COA 368742 PEOPLE OF MI V CAMERON CAMPBELL Opinion - Authored - Published 12/16/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 16, 2025
1:31 PM
v No. 368742
Wayne Circuit Court
CAMERON CAMPBELL, LC No. 87-010252-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and FEENEY, JJ.
PATEL, J.
In 1988, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of second-degree murder,1 MCL
750.317, assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83, and carrying a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1). Defendant, who was 18
years old at the time of the offenses, was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 65 to 100 years
for each second-degree murder conviction and the AWIM conviction, to be served consecutively
to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.2 Defendant now appeals by
delayed leave granted3 the opinion and order denying his motion for relief from judgment.
We find no error warranting reversal of defendant’s convictions. But we conclude that the
recent evolution of the law regarding juvenile and 18-year-old offenders has rendered defendant’s
term-of-years sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and
1 The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder as lesser offenses to the
original charges of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a).
2 This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences in his direct appeal, which was
consolidated with the appeal of his codefendant, Andre Cammons. People v Cammons,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 9, 1992 (Docket Nos. 110588
and 111199).
3 People v Campbell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 15, 2024 (Docket
No. 368742).

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AWIM convictions invalid under the principle of proportionality because the sentencing court
failed to consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors. For the
reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court order denying
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, vacate defendant’s sentences for second-degree
murder and AWIM, and remand for resentencing.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant’s convictions arise from his participation in the murders of the victims, Eddie
Haack and Charles Kniseley, and an assault of the victim, Harold Haack. On September 29, 1987,
the Haacks and Kniseley drove to a house in Detroit to purchase cocaine. Kniseley went inside to
make the purchase. Men who were standing on the front porch observed the Haacks waiting in
the vehicle and ordered them at gunpoint to go inside the house. Codefendant, Andre Cammons,
entered the home and screamed at the Haacks and Kniseley while swinging a handgun. Cammons
believed that the three men had broken into his house, stolen his stereo equipment, and were trying
to trade that same equipment for drugs.
Cammons ordered the three men to the dining room. Defendant and other men were
standing in the dining room when the Haacks and Kniseley entered. Cammons ordered the three
men to lie on the ground, face down, and pull their pants to their knees. The men complied.
Cammons began kicking Harold, and then eight other men, including defendant, joined in the
assault of all three men. The beating left Kniseley and Eddie unconscious. Harold was severely
injured, but conscious.
Cammons forced Harold at gunpoint to move Eddie and Kniseley’s unconscious bodies to
the living room. Cammons then told defendant and another man “to take them home and get rid
of them.” Cammons handed firearms and money to defendant and the other man. Cammons
opened the front door, and he and defendant ordered Harold to move Eddie and Kniseley to their
car. Eddie and Kniseley were thrown on top of each other in the back seat. Defendant and another
man got into the front seat with Harold, held a gun to Harold, and ordered him to drive.
Harold realized that defendant and the other man were not taking them home. At one point,
defendant told Harold to stop the car, claiming he needed to use the bathroom. Harold pretended
that his brakes did not work and tried to hit another car, but defendant grabbed the steering wheel
to avoid the crash. Defendant and the other man pointed their guns at Harold and ordered him to
stop the car. Defendant pointed his gun at Harold’s ear. Harold heard the other man tell defendant,
“No, not yet.” Harold accelerated the car, aimed it at a fire hydrant, and leaped from the car before
impact.
As Harold ran away, he looked back and saw defendant and the other man get out of the
car. The other man reached into the car and fired several shots into the vehicle. Defendant and
the other man then both shot at Harold while chasing him down the street Harold hid behind a
bush in a backyard, but they found him. One of the two men shot Harold four times before they
ran off. Harold survived and contacted the police. The police located Kniseley’s vehicle with
Eddie’s and Kniseley’s deceased bodies stacked on top of each other in the backseat.

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In 1988, Cammons and defendant were tried together before a jury. Defendant was
convicted and sentenced as indicated. Defendant thereafter appealed his convictions and
sentences. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, but remanded for articulation of the
reasons for the departure from the guidelines for the AWIM convictions only. People v Cammons,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 9, 1992 (Docket Nos. 110588
and 111199), p 5. Our Supreme Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal. People
v Campbell, 441 Mich 877 (2015).
