COA 382032 ROBERT DAVIS V SECRETARY OF STATE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 24, 2026
9:32 AM
v No. 382032
Court of Claims
SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 26-000135-MB
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and FEENEY and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this election matter, plaintiff, Robert Davis, appeals by right the Court of Claims’ August
14, 2026 order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, the Secretary of State, and
dismissing the case. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Davis filed the instant lawsuit on June 25, 2026, seeking a ruling that Eli Savit, who has
been endorsed by the Michigan Democratic Party (MDP) for the office of Attorney General, and
Garlin Gilchrist II, who has been endorsed by the MDP for the office of Secretary of State, cannot
appear on the November 3, 2026 general election ballot. Davis’s June 25, 2026 complaint pleads
two counts, one seeking a writ of mandamus and the other seeking declaratory relief. Both counts
rest on the same underlying legal theory. Davis alleges that Savit and Gilchrist were not merely
“endorsed” by the MDP at its April 19, 2026 endorsement convention, but were in fact
“nominated” at that convention. He asserts this is so even though the MDP will hold its fall
nominating convention, see MCL 168.596,1 on August 29, 2026. Pursuant to MCL 168.558(1), a
candidate nominated at a political party convention “shall file an affidavit of identity within 1
business day after being nominated with the secretary of state.” Davis’s position is that, because
Savit and Gilchrist were “nominated” at the April 19, 2026 endorsement convention and did not
1 “The state convention held for the purpose of nominating candidates for state offices to be voted
for at the November election shall be known as the ‘fall’ state convention . . . .” MCL 168.596.

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file affidavits of identity (AOIs) within one business day of being so nominated, neither may now
be placed on the November 3, 2026 general election ballot.
In the August 14, 2026 order appealed, the Court of Claims rejected this legal argument.
The court held that Savit and Gilchrist were merely endorsed, and not nominated, at the MDP’s
April 19, 2026 convention, and so they “were not required to file an AOI with the Secretary of
State within one business day after [that] endorsement convention.” Accordingly, the Court of
Claims granted summary disposition and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding no basis
to afford the relief requested by Davis.
On appeal, Davis has made no argument whatsoever about the merits of that legal
conclusion. Rather, he attacks the Court of Claims’ final disposition of the case on the basis of a
preceding, procedural ruling. After Davis filed his complaint, the Court of Claims entered a
scheduling order recognizing “the time-sensitive nature of this election matter” and
correspondingly requiring the Secretary of State to either file an answer to Davis’s complaint or a
dispositive motion in lieu of an answer by July 27, 2026. The court further directed that if the
Secretary of State filed a dispositive motion, Davis’s response would be due by 4:00 p.m. on
August 3, 2026, and the Secretary of State’s reply would be due by 4:00 p.m. on August 7, 2026.
On July 27, 2026, the Secretary of State filed a motion for summary disposition in lieu of
an answer. Relevant to this appeal, the Secretary of State generally argued that the MDP’s April
19, 2026 endorsement convention was just that—an endorsement convention—and did not result
in the nomination of either Savit or Gilchrist by the MDP. The Secretary of State also directed the
Court of Claims to an interpretive statement issued by the Secretary of State in January of this
year, in response to a request from another individual who sought the Secretary of State’s opinion
concerning whether a candidate endorsed at a party’s spring endorsement convention would be
deemed “nominated” and, as such, then have obligations under the Michigan Campaign Finance
Act, MCL 169.201 et seq. Consistent with its position in this case, the Secretary of State’s
interpretive statement answered that question in the negative. A copy of this interpretive statement
was provided with the motion.
