COA 374826 PEOPLE OF MI V LATRON ANTHONY WHITFIELD JR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2026
9:28 AM
v No. 374826
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LATRON ANTHONY WHITFIELD, JR., LC No. 2024-000997-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and RIORDAN and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Latron Anthony Whitfield, Jr. appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of
carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227. Defendant was sentenced to serve one day
in jail. Defendant now challenges the trial court’s decision to decline to include M Crim JI 11.10
in its instructions to the jury. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2024, Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety Officer Bradley Spieldenner
was conducting a nighttime patrol. During his patrol, Officer Spieldenner observed defendant and
noticed that the front pocket of defendant’s hooded sweatshirt was unusually heavy and pulled
tightly across his body. Officer Spieldenner apparently knew defendant from previous interactions
and asked dispatch to find out whether defendant had a concealed pistol license (CPL). Dispatch
informed Officer Spieldenner that defendant did not have a valid CPL.1 Officer Spieldenner
decided to approach defendant because of these observations and the response from dispatch.
When he approached defendant, Officer Spieldenner asked defendant if he was carrying a gun.
Defendant indicated that he was. Officer Spieldenner then handcuffed defendant and retrieved a
pistol from the front pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. At some point during this interaction,
1 The trial court overruled defendant’s hearsay objection to this testimony but instructed the jury
to “just receive it for the purpose of why the officer behaved the way he did, not for the truth of
what was relayed to him.”

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defendant told Officer Spieldenner that he had a CPL. Officer Spieldenner informed defendant
that he did not have a valid CPL, and defendant was then arrested and charged with CCW.
Officer Spieldenner was the only trial witness. He testified that defendant told him that he
had a CPL and that defendant did not know that it had expired. On cross-examination, defense
counsel asked whether Officer Spieldenner was aware of any other documentation regarding
defendant’s CPL status, to which Officer Spieldenner responded that he had received faxed
documentation in the form of a “LEIN return” that defendant’s CPL had expired in 2021. This
testimony was allowed in its entirety.
Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing, in relevant part, that there was no
evidence that he did not have a valid CPL. The trial court disagreed. It reasoned that defendant
had the burden to present some evidence that he had a valid CPL, and because defendant had not
satisfied this burden, the prosecution had no obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant lacked a valid CPL. The trial court thus denied the motion for a directed verdict.
Defendant then asked the trial court to include M Crim JI 11.10 in its instructions to the
jury. M Crim JI 11.10 provides, in relevant part, that a person with a valid CPL is exempted from
the prohibition of CCW. The trial court concluded that defendant had not satisfied his burden of
showing that he was licensed. The trial court reasoned that defendant’s assertion to Officer
Spieldenner about having a CPL “does not rise to the level where it shifts the burden back to the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he lacked a license.” The trial court added
that “had Mr. Whitfield presented any other evidence to support that, we may be having a different
conversation.”
As stated, the jury convicted defendant of CCW, and defendant was sentenced to serve one
day in jail. This appeal now follows.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Officer Spieldenner’s testimony that defendant thought that he had
a valid CPL was sufficient to satisfy the burden required for the trial court to include
M Crim JI 11.10 in its instructions to the jury. We disagree.
We review claims of instructional error involving questions of law de novo. People v
Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 702; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole
and “must include all elements of the crime charged and must not exclude consideration of material
issues, defenses, and theories for which there is supporting evidence.” People v Kurr, 253 Mich
App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002). The trial court’s determination whether a jury instruction
applies to the facts of a case is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dupree, 486 Mich at 702. “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34; 832 NW2d 409
(2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, defendant was convicted of CCW under MCL 750.227(2), which states:
A person shall not carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person, or,
whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by the person,

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except in his or her dwelling house, place of business, or on other land possessed
by the person, without a license to carry the pistol as provided by law and if
licensed, shall not carry the pistol in a place or manner inconsistent with any
restriction upon such license.
MCL 750.231a(1)(a) provides an exception to MCL 750.227(2) and states as follows:
(1) Subsection (2) of section 227 does not apply to any of the following:
(a) To a person holding a valid license to carry a pistol concealed upon his
or her person issued by his or her state of residence except where the pistol is carried
in nonconformance with a restriction appearing on the license.
M Crim JI 11.10 is the jury instruction that is provided when “some evidence relating to
the license exemption was admitted at trial.” Use Note, M Crim JI 11.10. The instruction states:
“This law [MCL 750.227(2)] does not apply to anyone who has a valid license to carry a concealed
pistol . . . . The prosecutor has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant . . . did not have a license . . . .” M Crim JI 11.10.
This instruction is, essentially, an affirmative-defense instruction because it is used to
instruct the jury when a defendant raises the defense against a CCW charge that he or she had a
valid CPL. See MCL 750.231a(1)(a); M Crim JI 11.10. See also People v Pegenau, 447 Mich
278, 289; 523 NW2d 325 (1994). Indeed, our Supreme Court has explained, when discussing a
previous version of MCL 750.227, that “[t]he language in the statute ‘without a license to so carry
said pistol as provided by law’ does not add an element to the crime, but simply acknowledges that
a person may be authorized so to carry a pistol.” People v Henderson, 391 Mich 612, 616; 218
NW2d 2 (1974).
A trial court is not required to automatically provide an affirmative-defense instruction
when a defendant requests it. People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 644; 975 NW2d 896 (2022).
Instead, “the defendant has the burden of producing some evidence from which the jury can
conclude the essential elements of the defense are present.” Id. (cleaned up). Similarly,
M Crim JI 11.10 follows this general rule because the Use Note to the instruction it states that
“[t]his instruction is to be given when the trial court determines that some evidence relating to the
license exemption was admitted at trial.”
Henderson is cited in the Use Note for M Crim JI 11.10. In Henderson, our Supreme Court
stated that once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case for the violation of MCL 750.227,
i.e., that the defendant was carrying a pistol, “the defendant has the burden of injecting the issue
of license by offering some proof—not necessarily by official record—that he has been so
licensed.” Henderson, 391 Mich at 616. Thereafter, the burden shifts back to the prosecution “to
establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, after the prosecution in this case produced evidence
that defendant knowingly carried a concealed pistol on his person, defendant then bore the burden
to present “some evidence” that he had a valid CPL. Use Note, M Crim JI 11.10. See also Leffew,
508 Mich at 644. Henderson, however, did not expound on what would suffice as “some
evidence,” yet fall short of an official record. Our Supreme Court later interpreted Henderson as