In 2012, defendant moved pro se for a reduction in his sentence, which the trial court
denied. In 2020, defendant moved for relief from judgment raising the following arguments: (1)
the admission of a witness’s preliminary examination testimony in redacted form at trial violated
his right to present a complete defense (2) various comments made by the prosecutor during
closing arguments amounted to prosecutorial misconduct; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the redaction of the witness’s testimony and to the prosecutor’s improper
comments during closing arguments; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
disproportionate sentences without adequate justification; and (5) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise these claims on direct appeal. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that defendant’s pro se motion for a reduction in his sentence was a motion for relief
from judgment and thus the successive motion for relief from judgment was barred by MCR
6.502(G).
Defendant filed a delayed application for leave to appeal. This Court vacated the trial
court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion as defendant’s first motion
for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D) because the trial court had “erred by characterizing
defendant’s prior motion for sentence reduction as a motion for relief from judgment . . . .” People
v Campbell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 17, 2022 (Docket
No. 359494). On remand, the trial court rejected defendant’s claims on the merits and denied his
motion. Defendant now appeals by delayed leave granted.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of
discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error.” People v Swain, 288
Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision
falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, or makes an error of law.” Id.
at 628-629 (citations omitted). Clear error occurs “if, after a review of the record, this Court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Meeker (On Remand), 340
Mich App 559, 563; 986 NW2d 622 (2022).
We also review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Boykin, 510 Mich
171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if the sentence imposed is not
“proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.”
People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (cleaned up).

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We review de novo the constitutional question whether a defendant was denied his
constitutional right to present a defense. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 247; 749 NW2d 272
(2008). We also generally review de novo the constitutional issue whether the prosecutor engaged
in misconduct. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). But
unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error. People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76, 88; 966NW2d
402 (2020).
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presents a “mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 487; 999 NW2d 490 (2023). We review de
novo constitutional questions and the trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear
error. Id.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCES
Defendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offenses, argues that his sentences of
65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and AWIM convictions violate the
principle of proportionality. We agree.
Motions for relief from judgment are governed by MCR 6.500 et seq. A “defendant has
the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested.” MCR 6.508(D). Relief is not proper
if a defendant “alleges grounds for relief that could have been previously raised, unless the
defendant demonstrates both good cause for failing to raise such grounds earlier as well as actual
prejudice.” People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). See also MCR
6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b).
Although defendant raised a sentencing issue in his direct appeal, see Cammons, unpub op
at 4, he did not challenge the proportionality of his sentence. Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentences are cruel and
unusual punishment as applied to juveniles under the age of 18 who have been convicted of first-
degree murder. Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). As
this Court reasoned in People v Eads, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket
No. 357332); slip op at 5, lv gtd 25 NW3d 118 (2025), “the fact that [defendant’s] direct appeal
occurred well before Miller and its progeny came into being is enough in itself to establish good
cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) for failing to raise the challenge at that time.”
In order to establish that he is entitled to resentencing, defendant must also demonstrate
actual prejudice. In the context of challenging a sentence, “actual prejudice” requires a defendant
to establish his sentence is invalid,” which he can do by prevailing on the merits of the challenge.”
Id. at __; slip op at 5. As discussed infra, the evolution of the law regarding juvenile and 18-year-
old offenders invalidates defendant’s sentences for second-degree murder and AWIM and,
consequently, defendant is entitled to resentencing.
