s life when living in Ludington. This
Court concluded that under the circumstances “any modification of parenting time based on the
move would amount to a change in the established custodial environment.” Id. at 529. Although
the trial court did not explain why the change of custody was in the child’s best interests, this Court
concluded that such a finding could “easily and clearly be drawn from the trial court’s written
opinion” and affirmed the trial court. Id. at 530-531.
This case is distinguishable from Powery because the change in parenting time is slight,
and the trial court made findings regarding the accessibility of the two communities and plaintiff’s
ability to maintain an active role in EE’s life. First, we note that Powery is silent as to the change
in the number of overnights in which the parties in that matter had custody of their child; rather, it
simply indicates that the plaintiff exercised parenting time on the weekends after the trial court’s
2 These figures were calculated for 2026 based on the trial court order, Mason school district
calendar, and the Monroe County holiday schedule. See Mason Public Schools, School Calendars
<https://www.masonk12.net/district/calendars/> (accessed June 5, 2026). Defendant also stated
that plaintiff had 156 overnights. Plaintiff and the trial court did not provide a calculation of the
number of overnights.

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order directing that “the residence of the parties’ minor child not be changed to Traverse City and
granting defendant [] weekly physical custody of the child during the school year in the event that
plaintiff chose to remain in Traverse City.” Id. at 527. In other words, unlike Rains, Powery does
not provide any other pertinent information regarding the summer and/or holidays. Second,
defendant had been living in Mason for approximately five months at the time plaintiff moved for
a parenting-time modification, and there was no evidence that EE’s established custodial
environment had changed in that time. There was also no evidence to suggest that the custodial
environments would be impacted by the proposed modification of the parenting-time schedule to
allow EE to attend school. As the trial court noted, both communities were easily accessible, and
plaintiff was still able to participate in EE’s school activities and extracurriculars during the week
if she wished. As the parties had frequently traveled to switch parenting-time until that point, there
was no concern that plaintiff could not be involved in EE’s life.3 Further, plaintiff would have a
significant amount of parenting-time in the summer; something not addressed at all in Powery, as
noted above.
Plaintiff relies on Lieberman, 319 Mich App at 89-90, which held that a significant change
in parenting time constitutes a change of custody. However, the parent in that case had primary
physical custody and the trial court’s order reduced her parenting time from 225 overnights a year
to 140 overnights. As this Court recognized, the 85-day reduction was a nearly 40% decrease in
the time the children would spend with that parent and that time would have been primarily on the
weekends and in the summer. In contrast, the parties here continue to share joint legal and physical
custody and plaintiff’s parenting time has not been significantly reduced. The trial court’s order
reduced plaintiff’s parenting time from 182 overnights to 156 overnights, only a 14.3% reduction,
a reduction that this Court has specifically recognized as not rising to a change of custody. See
Rains, 301 Mich App at 341.
Further, in the trial court, both parents recognized a need for a parenting-time modification
to allow EE to attend school and to avoid EE having to spend a significant amount of additional
time in the car driving to school on some days. Plaintiff advocated for a parenting-time schedule
in which she would have EE during the week, and defendant would have EE on alternating
weekends. In her closing argument, plaintiff continued to argue that she was seeking only
parenting-time modification and not a change of custody. Further, in her motion for
reconsideration, plaintiff did not argue that the trial court’s order constituted a change of custody,
she argued only that the trial court had palpably erred and that it should enter the exact same
modification of parenting time in her favor with EE attending school in Canton and with defendant
having EE primarily on weekends and in the summer. Accordingly, it strains credulity for plaintiff
to now argue that the trial court’s order constituted a change in custody.
3 In contrast, in Powery, “the evidence presented at the motion hearing showed that if plaintiff
moved to Traverse City, either she or defendant would be relegated to the role of a ‘weekend’
parent.” Id. at 528.