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holding “that the defendant bore the burden of producing evidence regarding licensure . . . .”
People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 638; 703 NW2d 448 (2005). In other words, “the defendant bore
the burden of producing or going forward with evidence that he was licensed . . . .” Id. But in
Perkins, the defendant produced no evidence to satisfy his burden, id. at 640, 2 so the Court again
did not shed light on what evidence would be satisfactory.
A similar situation to the present case occurred in People v Combs, 160 Mich App 666;
408 NW2d 420 (1987). In Combs, the defendant told the officer that he had a license to carry the
revolver on his person, and he testified at trial that he thought that his license had not yet expired
at the time. Id. at 672-673. This Court followed Henderson and determined that these statements
were not sufficient to shift the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not have a valid license. Id. at 673. “Since defendant did not sustain his burden
of showing that he was in fact properly licensed to carry the weapon, . . . no further proofs were
required of the prosecution to sustain defendant’s conviction.” Id.
Further, in a case involving the defendant’s burden to prove the affirmative defense that he
had a valid prescription for purposes of MCL 333.7403(1), the defendant similarly argued that “the
police officers’ testimony recounting his assertion that he had a prescription satisfied his burden
of production.” Pegenau, 447 Mich at 294. Pegenau recognized that MCL 333.7403(1) was
analogous to the CCW statute and relied, in significant part, on the burden discussion in
Henderson. Id. at 290-292. The Court noted that MCL 333.7531 did “not define the quantum of
evidence required to meet defendant’s burden. However, defining the evidentiary threshold is
clearly within the power of this Court.” Id. at 294. The Court further explained that, although
“paper documentation is not always required, more than defendant’s own assertion is required.”
Id. at 296. Yet, the Court also clarified that a defendant’s own testimony “may be enough to meet
his burden” if, for example, he provides specific details about when and where he received a
prescription. Id. at 298 n 20. Nevertheless, in that case, the Court determined that the officer’s
testimony, presented as the prosecution’s witness, that the defendant had told the officer that he
had a valid prescription was “insufficient to meet defendant’s burden of proof . . . .” Id. at 294.3
In the present case, defendant’s reliance on Officer Spieldenner’s testimony recounting his
assertion that he thought that he had valid CPL is significantly similar to the assertions relied on
2 Perkins addressed the respective burdens in a prosecution under MCL 750.224f, which sets forth
restrictions concerning the possession of firearms by persons having been convicted of a felony.
Relying on MCL 776.20 and Henderson, the Court concluded that “the defendant has the burden
of producing evidence to establish that his or her right to possess a firearm has been restored.” Id.
at 628.
3 Further, in the self-defense context, which employs a similar burden-shifting scheme, see Dupree,
486 Mich at 709-710, this Court has indicated that the defendant must introduce some evidence
beyond a bare assertion of self-defense to satisfy his initial burden. See Guajardo, 300 Mich App
at 41 (“After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no evidence that would
have allowed a jury to find that defendant’s criminal possession of the rifle was justified by an
honest and reasonable belief that it was necessary for him to use deadly force to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm to himself or to another.”).

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in Combs and Pegenau. Therefore, as the respective assertions in those cases were deemed
insufficient, see Combs, 160 Mich App at 673; Pegenau, 447 Mich at 294, we conclude that
defendant here likewise has failed to satisfy his burden of production that would support his
entitlement to an instruction under M Crim JI 11.10. That is, defendant has failed to produce or
come forward with anything more than a mere assertion at the time of arrest that he had a valid
CPL. This is insufficient to shift the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant did not have a valid CPL. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its
discretion by declining to provide M Crim JI 11.10 to the jury. See Dupree, 486 Mich at 702.
Defendant briefly suggests that the trial court’s denial of his request to include
M Crim JI 11.10 in its jury instructions violated his due-process right to present a defense. We
disagree. We review de novo “the constitutional question whether a defendant was denied her
constitutional right to present a defense.” Kurr, 253 Mich App at 327. “Instructional errors that
directly affect a defendant’s theory of defense can infringe a defendant’s due process right to
present a defense.” Id. at 326-327. However, in the present case, there was no instructional error.
And, because there was no error, defendant’s due-process right to present a defense was not
violated.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err or otherwise abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury
on M Crim JI 11.10. We affirm.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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