On August 3, 2026, at 3:49 p.m., Davis filed an amended complaint. In this complaint, he
first stated allegations explaining why he believed he had a right to amend his complaint under
MCR 2.118(A)(1). Substantively, the amended complaint added one count to those pleaded
before. This new, third count asked the Court of Claims to declare that the Secretary of State’s
interpretive statement was legally incorrect for the same underlying reasons Davis argued with
respect to the other two counts. Then, about 15 minutes after filing that amended complaint, Davis
filed a response to the motion for summary disposition. Rather than argue the merits of the
underlying legal issue he had raised, Davis asserted that the Secretary of State’s motion was now
moot because his amended complaint superseded the initial complaint, which meant that the
Secretary of State’s motion sought summary disposition as to a now-inoperative complaint.
The Court of Claims entered an order the following day rejecting the amended complaint,
concluding that Davis did not have a right to amend his original complaint under MCR
2.118(A)(1). Davis sought reconsideration, arguing that he did. That motion was denied on

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August 5, 2026.2 The Court of Claims also entered an amended scheduling order stating that Davis
could file a substantive answer to the motion for summary disposition by August 7, 2026.
Then, on August 6, 2026, this Court released a published decision in Barkley v Southfield,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (Docket Nos. 369608; 370050; 370112; 370580; 370583;
372060; 372076). Barkley is not an election matter but does concern the right to amend a
complaint under MCR 2.118(A)(1). And in Barkley, this Court held:
In sum, MCR 2.118(A)(1), by its plain terms, does not condition a party’s
ability to amend its complaint by right on whether the adverse party has served a
responsive pleading; instead, that subrule permits a party may amend its complaint
once by right at any point before, and then up to 14 days after, the adverse party
serves its requisite responsive pleading. This comports not only with the court
rule’s plain terms, but also with its history and the manner in which published
authority from this Court has interpreted it. Plaintiffs thus did not amend their
complaints in violation of MCR 2.118(A). [Id. at ___; slip op at 13 (emphasis
added).]
Citing Barkley, Davis moved for reconsideration a second time, again arguing that the
Court of Claims could not reject his amended complaint. The Court of Claims again denied
reconsideration, holding that Barkley was distinguishable and did not require the court to accept
his amended complaint. Davis then filed his substantive response to the motion for summary
disposition, and the Secretary of State replied. The Court of Claims issued its opinion and order
on August 14, 2026, granting summary disposition and dismissing the case.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Davis argues that the Court of Claims was required to accept his amended
complaint. He does not address the merits of the August 14, 2026 order granting summary
disposition, but instead asserts that it must be vacated because it granted summary disposition as
to an inoperative complaint. Accordingly, he asks this Court to vacate that summary-disposition
ruling and remand the matter to the Court of Claims to accept his amended complaint and resolve
the merits of the case expeditiously, given that the MDP will hold its nominating convention on
August 29, 2026.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The primary issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Claims reversibly erred by
rejecting Davis’s amended complaint. A trial court’s decision to strike a pleading is reviewed for
2 Davis also filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint under MCR 2.118(A)(2). The Court
of Claims entered a separate order denying that motion, concluding that the amended complaint
was unreasonably delayed and would cause undue prejudice to the Secretary of State. Davis does
not seek to challenge that conclusion in this appeal.

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an abuse of discretion. Id. at ___; slip op at 9. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders
a decision outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, which necessarily occurs when
it makes an error of law.” Id. at ___; slip op at 9. The proper interpretation and application of
court rules is reviewed de novo. Id. at ___; slip op at 9.
B. DISCUSSION
We agree with Davis that, under Barkley, the Court of Claims erred by rejecting his
amended complaint. Davis, however, has made no attempt to address—and we do not see—why
that error entitles him to the relief he seeks through this appeal, in light of the particular set of
circumstances presented in this case.