Courts must impose reasonable sentences. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 471. A sentence is
reasonable if it adheres to the “principle of proportionality,” which requires the sentence to be “
‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’
” Id. at 473-474, quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). “When a
trial court sentences a defendant within the guidelines’ recommended range, it creates a

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presumption that the sentence is proportionate.” People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 360; 1 NW3d 101
(2023) (Opinion by BOLDEN, J.). To overcome that presumption, “the defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating that their within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate.” Id.
at 359. Defendant acknowledges that his sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment were within
the applicable guidelines’ range of 120 months to life, but argues that his sentences violate the
principle of proportionality because his youth at the time of the offense must be treated as a
mitigating factor when imposing a term-of-years sentence.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court applied its rationale from Roper v Simmons,
543 US 551; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005) and Graham v Florida, 560 US 48; 130 S Ct
2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010) that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes
of sentencing.” The Court explained that “juveniles have diminished culpability and greater
prospects for reform” and thus “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller,
567 US at 471 (cleaned up). The Court explained that children are different from adults in three
primary ways:
First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures,
including from their family and peers; they have limited control over their own
environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings. And third, a child’s character is not as well formed as an
adult’s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of
irretrievable depravity. [Id. (cleaned up).]
Because mandatory sentences of LWOP preclude consideration of the offender’s age and
its attendant characteristics, the Miller Court concluded that such sentences for offenders who were
under the age of 18 at the time of the offenses violate the principle of proportionality and the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 479. “By making youth (and all that
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. The Court therefore dictated that sentencing
courts “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480.
Two years later, the Michigan Legislature enacted “a sentencing scheme that eliminated
mandatory life without the possibility of parole for all individuals who were convicted of specific
crimes, including first-degree murder, for acts committed while they were juveniles.” Boykin, 510
Mich at 179-180, citing MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a. The United States Supreme Court
subsequently held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because it
announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law. Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190,
206; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016).
“Michigan law has evolved in the wake of Miller,” and our “Supreme Court has looked to
and built upon Miller’s guiding principles in construing the law of this state with respect to the
sentencing of juveniles.” Eads, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. In Boykin, 510 Mich at 185,
our Supreme Court recognized that “juvenile status matters, and special consideration must be paid
to youthful offenders before the harshest sentences may be imposed.” The Court declined to limit

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application of Miller and its progeny to the context of mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile
defendants. Id. at 187-188. Applying Miller’s principles to the principle of proportionality in this
state’s sentencing jurisprudence, the Court concluded that a sentencing court must consider the
offender’s youth and treat it as a mitigating factor when imposing a term-of-years sentence on a
juvenile defendant. Id. at 188-189.
Our Supreme Court expanded even further on Miller’s guiding principles in People v
Parks, 510 Mich 225, 267-268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), holding that a mandatory sentence of
LWOP for first-degree murder is also unconstitutional for offenders who were 18 years old at the
time they committed the offense, and that any 18-year-old who was given a mandatory LWOP
sentence was entitled to be resentenced.4 The Court explained that it was extending Miller’s
protections to 18-year-old defendants because there was a clear scientific consensus that late
adolescence—including those 18 years old—“is a key stage of development characterized by
significant brain, behavioral, and psychological change.” Id. at 249. The Court detailed the
scientific findings, and explained: “Overall, late-adolescent brains are far more similar to juvenile
brains, as described in Miller . . . than to the brains of fully matured adults.” Id. at 252. The Court
stated that the “logic articulated in Miller about why children are different from adults for purposes
of sentencing applies in equal force to 18-year-olds.” Id. at 259. The Court reasoned that “no
meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18; to treat those two classes of
defendants differently in our sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point of being cruel
under our Constitution.” Id. at 266 (cleaned up). The Court concluded that Michigan’s
Constitution “prohibits imposing sentences of mandatory life without parole for 18-year-old
defendants convicted of first-degree murder, given that their neurological characteristics are
identical to those of juveniles, as articulated in Miller . . . .” Id. at 265. The Court determined that
such offenders are entitled to “all the protections enumerated in our caselaw interpreting [MCL
769.25].” Id. at 267 n 19. This includes “a rebuttable presumption against life-without-parole
sentences . . . .” See id. at 241. And as with juveniles, the “default” term-of-years sentence for an
18-year-old offender is “a minimum sentence of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of
at least 60 years’ imprisonment.” Id. at 267 n 19.5
Miller’s principles have also been applied to juvenile defendants convicted of second-
degree murder. In People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 322; 987 NW2d 85 (2022), which was decided
on the same day as Boykin and Parks, our Supreme Court held that “a parolable life sentence for a
defendant who commits second-degree murder while a juvenile” is unconstitutional. The Court
noted that a parolable life sentence “is particularly severe when imposed on a juvenile, given the
important mitigating ways that children are different from adults.” Id. at 315. The Court further
observed that “a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder is often more severe than the
4 Our Supreme Court recently extended Miller protections, as discussed in Parks, to individuals
who were 19 or 20 years old at the time they committed the offense of first-degree murder. See
People v Taylor, ____ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); slip
op at 13, 37-38.
