COA 374744 PEOPLE OF MI V PATRICK JOHN PINKOWSKI Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2026
9:47 AM
v No. 374744
Hillsdale Circuit Court
PATRICK JOHN PINKOWSKI, LC No. 2023-475475-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Patrick John Pinkowski, appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of
accosting a child for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a, and second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(b). Pinkowski was sentenced to one year in jail for each
conviction and five years’ probation. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of Pinkowski’s sexual conduct toward a minor, ES. In the summer of
2022, Pinkowski was 27 years old and worked as the Health Officer for a children’s camp. ES
was 14 years old and worked as a counselor-in-training at the camp. One night, while Pinkowski
and the female counselors in training were playing a game, Pinkowski reached over into ES’s lap
and hit her inner thighs, brushing against her vagina as he made “moaning noises” while “throwing
his head back.” ES was uncomfortable and left to get cereal at the camp lodge. Pinkowski’s
housing was also located at the lodge. Pinkowski eventually appeared while ES was alone and
eating cereal and sat across from her. ES began mimicking Pinkowski’s movements to “lighten
the mood.” Pinkowski became aware and purposefully began initiating movements for ES to copy.
ES mimicked Pinkowski’s movements until Pinkowski grabbed his chest and then opened his legs
and made motions mimicking female masturbation. ES did not copy the moves and Pinkowski
asked: “So, why did you come here, to have sex with me?” ES did not respond and returned to
her housing. Pinkowski was charged as noted.
Before trial, the prosecution sought to admit evidence of 11 other acts and comments by
Pinkowski related to ES. The trial court partially granted the motion and at trial, testimony

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regarding Pinkowski’s other inappropriate comments and conduct was admitted. These acts
included (1) Pinkowski placing a heart rate monitor on the ES’s finger and asking if she was
sexually interested in him; (2) Pinkowski pulling ES onto a couch with him; (3) Pinkowski placing
ES’s feet on his lap making contact with Pinkowski’s penis over his clothes; (4) multiple incidents
of Pinkowski simulating masturbation; (5) Pinkowski staring and gazing at ES’s breasts as she
exited the bathroom after a shower in pajamas while not wearing a bra; and (6) a conversation
about Pinkowski’s sex life and with whom ES would have sex.
At trial, ES and several other witnesses testified, including other camp employees. In
delivering its closing argument, the prosecution stated:
And so, you’ve heard specifically that [Pinkowski’s] been charged with two things,
right. So, we’ve got the incident where they’re in the staff lounge by themselves
where [Pinkowski] encourages or solicits [ES] to have sex with him based on her
interpretation of what happened. I think a reasonable interpretation, right. [ES is]
14, she’s there [Pinkowski’s] talking to her about all these other things, he’s you
know, on these other occasions these other things are happening. He’s playing this
game with her, and then he prompts this conversation, right.
Under MCL 750.145a, there are two theories of liability: Accosting, enticing or soliciting
a child to induce a proscribed act, or encouraging a child to commit a proscribed act. At trial,
defense counsel requested a jury instruction requiring the jury to unanimously decide under which
theory to convict Pinkowski. The trial court denied the request. Pinkowski was found guilty and
now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Pinkowski argues his accosting conviction should be reversed or vacated and remanded for
a new trial because (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting other acts evidence; (2) the
trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction specifying which behaviors referenced
in MCL 750.145a served as the basis for Pinkowski’s guilt; and (3) there was insufficient evidence
to sustain Pinkowski’s conviction. We disagree.
A. OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE
Pinkowski contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other acts evidence.
We disagree. This Court reviews “a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion.” People v Hoskins, 342 Mich App 194, 200; 993 NW2d 48 (2022). “[W]e
review de novo the proper interpretation and application of court rules.” People v Traver, 502
Mich 23, 31; 917 NW2d 260 (2018) (citation omitted). “To preserve an evidentiary issue for
review, a party opposing the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground
for objection that it asserts on appeal.” People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693
(2019). Defense counsel objected to the admissibility of the other acts evidence under MRE
404(b), and therefore the issue is preserved.

