COA 375876 PEOPLE OF MI V MARK OWEN ANDERSON Opinion - Authored - Published 2/25/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 25, 2026
1:24 PM
v No. 375876
Tuscola Circuit Court
MARK OWEN ANDERSON, LC No. 24-016610-FH
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
YOUNG, J.
While working at an event at the Tuscola County Fairgrounds, Shawna Brinkman called
911 to report that two men were about to depart the fairgrounds on motorcycles and were
intoxicated. A Michigan State trooper was dispatched and stopped defendant, Mark Owen
Anderson, based only on Brinkman’s tip, without observing any traffic violation. Anderson was,
as Brinkman surmised, driving while intoxicated. Anderson was charged with operating a vehicle
while intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625(7)(a)(ii). He successfully moved in the circuit court
to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. Although the circuit court erred when it
used Brinkman’s preliminary examination testimony to assess the reliability of her tip, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Anderson and another man were attending a dirt bike rally at Tuscola County Fairgrounds.
Shawna Brinkman was working the entry gate at the venue and noticed the two men drinking beers.
Afterward, as the men left on their motorcycles, Brinkman called 911. She told the operator that
the men were on black Harley Davidson motorcycles, that they “[were] getting ready to leave [and]
that [they were] intoxicated.” She went on, “I’ve watched them drink at least six beers and they’ve
been asked multiple times to not drink on [the] fairgrounds.” Brinkman also provided physical
descriptions of both men, the license plates of their motorcycles and direction of travel and
reiterated that the men “[were] drunk.”

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Trooper Chloe Farnham was near the rally and received a call from dispatch that relayed
the information from Brinkman’s call.1 Farnham identified the two men by the physical
description and the license plate numbers Brinkman provided. She followed the motorcycles for
five minutes and while neither motorcyclist committed a traffic violation, Farnham stopped
Anderson.2 Field sobriety tests indicated Anderson was intoxicated.
After being bound over on a charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated third-offense,
Anderson moved the circuit court to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop and dismiss the
charge on the grounds that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. Anderson argued that the caller
was unreliable, and that Farnham lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The circuit court
agreed, finding that Brinkman’s preliminary examination testimony completely undermined the
content of her 911 call, and granted Anderson’s motion. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The prosecution argues that Brinkman’s 911 call established both that she was reliable as
well as reasonable suspicion for Farnham to stop Anderson. We agree with the prosecution only
as to reliability.
A. RELIABILITY OF THE TIP
“A traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for
a violation of law.” People v Moorman, 331 Mich App 481, 485; 952 NW2d 597 (2020). A tip
provided to police may establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if it carries with it
“sufficient indicia of reliability.” People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 169; 499 NW2d 764 (1993).
Contrary to some of the statements by the lower court, this does not require a “history of reliability”
or status as a professional informant. Here, the circumstances indicate that Brinkman was reliable,
1 At the preliminary examination hearing in this case, Farnham confirmed that the call she received
from dispatch included substantially the same information as Brinkman provided to the operator.
While we did receive a recording of the 911 phone call, we did not receive a recording of the call
from dispatch to Farnham. Because neither party argues about whether the information from the
dispatcher amounts to reasonable suspicion and because Farnham’s testimony confirms the
content was substantially the same, our analysis focuses on the 911 call. We note, however, that
other cases engage with the content of the dispatch call, rather than the 911 tip. See e.g. Navarette
v California, 572 US 393, 395; 134 S Ct 1683; 188 L Ed 2d 680 (2014) (directly quoting a 911 tip
as relayed by the dispatcher); see also State v Stanage, 893 NW2d 522; 2017 SD 12 (2017)
(reversing the denial of a motion to suppress where a fast food employee provided a tip to police
of suspected drunk driving because an individual in the drive-through had bloodshot eyes and
slurred speech but only the conclusion of drunk driving was relayed by dispatch, not the supporting
personal observations of the employee).
2 The other motorcyclist continued driving and Farnham did not pursue him.