5 Subsequently, in People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 166813),
slip op at 1, the Supreme Court held that Parks applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

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minimum sentences now given to most juveniles who commit first-degree murder: 25 to 40 years.” Id.
at 316.
Relying on Stovall, this Court concluded that a term-of-years sentence of 50 to 75 years for
second-degree murder for an offender that was 16 years old at the time of the offense was
unconstitutional and also disproportionate because the sentencing court failed “to consider [the
defendant’s] youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors.” Eads, __ Mich App at
__; slip op at 1. Recognizing the legal distinction between a punishment that is “so
disproportionate as to be unconstitutionally cruel or unusual” and one that violates “the
nonconstitutional ‘principle of proportionality’ ” discussed in Milbourn, the Eads Court stated:
In light of Miller and its progeny, Eads’s sentence lacks the requisite
proportionality. As previously detailed, Eads, despite his juvenile status and all
that has now been recognized to come with it, received a sentence for second-
degree murder that would require him to outlive his life expectancy before even
becoming eligible for parole and would deny him a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Indeed, the
sentence is, in purpose and effect, even more severe in some respects than the life-
sentence alternative that our Supreme Court has now deemed so disproportionate
as to be categorically unconstitutional for juvenile offenders such as Eads. We
cannot conclude that such a sentence nonetheless meets our state’s proportionality
requirement. [Id. at ___; slip op at 13-14 (citation omitted).]6
Similarly, in People v Echols, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket
No. 370709); slip op at 1, this Court held that a term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for
second-degree murder for an offender that was 18 years old at the time of the offense was
unconstitutional. Noting that the defendant’s sentence was even harsher than the sentence as issue
in Eads, this Court explained:
Under this sentence, Echols will not even become eligible for parole for the first
time until well past the life expectancy of individuals incarcerated as adults, let
alone as youths, and several decades beyond when he would have first become
parole-eligible under the life sentence deemed unconstitutional in Stovall. Had
Echols been convicted of first-degree murder as originally charged, he would now
be entitled to a resentencing hearing and would be facing a default term-of-years
sentence limited to a minimum of 25 to 40 years and a maximum of 60 years.
Instead, Echols, for committing a lesser offense than first-degree murder, is left
with a minimum sentence that is 15 years higher—and a maximum sentence that is
90 years higher—than the default 60-year statutory upper limit for first-degree
murder, and without any of the significant procedural safeguards that must be
satisfied to exceed the statutory limits for first-degree murder. Such a sentence is
6 In People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369185); slip op
at 5-8, this Court distinguished Eads on the basis that the defendant in Nard was released from
prison and on parole since July 17, 2024, and could be discharged from parole as early as July 17,
2026.

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out of line with other jurisdictions’ punishments as discussed in Stovall, and leaves
Echols without any more meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation than a juvenile sentenced to parolable life.
[Id. at __; slip op at 6-7 (cleaned up).]
Although the defendant in Echols also raised a challenge to his sentence under the
nonconstitutional principle of proportionality, this Court stated that it was not necessary resolve
the additional issue because it concluded that the defendant was entitled to resentencing on the
basis of his constitutional challenge. Id. at __; slip op at 8. But this Court “observe[d], as we did
in Eads, that we do not see how Echols’s sentence could meet our state’s proportionality
requirement given that it is, for the reasons discussed, unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.” Id. at
__; slip op at 8. This Court additionally instructed the trial court to “ensure that its resentencing
of Echols is both constitutional and in line with our state’s nonconstitutional principle of
proportionality” by considering the defendant’s “youth and its attendant characteristics at the time
of the offense as potentially mitigating—and not aggravating—factors.” Id. at __; slip op at 8.