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Therefore, we conclude that reduction in plaintiff’s parenting time, which was necessary
for EE to attend school, was a modification of parenting time and not a change in custody.4
V. BEST-INTEREST ANALYSIS
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s finding that plaintiff attempted to alienate EE
from defendant was against the great weight of the evidence.5 We disagree.
“The child’s best interests govern a court’s decision regarding parenting time.” Shade, 291
Mich App at 31. The factors listed in the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23, and in the parenting
time statute, MCL 722.27a(6), are relevant in determining parenting time. Id. Though a custody
decision requires findings on each best-interest factor, a parenting time decision may be made with
findings only related to the contested issues. Id. at 31-32.
The only contested best-interest factor in this case is MCL 722.23(j), which considers
[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or
the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively for the purposes of
this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a child or that parent
from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child’s other parent.
“Parental alienation is seemingly contrary to MCL 722.23(j) . . . .” In re Gorcyca, 500 Mich 588,
597 n 4; 902 NW2d 828 (2017).
The trial court weighed factor (j) in favor of defendant after finding that plaintiff had
alienated or attempted to alienate EE from defendant. In support of this finding, the trial court
relied on plaintiff’s role in the breakdown of communication between the parties; plaintiff’s
decision to unilaterally have EE vaccinated without consulting defendant; plaintiff’s acquiescence
4 Although plaintiff is correct that the trial court legally erred by stating that it did not need any
change in circumstances to modify its parenting-time order, the fact that EE needed to be enrolled
in school for the first time was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant the trial court
revisiting the issue of parenting time. See Marik, 325 Mich App at 367-369. Therefore, the trial
court did not commit clear legal error in holding these proceedings and determining that there was
no change in the established custodial environment. Id. at 644-645.
5 Throughout her brief on appeal and during oral argument, plaintiff suggested that the trial court
“shot-gunned its approach” and treated “the Child Custody Act as an impediment to what it wanted
to do.” We disagree with this characterization. The trial court thoroughly laid out its factual
findings and explained its reasoning for ordering a modification of parenting time in defendant’s
favor. The trial court went through each and every best interest factor, as required, and took the
time to bolster its factual findings when it acknowledged that it had not discussed an issue. That
the trial court stated that it found the evidence met not only the preponderance of the evidence
standard, but also the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence is not unusual, nor is it
inappropriate. Thus, we find the record here reflects highly of the trial court and its understanding
of the Child Custody Act.

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to the hiring of a private investigator to investigate defendant; her mere reiteration of arguments
made in her prior motion to change custody, which was denied; and her reaction and testimony
regarding EE’s groin injury.
The trial court attributed the communication breakdown to the parties’ differing parenting
styles: plaintiff was detail-oriented and wanted constant communication, whereas defendant took
“more of a big picture approach” and wanted to sit down and discuss issues over dinner. The trial
court also found that plaintiff’s level of communication was “beyond what would be necessary”
for coparenting EE. We conclude that these findings have support in the record, particularly in the
messages between the parties.
The record includes a back and forth between the parties involving EE’s participation in
the Christmas pageant at defendant’s church and its overlap with plaintiff’s plans to take a trip to
Colorado during the week of Thanksgiving with EE. These messages reflect that defendant
remained level-headed and at first attempted to work with plaintiff about her plan to have EE go
to Colorado, whereas plaintiff asserted that defendant did not have a right to his parenting time
during her trip, was combative, and preceded to offer an ultimatum. Notably, plaintiff purported
to be requesting consent for EE to go on the trip which would impact defendant’s scheduled
parenting time and require EE to be dropped off to defendant later than usual but then informed
defendant that tickets had already been purchased. In addition, plaintiff testified about
communicating with defendant about scheduling a zoom call with EE to see how her holiday was
going while he was at a family party around New Years Eve. Plaintiff expressed frustration that
defendant refused to give her a time for a zoom call and told her that the conversation would have
to wait until after they opened presents. Plaintiff’s disruption of defendant’s parenting time at a
family party supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s communication was beyond what was
reasonable.
Plaintiff’s actions also suggested that she was much more hesitant about the prospect of
continuing to work with defendant in parenting EE and she was “extremely distrustful” of
defendant’s parenting ability as the trial court described. Plaintiff scheduled a medical
appointment for EE for her to receive all her vaccinations without informing defendant, though he
had expressed that he wanted EE’s vaccinations spread out over appointments. Further when EE
was injured from falling on the baby gate, plaintiff contacted CPS and brought EE to the hospital,
resulting in a sexual abuse examination. If a child reports such an injury to a parent, being
concerned about potential sexual abuse is certainly understandable and we acknowledge that
MCL 722.23(j) specifically prohibits a court from negatively considering any reasonable action
taken by a parent to protect a child from sexual assault. However, the trial court’s findings suggest
that it found plaintiff’s actions unreasonable. The trial court noted that it felt that plaintiff
portrayed the injury as a vaginal injury to “give more elevated weight to what happened,” rather
than referring to the injury as a groin injury. Further, the trial court was troubled by plaintiff’s
testimony that she felt she had to report the injury as a mandatory reporter at work. The trial court

