COA 372778 IN RE CLARK MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2026
3:07 PM
In re CLARK, Minors.
Nos. 372778; 373304
Missaukee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-010999-NA
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals1 arise from child protective proceedings that culminated in the
termination of respondent’s parental rights to the minor children, CJC and CLC.2 In Docket
No. 372778, respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order of adjudication taking jurisdiction
over respondent’s minor children. In Docket No. 373304, respondent appeals by right the court’s
order terminating his parental rights to the children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act
caused abuse or injury), (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent),
(k)(iii) (parent battered, tortured, or caused serious physical abuse), and (k)(iv) (loss or serious
impairment to organ or limb). We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner, Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), initiated this case
after receiving a complaint related to burns suffered by CJC on November 15, 2023, while he was
in respondent’s care. According to the petition filed the next day, the Department alleged that CJC
received third-degree hot liquid burns on 10% of his body after respondent submerged CJC’s legs
1 In re Clark Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 9, 2025 (Docket
Nos. 372778 and 373304).
2 CJC and CLC were born in 2020 and 2018, respectively.

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in hot water. As a result of the burns, CJC was required to be hospitalized for weeks and undergo
months of surgeries and therapy.
Respondent claimed that at 2:30 a.m. on November 15, 2023, he woke up to a loud thud
and heard CJC crying. Because both CJC and CLC are nonverbal children—CJC was diagnosed
with autism—CJC could not explain to respondent what had happened. Respondent stated that he
found CJC in the upstairs bathroom, the water faucet on the sink was turned on, and water was
overflowing from the sink. Respondent also stated that after he began cleaning the bathroom, he
noticed that the water in the sink was very hot and went to check on CJC, whom respondent had
placed in his crib. It was at this point that respondent first said he noticed that CJC had burns on
his legs. Respondent also noticed a burn on CJC’s thumb and buttock. Respondent took CJC and
CLC to the hospital, where he met with the children’s mother, with whom respondent shared joint
custody.
On the basis of the symmetry of the burns and the clear demarcation between the burned
and nonburned skin on CJC’s legs, medical professionals at the hospital did not believe
respondent’s version of events and diagnosed the burns as nonaccidental. In addition to the
investigation by Children’s Protective Services, respondent was charged with second-degree child
abuse, MCL 750.136b(3), and later pleaded no contest to third-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(5), leading to his incarceration.
After a two-day adjudication trial during which the jury concluded that the court had
jurisdiction over the children, and a one-day dispositional hearing, the trial court terminated
respondent’s parental rights to the children. These appeals followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“The trial court’s decision that a ground for termination of parental rights has been proved
by clear and convincing evidence is reviewed for clear error.” In re Pops, 315 Mich App 590,
593; 890 NW2d 902 (2016). The Court also reviews for clear error the trial court’s determination
that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children, In re White, 303 Mich
App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), and the trial court’s findings regarding reasonable efforts
toward reunification. In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 43; 919 NW2d 427 (2018). “A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the
witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “This Court gives
deference to a trial court’s special opportunity to judge the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses who appear before it.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 710; 859 NW2d
208 (2014).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it terminated his parental
rights because the trial court did not order that the Department offer services toward reunification
or make findings of aggravated circumstances such that the services were not required to be
offered. We disagree.

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Under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), the petitioner must make reasonable efforts to reunify the
child and family in all cases except when, as applicable here, there “is a judicial determination that
the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in . . . MCL 722.638.”
In relevant part, MCL 722.638 provides:
(1) The department shall submit a petition for authorization by the court
under [MCL 712A.2(b)], if 1 or more of the following apply:
(a) The department determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a
person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any length of time in the
child’s home, has abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse included
1 or more of the following:
* * *
(iii) Battering, torture, or other serious physical harm. [MCL
722.638(1)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).]
Thus, MCL 722.638(1)(a) plainly indicates that, if there is a finding relative to one child under the
statute, the Department does not need to offer services to a respondent for any other siblings of the
child.3
In the order of disposition, the trial court found that reasonable efforts toward reunification
were not required as a result of respondent’s conviction of third-degree child abuse. Respondent
does not make reference to this finding by the court in his argument, and there is no suggestion
from respondent that he was not convicted of third-degree child abuse4 as a result of his no-contest
plea.
The finding in the court’s order of disposition is clearly related to the allegations lodged
against respondent that he intentionally submerged CJC’s legs in a hot liquid such that CJC
received third-degree burns on approximately 10% of his body. The court specifically noted the
3 As this Court has previously stated, in the context of the aggravating circumstances delineated
by MCL 722.638(1)(a), “[p]etitioner . . . is not required to provide reunification services when
termination of parental rights is the agency’s goal.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 463; 781
NW2d 105 (2009); see also In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90-91; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).
4 Under MCL 750.136b(5):
A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree if any of the following
apply:
(a) The person knowingly or intentionally causes physical harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that under the
circumstances poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child, and the act
results in physical harm to a child.