In this case, defendant’s minimum sentence range under the sentencing guidelines was 10
years to life for the second-degree murder convictions. It is clear from the record that the trial
court did not consider the mitigating factors of defendant’s youth during sentencing. In explaining
its concurrent sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment, the trial court focused on primarily on
the nature of the offense, noting that it was “savage,” “inhumane,” and “disgusting.” The trial
court remarked that it was hard “to imagine the emptiness of soul that must occupy [defendant’s]
spirit,” and expressed that it was “shocked and dismayed and disgusted by [defendant’s] behavior.”
But the trial court did not consider this behavior in light of the mitigating factors of youth
announced in Miller and its progeny.
Similar to the sentences at issue in Eads and Echols, defendant’s term-of-years sentences
are more severe than generally authorized for offenders who were juveniles or between 18 and 20
years old when they committed first-degree murder. The default sentence for such offenders is
now a minimum term of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment with a maximum of at least 60 years’
imprisonment if the court decides not to sentence the defendant to LWOP. See Taylor, ___ Mich
at ___; slip op at 12-13; Parks, 510 Mich at 267 n 19. See also MCL 769.25(9). Defendant’s
minimum sentence of 65 years for second-degree murder exceeds the suggested maximum sentence
for an offender who was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder.7 Although the
defendant in Eads was a juvenile when he committed second-degree murder, this Court’s
reasoning and conclusion that the defendant’s 50-to-75-year sentence violated the principle of
proportionality is persuasive here when viewed alongside the Parks Court’s recognition that
juvenile and 18-year-old offenders are not meaningfully distinguishable for sentencing purposes.
7 At present, defendant’s earliest release date for parole is February 6, 2047, when he would be
nearly 78 years old, and his maximum discharge date from his sentence is July 26, 2075,
approximately 28 years later when defendant is 106 years old, which almost certainly exceeds his
life expectancy. See Michigan Department of Corrections Offender Tracking Information System
<https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=194452> (accessed
December 11, 2025).

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Defendant was entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly accounted for the
individualized circumstances of defendant and the offenses, which included his “youth and its
attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors.” Eads, __ Mich App at __; slip op at 15.
See also Echols, __ Mich App at __; slip op at 8 (instructing the trial court to ensure its
resentencing of defendant was “in line with our state’s nonconstitutional principle of
proportionality[]” by considering the defendant’s “youth and its attendant characteristics at the
time of the offense as potentially mitigating—and not aggravating—factors.”).
Accordingly, defendant’s term-of-years sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his
second-degree murder and AWIM convictions are invalid for lack of proportionality and he is
entitled to resentencing.
IV. REDACTION OF TESTIMONY
Defendant argues that the redaction of the preliminary examination testimony of Anthony
Ridley, who was in the home and witnessed the victims being beaten, violated his right to present
a defense by depriving him of exculpatory evidence. We disagree.
A criminal defendant has a due-process right to present a defense under the state and federal
Constitutions. People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 198; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). However, a
defendant’s right to present evidence in his defense is not absolute. Unger, 278 Mich App at 250.
The defendant must still comply with procedural and evidentiary rules established to assure
fairness and reliability in the verdict. See People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 279; 364 NW2d 635
(1984). Further, a “defendant’s interest in presenting . . . evidence may thus bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 250 (cleaned up).
Ridley testified at defendant’s preliminary examination, but “disappeared” before
Cammons was arrested and did not testify at Cammons’s preliminary examination. Because
Ridley could not be located for trial, his prior testimony was read into the record. But his testimony
was redacted to protect Cammons’s right to confront the witnesses against him.8 Accordingly,
there was a legitimate reason for the redaction.