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The prosecution moved to admit other acts evidence under MRE 404(b)(1). At the time
the matter was decided1, MRE 404(b) stated as follows:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses. If it is material, the evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
However, the trial court quoted the earlier version of MRE 404(b) as provided by the prosecution
in their motion:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan,
or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes,
wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to
the conduct at issue in the case.
Pinkowski does not contend the error in referencing the earlier version of the wording of the court
rule was grounds for reversal. Nevertheless, the court rules are not substantially different, and the
error does not constitute reversible error.
Pinkowski contends that admitting the other acts evidence was improper because the
prosecution merely recited the exception listed in MRE 404(b) without explaining the relevance
of the incidents. However, in its motion, the prosecution argued that Pinkowski’s state of mind
was directly at issue in both charged offenses, and that his other comments and acts occurring in
the same time frame established his intent, plan, and state of mind. The trial court noted the
prosecution sought “to show that [Pinkowski] was sexually interested in ES and that his actions
were done for sexual gratification.”
More to the point, accosting a child for immoral purposes includes two theories of liability.
See People v Darga, 349 Mich App 1, 11-12; 27 NW3d 298 (2023). The first theory requires the
prosecution to prove Pinkowski “(1) accosted, enticed, or solicited (2) a child (or an individual
whom [Pinkowski] believed to be a child) (3) with the intent to induce or force that child to commit
(4) a proscribed act.” Id. at 11. The second theory requires showing Pinkowski “(1) encouraged
(2) a child (or an individual whom . . . [Pinkowski] believed to be a child) (3) to commit (4) a
1 The Michigan Rules of Evidence were amended on September 20, 2023, and became effective
on January 1, 2024. The trial court order was entered on October 31, 2024.

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proscribed act.” Id. at 11-12. Pinkowski’s general denial of both charges placed all elements at
issue, including the touching of ES for sexual purposes under MCL 750.520c(1)(b), and the intent
to induce sexual activity under MCL 750.145a. Thus, the trial court correctly reasoned that “[t]he
Prosecution offers an explanation following each recited purpose, seeking admissibility as proof
of motive and intent in a case where Defendant’s intent is an element of each of the pending
charges.”
The other acts evidence, consisting of Pinkowski’s inappropriate acts and comments,
demonstrated his intentions while touching ES’s thighs and vagina as well as his intention in
asking, “So, why did you come here, to have sex with me?” Further, “evidence of sufficiently
similar prior bad acts can be used to establish a definite prior design or system which included the
doing of the act charged as part of its consummation.” People v Smith, 282 Mich App 191, 196;
772 NW2d 428 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Pinkowski’s uncharged conduct
leading to the charged conduct shows his common scheme for gaining access to ES through his
position as an authority figure at the camp. For similar reasons, the evidence is also relevant.
People v Gerwatowski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374157); slip
op at 8.
Regarding the probative value of the evidence, “the third prong of [the VanderVliet]2
standard requires nothing more than the balancing process described in MRE 403.” People v Starr,
457 Mich 490, 498; 577 NW2d 673 (1998) (citation omitted). Under MRE 403,
[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.
“All evidence offered by the parties is prejudicial to some extent, but the fear of prejudice does
not generally render the evidence inadmissible. It is only when the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.” Gerwatowski, ___ Mich
App ___, slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if
it has a tendency to adversely affect the objecting party’s position by injecting considerations
extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” People v
Berklund, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 374157); slip op at 9
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Pinkowski argues the prejudicial effect of allowing his other comments to be admitted
substantially outweighed any probative value. While the other acts could be prejudicial, such
effect did not substantially outweigh any probative value of the evidence. The other acts all related
to the same person—ES. All the acts and comments occurred within the same general time frame
and location, involving the two months ES worked at the camp. As such, Pinkowski’s conduct
and comments were highly probative of his intent to engage in sexual activity with ES and related
2 People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).