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found that there was no relationship between plaintiff’s role as a mandatory reporter and her
decision to make a CPS report.6
As this injury occurred in January 2025, approximately eight months before the hearings
on plaintiff’s motion for a parenting-time modification, it is noteworthy that plaintiff was still
attempting to portray the injury as potentially being caused by sexual abuse, even though this
assertion was not supported by a CPS investigation or the results of the sexual abuse examination.
Even after the sexual abuse examination was conducted, plaintiff did not inform defendant of her
concern or that EE had been to the hospital. Rather than express concerns over EE’s safety to
defendant, plaintiff consented to her mother hiring a private investigator to surveil defendant and
his family. As the trial court found, this suggested an inability or unwillingness to communicate
with defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff also focuses her entire argument on the trial court’s findings related to
the injury and continues to suggest that EE was not safe in defendant’s home. But this argument
ignores the other evidence that demonstrated plaintiff’s unwillingness and inability to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between EE and defendant. Giving
appropriate deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and in light of the record before
us, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence or that
the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Merecki, 336 Mich App
at 645; Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.
VI. EE’S SCHOOL
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it determined that EE should attend
Harvey because its decision was against the great weight of evidence. We disagree.
If parents have joint legal custody, the Child Custody Act provides that they share joint
responsibility for decisions impacting the welfare of their child. Pierron, 486 Mich at 85.
“However, when the parents cannot agree on an important decision, such as a change of the child’s
school, the court is responsible for resolving the issue in the best interests of the child.” Id., citing
Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 159; 507 NW2d 788 (1993). When making such
decisions, “the trial court must first determine whether the proposed change would modify the
established custodial environment of that child.” Pierron, 486 Mich at 92. “If the required
parenting time adjustments will not change whom the child naturally looks to for guidance,
discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established custodial environment
will not have changed.” Id. at 93.
6 To be clear, the issue of whether plaintiff, as both the mother of the child and a mandatory
reporter, was required to report this issue to CPS is not before this Court. Rather, we deem the
analysis of this issue by the trial court to be a credibility determination as to whether plaintiff had
reasonable cause to suspect child abuse under MCL 722.623. This Court gives considerable
deference to the “superior vantage point of the trial judge respecting issues of credibility . . . .”
Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 305; 477 NW2d 496 (1991).

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In the present case, as discussed, the trial court concluded that the modification in
parenting-time required for EE to attend school would not change the established custodial
environment. When analyzing each best-interest factor, the trial court found that most of the
factors weighed in favor of both parents. However, the trial court found that defendant had more
flexibility to adjust his work schedule so that EE could attend school. Further, the trial court found
that defendant was more willing to facilitate a close relationship between plaintiff and EE.
In addition, the trial court compared the particular schools advocated for by each parent
The trial court ultimately concluded that EE would attend Harvey because it had a better student
to teacher ratio; there were programs involving health, wellness, and school counseling; a “vibrant”
website with a family access portal; food service programs; scholarship programs; opportunities
for the arts, music, special education; and girls’ athletic programs. On appeal, plaintiff argues that
the trial court’s findings that Harvey had a better student teacher ratio was contrary to the evidence
presented at the hearing. We disagree.
The record indicates that there was varying information regarding the student to teacher
ratios at each school. For Harvey, defendant provided a report and testified that it indicated Harvey
had a student-teacher ratio of 11:1. However, plaintiff testified that the report indicated that the
student to teacher ratio was 17:1. Similarly, plaintiff provided testimony from Dr. Denise Lilly,
the Executive Director of Elementary Education in Plymouth-Canton Community Schools, that
indicated that Eriksson had a student teacher-ratio of 27:1, and also provided a report that indicated
that Eriksson had a student teacher-ratio of 15:1. Dr. Lilly clarified that she thought the lower 15:1
ratio took into account the teacher and the paraprofessional7 in each classroom. She suggested that
the 27:1 ratio was more accurate when just considering the teacher. Further, Dr. Lilly testified that
27:1 was also just the maximum that an Eriksson classroom would have, which did not necessarily
mean 27:1 was the student-teacher ratio in any given classroom. However, she thought that there
were typically 22 to 27 students in an Eriksson class, which would still be higher than any of the
potential student-ratios at Harvey. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim that the trial court was “mak[ing]
up findings” is simply without merit.
The trial court as the finder of fact is permitted to make credibility determinations, weigh
the evidence, and resolve factual conflicts. Surman v Surman, 277 Mich App 287, 303; 745 NW2d
802 (2007). None of the parties allege that any of the reports or testimonies admitted as evidence
were erroneous. Plaintiff suggests only that the trial court should have relied on one source of
information, rather than another. Therefore, it was not against the great weight of evidence for the
trial court to find that Harvey schools had lower student to teacher ratio because it was properly
supported by the admitted evidence, i.e., defendant’s testimony and the admitted report.
Regardless, the trial court did not make its decision solely based on the student-teacher ratio. The
trial court also noted the wide range of resources and programs available at Harvey. Further, the
trial court explained that defendant had more flexibility with his job, so he would be more able to
7 Dr. Lilly explained that paraprofessionals are not certified teachers but are required to have state
certifications and receive some training on areas of diversity, equity, inclusion, safety, and
security. Dr. Lilly also explained that there is a paraprofessional assigned to each class and they
provide security and support for each teacher.

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take and pick up EE from school, and that this determination factored into its decision to choose
Harvey over Eriksson. Although plaintiff disputes defendant’s work flexibility, the trial court is
able to make factual determinations and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before it.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was against the great
weight of the evidence. Merecki, 336 Mich App at 644-645.
VII. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court’s order did not significantly reduce plaintiff’s parenting-
time and did not constitute a change in custody because it did not change who EE would naturally
look to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. Further, the trial
court’s best-interest analysis was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, as was the trial
court’s decision that it was in EE’s best interests to attend school in the Mason school district.
We affirm.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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