COA 378274 IN RE TEB Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2026
8:50 AM
In re TEB.
No. 378274
Lenawee Probate Court
LC No. 16-049751-MI
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order for continuing involuntary mental-health
treatment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent’s history of court-ordered involuntary mental health treatment commenced in
June 2016, with his initial hospitalization for schizophrenia. He has subsequently received
diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder. Since June 2016, three separate orders
for involuntary mental health treatment have been entered against respondent. The most recent
order prior to the events giving rise to the present appeal was entered on January 14, 2025. 1
On June 23, 2025, the court liaison for Havenwyck Hospital petitioned for a subsequent
order for involuntary mental health treatment. Respondent had been transferred to Havenwyck
Hospital from jail following an altercation with his mother. During his admission, respondent
exhibited threatening and agitated behavior, demanded immediate discharge, and demonstrated
limited insight into his condition. He persistently refused prescribed medication, asserting its
1 Respondent has appealed two of these orders. Both of these appeals were found moot by this
Court. In re TEB, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 27, 2025
(Docket No. 372913) (TEB I), and In re TEB, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued January 22, 2026 (Docket No. 374573) (TEB II).

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ineffectiveness and expressing a preference for holistic interventions. The probate court granted
the petition and entered a second order for involuntary mental health treatment.
Due to respondent’s repeated noncompliance with the foregoing order, a case manager with
Lenawee Community Mental Health Authority (LCMHA) subsequently filed a petition seeking a
continuing order for involuntary mental health treatment for a one-year term. At the hearing on
this petition, respondent conceded the necessity of treatment but requested that a review hearing
be scheduled to monitor his progress. The probate court issued an order for continuing involuntary
mental health treatment and declined to schedule a review hearing until respondent had consulted
with his medical providers and demonstrated that such a hearing was warranted. Respondent now
appeals from this order.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not
know the petition was for one year of treatment, trial counsel did not meet with respondent before
the hearing, and trial counsel did not schedule a review hearing. A respondent’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is preserved if the respondent moves for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing in the probate court or moves to remand in this Court. In re LT, 342 Mich App
126, 133; 992 NW2d 903 (2022). Because respondent failed to move for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing in the probate court and did not move in this Court for remand, this issue is
unpreserved. Id.
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a “mixed question of law and fact; this
Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact and reviews de novo questions of
constitutional law.” In re Londowski, 340 Mich App 495, 516; 986 NW2d 659 (2022). “A probate
court’s finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to support the finding.” In re
Portus, 325 Mich App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Because no evidentiary hearing was held, this Court’s review is for errors apparent on the record.
Londowski, 340 Mich App at 516.
Proceedings seeking involuntary mental-health treatment are also referred to as civil
commitment proceedings. Portus, 325 Mich App at 382. “[D]ue process requires that an
individual subject to a petition in a civil commitment proceeding has a right to the effective
assistance of an attorney.” Londowski, 340 Mich App at 515. The metric for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings is the same as in criminal
proceedings. Id. at 515. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the respondent
must demonstrate “that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d
136 (2012). A reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the result of the trial.
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). The respondent
must identify specific actions by their counsel that constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 690.
Counsel is presumed to be effective. Id. The respondent bears the burden of proving any
deficiency of counsel. People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018).