We start with the error. In Barkley, id. at ___; slip op at 13, this Court set forth a
straightforward rule: under MCR 2.118(A)(1), “a party may amend its complaint once by right at
any point before, and then up to 14 days after, the adverse party serves its requisite responsive
pleading.” Davis’s filing of his amended complaint fell comfortably within this rule. Davis filed
his amended complaint on August 3, 2026. At that point, the Secretary of State had filed a motion
for summary disposition in lieu of an answer. The parties dispute whether that motion constituted
a “responsive pleading” for purposes MCR 2.118(A)(1). Compare, e.g., Progress Mich v Attorney
General, 506 Mich 74, 95; 954 NW2d 475 (2020) (explaining that, “[u]nder MCR 2.118(A)(1),
[the] plaintiff was entitled to amend its complaint, without seeking leave from the Court of Claims,
within 14 days of [the] defendant filing its motion to dismiss”) with Dimondale v Grable, 240
Mich App 553, 565; 618 NW2d 23 (2000) (“A motion for summary disposition is not a responsive
pleading under MCR 2.110(A).”); see also Barkley, ___ Mich App at ___ n 12; slip op at 12 n 12
(noting the understanding of “responsive pleading” recognized in caselaw such as Dimondale but
declining to follow unpublished decisions that have relied on it to foreclose amendment by right
before such a “responsive pleading” has been served). Regardless of the answer to that question,
Davis was within the timeframe provided by MCR 2.118(A)(1) for amending his complaint once
by right. If the Secretary of State’s motion was a “responsive pleading,” then Davis filed his
amended complaint well within 14 days of its service. MCR 2.118(A)(1). If it was not a
“responsive pleading,” then Davis filed his amended complaint before any such responsive
pleading had been served. Id. As Barkley makes clear, “MCR 2.118(A)(1) sets an outer boundary
on when an amended pleading may be filed by right but does not require the filing of a responsive
pleading by an adverse party before that right is triggered.” Barkley, ___ Mich App at ___ ; slip
op at 11. Davis thus did not need to wait for the filing of a responsive pleading before amending
his complaint once by right pursuant to MCR 2.118(A)(1).
The Secretary of State argues on appeal that Barkley is not controlling because it concerned
the amendment of a complaint before service of the original complaint had occurred, a fact pattern
not at issue in this case. We disagree. While the fact patterns of this case and Barkley are distinct
in this respect, Barkley did not purport to base its holding or analysis regarding MCR 2.118(A)(1)
on that distinction. The amended complaint was properly filed in Barkley not because it was filed
before service of the original complaint, but because it was filed before any responsive pleading
had been served—and thus necessarily before 14 days had elapsed since service of any such
responsive pleading. Under Barkley’s interpretation of MCR 2.118(A)(1), that same conclusion
holds true as to the facts presented here, and we see no basis for distinguishing Barkley with respect
to it.

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The Secretary of State also contends that, even if Barkley applies in this case, the Court of
Claims had the inherent authority to control its own docket. According to the Secretary of State,
the Court of Claims’ rejection of the amended complaint was a permissible exercise of that
authority, given the nature of this case and Davis’s actions in response to the scheduling order. A
trial court undoubtedly has the general, inherent authority to control its own docket in order to
achieve the orderly disposition of the case before it. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372,
376; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). But a trial court must also comply with the court rules. See MCR
1.103 (“The Michigan Court Rules govern practice and procedure in all [Michigan] courts . . . .”).
And as explained, the court rules, as interpreted by this Court in Barkley, permitted Davis to amend
his complaint by right. The Secretary of State has identified no colorable legal or factual basis for
concluding that Davis could not exercise that right in this case.3
Accordingly, and as Barkley makes clear, the amended complaint was timely filed under
MCR 2.118(A)(1) and should have been accepted, as it was Davis’s right to amend his complaint
once under that rule. Davis’s position appears to be that this error automatically entitles him to his
requested relief—namely, to a vacatur of the Court of Claims’ award of summary disposition to
the Secretary of State and a remand for that court to essentially start this case over, albeit with only
mere days now before the August nominating convention at issue. Another court rule, however,
indicates that our finding of error under MCR 2.118(A)(1) does not necessarily end our inquiry
into Davis’s entitlement to relief. MCR 2.613(A) provides:
Harmless Error. An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an
error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the
court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a
verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice.