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testimony of Dr. Timothy Burton and Dr. Corey Schmidt, offered by the Department, that CJC’s
burns were immersion burns that would be very difficult to self-inflict given the nature of the burns
and the pain that would be involved. The court stated that, according to the doctors’ testimony, it
also would have been very unlikely that CJC would have even been able to stand after the event,
which respondent claimed CJC was doing when respondent found him. In addition, the court did
not find respondent’s version of events to be credible, stating, “I find it hard to believe that a child
would intentionally submerse his legs and sit there while this burn occurred without pulling
away[,] causing . . . splash marks.” The court continued:
The only fact scenario that makes sense with these burns is that this child was
essentially either dunked or held in boiling water to cause a circumferential burn
without a ripple, without any splashes. And so, I think the doctor’s testimony is
extremely convincing when also coupled with the photographs that I’ve seen and
what the jury has seen as well as the photographs of the residence and the bathroom.
The court also specifically addressed the factors relevant under MCL 722.638, stating that
“[t]he battery, the torture, severe physical abuse, and as well—as well as loss and impairment have
occurred here.” According to the court, “[t]here has then been testimony for the loss of impairment
that we had third-degree burns but not only that but the emotional counseling that had to then occur
after that due to the fear of water.”
Respondent argues that, while the trial court discussed the seriousness of CJC’s injuries,
and respondent’s failure to seek prompt emergency medical care, it never connected those fact to
a formal finding of aggravating circumstances. While respondent is correct that, on the record, the
trial court did not specifically link its findings that respondent had physically abused the child to
its decision to not order reasonable efforts toward reunification, respondent does not offer this
Court any authority that such a specific statement on the record is required. “[W]here a party fails
to cite any supporting legal authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.” Berger v
Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 715; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Even if the issue was not abandoned,
this Court is not aware of any authority for respondent’s proposition. In the order of disposition,
the court stated that it was not ordering the Department to offer services toward reunification
because of respondent’s conviction of third-degree child abuse. The court also plainly made
findings that respondent intentionally caused serious harm to CJC and caused the loss or
impairment to one or more of his limbs. There also did not appear to be any confusion among trial
counsel that the Department was not offering services and that the court made findings relative to
the injuries suffered by the children. Thus, in this case, where the trial court made a determination
that respondent had subjected the child abuse consistent with MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii) (battering,
torture, or other serious physical harm), the trial court did not clearly err when it found that
reasonable efforts toward reunification were not required.
Next, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred because there was not clear and
convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination was established. We
disagree.
“ ‘If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be

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made.’ ” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 139, quoting MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court
terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(iii), and (k)(iv).
Those provisions state:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical
or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer
from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
the parent.
(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse
included 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(iii) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.
(iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.
Respondent accurately notes that the trial court relied on the testimony of Drs. Burton and
Schmidt when concluding that CJC’s burns were nonaccidental. According to respondent,
however, the testimony from the doctors was inconclusive as to the source of the burns and,
therefore, in light of his testimony that CJC’s burns were caused by accident, petitioner did not
present clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination had been met.
Contrary to respondent’s suggestion in his brief on appeal, neither Dr. Burton nor Dr.
Schmidt equivocated that the large burns on CJC’s legs were the result of an immersion injury that
was indicative of a “controlled event.” Dr. Burton testified that it was his opinion that CJC’s “feet
and legs were submerged in a hot liquid.” When asked whether the injury could be self-inflicted,
Dr. Burton responded that, “given the patient’s age and severity of the burns, I find it difficult to
imagine that this was self-inflicted.” Dr. Burton did admit however that he did not know “exactly