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and the circuit court clearly erred in finding otherwise. People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 31; 691
NW2d 759 (2005).
To begin, we agree with the circuit court’s observation that Brinkman’s testimony at the
preliminary examination contradicted her statements made in the 911 call, but we disagree that
those contradictions make Brinkman legally unreliable for the purposes of this Fourth Amendment
analysis. “A valid investigatory stop must be justified at its inception.” People v Champion, 452
Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849, 853 (1996) (emphasis added). Thus, when assessing the reliability
of a tip, the focus is exclusively on the information provided to dispatch and ultimately relayed to
the trooper.
When Brinkman made the initial report in this case, she called 911 and gave her name and
phone number. This is at least partially indicative of reliability. Navarette, 572 US at 400-401.
Brinkman told the operator that she watched Anderson and his companion drink “at least six
beers,” that the two men were asked “multiple times” not to drink on the fairground, that they were
about to leave on motorcycles, and that they may have had beers in their cooler on the motorcycles.
Because Brinkman claimed eyewitness knowledge of an alleged crime, and because she called 911
close in time to her observations, her tip is entitled to further weight. Id. at 399. Brinkman
additionally provided physical descriptions of the two men and their motorcycles and told the
operator the direction the men were heading. When Farnham spotted the two men, they and their
motorcycles matched the information she received from dispatch. The men were also traveling in
the direction stated in Brinkman’s call and the corroborated information indicates Brinkman’s
reliability as a tipster. Id. at 398 (“the officers’ corroboration of certain details made the
anonymous tip sufficiently reliable . . . .”). Thus, at the time the call was placed, Brinkman was
reliable.
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION
After finding that Brinkman was reliable, the circuit court must next determine whether the
information Brinkman provided established reasonable suspicion for Farnham to stop Anderson.
Reasonable suspicion requires less of a showing than probable cause, but “it still entails something
more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ because an officer must have had
a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of criminal activity.” People v Pagano, 507
Mich 26, 32; 967 NW2d 500 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Reasonable suspicion need not be supplied by the officer’s own observations; it can be
supplied by another person’s observations. Navarette, 572 US at 397. “In determining whether
the information from the citizen-informant carried enough indicia of reliability to provide the
officers with a reasonable suspicion,” courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances,
including “(1) the reliability of the particular informant, (2) the nature of the particular information
given to the police, and (3) the reasonability of the suspicion in light of the above factors.” People
v Tooks, 403 Mich 568, 575; 271 NW2d 503 (1978). Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, there
is no legal requirement that an officer corroborate the information in the tip. However, when an
officer does corroborate some information, it affects the reliability analysis, as indicated above.
And it follows that, “an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely
to tell the truth about other things, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in

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criminal activity.” Navarette, 572 US at 398 (cleaned up). However, even a reliable tipster must
supply more than “a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving.” Navarette at 401-402.
At oral argument appellate defense counsel conceded that the content of the 911 call
provided reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. Their brief in this Court, however, argued
something different: that Brinkman’s 911 call “is little more than a conclusory allegation of drunk
driving.” It is with the latter argument that we agree.
In her 911 call, Brinkman relayed the following information:
There’s two gentlemen on Harleys getting ready to leave that are intoxicated. I
watched them drink at least six beers and they’ve been asked multiple times not to
drink on the fairgrounds.
Brinkman then provided the presumed direction of travel and concluded with “they are drunk.”
Brinkman’s call does include conclusory allegations of drunk driving. Brinkman states the
two men “are intoxicated” and “are drunk.” But, critically distinct from Pagano, Brinkman’s call
also contains additional specific observations by Brinkman: that the two men were repeatedly
asked to stop drinking at the fairground and that she saw the two men consume six beers. This
factual scenario does not have an exact analogue in our jurisprudence so we begin with what that
information is not.
The observations relayed in Brinkman’s 911 call are not “certain driving behaviors [that
are] sound indicia of drunk driving.” Navarette, 572 US at 402-403 (cleaned up) (noting the
“paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving” include “weaving all over the roadway,”
“cross[ing] over the center line on a highway and almost caus[ing] several head-on collisions,”
“driving all over the road,” “weaving back and forth,” and “driving in the median.”); see also
People v Dacus, 559 P3d 198, 205; 2024 CO 51 (Colo, 2024) (holding that a caller provided the
police with reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle where the caller provided contemporaneous
observations of the individual “driving erratically and crossing lanes of traffic.”).
The observations relayed in Brinkman’s 911 call are not physical indicators of drunkenness
(i.e. observations of bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech after an admission that alcohol was
consumed). See People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
369614), slip op at 4-5; see also State v Scholl, 684 NW2d 82, 2004 SD 85 (2004) (finding an
officer had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop based only on a tip where the tip provided
a personal observation that the driver had left a bar “stumbling pretty badly and ha[d] problems
getting into [his] Toyota Tacoma pickup.”). As recognized by the trial court, drinking alcohol and
then driving a vehicle is not a crime in and of itself; thus, observing two men consume beer, without
more, is not an observation of criminal behavior or behavior by which one can infer criminality.
Brinkman also said, “they’ve been asked multiple times not to drink on fairgrounds,” but that does
not support “a commonsense judgment” that the individuals were drinking to the point of
intoxication. Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3 (citing Pagano, 507 Mich at 32).
Critically absent from Brinkman’s tip is any information that suggests Anderson was
engaging in crime, beyond Brinkman’s own conclusions. Moreover, after five minutes of
following Anderson and observing his operation of his motorcycle, the trooper observed nothing

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to corroborate Brinkman’s otherwise conclusory statements. The dissent notes other states that
have held a layperson’s conclusory statement on another’s intoxication can rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion. The United States Supreme Court has not, and Michigan has not, and we
decline to do so today agreeing that “[d]runken driving is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our
freedom to come and go as we please without police interference.” Navarette, 572 US at 414
(SCALIA, J., dissenting).
Because Brinkman’s tip failed to communicate sufficient information suggesting Anderson
was operating a vehicle while intoxicated, the trooper had no reasonable suspicion that a crime
was afoot.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Anderson’s motion to suppress.3
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
3 See Lane v KinderCare Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998) (this
Court may affirm a trial court’s decision if the trial court reached the correct outcome, albeit for a
different reason).

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