Davis has made no effort to address this provision, its application to his claim of error, or why
refusing his requested relief under the particular circumstances presented by this case would be
“inconsistent with substantial justice.” See, e.g., Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller, 256 Mich App
336, 339-340; 662 NW2d 854 (2003) (“An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his
assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue.”). Nor do we see reason to conclude that
it would be.
As discussed, Davis filed his original complaint on June 25, 2026, and the Court of Claims
afforded his case expedited treatment to accommodate the nature of his claims and requested relief.
3 The Secretary of State makes a passing reference to MCL 600.2301, stating that it provides a
court with discretion to allow amendment of pleadings. The Secretary of State does not explain
how this statute would permit rejection of a pleading, or otherwise develop an argument that the
Court of Claims’ rejection of the amended complaint in this case can be justified by the statute.
And to the extent the Secretary of State directs this Court to MCR 2.118(A)(2) and the Court of
Claims’ denial of Davis’s motion for leave to amend under that rule, that issue is not before this
Court. Davis has not raised it, and for the reasons discussed, the question here is whether Davis
had a right to amend his complaint, not whether he should have been granted leave to do so.

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Davis’s complaint raised two claims, both premised on the same underlying legal theory.
Consistent with the Court of Claims’ expedited schedule for the case, the Secretary of State
provided Davis with its position on the merits of his claims through a motion for summary
disposition. In response, Davis chose not to address the merits in kind; instead, right at the deadline
for articulating his substantive position, he opted to amend his complaint and to seek to effectively
start the merits-adjudication process over—only with even less time now to carry out that process
in a manner that would duly accommodate his requested relief. And the core substantive
amendment he made was to add a third claim that shared the same underlying legal theory as the
other two; at no point has Davis suggested otherwise or explained how the new, third claim might
prevail on this underlying legal theory should the other two not. See id.
The Court of Claims, though erroneously refusing to accept this amendment, proceeded to
provide Davis with a substantive answer to the underlying legal question shared by all his claims
within the expedited timeframe required by those claims. Davis has at no point suggested that his
amended complaint would fare any better under the Court of Claims’ substantive analysis than his
original one did—nor, for that matter, has Davis made any attempt to challenge the merits of the
Court of Claims’ ruling on appeal, opting instead to abandon any such arguments. See id.
Furthermore, this merits analysis, in our view, is sound. As the Court of Claims explained:
MCL 168.596 of the Michigan Election Law provides:
The state convention held for the purpose of nominating
candidates for state offices to be voted for at the November election
shall be known as the “fall” state convention and the county
convention held for the purpose of electing delegates to the fall state
convention shall be known as the “fall” county convention. The
state convention held not less than 37 days before the first Monday
of April in every odd numbered year shall be known as the “spring”
state convention, and the county convention held for the purpose of
electing delegates to the spring state convention shall be known as
the “spring” county convention.
Under MCL 168.591(1), “the state convention of all political parties for the
nomination of candidates for state offices in the even numbered years shall
commence not less than 60 days before the general November election. The date,
time, and location of the state convention shall be designated by the state central
committees of the various political parties in their call for a state convention. The
calls shall be issued at least 60 days before the August primaries.” See also MCL
168.598(1)[.] On May 31, 2026, the Michigan Democratic Central Committee
approved the call for its fall convention that will be held on August 29, 2026. The
MDP sent that call to all its members on June 5, 2026.
After a political party holds its fall convention, the party must forward to
the Secretary of State a list of the names of all candidates nominated at the state
convention. MCL 168.686. After receiving the list of nominees, the Secretary of
State “shall forward a copy” of the list received to the board of election
commissioners of each county. Id. A candidate nominated for a state office at a

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political party convention “shall file an affidavit of identity within 1 business day
after being nominated with the secretary of state.” MCL 168.558(1).