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what happened at the injury because I was not present.”5 Dr. Burton also testified that he was
unsure how the burns to CJC’s thumb and buttock occurred, but “if I were to guess, based on the
injury pattern, I would consider those two injuries splash injuries.” Dr. Burton stated that there
was “a lot of variability in splash patterns” and could only “tell grossly that that’s likely a splash
injury.”
Dr. Schmidt similarly testified that it was his opinion that the injuries to CJC were the result
of a “controlled event.” Dr. Schmidt explained:
I would expect at his age if he were to have his leg in water or a fluid hot enough
to cause those burns, it would be kind of an erratic event in which he would feel
pain, the leg would move around quite a bit and not—not really produce that clear
of a line across.
Dr. Schmidt also found it very unlikely that CJC would have been able to stand on his feet after
receiving the burns. Concerning the other burns on CJC’s body, Dr. Schmidt found it “a lot more
difficult to know a lot about what happened with those.” Dr. Schmidt diagnosed CJC’s injuries as
“pediatric physical abuse.”
Dr. Schmidt was not able to confidently diagnose the source of the burns on the thumb and
buttock, stating, “I cannot determine if those were inflicted or accidental.” He did opine, however,
that he would not expect to see injuries on the thumb and buttock from touching water that was
already on the floor:
So in general, if you fall onto the ground, you typically are going to use
your hands to help yourself get up. So, I would expect if there was hot water on a
carpet and you use your hands to either brace yourself when you fall or to use it to
then get back up, I would expect a lot more of a hand to be burned rather than just
the tip of one thumb. And then similarly, if you fell onto your backside, to sustain
just a pretty small burn on this one part of your upper buttock would be a little odd
to me.
For its part, the trial court disagreed with respondent’s argument that the medical doctors
were conflicted in their diagnosis of the source of CJC’s burns. The court noted Dr. Burton’s
testimony that “this is an immersion burn, that it was caused by a hot liquid, that in his professional
opinion that given the age of the child, the severity of these burns, it would be extremely
difficult . . . for him to imagine that this could have been self-inflicted.” Similarly, referencing Dr.
Schmidt’s testimony, the court noted “his concern here and his conclusion also is non-accidental
and intentional burning and his following [sic] was because of the concern of the uniformity of the
burn, the degree of the burn, here being a third degree burn.” In contrast, the court stated that if
found respondent’s version of events “hard to believe.” The court explained:
5 Dr. Burton also testified that, of the more than 500 people he treated for burn injuries, he was not
present when any of their injuries occurred, yet he was able to diagnose and treat those injuries.

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So, if we believe the father’s version this child would have been splashing around
in the sink it would have burned himself potentially that way. Would have burned
himself by maybe placing his feet into the sink and or splashing around on the water
that’s all over the floor. The splashing around in the water all over the floor is
completely not even plausible at all with what the doctors testify could have
occurred here.
Thus, contrary to respondent’s argument on appeal, neither Dr. Burton nor Dr. Schmidt
equivocated as to the source of the third-degree burns on CJC. Both opined that it would have
been very unlikely for CJC to have inflicted such a serious wound on himself given the time it
would have taken to reach a third-degree burn. While neither doctor could precisely diagnose the
burns on the other parts of CJC’s body, neither doctor believed those injuries were inconsistent
with respondent intentionally causing the burns. Moreover, the trial court was entitled to judge
the credibility of the various witnesses and to conclude that it did not believe respondent’s version
of events. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 227; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) (stating that the Court
“must defer to the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In his statement of the issues presented, respondent also argues that the trial court clearly
erred because there was not sufficient evidence that respondent was the perpetrator of the injuries.
Respondent does not develop this argument in his brief on appeal and has, therefore, abandoned
the argument. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). But even if not
abandoned, the argument lacks merit. Respondent was the only adult at home with the children
on the night of November 15, 2023. Taking as true the assertion that CJC’s injuries were
nonaccidental, the only adult that could have inflicted the injuries was respondent. See In re Ellis,
294 Mich App 30, 35-36; 817 NW2d 111 (2011) (holding that “termination of parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (j), and (k)(iii) is permissible even in the absence of definitive
evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator when the evidence does show that the respondent
or respondents must have either caused or failed to prevent the child’s injuries.”).
Lastly, respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination
was in the children’s best interests because the court did not conduct a bonding assessment with
the children and overly relied on the fact of respondent’s incarceration as a justification for
termination. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must “find[] by a preponderance of the evidence
that termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App
426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). All available evidence should be weighed by the trial court,
which should consider factors such as “ ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting
ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home
over the parent’s home.’ ” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713, quoting In re Olive/Metts Minors,
297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In addition, “[t]he trial court may also consider
a parent’s history of domestic violence . . . .” In re White, 303 Mich App at 714.
As an initial matter, respondent does not cite any authority for the proposition that a
bonding assessment is necessary in any circumstance. Indeed, we are unaware of any published