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Counsel is given wide discretion in matters of strategy, and it is presumed that counsel’s
actions are based on a sound strategy. Strickland, 466 US at 689-690. This Court should not
“substitute [its] judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will we use the benefit
of hindsight when assessing counsel’s competence.” People v Loew, 340 Mich App 100, 120; 985
NW2d 255 (2022) (alteration in original; citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d 514 Mich
158 (2024). Strategic decisions of counsel still must be objectively reasonable. Trakhtenberg,
493 Mich at 52. “The Michigan Supreme Court has held that civil commitment statutes must be
strictly complied with.” In re Jestila, 345 Mich App 353, 358; 5 NW3d 362 (2023).
Respondent contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance
on the ground that respondent allegedly did not comprehend that the petition for continuing
mental-health treatment sought a one-year commitment. In support, respondent has appended a
declaration to his appellate brief. However, it is well settled that a party may not unilaterally
expand the appellate record with documents not presented to the lower court. See Magley v M &
W Inc, 325 Mich App 307, 322 n 8; 926 NW2d 1 (2018). Notably, respondent has neither sought
nor obtained leave to supplement the record pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(4). Accordingly, this
Court will not consider the proffered declaration.
Upon a thorough review of the lower court record, there is no indication that respondent
was unaware that the petition for continuing mental-health treatment sought a one-year term. The
record unequivocally reflects that respondent was personally served with a copy of the petition,
which expressly recited the one-year duration in two distinct locations. Although respondent
asserts on appeal that confusion may have arisen due to the purported existence of two separate
petitions for continuing treatment, the record contains only a single petition. As a general
principle, “the appellant bears the burden of furnishing the reviewing court with a record that
verifies the basis of any argument on which reversal or other claim for appellate relief is
predicated.” Kilian v TCF Nat’l Bank, 343 Mich App 621, 638; 997 NW2d 745 (2022) (cleaned
up). There is no evidence in the record of a petition lacking the one-year term; thus, respondent
fails to establish a factual predicate for his argument. Id. Furthermore, respondent affirmatively
stated on the record that he agreed to a treatment order. There is no evidence that trial counsel
failed to explain the one-year nature of the petition or that respondent lacked understanding
regarding the length of the treatment order. In sum, the absence of any record evidence precludes
a finding of error warranting relief for this unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Londowski, 340 Mich App at 516. Accordingly, respondent has not met his burden to establish
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Head, 323 Mich App at 539.
Respondent further asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
consult in person with respondent at least 24 hours prior to the hearing on the petition for
continuing mental-health treatment, as required by MCL 330.1454(7). The statutory scheme
mandates that, following such consultation, counsel must file a certification with the probate court
confirming compliance. See MCL 330.1454(9); Jestila, 345 Mich App at 358. The record does
not reflect that counsel met with respondent the requisite 24 hours before the hearing, nor does it
contain the statutorily mandated certification. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates that counsel
did, in fact, meet with respondent prior to the hearing and was fully apprised of respondent’s
preferences, including his consent to treatment and his concerns regarding medication side
effects—positions that were consistent with respondent’s own testimony. Given that counsel

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competently communicated respondent’s wishes to the court, there is no reasonable probability
that the outcome would have differed had the certification been timely filed. While counsel’s
omission in failing to file the certification falls below an objective standard of reasonableness,
respondent has failed to establish the requisite prejudice necessary to sustain a claim of ineffective
assistance. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52.
Respondent also contends that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to
schedule a review hearing within 30 to 45 days after entry of the continuing mental-health
treatment order. However, respondent does not cite any legal authority imposing an affirmative
duty on trial counsel to schedule such a hearing. As this Court has repeatedly cautioned, “an
appellant may not merely announce its position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize
the basis for its claims.” Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 220; 761
NW2d 293 (2008). Accordingly, this argument is deemed abandoned for failure to properly brief
the issue. Id.
In the alternative, respondent requests a remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). A Ginther hearing is warranted only
when a party has demonstrated an issue for which further factual development would materially
advance a claim of ineffective assistance. See People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 369; 770
NW2d 68 (2009). Such a request must be supported by an affidavit or offer of proof delineating
the facts to be established at the hearing. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a). Here, respondent’s appellate
declaration merely reiterates arguments previously advanced in his briefing—namely, that he did
not agree to a one-year treatment order and that counsel failed to schedule a review hearing. These
assertions do not raise new factual disputes nor do they suggest that additional development would
further respondent’s claim. Chapo, 283 Mich App at 369. Moreover, as a matter of law, an order
for involuntary mental-health treatment does not require respondent’s consent. MCL 330.1400(f).
There is nothing in the record suggesting that a review hearing was appropriate or that the probate
court would have granted such a request, particularly in light of respondent’s documented
noncompliance with medication and treatment. The probate court expressly instructed respondent
to consult with his medical providers regarding possible changes to his treatment regimen. For
these reasons, a remand for a Ginther hearing is unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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