Defendant argues that the redaction of Ridley’s testimony deprived him of exculpatory
evidence because the redacted portions contradicted the only other eyewitness, i.e., Harold, who
testified that Cammons told defendant to “take them home . . . get rid of them.” Ridley testified
at defendant’s preliminary examination that after the beating at the drug house ended, Cammons
stated that defendant, the tall man, and the three victims were going to “get the guy who did the
breaking and entering and get the rest of the stolen property.” At trial, the jury heard that Ridley
heard a conversation indicating that defendant, the tall man, and the three victims were going to
“get the guy who did the breaking and entering and get the rest of the stolen property[.]” Although
the jury did not hear that Cammons was the source of these statements, this fact was immaterial.
8 Both the United States and the Michigan Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” People v Nunley, 491 Mich 686, 697; 821
NW2d 642 (2012), cert den 568 US 1029 (2012). See also US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1,
§ 20.

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The salient point was that defendant’s alleged intent when leaving the house was to search for a
thief and retrieve the stolen property, and this was conveyed to the jury by Ridley’s redacted
testimony. The redaction of Cammons’s identity as the source of the statements did not deprive
defendant of exculpatory evidence.
Defendant also asserts that the redacted portions Ridley’s testimony that Cammons did not
participate in the beatings would have undermined Harold’s testimony that Cammons did
participate in the beatings. Although Ridley’s testimony contradicted Harold’s testimony in this
regard, whether Cammons participated in the assault is not directly related to defendant’s
convictions, as defendant acknowledges.
Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions and thus
defendant cannot demonstrate that the redactions resulted in actual prejudice necessary to support
his motion for relief from judgment. See MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i)(A). Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment on the basis
of the admission of Ridley’s redacted preliminary examination testimony.
V. PROSECUTOR’S CONDUCT
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making various
comparisons to Nazis and Lebanese terrorists. Defendant also claims that the prosecutor injected
race into the matter by emphasizing that the victims were white, while their attackers were black.
The trial court rejected these arguments, finding that the prosecutor’s comments did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court
made a mistake.
Because defendant did not preserve the challenged statements by contemporaneous
objections and requests for curative instructions, our review is for plain error. Evans, 335 Mich
App at 88.9 “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1)
error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error
affected substantial rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To
satisfy the third element, the defendant must show that the error “affected the outcome of the lower
court proceedings.” Id. “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.”
Id. at 763-764 (cleaned up). “Further, we cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative
9 Defendant cites to a portion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument when trial counsel objected.
However, the objection was not on the basis of the prosecutor shifting the burden of proof,
denigrating the defense, or vouching. Instead, defendant asserted the prosecutor was exceeding
the scope of rebuttal argument by moving beyond a response to the arguments raised in defendant’s
closing argument. “An objection on one ground is not sufficient to preserve an issue on a different
ground.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 197; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). Additionally, there
is no dispute defendant never requested a curative instruction during his objection.

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instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312,
329-330; 662 NW2d 501 (2003).
“Generally, prosecutors are given great latitude regarding their arguments and are free to
argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as they relate to their theory of
the case.” People v Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 172; 911 NW2d 201 (2017) (cleaned up). But a
“defendant’s opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues
broader than the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63-64; 732
NW2d 546 (2007). “As with all forms of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court abhors the injection
of racial or ethnic remarks into any trial because it may arouse the prejudice of jurors against a
defendant and, hence, lead to a decision based on prejudice rather than on the guilt or innocence
of the accused.” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266; 531 NW2d 650 (1995). “Therefore, this
Court is not hesitant to reverse where potentially inflammatory references are intentionally
injected, with no apparent justification except to arouse prejudice.” Id. Ultimately, the question
is whether the prosecutor’s remarks, when viewed in context, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Id. at 266-267
During closing argument, Cammons’s attorney argued that Cammons never directed that
anyone be killed, but only told defendant and the other man to “take them home.” Defendant
contends that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument impermissibly addressed Cammons’s attorney’s
argument by comparing defendants’ actions to that of the Nazis in World War II and Lebanese
terrorists. We disagree. The challenged remarks, viewed in context, were part of a permissible
argument that was responsive to Cammons’s counsel’s assertion that Cammons was “not