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to the required elements of the charged offenses. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the other acts evidence.
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Pinkowski contends the court improperly instructed the jury by not requiring a unanimous
decision of which theory to convict him of under MCL 750.145a. We disagree. “We review de
novo claims of instructional error and must consider the instructions as a whole, rather than
piecemeal, to determine whether any error occurred.” Traver, 502 Mich at 31 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “[A]n imperfect instruction is not grounds for setting aside a conviction
if the instruction fairly presented the issues to be tried and adequately protected the defendant’s
rights.” Id. at 34 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
A criminal defendant has a right to a unanimous verdict. Const 1963, art I, § 14; MCR
6.410(B). “In order to protect a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, it is the duty of the trial
court to properly instruct the jury regarding the unanimity requirement.” People v Chelmicki, 305
Mich App 58, 68; 850 NW2d 612 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “However, a
specific unanimity instruction may be required in cases in which more than one act is presented as
evidence of the actus reus of a single criminal offense and each act is established through
materially distinguishable evidence that would lead to juror confusion.” Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Here, such an instruction was not needed.
“Under MCL 750.145a, a defendant may be convicted under one of two theories of
criminal liability: (1) accosting, enticing, or soliciting or (2) encouraging.” Darga, 349 Mich App
at 5 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “This Court held that when a statute lists alternative
means of committing an offense which in and of themselves do not constitute separate and distinct
offenses, jury unanimity is not required with regard to the alternate theory.” Chelmicki, 305 Mich
App at 68.
In this instance, the trial court informed the jury that the prosecutor must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt “[Pinkowski] accosted, enticed, solicited, or encouraged [ES].” However, the
trial court did not require the jury to unanimously decide under which statutory theory Pinkowski
was guilty. In Chelmicki, this Court found “defendant was properly convicted of unlawful
imprisonment even if some jurors believed he restrained the victim by means of a weapon, and the
rest of the jurors believed he restrained the victim in order to facilitate the commission of the felony
of arson (preparation to burn).” Id. at 68-69. Similarly, Pinkowski was properly convicted of
accosting a minor for immoral purposes whether he did so by accosting, soliciting, and enticing
ES or by encouraging her to commit an immoral act. Like the statute providing alternative theories
in Chelmicki, under MCL 750.145a, “[t]he alternative theories each relate to a single element of
the offense, and are merely different ways of establishing that element.” Chelmicki, 305 Mich
App at 68.
Here, there were no alternate theories of the charge pursued, but rather only other acts
evidence providing factual context. Pinkowski was charged with accosting a minor specifically
for asking: “So, why did you come here, to have sex with me?” As such, there was one act which
constituted the factual basis of the charge. The trial court stated, “I think that we have the same

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act that is applying under two different theories, and for that reason, I’m going to deny your
request.”
C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Pinkowski contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of accosting
a minor for immoral purposes. We disagree. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are
reviewed de novo. People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29, 44; 979 NW2d 406 (2021). “For a jury
to find a defendant guilty of a charged crime, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant
is guilty of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Posey, 512 Mich 317,
323; 1 NW3d 101 (2023). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what
inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those
inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
Pinkowski was convicted of accosting a child for immoral purposes under MCL 750.145a,
which states:
[a] defendant is guilty of accosting a minor if the prosecution proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) accosted, enticed,
or solicited (2) a child (or an individual whom the defendant
believed to be a child) (3) with the intent to induce or force that child
to commit (4) a proscribed act. Alternatively, a defendant is guilty
of accosting a minor if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant (1) encouraged (2) a child (or an individual
whom the defendant believed to be a child) (3) to commit (4) a
proscribed act. Taken as a whole, the statute permits conviction
under two alternative theories, one that pertains to certain acts and
requires a specific intent and another that pertains to encouragement
only and is silent with respect to mens rea. [Kowalski, 489 Mich at
499.]
This Court has adopted the “ordinary definitions” of accost, solicit, induce, and encourage
as defined by the dictionary. Darga, 349 Mich App at 12-13. As such, “[e]ntice means to attract
artfully or adroitly, or by arousing hope or desire.” Id. at 13 (citation omitted). “Solicit means to
approach with a request or a plea, to urge strongly, or to entice or lure, especially into evil.” Id.
(citation omitted). “Induce means to move by persuasion or influence; to call forth or bring about
by influence or stimulation.” Id. (citation omitted). “Encourage means to inspire with courage,
spirit or hope; to attempt to persuade.” Id. (citation omitted).
At trial, ES testified she was 14 years old while working at the camp and interacting with
Pinkowski. ES described going to the lodge alone to eat cereal and getting space away from the
loud apartment. ES was alone with Pinkowski in the lodge, late at night, when he asked her: “So,
why did you come here, to have sex with me?” Pinkowski’s housing was also located in the lodge.
ES did not answer Pinkowski’s question, pretending she did not hear him, and he repeated the
question. ES felt “really uncomfortable” because she believed Pinkowski’s question meant to ask
her to have sex with him. Immediately before, Pinkowski attempted to have ES mimic him by
grabbing his chest, which would have made her grab her breasts. Pinkowski then tried to have ES
mimic acts representing female masturbation. In an earlier encounter, Pinkowski touched ES’s

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inner thighs and vagina while making moaning noises. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a jury could find the evidence sufficiently established that Pinkowski intended to
accost, solicit, induce, or encourage ES to have sex with him.
For the reasons explained above, we affirm.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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