The Michigan Election Law generally regulates the political party
conventions in the State of Michigan. See Heitmanis v Austin, 899 F2d 521, 522
(CA 6, 1990). It clearly provides that political parties will hold a fall nominating
convention where the parties will determine the nominees at the convention[, MCL
168.596], that the parties must forward to the Secretary of State a list of the names
of all candidates nominated at the state convention[, MCL 168.686], that nominated
candidates shall file an AOI within one business day after being nominated with
the Secretary of State[, MCL 168.558(1)], that the Secretary of State (or relevant
officer) shall not certify to the board of election commissioners the name of a
candidate who fails to comply with MCL 168.558(1)[, MCL 168.558(4)], and that
the Secretary of State forward a list of candidates nominated at the convention to
the board of election commissioners of each county[, MCL 168.686].
Plaintiff contends that the MDP’s spring endorsement convention
nominated Savit and Gilchrist for state office. Plaintiff focuses on the language in
MCL 168.558(1) that “[a] candidate nominated for a . . . state . . . office at a political
party convention . . . shall file an affidavit of identity within 1 business day after
being nominated with the secretary of state.” [(Emphasis added.)] Plaintiff argues
that the MDP’s spring endorsement convention was “a” political party convention
and that the MDP “nominated” Savit and Gilchrist for a state office at that
convention.
The Michigan Election Law does not require an endorsement convention.
The endorsement convention is entirely a creature of internal Democratic party
rules and procedures, legally unrelated to the formal nominating process outlined
in state law. The documents attached to plaintiff’s complaint show that the
endorsement convention and the nominating convention are different events with
different purposes. The MDP chose to issue a spring call for an endorsement
convention “to endorse Democratic candidates to the November General Election
(emphasis added).” The term “endorse” means “to approve openly,” “to express
support or approval of publicly and definitely,” such as “a mayoral candidate.”
Meriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). The term “nominate” means
“to propose as a candidate for election to office.” Id. At the endorsement
convention the MDP publicly expressed support for the candidacies of Savit and
Gilchrist—that is, the MDP endorsed Savit’s and Gilchrist’s candidacies—but the
MDP did not propose Savit and Gilchrist as candidates for election to office to the
Secretary of State. In accordance with the Michigan Election Law, the MDP will
nominate its candidates for office at the fall nominating convention and will provide
the names of its candidates to the Secretary of State after the fall nominating
convention.
Savit and Gilchrist were not nominated for office at the MDP’s endorsement
convention and were not required to file an AOI with the Secretary of State within
one business day after the endorsement convention. Plaintiff is not entitled to a

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declaration that the SOS has a duty not to certify to the election commissions of
each county the names of Savit and Gilchrist as candidates for the offices of
Michigan Attorney General and Secretary of State, respectively, to the November
3, 2026 general election ballot, nor is he entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling
her to do the same. The Court therefore GRANTS summary disposition of the
declaratory judgment and mandamus claims in favor of the SOS. [Footnotes
omitted; ellipses in original.]
We see no error in this analysis, nor any reason to think its substance would apply any
differently or less completely to Davis’s amended complaint—and again, Davis has offered
nothing whatsoever on appeal to suggest otherwise. See Johnson, 256 Mich App at 339-340.
Nonetheless, he now seeks to send the matter back to the Court of Claims for another ruling, with
an ever-vanishing amount of time for that ruling to be issued and any appeal of it completed within
a timeframe that would duly accommodate the relief he is pursuing through this lawsuit.
As discussed, Davis had a right to amend his complaint as he did; he should not have been
denied that right. But here we are, and the task before us on appeal is to determine not only if error
occurred, but whether the relief sought for that error is in order. And Davis has wholly failed to
explain why, given the particular set of circumstances presented by this case, it would be
“inconsistent with substantial justice” to let stand the Court of Claims’ award of summary
disposition to the Secretary of State, rather than vacate that ruling and remand as he requests. MCR
2.613(A). Accordingly, while we agree with Davis that the Court of Claims erred under Barkley
when it rejected his amended complaint, we disagree that he has demonstrated entitlement to the
relief he has requested on appeal for that error in this case.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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