criminally responsible” for conspiring to kill the victims. Codefendant’s theory was that because
Cammons merely instructed defendant and another man to “take them home,” i.e., he did not
instruct them to kill the victims, he had no responsibility for their deaths. In contrast, the
prosecution’s theory was that Cammons’s instruction to “take them home” was coded language
for directions to kill the victim. To illustrate this theory, the prosecutor referred to two historical
events when euphemisms were used for orders to kill. The prosecutor described how, during Nazi
Germany’s perpetration of the Holocaust, German guards lured Jews into gas chambers by telling
them that “it was time for showers,” and discussed a news report that described how Lebanese
kidnappers of Syrian hostages used the term “liberated” as a euphemism for “killed.” The
prosecutor then analogized these examples with the euphemism for killing used in this case, and
also argued that criminals may use “euphemisms for killing” to keep their victims calm and
cooperative. The prosecutor did not compare Cammons or defendant to Nazis or Lebanese
terrorists, or equate their crimes with those of either of these groups. Although the prosecutor
could have used less colorful terms and chosen less egregious examples, a prosecutor “need not
speak in the blandest of all possible terms” when arguing the case. People v Blevins, 314 Mich
App 339, 355; 886 NW2d 456 (2016) (cleaned up). We cannot conclude that defendant’s right to
a fair trial was violated.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor impermissibly injected race into the trial by
emphasizing that the victims were white and the defendants were black in order to arouse prejudice
during a “racially-tense era.” We disagree. The prosecutor’s questions during trial and statements
during closing argument do not show an intention to inject race into the trial and were not improper.
See Bahoda, 448 Mich at 266.

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Even if the prosecutor’s challenged remarks could be considered improper, the trial court’s
instructions were sufficient to dispel any possible prejudice arising from the prosecutor’s remarks
and to protect defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 281. The trial court instructed the jury that the
lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence, that the jury was to decide the matter solely
on the admitted evidence, that “sympathy and prejudice should not enter [the jury’s] decision,”
and that the jury was to follow the court’s instructions. Jurors are presumed to have followed their
instructions, People v Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 13; 798 NW2d 738 (2011), and defendant has not
provided any basis for concluding that the jurors failed to do so in this case.
Because this issue was raised in a motion for relief from judgment, defendant must show
actual prejudice. MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b). The evidence against defendant was overwhelming, and
the jury was instructed to decide the matter solely on the evidence presented and that arguments
were not evidence. Defendant cannot demonstrate that the alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct resulted in actual prejudice necessary to support his motion for relief from judgment.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment on the basis of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of
Ridley’s redacted preliminary examination testimony and to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
He further asserts that his first appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in his direct
appeal all of the claims asserted in the motion for relief from judgment. We disagree.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Yeager, 511 Mich at 488, citing Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const
Am VI; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” Yeager, 511 Mich
at 488 (cleaned up). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d
752 (2018) (cleaned up). We will not find trial counsel to be ineffective where an objection would
have been meritless or futile. Id.
In moving for relief from judgment, “[t]he requirement of ‘good cause’ can be established
by proving ineffective assistance of counsel.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 631. As discussed, there
was a legitimate interest to redact Ridley’s preliminary hearing testimony and the redaction did
not deny defendant the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. Further, defendant did not
establish that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to
object to the redactions or the prosecutor’s remarks was not objectively unreasonable. See Head,
323 Mich App at 539. And appellate counsel’s failure to raise these futile arguments on direct
appeal was not objectively unreasonable. Id. Further, it would have been impossible for
defendant’s current sentencing issue to be raised in his direct appeal because his appeal occurred
well before Miller and its progeny were decided. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

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discretion by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment on the basis that defendant was
denied the effective assistance of counsel.
VII. CONCLUSION
We find no error warranting reversal of defendant’s convictions. But Miller and its
progeny have rendered defendant’s term-of-years sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for
his second-degree murder and AWIM convictions invalid under the principle of proportionality in
our state’s sentencing jurisprudence. The trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We vacate defendant’s sentences for
second-degree murder and AWIM, and remand for resentencing. At resentencing, the trial court
shall consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics at the time that he committed the
offense as mitigating factors. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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