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case or statute in which the issue of bonding assessments is addressed. Thus, the issue has been
abandoned. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 715.
Even if not abandoned, however, the trial court did not clearly err when it denied
respondent’s motion for a bonding assessment and found that the children’s best interests were
served through termination in the absence of such an assessment. For purposes of its best-interest
analysis, the court presumed that respondent and his children shared a bond. Even in light of the
bond between respondent and his children, the trial court determined that termination was in their
best interests.6
Concerning the issue of incarceration, we find respondent’s reliance upon In re Mason,
486 Mich 142, 146; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), to be distinguished. In that case, the Michigan
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court affirming the trial court’s decision to terminate
the respondent’s parental rights based upon his incarceration. While the respondent was
incarcerated for drunk driving, the Department began termination proceedings with respect to the
mother after the children were found “wandering” unsupervised. Id. at 147. “The removal petition
filed by the [Department] also accused respondent of neglect, citing his criminal history and
alleging that he has failed to provide for the children physically, emotionally and financially.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
As a result of his incarceration, the respondent was not included in various hearings and
was not informed of his right to participate by telephone. Id. at 148. During the termination
hearing, the respondent was faulted “because he had not personally cared for the children for at
least the past two years” and because “his incarceration precluded him from taking advantage of
services offered by the [Department].” Id. at 151.
Reversing the decision of the trial court to terminate the respondent’s parental rights, the
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he state’s failures in this case (which are all too common in this type of case)
appear to stem primarily from the fact of respondent’s incarceration. Not only did
the state fail to properly include him in the proceedings, but the circuit court’s
ultimate decision in the case was replete with clear factual errors and errors of law
that essentially resulted in the termination of respondent’s parental rights solely
because of his incarceration. The mere present inability to personally care for one’s
children as a result of incarceration does not constitute grounds for termination.
[Id. at 160.]
In this case, on appeal, respondent contends that the trial court violated the spirit of In re
Mason when it remarked that the children had not seen their father in over a year as a result of his
6 We also note that, in order to conduct a bonding assessment, the children would have had to go
to respondent’s place of incarceration and that the court did not want to subject the children to
such a traumatic event. But, as noted above, the court ultimately presumed that the children and
respondent shared a bond. As a result, we cannot find that the court erred by not nonetheless
ordering a bonding assessment to take place at respondent’s place of incarceration.

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incarceration. This argument, however, grossly oversimplifies the trial court’s ruling, which spans
almost 16 pages of the transcript. The court spent considerable time discussing the children’s need
for permanence and stability and only briefly discussed the fact of respondent’s incarceration,
stating:
I think it’s time that we make it free and clear that the father could [sic: cannot]
come back into their lives. They could be yanked out from their current stable
environment which appears and seems to be going extremely well. And that is what
they’ve known for the past year in their very young life. And as [the guardian ad
litem] pointed out that is what they are going to know for their next two years of
their life before dad is even able to have contact per his probation order.
Thus, it is clear that the court did not base its decision that the children’s best interests were served
by termination on the fact that respondent was incarcerated, but rather on the fact that the children
would spend at least three years without contact with their father as result of his no-contest plea
for child abuse. In the court’s view, the children’s need for permanence and finality dictated that
three years was too long of a period of time to have uncertainty in their future.
Moreover, unlike in Mason, where the Department did not present any evidence that the
respondent harmed his children, the court in this case was permitted—to the extent it did—to
consider respondent’s criminal conviction as a basis for termination. As the Court noted in Mason,
termination solely because of a parent’s past violence or crime is justified only
under certain enumerated circumstances, including when the parent created an
unreasonable risk of serious abuse or death of a child, if the parent was convicted
of felony assault resulting in the injury of one of his own children, or if the parent
committed murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter of one of his own
children. [Id. at 165.]
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it considered the fact of respondent’s
incarceration when determining whether it was in the children’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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