PEOPLE OF MI V MARK MCCLOUD

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
PEOPLE OF MI V MARK MCCLOUD
Docket No. 377741
LC No. 88-011197-01-FC
Sima G. Patel
Presiding Judge
Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
Adrienne N. Young
Judges
The motion to file a delayed application for leave to appeal exceeding the 16,000-word
limit set forth under MCR 7.212(B)(1) is GRANTED. The delayed application that was received on
October 13, 2025, is accepted for filing.
Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(2), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the trial
court’s June 27, 2025 order and REMAND this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with
this order. By applying the Cress1 standard in analyzing defendant’s Brady2 claim, the trial court erred.
See People v Milton, 506 Mich 999 (2020) (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring) (“Though Brady claims and
Cress claims are often intertwined, trial courts must address each claim separately.”) (footnote omitted).
Put simply, the Brady standard is “less demanding” and is “widely recognized” as “more ‘defendant-
friendly’ than the standard for granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.” See People
v Grissom, 492 Mich 296, 355 n 38; 821 NW2d 50 (2012) (ZAHRA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, as the prosecution conceded below, on this record, we are persuaded
that the trial court should have afforded defendant an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the merits of the
successive motion for relief from judgment at bar. This is particularly true given that the trial judge did not
preside over defendant’s joint trial with his several codefendants. See People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541,
568; 918 NW2d 676 (2018) (“If a witness’s lack of credibility is such that no reasonable juror would
consciously entertain a reasonable belief in the witness’s veracity, then the trial court should deny a
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. However, if a witness is not patently incredible, a trial court’s
credibility determination must bear in mind what a reasonable juror might make of the testimony, and
not what the trial court itself might decide, were it the ultimate fact-finder.”); id. at 572 (“[T]he trial court
judge who presided over these motions for relief from judgment was not the same judge who presided
over the preliminary examination or the original trials. The trial court judge thus was functionally in
the same position as an appellate court where the credibility of witnesses at the preliminary
examination and the original trials was concerned.”).
1 People v Cress, 468 Mich 678; 664 NW2d 174 (2003).
2 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).

-- 1 of 2 --

On remand, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing, then reexamine this matter on
the merits. The trial court may hold any additional proceedings it deems necessary to that end.
This order is to have immediate effect. MCR 7.215(F)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge

-- 2 of 2 --